

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 September 1980

*Dear Michael,*

The Prime Minister has agreed to see King Hussein at 12.00 noon on Wednesday, 10 September. I enclose a brief for this meeting.

Mr Urwick has to return to Amman that day and will unfortunately not be able to attend. Sir J Graham will, if the Prime Minister agrees, represent the FCO.

*Yours ever,*

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'M A Wickstead'.

M A Wickstead  
Assistant Private Secretary  
to the Lord Privy Seal

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

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CALL BY KING HUSSEIN ON THE PRIME MINISTER  
AT 12 NOON ON 10 SEPTEMBER 1980

Points to Make

Arab/Israel

1. Grateful for King's continuing support for European activity. M. Thorn reporting to Foreign Ministers on 15/16 September; will consider thereafter how the Nine should pursue their views.
  
2. Saudis and Kuwaitis have suggested to Thorn that occupied territories should be returned to pre-1967 owners with self-determination for the Palestinians to be worked out later. Would the King find such an approach workable? Would the other Arabs agree to a period of 'Jordanian trusteeship'? Could it be reconciled with Mr Peres's ideas?
  
3. What are the prospects for the Arab Summit in Amman in November? Any chance of positive proposals?

Anglo-Saudi relations

4. Grateful for King's intervention with the Saudis. Gratifying that relations have now been restored.

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Essential Facts

1. King Hussein arrived for a private visit on 1 September; he is expected to stay until 12 September. He attended the Farnborough Air Show on 5 September, where he met Mr Pym, and visited the Royal Ordnance Factory in Leeds (where the Chieftain tanks which are being sold to Jordan are made) on 8 September.
2. The record of the Prime Minister's last meeting with the King on 24 June is attached.

Arab/Israel

Annex 'A'

3. A copy of Amman telegram number 306 reporting M. Thorn's talks with the King in early August is attached. The King said that he had sought to persuade the more sceptical of his Arab colleagues to take the European initiative seriously. He stressed the need to maintain momentum and suggested a Euro-Arab Ministerial meeting, not necessarily in the context of the Dialogue. He saw advantage in that this would directly involve those, like the Syrians, who were difficult. (We would have serious difficulties with such a meeting, since it could achieve little in practice, would offend the Egyptians and would cause problems for us because of PLO participation.) For the remainder the talks elicited little new, although Thorn appears to have left with a clearer idea of the limited room for manoeuvre which the Jordanians have.
4. When Thorn visited Saudi Arabia later in August and probed the procedural and legal aspects of Israeli withdrawal the Saudis suggested that the occupied territories could be handed back to their pre-1967 owners with Palestinian self-determination following at a later stage. The Kuwaitis made a similar suggestion with the elaboration that the transfer of authority could be negotiated with Jordan, Egypt and Syria. There could then be a conference of all the parties concerned, including Israel and the PLO, to 'decide the future of Palestine'. This

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coincides with the prospect of a Labour Government in Israel next year committed to early negotiation with Jordan for the return of the greater part of the West Bank. The difficulties would be likely to arise over (a) gaining broad Arab acceptance for such an approach, (b) the likelihood of Arab insistence on some Israeli pre-commitment on self-determination (Mr Peres remains firmly opposed to a Palestinian state), and (c) the future of those territories (eg security zones on the West Bank borders and East Jerusalem) from which the Labour Party would be unwilling to withdraw. But the Prime Minister might sound out the King on how far along this road he would be prepared to go.

#### Anglo-Saudi relations

- Annex B. 5. At his last meeting with the Prime Minister King Hussein undertook to contact the Saudis on our behalf. He subsequently told HM Ambassador that he had spoken personally to the Saudi Foreign Minister and asked him to convey to King Khalid his hope that Saudi/UK relations could be restored.



