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*cc. Defence May 79  
Sale of SHIR tanks to  
Jordan*



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-930 7022

CONFIDENTIAL

20th September 1979

MO 26/9/19

*for Pym 20/9*

*Dear Michael,*

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE  
PRIME MINISTER

You told me this morning that the Prime Minister wished to take a more forthcoming line with King Hussein in respect of the possible sale of tanks to Jordan than was envisaged in the brief sent you by Paul Lever (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) under cover of his letter of 19th September. We have now secured a copy of Paul's letter; and I have consulted my Secretary of State.

Mr Pym strongly supports the Prime Minister's desire to be as positive as possible with King Hussein; and I attach a revised line to take which has been agreed between FCO and MOD officials accordingly. You will note that the Prime Minister is now being advised to express HMG's willingness to conclude a deal provided that we are not asked for further concessions on price, and to seek the King's agreement to further negotiations to re-arrange the proposed financial package in a form more acceptable to Jordan, and still acceptable to us in terms of the eventual financial return.

Mr Pym has asked me to add that in his view this is an important deal that could show substantial long term

/ profits ...

M O'D B Alexander Esq.,  
10 Downing Street

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profits. This sale presents the first opportunity for many years to get a commercial foothold in Jordan, with all the advantages that could give us, and while there remain a number of problems to be resolved, Mr Pym believes that we have the basis of a deal on the price and conditions under discussion.

Mr Pym would propose to speak in similar terms to the Jordanian Commander in Chief when the latter calls on him tomorrow morning; I should accordingly be most grateful for urgent advice on the outcome of the Prime Minister's discussion with King Hussein.

I am sending copies of this letter to Paul Lever (FCO); the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD, and to the Private Secretaries of the Secretaries of State for Industry and Employment; and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Your sincere  
Boris Norbury*

(B M NORBURY)

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KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER  
ON 20TH SEPTEMBER

Points to Make

Tanks

I assure you that we have every intention of concluding the sale of these 274 Shir I tanks to you.

However, this cannot be at the expense of the British taxpayer.

~~The concessions on price so far amount to £260m and there is no room for any more.~~

But, we stand ready to negotiate on the overall financial arrangements to make these more acceptable to you.

I hope you can agree that our people should now get together quickly to resolve these final details of the deal on this basis.

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Jordan



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-~~93XXXX~~ 218 2111/3

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MO 26/9/19

27th September 1979

*for Pmt 29/5*

*Dear Wilson,*

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 21st September recording the Lord Chancellor's comments on my Secretary of State's minute to the Prime Minister of 20th September.

I have shown Mr Pym your letter. He has asked me to let you know that, as regards the price for the tanks, this has been negotiated as the best that it has been possible to obtain in the face of stiff competition from America and Russia for the contract; it has in fact been possible to reduce our price by incorporating redundant material from the earlier contract repudiated by the Iranian Government. ECGD cover is being provided since Jordan is now considered a better risk than previously since funds are being made available to King Hussein by the Baghdad summit Arab States.

As to the potential use of the tanks, the Lord Chancellor will recall that when OD considered the sale the Committee did so in the light of an intelligence assessment that while the tanks would improve Arab

/ capability ...

W Arnold Esq.,  
Lord Chancellor's Office

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capability they could not do so to an extent to threaten Israel's superiority during the next five years. OD therefore concluded that the benefits of the sale outweighed the possible political objections to sale to a confrontation State.

I am sending copies of this letter to Michael Alexander (No 10), George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD and to the Secretaries of State for Industry and for Employment; and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,  
Brian Norbury*

(B M NORBURY)

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28 SEP 1979





FROM THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Jordan



HOUSE OF LORDS,  
SW1A 0PW

Your ref MO 26/9/19

21 September 1979

Dear Brian,

Lg. Pmt

King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister

The Lord Chancellor has seen your Secretary of State's minute to the Prime Minister of 20 September. He has commented as follows:-

"I hope the arrangements for payment will be adequate, as well for certainty as to price. I hope also that these tanks will not be used for a war against Israel".

