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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 June 1980

MS  
Mr Moberly will be in attendance.

Dear Michael,

King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister  
on 24 June

King Hussein is calling on the Prime Minister at 9.15 am  
/ on 24 June. I attach a brief.

We do not yet know who will be with the King. But the  
Jordanian Prime Minister, Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, is  
expected to be coming home with him from Washington and may  
well accompany him on this call.

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London

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KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER AT 9.15 AM ON 24 JUNE

Points to Make

Arab/Israel

1. Glad that Jordan has welcomed European statement. Intended to be a balanced contribution, which will be followed up with contacts through Presidency. Jordan very important port of call.
2. Disappointed by Israeli reactions, and also by negative attitudes of Syria and PLO. Would appreciate Jordan's help in getting across to PLO leadership that we take seriously intransigent statements such as that of Fatah Congress. Very damaging to Palestinian image in the West. If the PLO do not respond to Western acknowledgement of their role, Europe can go no further.
3. Peres has spoken of 'Jordanian' solution bypassing the Palestinians if he comes to power. If this is not a serious option worried that Peres might commit himself too inflexibly to this solution. Is there anything Hussein can do?



ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. King Hussein is stopping over in London on his way home from his official visit (16-18 June) to the United States. The purpose of this call is to report to the Prime Minister on that visit. The King has spoken of also calling on President Giscard and Chancellor Schmidt on his way home but we are not sure of his plans. The record of the Prime Minister's last meeting with the King on 28 May is attached. *(removed at review)*

2. Since then the King and Queen Noor were received by The Queen on 13 June (no record). They were unable to accept the Prime Minister's invitation to Trooping the Colour because one of the King's daughters was undergoing a tonsillitis operation at that time.

EC statement on the Middle East

3. The Jordanian reaction has, on the whole, been helpful. The Prime Minister issued a statement describing the Venice declaration, as a positive step in the right direction 'although not quite enough in itself to advance in practice the cause of justice and peace in the area'. He drew attention to the emphasis in the declaration on full Israeli withdrawal, Palestinian self-determination, rejection of Israeli measures in occupied Jerusalem, opposition to settlements, and the call for PLO involvement in negotiations. But he concluded that the EC should turn its words into action.



4. Speaking separately to HM Ambassador Sharif Sharaf said that he had deliberately taken the lead in drawing attention to the positive aspects of the declaration in order to get ahead of other less enthusiastic Arab reactions. He said that he was personally well pleased with its contents. Lord Carrington spoke on the telephone to the King in London on 15 June; the King said nothing of substance.

Visit to Washington

5. Washington telnos 2307 and 2308 reporting the King's visit are attached. The King took a moderate and constructive line in public, although there was only a passing reference to the EC initiative. In private, there appears to have been a useful discussion particularly on means of bringing the Palestinians into the negotiations; but Hussein still appears to have no clear ideas of his own on the subject. Aiming off for optimism in the State Department briefing the visit seems to have been successful more in re-establishing relations between King Hussein and President Carter than in bridging the still considerable gap between them. The King might need to be advised not to expect the Americans to be as forthcoming publicly on Palestinian involvement as they have been in private.

6. The King has since announced US agreement to sell him 200 M-60 tanks (presumably to replace older American tanks). This may well have been premature given the difficulties which the State Department foresee in gaining Congressional approval. Our own contract for sale of 274 advanced Chieftain tanks (signed last November for

/delivery



delivery between 1981-3) is not at risk. The prospect of future Chieftain sales might be diminished if the US deal comes off. But there has as yet been no discussion of further Chieftain sales.

7. A personality note on the Jordanian Prime Minister who may attend this meeting is attached. The Prime Minister will recall meeting Sherif Sharaf with the King last September.



