

CONFIDENTIAL  
UK COMMS ONLY  
FM RIYADH  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 1180  
OF 150625Z

**ADVANCE COPY**

*R. Jil  
R*

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD  
INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, CAIRO, AMMAN, MOSCOW, DAMASCUS, SANA'A  
INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING, RABAT, JHQ HIGH WYCOMBE, PARIS, ACTOR,  
INFO IMMEDIATE TUNIS, ROME  
SAVING HQBFME

SIC AAA/I9M

IRAQ/KUWAIT: VISIT OF DEFENCE SECRETARY, 13 - 14 NOVEMBER

SUMMARY

1. A BUSY AND PRODUCTIVE TWO DAYS IN SAUDI ARABIA, MEETING KING FAHD, PRINCE SULTAN, PRINCE SAUD, PRINCE TURKI (HEAD OF GID) THE GOVERNOR OF TABUK AND US AND SAUDI C-IN-C'S. SAUDI READINESS TO FACE MILITARY ACTION EVIDENT, PREFERABLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSEMENT OF A DEADLINE. WELCOME FOR REINFORCEMENT. DOUBT THAT SADDAM WILL BE PERSUADED TO WITHDRAW. CONFIDENT THAT EGYPTIANS AND ALSO SYRIANS WOULD DO THEIR MILITARY BIT, AND THAT CHINESE (RECENTLY HERE) HAVE NO TIME FOR SADDAM. NO QUESTION OF ANOTHER ARAB SUMMIT. ANGER OVER YEMEN AND SUDAN, BUT KING FAHD INSISTENT KING HUSSEIN MUST SURVIVE, JUST POSSIBLE A DOOR OPENING HERE.

2. SEVERAL MILITARY ADMINISTRATION POINTS WERE CLEARED UP. ENCOURAGING NEW DEFENCE SALES IN PROSPECT OUTSIDE AL YAMAMAH. IMPRESSIVE CROSS DESERT TRAINING EXERCISE BY 7TH ARMoured BRIGADE. NIGHT VISIT TO GRI TORNADO AT TABUK. GOOD MEDIA COVERAGE.

DETAIL

3. MR KING'S VISIT COMING JUST AFTER THAT OF BAKER, GAVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR TIMELY DISCUSSIONS ON BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS. KING FAHD AND PRINCE SULTAN PUT THEMSELVES OUT TO WELCOME THE DEFENCE SECRETARY.. BOTH PRINCE SAUD AND PRINCE TURKI (HEAD OF GENERAL INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT)

PARTICIPATED IN TALKS (AND PRINCE SAUD HAD A SEPARATE MEETING WITH MYSELF AND YOUNG (MED)). A COHORT OF AL SAUD WERE BIDDEN TO PRINCE SULTAN'S LUNCH IN MR KING'S HONOUR IN JEDDAH. DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN REPORTED SEPARATELY. MR KING ALSO HELD TALKS ON MILITARY OUTLOOK WITH GEN SCHWARZKOPF AND WITH GEN PRINCE KHALID IN RIYADH AND VISITED HQBFME. HE SAW 7TH ARMOURED BRIGADE NEAR JUBAIL ON A RIGOROUS CROSS DESERT EXERCISE INVOLVING OBSTACLE CLEARING, WHERE HE ALSO GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE, TO EMPHASISE WE MEANT WHAT WE WERE SAYING ABOUT A MILITARY OPTION IF SADDAM DID NOT SOON WITHDRAW. THE BASE AREA AT JUBAIL AND THE GRI TORNADO SQUADRON AT TABUK WERE VISITED. THESE VISITS GAVE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO FRONT-LINE SOLDIERS AND AIRMEN ABOUT THE TASK THEY MIGHT SOON FACE.

4. THE MAIN MESSAGES TO COME ACROSS WERE CLEAR:

A) REAFFIRMATION OF OUR MUTUAL RESOLVE TO FACE UP TO HOSTILITIES IF NEED BE. SADDAM SEEN AS LIKELY TO PLAY FOR TIME RATHER THAN WITHDRAW. MR KING SUGGESTED SANCTIONS MIGHT BE STARTING TO TAKE EFFECT ON IRAQI PUBLIC.

B) AN ASSURANCE FROM SAUD THAT BOTH EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS WOULD JOIN IN HOSTILITIES.