Copies of this letter go to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD and to the Secretaries of State for Industry and Employment and to Sir John Hunt.

Your sincerely,


William Arnold

W ARNOLD

Brian Norbury Esq  
Private Secretary to the  
Secretary of State for Defence  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
London S W 1



25 SEP 1979





CONFIDENTIAL



of Defence: take of  
5402 tanks to Jordan may 79  
File Top  
Jordan

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 September 1979

Ken Binn,

King Hussein's Call on the Prime Minister

You wrote to me earlier today giving an amended line for the Prime Minister to use with King Hussein in respect of the possible sale of British tanks to Jordan.

The Prime Minister raised the question with King Hussein. I enclose a copy of the relevant extract from the record.

The Prime Minister was inclined to think that even the revised line contained in your letter displayed too much reluctance on our part. She has asked me to ensure that the Defence Secretary is aware of her wish that the deal should be concluded. She does not agree that the question of the application of cost escalation to down payments should be allowed to cause difficulties.

The Prime Minister also hopes that we will be able to respond favourably to the request made by the Jordanian Commander-in-Chief for assistance in training the Jordanian armed forces.

I am sending copies of this letter to Paul Lever (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

Sp

B.M. Norbury, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

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FM AMMAN 200835Z SEPT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 372 OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1979,  
INFO BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW  
YORK, WASHINGTON AND CG JERUSALEM.

MY TEL NO 358 (NOT TO JEDDA) : JORDAN/PLO

1. KING HUSSEIN LEFT AMMAN THIS MORNING FOR LONDON. HE IS STOPPING OFF IN SWITZERLAND FOR A FEW HOURS TO SEE KING KHALED. THE JORDANIANS LET IT BE KNOWN TWO DAYS AGO THAT THE SAUDIS (ALMOST 5 MONTHS LATE, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT OF COURSE MENTIONED IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT) HAD PAID THE SECOND INSTALMENT OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROMISED TO JORDAN AT BAGHDAD FOR 1979. AMOUNTING TO US DOLLARS 119 MILLION.
2. YASSER ARAFAT ARRIVED IN AMMAN YESTERDAY AFTERNOON FROM DAMASCUS, ACCOMPANIED BY ABU MAIZER AND YASSER ABED RABBO (BOTH MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PLO) FOR SEVERAL HOURS OF TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN. THE PRIME MINISTER, THE HEAD OF THE ROYALL COURT, GENERAL KHAMMASH AND THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF (ALL OF WHOM LEFT FOR LONDON THIS MORNING WITH THE KING) ATTENDED THE TALKS ON THE JORDANIAN SIDE.
3. THERE WAS NO OPPORTUNITY AT THE AIRPORT THIS MORNING TO FIND OUT FROM ANY OF THE PARTICIPANTS HOW THE TALKS HAD GONE. SIGNIFICANTLY, ON THIS OCCASION ARAFAT AND HIS PARTY WERE RECEIVED AT THE ROYAL PALACE IN AMMAN RATHER THAN AT THE MILITARY BASE AT MAFRAQ. TODAY'S JORDANIAN PRESS ECHOING THE LINE IN THE OFFICIAL STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE JORDAN NEWS AGENCY, CLAIMED THAT THE TALKS HAD BEEN COMPREHENSIVE AND WIDE-RANGING, AND HAD "REVIEWED MEANS OF STRENGTHENING JOINT ARAB ACTION AND CO-OPERATION ... IN THE LIGHT OF DECISIONS ADOPTED DURING PREVIOUS MEETINGS OF THE TWO SIDES". THE JORDANIAN OFFICIAL STATEMENT SAYS THE TWO SIDES AGREED ON THE PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND TO SETTING UP A "NATIONAL ENTITY" ON THEIR LAND BUT DID NOT REFER SPECIFICALLY TO A PALESTINIAN STATE.