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TELEGRAM NUMBER 2307 OF 19 JUNE  
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, HMCJ JERUSALEM,  
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KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. HUSSEIN ACCOMPANIED BY, AMONG OTHERS, QUEEN NOOR, ABDUL HAMID SHARAF AND GENERAL BIN SHAKER, ARRIVED IN WASHINGTON ON 16 JUNE. HIS OFFICIAL TALKS WERE ON 17 AND 18 JUNE: HE MADE A MAJOR SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB ON 19 JUNE: AND IS STAYING ON FOR TWO PRIVATE DAYS, LEAVING ON 21 JUNE. HE HAD TWO SESSIONS WITH PRESIDENT CARTER, ONE WITH DEFENCE SECRETARY BROWN AND A WORKING LUNCH WITH MUSKIE. HE ALSO SPENT TIME WITH THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. THE PRESIDENT GAVE A DINNER IN HIS HONOUR ON 17 JUNE.

2. THE KING'S VISIT RECEIVED COMPREHENSIVE BUT NOT UNIVERSALLY FRIENDLY MEDIA ATTENTION (CBS SHOWED SADAT'S REMARKS DESCRIBING HUSSEIN AS A MONEY-MOTIVATED OPPORTUNIST AS PART OF A NEWS ITEM ABOUT THE KING'S ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON). BUT THE PRESIDENT'S UNDERTAKING ON 13 JUNE THAT HE WOULD EXERCISE HIS PERSUASION ON THE KING TO JOIN CAMP DAVID (MYTEL 2253) HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN MUCH TONED DOWN BY OFFICIAL BRIEFING, ONE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL GOING SO FAR AS TO TELL THE WASHINGTON POST REPORTER THAT THIS PROMISE WAS QUOTE UNINTENDED UNQUOTE. IN HIS REMARKS TO THE PRESS AFTER THE SECOND MEETING WITH HUSSEIN, CARTER SAID QUOTE WE HAVE NOT TRIED TO CHANGE EACH OTHER'S MINDS ABOUT THE APPROACH, OR THE TECHNIQUE OR THE PROCEDURE TO BE USED. BUT WE DO AGREE COMPLETELY WITH THE ULTIMATE GOALS: THAT IS THE SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. IN ALL OF ITS ASPECTS, THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO HAVE A VOICE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR OWN FUTURE, THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AND A COMPREHENSIVE AND JUST PEACE FOR THE REGION. SO IN ALMOST EVERY INSTANCE OUR ULTIMATE GOALS ARE PARALLEL OR THE SAME, AND WE HAVE EXPLORED WAYS TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES IN OUR APPROACH. UNQUOTE HUSSEIN IMPLICITLY ENDORSED THIS LINE DESCRIBING DISCUSSIONS AS QUOTE EXTREMELY FRUITFUL... WE UNDERSTAND BETTER THE US POSITION. WE HAVE HAD THE CHANCE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BRING TO YOU AND OUR FRIENDS IN THE US OUR FEELINGS THAT A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE MUST COME IN THE AREA. UNQUOTE

3. GENERALLY SPEAKING THE MEDIA, ESPECIALLY ON THE FIRST DAY, CLAIMED TO DETECT A SOMEWHAT TENSE CORRECTNESS IN THE CARTER/HUSSEIN ENCOUNTERS AND TRIED TO READ DISAGREEMENT INTO THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN'S DESCRIPTION OF THE FIRST MORNING'S TALKS AS QUOTE

*/Both*



BOTH VERY FRANK AND EXTREMELY CORDIAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE UNQUOTE. THE NEW YORK TIMES ALSO REPORTED ON 19 JUNE THAT HUSSEIN HAD A HARD TIME ON THE HILL, QUOTING REPRESENTATIVE ROSENTHAL OF NEW YORK AS DESCRIBING THE TONE AS QUOTE SHARP, THE SHARPEST I HAVE EVER HEARD IN A MEETING WITH A FOREIGN LEADER. UNQUOTE FOR HIS PART, HUSSEIN DECLARED HIMSELF QUOTE VERY, VERY SATISFIED WITH ALL THAT HAS HAPPENED DURING MY VISIT HERE ... AND VERY PLEASED THAT WE ARE FRANK WITH EACH OTHER. UNQUOTE