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MIDDLE EAST THORN MISSION

1. M. GASTON THORN VISITED AMMAN FROM 7-10 AUGUST. HE SAW KING HUSSEIN, CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER. HE ALSO HAD TWO HOURS OF GENERAL CONVERSATION WITH A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF WEST BANKERS, ARRANGED BY AND HELD AT THE HOUSE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER. HE WAS TAKEN FOR A HELICOPTER TOUR OF THE JORDAN VALLEY AND ALSO FITTED IN A DAY TRIP TO PETRA. HIS AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN COULD ONLY BE ARRANGED AT THE LAST MINUTE ON 10 AUGUST AND HE DEPARTED IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER FOR PALMA WHERE HE WAS DUE TO MEET MR. KREISKY. HE COULD ONLY THEREFORE SPARE TIME TO GIVE LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NINE A QUICK FIVE MINUTE BRIEFING AT AMMAN AIRPORT BEFORE BOARDING HIS PLANE. M. THORN SAID THAT, BECAUSE OF THIS M. MERTZ WOULD PROVIDE A FULLER BRIEFING ABOUT THE AMMAN VISIT AFTER HIS RETURN TO LUXEMBOURG. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE BRIEFING WERE AS FOLLOWS:

2. JERUSALEM.

KING HUSSEIN HAS SAID HE WAS ABOUT TO ISSUE A "VERY STRONG" STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM. JERUSALEM WAS "HIS CONCERN" ABOVE ANYONE ELSE'S AND, NOW THAT HE WAS BACK IN AMMAN, HE FELT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR BOTH INTERNATIONAL AND INTER-ARAB REASONS TO MAKE A FIRM PRONOUNCEMENT. HE WAS TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER AT A CABINET MEETING AFTER M. THORN'S DEPARTURE. KING HUSSEIN HAD REACTED COOLY TO REPORTS IN THE JORDANIAN PRESS TODAY THAT PRESIDENT CARTER MIGHT CONVENE A CAMP DAVID SUMMIT TO DISCUSS JERUSALEM. HE THOUGHT SUCH A SUMMIT MIGHT ONLY TURN OUT TO BE "A PIECE OF GADGETRY" AND WONDERED WHY, IF IT TOOK PLACE, IT WOULD ONLY CONCERN ITSELF WITH JERUSALEM.

3. EUROPEAN INITIATIVE.

KING HUSSEIN CONFIRMED HIS APPROVAL OF THE VENICE DECLARATION. HE BELIEVED THAT, IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, ONLY EUROPE WAS IN A POSITION TO PLAY A SERIOUS ROLE OVER THE MIDDLE

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EAST IN WHICH THE [REDACTED] THE DISPUTE COULD HAVE ANY CONFIDENCE. HE HAD DIFFICULTY PERSUADING SOME OF HIS ARAB PARTNERS THAT [REDACTED] WOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY SEMICOLON BUT HE WOULD CONTINUE TO CONVINCE THEM OF THIS EVEN THOUGH HE ATTRACTED CRITICISM FOR DOING SO. KING HUSSEIN STRESSED THAT THE EUROPEANS MUST NOW MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM SEMICOLON ONE VISIT WAS NOT ENOUGH. AS PART OF THIS PROCESS, KING HUSSEIN SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A EURO-ARAB MEETING AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. THIS MIGHT BE HELD WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE BUT NOT NECESSARILY SO. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF SUCH A MEETING WERE TO INVOLVE AT LEAST A WIDE GROUP OF MINISTERS FROM BOTH SIDES SEMICOLON THIS WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF DIRECTLY INVOLVING THOSE SUCH AS THE SYRIANS WHO WERE DIFFICULT. M. THORN SAID THE JORDANIANS DID NOT NECESSARILY EXPECT IMMEDIATE RESULTS FROM HIS PRESENT MISSION SEMICOLON BUT ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO EUROPEAN ACTIVITY BEING SEEN TO CONTINUE.

4. OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

THE KING HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE ON THE BASIS OF A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL COMMITMENT IN ADVANCE BY ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ONLY THEREAFTER COULD THE WAY BE OPEN FOR DISCUSSION OF SECURITY BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS AND OTHER RELATED ISSUES. M. THORN HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WAS AN ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL RATHER THAN AN ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL, WHICH WAS THE ESSENTIAL AND NON-NEGOTIABLE STARTING POINT FOR THE JORDANIANS, AND REFERRED TO HINTS MADE IN SIMILAR VEIN BY ARAFAT (PARA 13 OF BEIRUT TELNO 197).