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/4.



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4. KING HUSSEIN TOLD ME HOW MUCH HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS LONDON VISIT AND IN PARTICULAR TO SEEING THE PRIME MINISTER.

URWICK

FILES

NRNAD,

MED.

PCD

DEF. D.

ACDD.

MAED.

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PS.

PS/KPS

PS/MRHURD.

PS/PUS

SIR A. DUFF.

MR J.C. MOBERLY

MR PH MOBERLY

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ASSESSMENT STAFF  
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No. 10 DOWNING STREET



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P S TO P M NO 10 DOWNING ST

FM AMMAN 191035Z SEPT  
TO ROUTINE FCO  
TEL NO 369 OF 19 SEPTEMBER 1979,  
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK.

*Prime Minister*

*(2 lls)*

*And*

SAVING BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV,  
WASHINGTON AND CG JERUSALEM.

HEATH'S TELELETTER OF 7 SEPTEMBER TO JENNER (NOT TO ALL) :  
JORDANIAN ATTITUDE TO CAMP DAVID.

1. IN A MAJOR POLICY STATEMENT BEFORE THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL ON 17 SEPTEMBER ON THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER RE-ITERATED JORDANIAN REJECTION OF THE AGREEMENTS THEMSELVES AND SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HE CHARACTERISED AS AN OBSTACLE TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY HAD ENCOURAGED ISRAEL TO ATTACK SOUTH LEBANON AND TO ESTABLISH NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE ISRAELI DECISION TO ALLOW ISRAELI CITIZENS TO BUY LAND ON THE WEST BANK, IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, SHOWED THE AGREEMENTS WERE INTENDED TO SERVE ISRAEL'S EXPANSIONIST POLICIES RATHER THAN BEING A FIRST STEP TO A JUST SOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. HE SAID THAT KING HUSSEIN'S SPEECH TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 25 SEPTEMBER WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST BE CONDUCTED WITHIN A SOUND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AND WOULD RESTATE THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH A SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE BASED.

2. ANSWERING QUESTIONS AFTER HIS STATEMENT, BADRAN EXPLICITLY DENIED SUGGESTION THAT JORDAN MIGHT SEEK TO JOIN THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS AND THAT THE KING'S 1972 PROPOSAL FOR A UNITED ARAB KINGDOM COMPRISING BOTH BANKS OF THE JORDAN AND THE GAZA STRIP WAS ABOUT TO BE REVIVED.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON AND CG JERUSALEM.

URWICK

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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ADDITIONAL DISTN  
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 September 1979

*Prime Minister*

*Paul 19/9*

*Dear Michael,*

King Hussein's Call on the Prime Minister

King Hussein is to call on the Prime Minister at 6.00 pm on 20 September.

We have told the Jordanian Ambassador that we should prefer the meeting to be kept as small as possible, and that we hope the King would bring no more than one or, at most, two advisers with him. The Ambassador undertook to make this clear to the King; he will probably be accompanied by his principal Foreign Affairs Adviser, Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, and by the Ambassador, though it is just possible that one of the two places may be taken by the Jordanian Commander-in-Chief, Sherif Zeid bin Shaker. John Moberly, the Assistant Under Secretary who supervises Middle East Affairs in the FCO, will attend from here.

/ I enclose a brief and personality notes.

*Yours WEL*


*Paul*

Paul Lever  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street



179<sup>th</sup> SEP 1979



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KU KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER ON 20 SEPTEMBER

Points to Make

Tanks

1. Hope that negotiations for sale of 274 Shir I tanks can be satisfactorily concluded. MOD have made a number of concessions on price but cannot quote terms which will involve a loss on the deal.

/If raised\_7 No commitment at this stage to equip a second division.