4. IN HIS SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB (WHICH WAS BROADCAST LIVE ON THE NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO NETWORK) HUSSEIN ARGUED FORCEFULLY THAT RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION WAS THE KEY TO THE JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH JORDAN SOUGHT. WHILE ASSERTING HIS FAITH IN QUOTE STEADY AND FRANK COMMUNICATION UNQUOTE BETWEEN THE US AND THE ARABS, HE WARNED THAT AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO A QUOTE PECULIAR AND INDEFENSIBLE UNQUOTE CONCEPT OF ISRAELI SECURITY WHICH APPEARED TO EQUATE SECURITY WITH CONQUEST, THUS CONDONING ISRAELI EXPANSIONISM, CONTAINED THE SEEDS OF A MAJOR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE US AND THE ARAB WORLD. NEITHER MORALITY NOR ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST JUSTIFIED US SUPPORT FOR ISRAELI POLICIES OF ANNEXATION AND DENIAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH RESULTED IN QUOTE ALIENATION OF ESSENTIALLY FRIENDLY PEOPLE, THE RADICALISATION OF THE MODERATES AMONG THEM, AND THE POSSIBLE DISRUPTION OF THE NORMAL EXCHANGE OF INTERESTS IN THE MAJOR AREAS OF TRADE, ENERGY AND CULTURE UNQUOTE. A SEPARATE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL WOULD NOT LEAD TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT SO LONG AS ISRAEL INSISTED ON SETTLING OCCUPIED LANDS; AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LAND OCCUPIED SINCE 1967 COULD NOT BE SEPARATED FROM PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL FREEDOM. HUSSEIN REFERRED TO JORDAN'S RECORD AS THE MOST ACTIVE ARAB COUNTRY IN PURSUIT OF A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE, TO HER COOPERATION WITH SUCCESSIVE UN AND US ENVOYS AND TO HIS OWN TALKS WITH FOUR AMERICAN PRESIDENTS ALL OF WHOM HAD ASSURED HIM THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEM. QUOTE I AM CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, ONE THEY UNDERSTAND THE FACTS OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WILL DEMAND OF THEIR GOVERNMENT A BALANCED POLICY AND WILL SUPPORT A PRESIDENT SEEKING TO CORRECT PAST MISTAKES AND RE-ESTABLISH A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ARAB WORLD. UNQUOTE HE DEFENDED THE BAGHDAD AND TUNIS SUMMIT DECISIONS AS MOVES DESIGNED TO PROMOTE PEACE; BUT THESE HAD BEEN THWARTED BY ISRAEL'S POLICIES OF SETTLEMENTS AND REPRESSION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. JORDAN'S CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PLO WERE DESIGNED TO OPEN AVENUES TO PEACE, NOT CLOSE THEM. PROGRESS TOWARDS A FREE AND PEACEFUL PALESTINIAN HOMELAND WAS THE PREREQUISITE TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ONCE PEACE WAS ESTABLISHED, MUTUAL SECURITY GUARANTEES COULD BE BUILT INTO IT; BUT A PEACE WHICH GUARANTEED PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND FREEDOM WOULD BE NATURALLY SELF-PERPETUATING.



THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAD ENDORSED THESE PRINCIPLES (HUSSEIN'S ONE OBLIQUE REFERENCE TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECLARATION). HUSSEIN CONCLUDED BY APPEALING TO THE US TO SHARE IN BRINGING ABOUT THE HONOURABLE AND GENUINE PEACE DESIRED BY JORDAN, THE PALESTINIANS AND ALL ENLIGHTENED ARAB OPINION.

5. THE QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD ADDED LITTLE, BUT HUSSEIN ELEGANTLY DECLINED AN INVITATION TO EXPRESS CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S LACK OF CONTINUITY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HE INSTEAD PAID TRIBUTE TO CARTER'S COURAGE, THE INTEREST HE HAD SHOWN IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HIS SINCERE DESIRE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SOLUTION OF THE AREA'S PROBLEMS. QUOTE HE HAS GIVEN ME MORE TIME OVER THIS SUBJECT THAN WAS THE CASE IN THE PAST WITH ALL THE GREAT PEOPLE THAT HELD THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. I HOPE THAT THE FUTURE WILL SEE US WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER UNQUOTE.