5. JORDAN/PLO

THE KING HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN LEARNING WHAT YASIR ARAFAT HAD HAD TO SAY TO M. THORN. THE KING SAID THAT JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE PLO CONTINUED DOWN A "NARROW BUT CLEARLY DEFINED PATH". JORDAN'S POSITION VIZ-A-VIZ THE PLO WAS ONE OF "UNDERSTANDING BUT NOT PERMISSIVENESS".

6. SUPERPOWER INVOLVEMENT

THE JORDANIANS HAD REAFFIRMED THEIR POSITION THAT NEITHER OF THE SUPERPOWERS COULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE SEARCH FOR A MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT SEMICOLON IN ADDITION TO THE ROLE WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO PLAY, IT COULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE SOME SOVIET INVOLVEMENT AT SOME STAGE.

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7. M. THORN'S MEETINGS WITH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN AND THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WERE LARGELY DEVOTED TO A JORDANIAN PRESENTATION OF THE SITUATION ON THE WEST BANK AND ISRAELI POLICIES THERE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER MADE PARTICULAR MENTION OF JORDAN'S POLICY OF KEEPING THE BRIDGES OPEN BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST BANKS NOTWITHSTANDING CRITICISM FROM SOME OTHER ARAB STATES. JORDAN SAW THIS POLICY AS ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE LOCAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST BANK AND THUS TO ENCOURAGE THE PALESTINIANS TO STAY PUT RATHER THAN EMIGRATE. JORDAN FEARED THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO IMPORT CHEAP AND DOCILE EGYPTIAN LABOUR TO THE WEST BANK IN ORDER TO UNDERMINE THE ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR THE WEST BANKERS. M. THORN ASKED WHETHER, IN THE EVENT OF A SOLUTION, ALL THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO GO. THE FOREIGN MINISTER FIELDERD THIS BY OBSERVING ONLY THAT A CONTINUANCE OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS WOULD PREVENT THE RIGHT SORT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL FEELING DEVELOPMENT AMONGST WEST BANKERS THAT THEY WOULD HAVE AN ENTITY OF THEIR OWN. HE SPECULATED THAT THE FUTURE OF ANY SETTLEMENTS MIGHT BE LINKED DIRECTLY TO THE NUMBERS OF PALESTINIANS ALLOWED BACK TO THEIR HOMES BY THE ISRAELIS SEMICOLON AND THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR ISRAEL, VIA THE OIL RICH ARAB STATES, FOR SETTLEMENTS THAT WERE DISMANTLED.

8. COMMENT.

THE JORDANIANS CLEARLY WELCOMED M. THORN'S VISIT NOTWITHSTANDING THE INCONVENIENCE TO THEM OF ITS TIMING AND THE LAST MINUTE CHANGES INFLICTED BY M. THORN ON THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR HIM. M. THORN HAD OF COURSE ALREADY SEEN BOTH KING HUSSEIN AND THE LATE ABDUL HAMID SHARAF HERE ON 30 JUNE AND THUS ALREADY HAD AN IDEA OF WHAT HE COULD EXPECT TO HEAR ON THIS VISIT. HOWEVER, HE REMARKED JUST BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE THAT HE NOW UNDERSTOOD BETTER WHY JORDAN, WITH HER REPUTATION AS A MODERATE, HAD LINED UP WITH THE OTHER ARAB STATES AND HAD REJECTED INVOLVEMENT IN THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. I DEDUCE FROM THIS REMARK THAT, PRIOR TO THIS VISIT, M. THORN MAY NOT HAVE FULLY APPRECIATED JORDAN'S LIMITED ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE AND HER UNWILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE ON ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES SUCH AS ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAWAL AND THE FULL RESTORATION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. AT THE SAME TIME M. THORN APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN CONFIRMING THE JORDANIAN VIEW THAT EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE SEARCH FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY.