Arab/Israel

2. How does King Hussein see the way forward? What chances of the PLO taking a more responsible and helpful position, eg. towards terrorism and recognition of Israel?

3. Alia Re-equipment

We hope that Alia will take up their option on Tristar aircraft equipped with the Rolls Royce RB211. Traffic rights are a question for the Department of Trade. Understand that negotiations on that point are to commence in October.





## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. King Hussein is in London from 20 - 23 September on his way to New York where he will address the United Nations General Assembly. He is accompanied by Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, his Foreign Affairs Adviser, by the Commander-in-Chief, Zeid bin Shaker, and by the Minister of Court, General Amer Khammash.

TANKS

2. The Defence Secretary informed King Hussein during his visit to London in June of HMG's readiness to proceed with negotiations for the supply of 274 Shir I tanks. The Head of Defence Sales visited Jordan twice in August for detailed negotiations. The Jordanian Commander-in-Chief is to call on Mr Pym on 21 September, and King Hussein has said that he hopes it will be possible to reach agreement on the sale during his visit to London. Broad agreement has been reached with the Jordanians on price (£820,000 per tank), on delivery, and on cost escalation (limited to 8% compound per annum). But a number of problems remain. The Jordanians argue strongly that cost escalation should not apply to down payments. The price of £820,000 has however been quoted on the assumption that it would apply and any change would involve the introduction of additional interim payments. On our own side, it seems likely that the cost of limiting cost escalation to 8% could involve a commitment of public funds in the region of £30 - 40 million. Mr Pym will be seeking his colleagues' approval for this, but a decision is unlikely to be made before the Commander-in-Chief returns to London on 27 September. If approval were not forthcoming MOD might have to revise the terms of their quotation with the consequent likelihood that negotiations will fail. We need to assure the King that the present negotiating problems are commercial. The Jordanians are also negotiating with the Americans for the supply of M60 tanks and have received offers for Russian T72 tanks. If the Shir purchase is concluded, Jordan may still buy a (smaller) number of M60 tanks from the United States.

/ ARAB/ISRAEL



ARAB/ISRAEL

3. Hussein, with the majority of other Arabs, is opposed to the Camp David agreements. He considers that the autonomy proposals perpetuate Israeli control and that once Israel and Egypt have normalised their relations the United States will lose interest in securing Israeli withdrawal from the 1967 occupied territories. This scepticism has been enhanced by continued Israeli expansion of settlements on the West Bank.

4. Since Camp David, Hussein has begun to restore Jordan's links with the PLO. Arafat has visited Jordan twice this year and met Hussein at the Non-Aligned Conference in Havana. Hussein has told HM Ambassador that he has the impression Arafat was now more willing to seek guidance and assistance from Jordan and has speculated about the possibility of the PLO and Jordan working out a joint proposal to break the present deadlock.

5. Negotiations based on the Camp David agreements are continuing and President Sadat visited Israel earlier this month. Sadat has opted for progress first on the bilateral Israel/Egypt items (particularly Israeli withdrawal from Sinai) and progress in the talks on Palestinian autonomy is very slow.

| This has only served to strengthen Arab, and Jordanian opposition  
| to the talks.

ALIA\_RE-EQUIPMENT

6. Alia, the Royal Jordanian airline needs up to five new aircraft with a possible option on four more. Alia, Saudi, Gulf and other Middle East airlines have recently agreed to try to standardise their purchasing policy. The Alia order could influence the sale of at least another twenty and perhaps as many as sixty aircraft in the Middle East as a whole.

7. The Jordanians have signed a Letter of Intent for the purchase of five Lockheed Tristar aircraft, equipped with RB211 engines. They have made this conditional on early agreement to improved landing rights for Alia at Heathrow Airport. A

/ Jordanian



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Jordanian official visited London for informal talks with the Department of Trade on this point in September and formal negotiations will begin in October. The Department of Trade hope to find an acceptable compromise but cannot be bound by commitments entered into by Lockheed to link aircraft purchases and landing rights.