6. SEE M I F T

F C O PASS SAVING BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, JEDDA.

FRETWELL

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FM WASHINGTON 192357Z JUNE 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2308 OF 19 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM,  
UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, JEDDA.

M I P T

1. STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED GREAT SATISFACTION AT THE WAY THE VISIT HAS GONE, DISMISSING AS SIMPLY INACCURATE THE ATTEMPTS BY THE MEDIA TO FIND NEGATIVE ASPECTS. CARTER'S UN-HELPFUL CURTAIN-RAISING INTERVIEW WITH THE JEWISH EDITORS HAD EVIDENTLY NOT DONE ANY HARM. EVEN ON THE HILL, WHERE HUSSEIN HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO SOME TOUGH QUESTIONING, HE HAD ANSWERED WELL AND, IF THERE WAS ANY JUSTICE, SHOULD HAVE DONE MUCH TO RESTORE HIS IMAGE.
2. SAUNDERS TOLD US THAT THE PRIME PURPOSE OF REESTABLISHING THE CARTER/HUSSEIN RELATIONSHIP WAS ACHIEVED. THIS VISIT WAS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW PERSONAL CONTACT GENUINELY COULD CLEAR THE AIR AND RE-ESTABLISH CORDIALITY AFTER A LONG PERIOD OF PUBLIC RECRIMINATION AND INCOMPLETE UNDERSTANDING. THE TWO MEN HAD FULLY EXPLORED AND DISPOSED OF THEIR MUTUAL GRIEVANCES. THE FACT THAT BOTH MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT HAD LASTED TWICE AS LONG AS SCHEDULED REFLECTED THEIR RESTORED MUTUAL ESTEEM AND FRIENDSHIP, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEIR DISCUSSION HAD INTERESTED THEM BOTH.
3. THERE HAD BEEN A GOOD AIRING OF HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE TO THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. THOUGH MAINTAINING THE POSITION THAT HE WISHED THE KING COULD JOIN IN, CARTER HAD ENDED BY ASSURING HUSSEIN THAT HE UNDERSTOOD HIS POSITION AND THAT HE WAS NOT GOING TO TRY TO PERSUADE HIM TO CHANGE IT. DISCUSSION HAD THEN MOVED TO WAYS AND MEANS OF RELATING THE PALESTINIANS TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. CARTER HAD ASKED HUSSEIN TO GIVE SERIOUS THOUGHT TO HOW PALESTINIAN ATTENTION COULD BE FOCUSED NOT MERELY ON WHAT THEY AIM FOR AS THE END RESULT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BUT RATHER ON THE SPECIFIC WAYS IN WHICH THEY FELT THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK TO BE DEFECTIVE AND ON WHAT NEEDED TO BE DONE TO ESTABLISH A NEGOTIATION TO WHICH THEY COULD BE RELATED WITHOUT DIRECT INVOLVEMENT. THE PRESIDENT HAD EMPHASISED THAT HE WAS NOT EXPECTING ANYONE TO ABANDON THEIR ULTIMATE GOALS. BUT HE HOPED THAT HUSSEIN COULD EXPLORE WITH HIS PALESTINIAN CONTACT HOW, GIVEN THAT THEY WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH CAMP DAVID AS SUCH, THEY MIGHT RELATE THEMSELVES TO SOME FORM OF NEGOTIATION WHICH, WHILST DIFFERENT FROM CAMP DAVID, WAS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH IT. SAUNDERS

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AGREED WITH MY SUGGESTION THAT THIS APPROACH WAS CLOSE TO THE CONCEPT UNDERLYING THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. (SAUNDERS MADE A PARTICULAR POINT OF ASKING ME TO ENSURE THAT WE KEPT ALL THE ABOVE TO OURSELVES. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT YET DECIDED HOW TO PRESENT IT TO OTHER EUROPEANS; THEY WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE RISK OF LEAKS WHICH MIGHT ENABLE THE ISRAELIS TO CLAIM THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE LOOKING FOR WAYS ROUND THEIR COMMITMENT NOT TO DEAL WITH THE PLO).

