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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 June 1979

*Brief  
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file*

Dear Bryan,

*A. A.  
Bry  
15/6*

Prime Minister's Lunch for King Hussein:  
18 June

As requested in your letter of 7 June, I enclose briefs on Arab/Israel and Jordan: Bilateral Questions for the Prime Minister's lunch with King Hussein on 18 June, together with personality notes on the King, Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf and Sharif Zeid bin Shaker.

Yours ever

P Lever

B G Cartledge Esq  
10 Downing Street

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## PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR KING HUSSEIN, 18 JUNE

## LINE TO TAKE

Arab/Israel

1. Understand Jordan's misgivings about the Camp David agree-  
ments and the difficulty for the King of taking part in negotiations  
without adequate assurances on Israeli withdrawal.
2. But the Egypt/Israel Treaty is a fact and we should see what  
can be built on it. Autonomy negotiations should be given a chance.  
Jordan should not discourage West Bank inhabitants from playing a  
part in them, if they see opportunities to improve their position.
3. Israel's expansion of settlements is losing her sympathy with  
US opinion. Signs of growing doubts in Israel too. Arabs should  
exploit this feeling by coming forward with constructive and  
plausible proposals of their own.
4. In particular they should urge the PLO to be realistic and commit  
themselves to acceptance of Israel's right to exist side by side with  
a land for the Palestinians.
5. Look to Jordan to work closely with Saudi Arabia to find positive  
ways to influence President Sadat and eventually to re-establish a  
dialogue.
6. Britain ready in principle to explore ways to get negotiations  
back into multilateral channels if autonomy negotiations founder.



## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The King is likely to concentrate on setting out Jordan's position and the reasons why Jordan and most other Arab countries cannot endorse the Camp David agreements. The King's basic fear is that by endorsing autonomy as an interim solution for the West Bank, the American commitment to secure eventual Israeli withdrawal has been irretrievably weakened, that limited autonomy for the Arab population will lead to eventual assertion by Israel of sovereignty over the West Bank and that in particular East Jerusalem will remain under Israeli control. His fears have been strengthened by the continuing expansion of Israeli settlements and reiteration of Israel's claims to sovereignty over the West Bank since the Camp David agreements were signed.

2. The King's attitude to the Camp David agreements has gone through several phases. Although placed in a very delicate position vis-a-vis other Arab governments by the role ascribed to Jordan in the agreements without any consultation with him, he did not initially condemn them. But his growing conviction that the only outcome would be a bilateral peace which would leave the position on the West Bank unaffected, reinforced by pressures from his radical neighbours particularly Syria and Iraq, led him at the autumn Arab summit in Baghdad to outright rejection of the Camp David agreements and a leading role in rallying Arab opposition to them. He also began to restore Jordan's links with the PLO. Relations with the US deteriorated sharply: the King accused the US Administration of bringing unfair pressure on him to join negotiations. More recently some slight softening of his views can be detected. There have been hints that Jordan will not



discourage West Bankers who wish to be associated with the autonomy negotiations. The King seems resigned to giving the negotiations a chance before proceeding with alternative proposals. But his basic scepticism remains unchanged.

3. It would be useful to find out rather more of the King's thinking on alternative ways forward. He has in the past talked of a return of negotiations to the Security Council or to a Geneva Conference but realises that neither is practical for the time being.

4. The King attaches particular importance to the question of settlements. He was distressed that HMG abstained on a Security Council resolution condemning settlements in March. His other main concern is the status of Jerusalem. His position on the ultimate status of the West Bank is ambiguous. He has conceded that only the PLO can negotiate on the future of the West Bank and has accepted the right of the Palestinians to an independent state.

But an outcome by which the inhabitants of the West Bank freely chose the option of federation or confederation with Jordan would be acceptable to him.

5. The King's internal position is reasonably secure despite the inherent tensions between the Palestinians and the East Bankers. He sees Arab unity as an important prop to his own position. Reconciliation with the PLO has caused some concern in the army: the King is likely to move slowly. Although there have been some signs of Islamic revival they do not seem to constitute a threat to the regime.



## PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR KING HUSSEIN, 18 JUNE

## JORDAN: BILATERAL QUESTIONS

Line to takeTanks

1. Confirm HMG ready to enter negotiations for the supply of 274 Shir I tanks, if satisfactory terms can be agreed. But no commitment at this stage to supply more. Prefer to avoid publicity.

RB 211

2. We hope Jordan will choose Rolls Royce engines for the Alia fleet. Rolls Royce prepared to establish an overhaul and repair facility in Jordan.

3. RB 211 now a candidate for Airbus. Would Alia be interested in this combination?

Medical Scholarships (defensive)

4. Britain ready in principle to help. Looking at ways and means. Understand Queen Noor discussed it with British Council in Amman recently.



## ESSENTIAL FACTS

Tanks

1. The Defence Secretary will have informed the King that HMG is ready to proceed with negotiations with him over the supply of 274 Shir I tanks, but will wish to consider the outcome of negotiations on the terms before the sale is completed. We should prefer to avoid publicity while the negotiations are in progress.
2. The King may press for a commitment to supply a further 325, enabling him to re-equip both of Jordan's armoured divisions. This would represent a major increase in Jordan's armed strength with implications for the military balance in the area, and would need further consideration.

RB 211

3. Alia, the Royal Jordanian Airline, needs up to five new aircraft, with a possible option on four more. Alia, Saudia, Gulf and other Middle East airlines have recently agreed to try to standardise their purchasing policy. The Alia order would influence the sale of at least another twenty, and perhaps as many as sixty aircraft.
4. The Rolls Royce RB 211 engine is a strong contender to power several of the available aircraft: it could be fitted to the Lockheed Tristar, Boeing 747, or the Airbus. An order for 25 Tristars or Boeings with RB 211 would be worth about £170 million to Rolls Royce. For commercial reasons Rolls Royce appear to be pressing Tristar, as the likely winner, although sales of RB 211/Airbus would make it easier for them to justify the cost of certifying the engine on a significant number of Airbuses. Rolls Royce have proposed to Alia that a workshop be established in Jordan to overhaul the engines. The Vice-Chairman of Rolls Royce hopes to discuss the prospects with King Hussein in London.



5. From HMG's point of view, sales of RB 211/Airbus would provide the biggest balance of payments advantage. We also need to be careful, vis-a-vis our Airbus partners, in pushing the sale of an American aircraft against Airbus.

Medical Scholarships

6. Queen Noor has asked for our assistance in obtaining places on professional training courses in Britain for medical ancillary workers. We should like to help. But places are hard to find and few Jordanians have the right qualifications. The British Council are discussing Jordan's needs with relevant officials in Amman.

7. King Hussein commented to the then Prime Minister last year that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe offered much more assistance to Jordanian students than did Western Europe. We have not been able to find a radical solution to this problem (eg on a Community-wide basis). We subsequently increased from 46 to 65 the number of British Council and ODA scholarships Britain could offer annually to suitable candidates from Jordan.



JORDAN: VITAL STATISTICS

1. UK trade with Jordan (£m)

	1976	1977	1978
Imports (% change over previous year)	0.9 (+28)	2.0 (+122)	6.2 (+310)
Exports (% change over previous year)	56.0 (+51)	49.0 (-12)	68.0 (+38)

Britain is Jordan's fourth largest supplier after USA, Japan, FRG

2. UK aid to Jordan (£m)

	1977/8	1978/9
Capital aid	4	4
Technical cooperation	1	1
aid and trade contingency fund	4	5

Most of Jordan's aid comes from Arab states, the UN and USA (see 3)

3. Jordan's trade statistics (US\$m)

	1978 (estimated)
Exports fob	310
Imports cif	1502
Remittances (250,000 Jordanians in the Gulf)	457
Aid	393
of which Arab governments	278
UN Agencies	56
USA	52
Others	7

Exchange rate: 1 Dinar = \$3.27 = £1.6

4. Economy (GNP in US \$ at 1978 current prices)

Labour force	:	382,800
Unemployed	:	2%
GNP total	:	\$2.33 bn.
GNP per capita	:	\$1,165
GNP growth rate	:	8%
Gross fixed investment	:	31% of GNP