MINISTERIAL VISITS

8. Lord Carrington may meet King Hussein in New York next week. Mr Hurd is to visit Jordan from 9 - 11 October.

Near East and North Africa Department  
19 September 1979

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## JORDAN: VITAL STATISTICS

### 1. UK Trade with Jordan (£m)

	1976	1977	1978
Imports (% change over previous year)	0.9 (+28)	2.0 (+122)	6.7 (+12)
Exports (% change over previous year)	56.0 (+51)	49.0 (-12)	68.0 (+33)

Britain is Jordan's fourth largest supplier after USA, Japan, FRG

### 2. UK aid to Jordan (£m)

	1977/8	1978/9
Capital aid	4	4
Technical cooperation	1	1
aid and trade contingency fund	4	5

Most of Jordan's aid comes from Arab states, the UN and USA (see 3)

### 3. Jordan's trade statistics (US\$m)

	1978 (estimated)
Exports fob	310
Imports cif	1502
Remittances (250,000 Jordanians in the Gulf)	457
Aid	393
of which Arab governments	278
UN Agencies	56
USA	52
Others	7

Exchange rate: 1 Dinar = \$3.27 = £1.6

### 4. Economy (GNP in US \$ at 1978 current prices)

Labour force	:	382,800
Unemployed	:	2%
GNP total	:	\$2.33 bn.
GNP per capita	:	\$1,165
GNP growth rate	:	8%
Gross fixed investment	:	31% of GNP
% shares of GDP:		

services	62.1
industry and mining	20.2
agriculture	10.5
construction	7.2

rate of wage increase: 17.5% (1977; weighted average)  
 increase of Cost of Living index 7.0% (1978)

### 5. Demography

Area	:	92,700 km <sup>2</sup>
Population	:	2,000,000; 43% urban
Population growth rate	:	3.2% pa
Infant mortality rate	:	97 per 1000
Resident British community	:	800



HUSSEIN BIN TALAL, HM KING

King of Jordan since 11 August 1952.

Born Amman 1935. Educated Bishops School, Amman, Victoria College, Alexandria, Harrow; shortened course at Sandhurst 1952/53. He was present when his grandfather, the Amir Abdullah, was assassinated in Jerusalem in 1952. He himself has survived unscathed many attempts on his life. Acceded to the throne in the following year on the deposition of his father, Talal, a schizophrenic. The major events of his reign have been: March 1956, dismissal of Glubb Pasha; 1956-58, a series of threats to his throne: Sulaiman Nabulsi's National Socialist Government, the Ali Abu Nuwar (qv) plot, and the overthrow and massacre of the Hashemites in Iraq; 1960, assassination of his Prime Minister, Hazza Majali; 1965, Prince Hassan proclaimed Crown Prince; 1963-7 period of considerable economic growth in Jordan; 1967, six-days war with Israel; 1970-1, civil war leading to the expulsion of the Fedayeen from Jordan; 1971, assassination of his Prime Minister, Wasfi al-Tell, in Cairo; 1972, announcement of plan for United Arab Kingdom (East and West Banks); 1973, October war with Israel; 1974, Rabat Conference ended King Hussein's isolation in the Arab world and opened the way for the establishment of his close personal understanding with President Asad. 1976, the Development Conference to launch Jordan's 5-year plan symbolised the recovery of the Hashemite Kingdom from the effects of the 6-days war and of the disorders which followed it.

In his early years King Hussein was often regarded as something of a playboy, but with the passage of time he has acquired a formidable skill in steering his small country through the treacherous currents of Middle East war and politics. He now appears to be wholly serious and dedicated in his efforts to preserve the Hashemite Kingdom and to protect the interests of his people, both East Bank Jordanians and the Palestinians. Allied to a measure of luck, he has shown the ability to take sensible decisions in times of crises.