4. I ASKED SAUNDERS WHETHER HUSSEIN HAD VOLUNTEERED ANY THOUGHTS ON HOW THE PALESTINIANS MIGHT THUS BE BROUGHT IN. HE SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN EASIER TO AGREE ON APPROACHES THAT HAD TO BE RULED OUT. CLEARLY; THERE WAS NO SCOPE FOR TRYING TO INSERT THE PALESTINIANS INTO THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION; INDEED, THEY WOULD NOT ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH ANYTHING THAT WAS SEEN TO SMACK OF CAMP DAVID. HUSSEIN HIMSELF (CONTRASTING HIS OWN ATTITUDE WITH THAT OF THE IRAQIS AND THE SYRIANS) HAD BEEN PREPARED TO ACCEPT WHAT CAMP DAVID HAD SO FAR ACHIEVED BUT HAD BEEN FIRM THAT THE PROCESS WAS INCOMPLETE. SAUNDERS INTERPRETED THIS AS MEANING THAT IN HUSSEIN'S VIEW A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT WOULD REQUIRE A MOVE AWAY FROM THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK, THOUGH NOT TO SOME BRAND NEW FORUM.

5. OTHER ISSUES DISCUSSED INCLUDED REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE GULF AND ARABIAN PENINSULA, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN AND LEBANON. THERE WAS LITTLE BILATERAL SUBJECT MATTER AND THE QUESTION OF U.S. ARMS SUPPLIES SEEMS NOT EVEN TO HAVE BEEN RAISED BETWEEN THE KING AND CARTER. NEUMANN (JORDAN COUNTRY OFFICER, STATE DEPARTMENT) HAS TOLD US THAT, ON THE ADVICE OF THEIR FRIENDS ON THE HILL, THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE DELIBERATELY DELAYED NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS OF THE U.S. WISH TO SELL JORDAN 100 TANKS UNTIL 23 JUNE, IN ORDER TO AVOID ARMS SUPPLIES BECOMING THE MAIN FOCUS OF HUSSEIN'S MEETING WITH CONGRESSMEN. THE SAME NOTIFICATION WILL MENTION JORDAN'S WISH TO PURCHASE A FURTHER 100 TANKS THEREAFTER. NEUMANN ANTICIPATES TROUBLE ON THE HILL AND A CHANCE FOR ISRAELI SUPPORTERS THERE TO ERODE HUSSEIN'S SUCCESS.

FCO PASS SAVING BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, JEDDA.

FRETWELL

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ABDUL HAMID SHARAF SHARIF

Born Baghdad 1939, younger brother of Sharif Fawwaz Sharaf. His father was Regent of Iraq briefly in 1940 following the pro-Nazi 'Golden Square' coup. Studied Philosophy and International Relations at AUB. Joined the MFA in 1962. Director-General of the Hashemite Broadcasting Service 1963. Assistant Head of the Royal Diwan 1964. Minister of Information 1965-7. Ambassador in Washington 1967-71. Jordanian Permanent Representative at the United Nations in 1971-1976.

He made a considerable impression in Washington, where he was the youngest Arab Ambassador. At the UN he gained wide respect, both in the Arab group and outside, for his intelligent, moderate, and often courageous, presentation of his Government's case. Described as outstanding among Arab Ambassadors in New York, and is one of Jordan's most able diplomats. Head of the Royal Diwan (court) 1976-9.

His diplomatic experience has resulted in his playing a much more significant role in the conduct of foreign affairs than his predecessor did as Head of the Diwan or as Prime Minister; particularly now that Zeid Rifai is (if only temporarily) hors-de-combat, Sharaf has become one of the King's closest and most trusted advisers and confidants.



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FM WASHINGTON 202100Z JUN 80  
TO ROUTINE F C O  
TEL NO 2316 OF 20 JUNE 1980  
INFO AMMAN, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, CAIRO.