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## 9. POSTSCRIPT

M. WAGNER CONFIRMED TO ME THAT M. THORN STILL HOPED TO PAY A WEST BANK VISIT TO TALK TO THE MAYORS AND OTHER LOCAL PERSONALITIES SEMICOLON BUT THAT TIMING OF THIS WAS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION.

SINDALL

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN  
JORDAN AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON TUESDAY 24 JUNE AT 0915 HOURS

Present: Prime Minister King Hussein  
Mr. J.C. Moberly Sharif Abdul Hamid  
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander Sharaf

\* \* \* \* \*

King Hussein said that, although his reception by President Carter in the United States had been very warm, their talks together had not achieved a great deal. He had tried to convince the President that whatever progress might have been made in the Camp David talks, no lasting solution to the Arab/Israel dispute could be achieved through the Camp David process. It was time to think of the challenge that would remain once the Camp David stalemate had been recognised. President Carter, on the other hand, clearly remained of the opinion that no other approach to the problems had yielded results and that the Camp David effort should be continued. He and President Carter now understood each other's position better, but there was still no agreement on how to proceed. The Prime Minister said that she had discussed the Middle East situation with President Carter in Venice. She had told him about the disagreeable letter she had received from Mr. Begin and had had the impression that President Carter did not care for Mr. Begin's policies any more than she did. President Carter evidently intended to push ahead with the Camp David talks and was thinking in terms of a two or three year time scale. He was conscious that Mr. Begin had originally said he would never withdraw from the Sinai and hoped that he might also change his mind about the West Bank. President Carter did not appear to be thinking in terms of broadening the Camp David talks. He was deeply opposed to the idea of a separate Palestinian state which he thought would probably be taken over by someone sooner or later. The Prime Minister said that her own view was that it would be far better for any Palestinian political entity to be tied to another state. Confederation with Jordan would be the best outcome. An independent state would be prey to outside influences.

/ King Hussein



King Hussein confirmed that President Carter had taken the same line with him as with the Prime Minister on the question of a Palestinian state. The matter was one of deep concern to the Jordanian Government. They were not prepared to attempt to prejudge the outcome of the exercise of self-determination by the Palestinians. But his own view was that a "Palestinian state" would not in the event prove dangerous and would not be controlled by radicals. Given the chance, he felt that the Palestinians would move to something which everyone could accept. Sharif Sharaf said that the problem of how the Palestinians would exercise their right to self-determination was academic so long as Israel pursued its present policy. The Prime Minister agreed, but said that it would nonetheless be useful to have the various options examined. If the various possible outcomes could be analysed and discussed, it might become easier for the Palestinians to see the advantages of a moderate approach. This consideration had been much in the minds of the European Heads of Government in issuing their recent declaration.

King Hussein said that there had been some discussion between him and President Carter about ways in which the Palestinians could advance their point of view. The Americans seemed to be looking for a group of Palestinians who would press the Palestinian case. King Hussein said that he, of course, had referred to the PLO. The Americans had given the usual answer about the need for the PLO to recognise Israel's right to exist. The Americans had suggested that a separate group of Palestinians might be included in the Egyptian delegation to the Camp David talks, but the Jordanians had, he hoped, dissuaded them from pursuing the idea. Sharif Sharaf said that King Hussein had instead floated the idea that West Bank opinion should be given some way to express itself. If the voice of non-violent protest could be channelled into some kind of assembly, this might one day be of great help in finding a way to peaceful self-determination. Of course the idea of such an assembly would not be practical unless international pressure was brought to bear on Israel. President Carter seemed to be only now discovering how oppressive Israeli measures in the West Bank had been.