At the Rabat Conference in October 1974 King Hussein recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and implicitly, therefore, renounced his claim to the West Bank. Nevertheless, moved as he is by a belief in the historic mission of the Hashemites, King Hussein has not in reality abandoned his belief that his family will have an important role to play with regard to the West Bank if there is ever to be an Arab/Israel settlement.

By natural inclination, as well as a result of a conscious assessment of the best interests of the Hashemites, King Hussein has always been strongly pro-Western. He has faltered in this general alignment only for brief periods, eg when reacting against the political tutelage of General Glubb, in his frustration over the catastrophic results of the 6-days war for Jordan, or when faced in 1976 with initial Western reluctance to supply Jordan with a suitable air defence system.

For most of his reign King Hussein has exercised a tight control over all major foreign and defence policy issues. He is less interested in economic questions and has devolved responsibility for planning in this field on Crown Prince Hassan. In pursuing his very personalised style of government King Hussein's biggest asset has been his very warm, friendly and outgoing personality. He has



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used this to good effect in maintaining by personal contact the loyalty of the Armed Forces, the supreme importance of which he has always recognised.

In relation to Israel King Hussein recognises the futility of extreme policies. His willingness to contemplate full peace with Israel is genuine but his freedom of manoeuvre has always been limited by the need to keep in step with his Arab neighbours and to take account of the views of the Palestinian half of Jordan's population, and by his dependence on the United States' continued economic and military assistance. In the light of the re-armament of Israel since 1973 he recognises how far the Arabs have to go before they have a credible military option but he is well aware that Jordan could be compelled by circumstances to enter a further Arab/Israel war.

Despite the King's increasingly mature political judgement born of long experience, he remains essentially practical and non-intellectual in his approach to his country's problems. To his warm friendliness he adds an undoubted courage without which he could have hardly survived in the face of military defeat, the frequent hostility of his Arab neighbours and the resentment of his Palestinian subjects.

In his personal life the tragic death in a helicopter crash in 1977 of his third wife, Queen Alia, affected him more deeply than any of the other disasters to which he has been exposed in his reign. His marriage (in June 1978) to his fourth wife, Noor (née Elizabeth, or Lisa) Halaby, is nevertheless to all appearances one of genuine affection. It may also help to provide a stable family life for the King's two young children by Alia. Despite complaints at the King's choice of another non-Arab, non-Muslim girl to marry, the marriage has not attracted the considerable public criticism aroused by the King's wedding to Princess Muna. Shortly before the marriage the King announced that Prince Ali, his infant son by Alia, would become next in the line of succession to Prince Hassan, cutting out any sons of the King's fourth marriage as well as his two sons by Muna (and presumably any sons born to the Crown Prince and Princess Sarvath, who have young daughters). By this means King Hussein sought to avoid later argument and to strengthen the Hashemite throne for the future by underlining its pure Arab character.

King Hussein has recently suffered on more than one occasion from slight heart trouble. Provided, however, that he continues to be able to avoid assassination attempts and accidents and that his health remains good, there seems no reason short of an all-out Arab/Israel war with all the uncertainties that this would bring, why he should not remain King of Jordan for some time to come. For the time being his neighbours, other than Iraq, and his financial backers are likely to conclude that their interests will continue to be best served by the maintenance of the Hashemite regime in Jordan and by King Hussein remaining at the head of it.



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ABDUL HAMID SHARAF, SHARIF

Head of the Royal Diwan.

Born Baghdad 1939, younger brother of Sharif Fawwaz Sharaf. His father was Regent of Iraq briefly in 1940 following the pro-Nazi "Golden Square" coup. Studied Philosophy and International Relations at AUB. Joined the MFA 1962. Director-General of the Hashemite Broadcasting Service 1963. Assistant Head of the Royal Diwan 1964. Minister of Information 1965-7. Ambassador in Washington 1967-71. Jordanian Permanent Representative at the United Nations 1971-1976.