MY TEL 2308 AND TELECON FORTESCUE/JENNER: U S TANKS FOR JORDAN.

1. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS YESTERDAY CONFIRMED TO THE PRESS THAT THE U S HAD AGREED TO SELL JORDAN 100 M60 A3 TANKS, EQUIPPED WITH NIGHT VISION SCOPES AND LASER RANGEFINDERS, AT AN ESTIMATED VALUE OF DOLLARS 160 MILLION: AND THAT, IF THIS DEAL GOES THROUGH CONGRESS, JORDAN INTENDED TO ASK FOR A FURTHER 100 TANKS.

2. OFFICIALS ARE, HOWEVER, REPORTED TO HAVE INSISTED THAT THE SALE HAD BEEN AGREED IN ADVANCE OF KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT AND DID NOT REPRESENT A BLANDISHMENT HELD OUT BY PRESIDENT CARTER TO MAKE HUSSEIN MORE COOPERATIVE OVER CAMP DAVID. THE DECISION HAD RESULTED FROM AN AMERICAN JUDGEMENT THAT THIS SALE WOULD NOT DISTURB THE MILITARY BALANCE OR POSE A THREAT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY. ACCORDING TO RICHARD BURT IN TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES QUOTE THE TANK DEAL WITH JORDAN... WAS EVIDENTLY MOTIVATED BY A GROWING FEAR IN WASHINGTON THAT THE KING, AT THE SUGGESTION OF IRAQ, WAS PREPARING TO SIGN A LARGE ARMS AGREEMENT WITH MOSCOW UNQUOTE. AND THE WASHINGTON POST WRITES QUOTE THE PROPOSED SALE IS VIEWED WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION AS A GESTURE THAT WILL HELP THE U S TO RECOUP SOME OF ITS INFLUENCE WITH HUSSEIN AND HIS ARMED FORCES UNQUOTE. THE POST ALSO ASSUMES THAT THIS PROPOSED SALE WILL BE OPPOSED BY ISRAEL, AND, QUOTING ISRAELI SOURCES, CLAIMS THAT AMBASSADOR EVRON HAS ALREADY BEEN INSTRUCTED TO INFORM THE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS OF ISRAEL'S QUOTE STRONG AND SERIOUS CONCERN UNQUOTE. THE PRESS BRACKETS THE OPPOSITION TO BE EXPECTED FROM ISRAEL AND HER SUPPORTERS HERE TO SIMILAR DIFFICULTIES EXPECTED OVER THE SAUDI REQUEST FOR EXTRA EQUIPMENT FOR THEIR F15S (MY TELNO 2279).

3. ONE RESULT OF THE FRONT PAGE COVERAGE OF THE TANKS IS THAT REPORTING OF KING HUSSEIN'S SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL-PRESS CLUB ON 19 JUNE IS MINIMAL AND RELEGATED DEEP INTO INSIDE PAGES OF THIS MORNING'S PRESS (THOUGH IT DID RECEIVE GOOD COVERAGE IN YESTERDAY EVENING'S WASHINGTON STAR).

4. THE JORDANIAN INTENTION ALSO TO BUY CHIEFTAINS IS MENTIONED, THE NEW YORK TIMES REFERRING TO QUOTE MORE THAN 200 UNQUOTE AND THE WASHINGTON POST TO 250 CHIEFTAINS.

*FRETWELL*

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File

Jordan <sup>DJG</sup>

B/F 20.6.80.

18 June 1980

I am writing to confirm that King Hussein will be paying a call on the Prime Minister at 0915 on Tuesday 24 June at 10 Downing Street. Could your brief please reach us by close of play on Friday 20 June?

I also confirm that Mr. J.C. Moberly will be attending.

CS

Malcolm Adams, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

DSS



PRIME MINISTER

c. Mr. Alexander

King Hussein is going to be over here on 23 June (you will be in Venice). Would you be prepared to see him on the morning of Tuesday 24 June, which is at the moment free for your Summit Statement?

*Ed.*

*Yes no*

12 June 1980