% shares of GDP:		
services		62.1
industry and mining		20.2
agriculture		10.5
construction		7.2

rate of wage increase:	17.5%	(1977; weighted average)
increase of Cost of Living index	7.0%	(1978)

5. Demography

Area	:	92,700 km <sup>2</sup>
Population	:	2,000,000; 43% urban
Population growth rate	:	3.2% pa
Infant mortality rate	:	97 per 1000
Resident British community	:	800





HUSSEIN BIN TALAL, HM KING

King of Jordan since 11 August 1952

Born Amman 1935. Educated Bishops School Amman, Victoria College, Alexandria, Harrow; Shortened course at Sandhurst 1952/53. He was present when his grandfather, the Amir Abdullah, was assassinated in Jerusalem in 1952. He himself has survived unscathed many attempts on his life. Acceded to the throne in the following year on the deposition of his father, Talal.

In his early years King Hussein was often regarded as something of a playboy but with the passage of time he has acquired a formidable skill in steering his small country through the treacherous currents of Middle East war and politics. He now appears to be wholly serious and dedicated in his efforts to preserve the Hashemite Kingdom and to protect the interests of his people, both East Bank Jordanians and the Palestinians. Allied to a measure of luck, he has shown the ability to take sensible decisions in times of crises.

At the Rabat Conference in October 1974 King Hussein recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and implicitly, therefore, renounced his claim to the West Bank.

Nevertheless, moved as he is by a belief in the historic mission of the Hashemites, King Hussein has not in reality abandoned his belief that his family will have an important role to play with regard to the West Bank if there is ever to be an Arab/Israel settlement.

By natural inclination, as well as a result of a conscious assessment of the best interests of the Hashemites, King Hussein has always been strongly pro-Western. He has faltered in this general alignment only for brief periods, eg when reacting against the political tutelage of General Glubb, in his frustration over the catastrophic results of the 6-day war for Jordan, or when faced in 1976 with initial Western reluctance to supply Jordan with a suitable air defence system.

Despite the King's increasingly mature political judgement born of long experience, he remains essentially practical and non-intellectual in his approach to his country's problems. To his warm friendliness he adds an undoubted courage without which he could have hardly survived in the face of military defeat, the frequent hostility of his Arab neighbours and the resentment of his Palestinian subjects.



ABDUL HAMID SHARAF, SHARIF

Head of the Royal Diwan

Born Baghdad 1939, younger brother of Sharif Fawwaz Sharaf. His father was Regent of Iraq briefly in 1940 following the pro-Nazi "Golden Square" coup. Studied Philosophy and International Relations at AUB. Joined the MFA 1962. Director-General of the Hashemite Broadcasting Service 1963. Assistant Head of the Royal Diwan 1964. Minister of Information 1965-7. Ambassador in Washington 1967-71. Jordanian Permanent Representative at the United Nations 1971-76.

He made a considerable impression in Washington, where he was the youngest Arab Ambassador. At the UN he gained wide respect, both in the Arab group, and outside, for his intelligent, moderate, and often courageous, presentation of his Government's case. Described as outstanding among Arab Ambassadors in New York, and is one of Jordan's most able diplomats. He was brought back to succeed Mudar Badran (qv) as Head of the Diwan in 1976.

His diplomatic experience has resulted in his playing a much more significant role in the conduct of foreign affairs than his predecessor did as Head of the Diwan or does now as Prime Minister; particularly now that Zeid Rifai is (if only temporarily) hors-de-combat, Sharaf has become one the King's closest and most trusted advisers and confidants.



ZEID BIN SHAKER, SHARIF, LIEUTENANT GENERAL

Commander-in-Chief, Jordan Armed Forces since January 1976

Born Amman 4th September 1935, son of the Amir Shaker who migrated to Jordan with the late King Abdullah. Educated at Victoria College Alexandria, and Sandhurst in 1954/55. Appointed ADC to the King after the dismissal of Glubb Pasha.

He is firmly established at the head of the Armed Forces where he has been either ACOS Operations, Chief of Staff or CINC since 1970. He mixes very little with the officers and soldiers and is therefore not well known by them. In the absence of any obvious successor he is likely to remain in his present position for some years yet. He is competent and has been responsible for many of the improvements in the Armed Forces since holding the top three posts in the Army.