He made a considerable impression in Washington, where he was the youngest Arab Ambassador. At the UN he gained wide respect, both in the Arab group and outside, for his intelligent, moderate, and often courageous, presentation of his Government's case. Described as outstanding among Arab Ambassadors in New York, and is one of Jordan's most able diplomats. He was brought back to succeed Mudar Badran (qv) as Head of the Diwan in 1976.

His diplomatic experience has resulted in his playing a much more significant role in the conduct of foreign affairs than his predecessor did as Head of the Diwan or does now as Prime Minister; particularly now that Zeid Rifai is (if only temporarily) hors-de-combat, Sharaf has become one of the King's closest and most trusted advisers and confidants.



10 ZEID BIN SHAKER, SHARIF, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL

Commander-in-Chief, Jordan Armed Forces since January 1976.

Born Amman 4th September 1935, son of the Amir Shaker who migrated to Jordan with the late King Abdullah. Educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, and Sandhurst in 1954/55. Appointed ADC to the King after the dismissal of Glubb Pasha. Involved in the 1957 plot; posted as Assistant Military Attaché to London in April 1957. Recalled and dismissed from the army November 1957. Reinstated as a Captain in 1960. Attended the Long Armour Course in the United States in 1962. As a Major in 1963 he commanded First Armoured Infantry Regiment and was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in the same appointment. In 1964 he attended the US Command and General Staff College and then took command of the important 60 Armoured Brigade. Given accelerated promotion to Colonel in November 1965 and appointed Military Assistant to the King. Acquitted himself well in the 1967 war. Promoted Brigadier July 1968 as Commander Royal Armoured Corps, and in late 1969 took command of 3 Armoured Division; as the 3rd was then Jordan's only Armoured Division this was a key appointment. He became unpopular with the Fedayeen, who suspected him of fomenting plots "to liquidate the revolution", and along with Sharif Nasser, was dismissed in June 1970. His eclipse did not last for long however, as in August 1970 he was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations) 1970-1972. He played a considerable part in the negotiations with the Fedayeen following the fighting in September 1970 and won grudging praise from some of them for his ability. Promoted to Major General in April 1971, appointed Chief of Staff, 5 March 1972, and promoted Lieutenant General in November 1974. Appointed Commander-in-Chief in January 1976.

Despite his chequered career and his lack of military field experience he is firmly established at the head of the Armed Forces where he has been either ACOS Operations, Chief of Staff or C-in-C since 1970. He mixes very little with the officers and soldiers and is therefore not well known by them. In February 1974, following the military disturbances at Zarqa, the discontented soldiery, whom he had let down, called for his replacement as Chief of Staff. At that time he was distrusted.

In the absence of any obvious successor he is likely to remain in his present position for some years yet. He is competent and has been responsible for many of the improvements in the Armed Forces since holding the top three posts in the Army.

He was married on 4 September 1957 to Miss Nawzad Sati who was at that time the niece of Dr Shawkat Sati, King Abdullah's doctor. Sharifa (Nawzad) Zeid is also the niece of Mr Iklil Sati (qv), a prominent Amman businessman and undeclared agent for Marconi.

He is goodlooking, ambitious, socially polished, and close to the King. He has considerable private means. He and his wife speak excellent English. He lives in a large and luxurious villa, paid for by the King, on the exclusive and heavily-guarded Hummar ridge outside Amman. His son, Shaker, (b. 1961) entered a Preparatory School at Seaford in 1972, and is now at Eastbourne College. He has a daughter Nesrine (b. 1959) who was at school in England and is now at Santa Clara University, USA.



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KHAMMASH, AMER, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL (RETD)

Court Minister since 1976.