C) A STRONG SAUDI PREFERENCE FOR UNSC ENDORSEMENT OF THE MILITARY OPTION, WITH A DEADLINE, AND SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. MR KING SUGGESTED WE NEED NOT BE TOO SPECIFIC ON A TIME LIMIT.

D) A WELCOME FOR US REINFORCEMENT AND FOR A BRITISH CONTRIBUTION, DESPITE THE TIME THIS COULD TAKE TO ASSEMBLE. RAMADAN'S ONSET WOULD COMPLICATE HOSTILITIES.

E) AN ENCOURAGING READ OUT ON THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER'S SECOND VISIT HERE THIS WEEK, WITH NO SIGN OF CHINESE INTEREST IN SAVING SADDAM'S FACE. QIAN EVIDENTLY SPELT OUT TO AN UNEASY SADDAM THE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES OF HANGING ON IN KUWAIT (US AMBASSADOR, A CHINA HAND, HAS SAME ACCOUNT OF QIAN'S TOUGH TALK IN BAGHDAD FROM OUR CHINESE COLLEAGUE).

F) UNDIMINISHED ANGER OVER YEMEN AND ARAFAT, BUT INSISTENCE THAT KING HUSSEIN MUST NOT FALL. CONTACT SO FAR WITH KING HUSSEIN HAS BEEN INDIRECT AND UNPROMISING, BUT SAUDI INTEREST (EXPRESSED BY PRINCE TURKI) IN OMANI EFFORTS TO SET UP A DIRECT JORDANIAN APPROACH.

G) REJECTION OF ANOTHER ARAB SUMMIT (NOW CONFIRMED PUBLICLY BY SAUD).

H) NO SIGN OF CONCERN THAT SADDAM MIGHT PROVOKE ISRAEL. BUT KING FAHD WARNED THAT YEMEN OR JORDAN MIGHT TRY TO ATTACH SAUDI ARABIA IN SUPPORT OF IRAQ (PERHAPS WE SHOULD UNDERTAKE AN ASSESSMENT, AND STEP UP THE MESSAGE IN JORDAN THAT SADDAM IS BOUND TO LOSE).

I) EMPHASIS ON NEED TO DISMANTLE IRAQ CBW CAPABILITY EITHER DURING HOSTILITIES OR POST WITHDRAWAL.

J) RELUCTANCE TO RELEASE SAUDI COMMAND OF KUWAITI UNITS AND REFUSAL TO BRIGADE KUWAITI CHIEFTAINS WITH 7TH ARMOURED BRIGADE.

K) ON THE MILITARY SIDE IT WAS IMPRESSIVE TO SEE 7TH ARMOURED BRIGADE SO QUICK OFF THE TRAINING AND FIRING MARK (AHEAD OF THE AMERICANS). MR KING OBTAINED SAUDI CLEARANCE FOR A CONTRIBUTION TO OUR IN COUNTRY COSTS ON SAME BASIS AS AMERICANS: A BRITISH FORCES BROADCASTING WAVELENGTH: AND AGREEMENT TO FRESH FIRING RANGE FACILITIES.

L) PRINCE TURKI TOLD ME HE LIKE THE MEDIA MATERIAL WE HAD SHOWN HIM AIMED AGAINST IRAQI MORALE. WE HAD TO FIND WAYS TO GET ITS IMPACT OVER TO THE MILITARY IN IRAQ WHO HELD THE KEY TO CHANGE. BUT NO CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE IRAQI POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WAS YET PERCEPTIBLE.

MUNRO

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

36

ADVANCE 36

IRAQ/KUWAIT  
PS  
PS/MR HOGG  
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

HD/SED  
HD/UND  
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY  
MR APPEYARD CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)

PAGE 3

CONFIDENTIAL UK COMMS ONLY

PS/PUS  
MR FAIRWEATHER  
MR SLATER  
MR GORE-BOOTH  
MR GOULDEN  
MR JAY  
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)  
HD/MED  
HD/AMD  
HD/CONSULAR D  
HD/ECD(E)  
HD/NAD  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/NENAD  
HD/NPDD  
HD/SECPOL D

MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST  
CABINET OFFICE DIO  
(BY TUBE H29)  
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE  
AUS (C) MODUK  
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK  
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND  
MR WICKS HMT  
EMERGENCY UNIT (PASSED)

NNNN