He is goodlooking, ambitious, socially polished, and close to the King. He has considerable private means. He and his wife speak excellent English. He lives in a large and luxurious villa, paid for by the King, on the exclusive and heavily-guarded Hummar ridge outside Amman. His son, Shaker (b. 1961) entered a Preparatory school at Seaford in 1972, and is now at Eastbourne College. He has a daughter Nesrine (b. 1959) who was at school in England and is now at Santa Clara University, USA.



Jordan

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

cc Miss Hemen  
Mrs Goodchild

London SW1A 2AH

SW  
12/6

11 June, 1979

Dear Bryan,

The Prime Minister's Lunch for King Hussein, 18 June

Thank you for your letter of 7 June on this subject.

I confirm that the Lord Privy Seal, Mr Hurd and Mr John Moberly will be able to attend the Prime Minister's lunch on 18 June. I understand that the Secretary of State for Defence will attend as well. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, who will be in Paris that day for an EEC Political Cooperation meeting, will be unable to be present. He will, however, call on the King at 11.00 am on Friday 15 June.

I understand that the Prime Minister has now agreed that King Hussein should be accompanied by the Jordanian Ambassador and by two advisers. They will be Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, the King's principal foreign affairs adviser, and Sharif Zeid bin Shaker, the Commander in Chief of the Jordanian Armed Forces. We have explained to the Jordanian Ambassador the reasons which make it impossible to arrange a lunch at which Queen Noor could also be present.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Roger Facer in the Ministry of Defence.

Yours etc

Paul

Paul Lever  
(Private Secretary)

B Cartledge Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London S W 1



Jordan  
c.c. Mrs. Goodchild

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 June 1979

1) B/F 11-6-79  
2) 15-6-79

THE PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR KING HUSSEIN, 18 JUNE

I have been told by the Department, and now by the Jordanian Ambassador as well, that Queen Noor will be in London with King Hussein during his forthcoming private visit. I have informed the Prime Minister of this, but she wishes, in view of her very heavy commitments during the period of the King's visit and the consequent difficulty of arranging both a session of talks with him and a "social" lunch which Queen Noor could attend, to maintain her original intention to offer the King a working lunch for a small number of guests.

The Prime Minister hopes that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary (or, if he is away from London, the Lord Privy Seal), the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Hurd, and Mr. John Moberly will be able to attend. She assumes that King Hussein will be accompanied by the Jordanian Ambassador, and there will be room for one other Jordanian guest if the King is to be accompanied on his visit by, for example, his Minister of Court or another adviser. I should be grateful if you would confirm as soon as possible that the UK invitees will be able to attend.

It would be helpful if briefing for the Prime Minister's discussion with King Hussein could reach me not later than noon on Friday, 15 June.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Roger Facer in the Ministry of Defence.

E. G. CARTLEDGE

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE LUNCHEON TO BE GIVEN BY THE  
PRIME MINISTER IN HONOUR OF HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN I OF  
THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN ON MONDAY, 18 JUNE 1979  
AT 1.00 PM FOR 1.15 PM

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The Prime Minister

His Majesty King Hussein I of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

His Excellency the Jordanian Ambassador

Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf

His Majesty's Principal Foreign  
Affairs Adviser

Sharif Zeid bin Shaker

Commander in Chief of the  
Jordanian Armed Forces

The Rt. Hon. Francis Pym, MP

The Rt. Hon. Sir Ian Gilmour, MP

The Hon. Douglas Hurd, MP

Mr. John Moberly

H.M. Ambassador, Amman

Mr. Bryan Cartledge

DRAFT SEATING PLAN FOR LUNCH ON MONDAY, 18 JUNE

Mr. Bryan Cartledge

The Hon. Douglas Hurd

Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf

HE The Jordanian  
Ambassador

THE PRIME MINISTER

The Rt. Hon. Francis Pym

HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN I

Sharif Zeid bin Shaker

The Rt. Hon. Sir Ian Gilmour

Mr. John Moberly

ENTRANCE