Born 1924 at Salt of a family of Turkish origin previously settled in Nablus for many years. No formal education after the age of 18. An original member of the Arab Legion Artillery. ADC to several different Prime Ministers 1955-7; Commander, Royal Jordanian Artillery 1957-62; Director of Planning and Organisation, JAA 1962-5; Chief of Staff, promoted Major-General 1965; promoted Lt-General 1968; removed from his position when Sharif Nasser (qv) became Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces; Minister of Defence and Transport for a short period, after which he retired from public life, to re-emerge in 1972 as King Hussein's Special Adviser on Gulf affairs. He also held a watching brief for the King on purchase and sales of military equipment.

Although Khammash has described himself as "only a simple soldier", he is in fact one of the best brains in Jordan, well able to handle a complex of military, economic, commercial, technological, political and diplomatic problems. In the period 1967-9 he was one of the three key men upon whom the security of the King and of Jordan depended. His recent job involved him in frequent visits, as the King's personal emissary, to Oman, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, where he handled such subjects as Jordanian military assistance to the Gulf States and since his appointment as Court Minister, he has continued to undertake such missions, as well as fulfilling the other tasks that go with the job. He favours continued Jordanian alignment with the West, and has a deep personal affinity for Britain, though he does not allow this to cloud his view of where Jordan's best interests lie.

In conversation he prefers the light touch even when seriously discussing important subjects, though he has little time for people not properly informed on the details of the subject under discussion. He has no hobbies outside his work, though he is an avid newspaper reader. Speaks excellent English. Married. Two sons and one daughter, of whom the elder boy (expelled from Wellington) and the daughter are being educated in the UK.



## CONFIDENTIAL

51 IZZIDDIN, IBRAHIM

Ambassador to London.

Born 1934, Amman. A graduate of the American University of Beirut (BA Political Science). A career civil servant, he has filled a remarkably wide variety of posts in the public service, in the Ministry of Communications, the Prime Minister's office, the Department of Press and Publications, the Press Section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alia, the then Ministry of Culture and Information, and the Royal Hashemite Diwan (Court) where he was Press Secretary to the King. Has served as Ambassador in Berne and Bonn before his present posting. He had a very good reputation with the Germans in Bonn and expresses the intention of keeping actively in touch with the FCO and more widely with moulders of opinion in London.

Married, but with no children. He is regarded as intelligent, honest and straightforward. His wife comes from a rich Circassian family. They are both friendly and enjoy Western social life. Reputedly keen on sports.



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 September 1979

*F.S. Pmt - 24/9*

*Dear Michael,*

King Hussein of Jordan

King Hussein of Jordan is making a short private visit to London from 20-23 September. He will be accompanied by one or two close advisers and the Jordanian Commander-in-Chief. The King is on his way to the United Nations General Assembly. While they are here, the Commander-in-Chief is to continue negotiations with the Secretary of State for Defence for the purchase of 274 Shir tanks, as agreed by OD. There are some continuing difficulties over price on which, we understand, the Defence Secretary will shortly consult his colleagues, but a sale looks very probable.

Lord Carrington will be seeing King Hussein himself in New York. He believes, however, that it would be useful if the Prime Minister were to offer to see the King briefly, perhaps over tea, on 20 or 21 September. Although the King was here and saw the Prime Minister as recently as June, it would be helpful if the Prime Minister could take this further opportunity to assure the King of our readiness to supply the tanks he wants if the price can be agreed. Moreover, the Middle East issue is bound to figure largely at the United Nations during the Autumn and an exchange of views with King Hussein at this stage could prove most valuable. His central position among the moderate Arab states, who are nevertheless opposed to the Egypt/Israel negotiations, makes his views of particular importance.

If the Prime Minister agrees to see King Hussein, Lord Carrington suggests that it might be preferable to do so on this occasion informally and without too many officials present. King Hussein would probably wish to bring with him his principal foreign affairs adviser, Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, and perhaps the Commander-in-Chief, Sherif Zeid Bin Shaker. Numbers on our side could be comparably limited.

*Yours* *GEN*

*Paul*

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

19 SEP 1979