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The Prime Minister



The Prime Minister asked which Palestinians might be prepared to raise their voice in the way the Jordanians had in mind. 'Would it be for instance, the West Bank mayors or Palestinian intellectuals?' Sharif Sharaf acknowledged that many of the intellectuals were associated with the PLO. However, the idea of a Palestinian Congress in which the Palestinians would press their demands peacefully seemed worth pursuing. The Jordanian Government would cooperate provided that it was agreed that the Israelis would not attempt to suppress it and provided it remained outside the Camp David framework. President Carter seemed to see possibilities in this. He had concluded the discussion of the idea by saying that it should be explored while the Camp David process continued.

The Prime Minister asked what hope there was for peaceful progress when the Fatah were issuing such violent declarations as that which followed their recent meeting in Damascus. She of course understood that many Palestinians argued that a peaceful approach had got them nowhere. Sharif Sharaf commented that the PLO were more moderate in private than in public. As regards their public posture it was similar in many respects to that of the Likud. King Hussein said that, unfortunately, there were governments, e.g. those of Syria, Libya and South Yemen, whose attitude was completely unhelpful. This related to their links with the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister, noting that there was little chance of any move on the part of the United States until after the Presidential election, asked whether there was likely to be further violence on the West Bank in the coming months. King Hussein said that Mr. Begin's decision to move his office to East Jerusalem was bound to provoke trouble and might well lead to further violence. The Prime Minister asked whether all the natural leaders of the Palestinian people were now committed to the PLO and its violent policies. King Hussein said that they were all in it or sympathetic to it. Sharif Sharaf added that this would remain the case so long as the PLO represented the resistance to Israeli oppression. The Prime Minister said that she had hoped that some Palestinians would be prepared to dissociate themselves from the methods of the PLO. King Hussein said that he had been encouraging moderate Palestinians to join the PLO

/ precisely



precisely in the hope of tempering its methods. Sharif Sharaf said that it was very difficult for any Palestinian to condemn the PLO's activities at present. The same trend to violence was, of course, apparent in Israel. Unless an alternative and peaceful road could be offered to the Palestinians to achieve their objectives, the violence would continue to escalate. Events in Rhodesia had demonstrated this. The PLO were no more extreme than other organisations which had fought for their people's independence. The Prime Minister agreed that unless people could be given the hope of achieving their objectives peacefully, they would take to terrorism. It had taken a great deal of international pressure to persuade Mr. Mugabe to opt for the ballot box. The United Kingdom could not have done it alone.

Sharif Sharaf said that he had reminded President Carter that both Mr. Begin and Mr. Shamir had terrorist backgrounds. President Carter had acknowledged the point, but had added that while the Jordanians were talking about principles, he was interested in methods. He agreed that the Palestinians should have a homeland. The question was how it could be achieved. The Jordanian reply had been that Camp David was not the way. President Carter spoke logically but he lacked experience of the events of the last 30 years. He did not seem to be conscious that the Israeli attitude to the West Bank was quite different from their attitude to Sinai. They had been prepared to give up Sinai in return for the neutralisation of Egypt, but had never indicated a willingness to make the same sort of gesture to the inhabitants of the West Bank. They were still, of course, engaged in establishing settlements there.

The Prime Minister said that everyone condemned the Israeli Government's settlement policy. Even the Jewish community in this country disapproved. There were signs that public opinion in Israel itself was turning against the policy. However, she doubted whether much progress towards an agreement would be made in the next few months. Indeed it would probably prove difficult to make progress so long as Mr. Begin remained in office. There would have to be change in the political situation within Israel. She hoped that the European initiative could achieve something. The Israelis would put themselves in the wrong if they refused to receive a



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representative of the EC Presidency. Both Sharif Sharaf and King Hussein said that the European statement had been helpful. It had encouraged moderate Arab opinion. In the long run it would help President Carter.

The Prime Minister said that President Carter had clearly learnt a lot from his meeting with King Hussein. His attitude in Venice had been different from that when he had met the Prime Minister in Washington before Christmas. It was a pity the meeting with King Hussein had not taken place earlier. King Hussein said that President Carter had acknowledged that the delay in arranging a meeting had been a mistake.

At the end of the meeting, King Hussein mentioned that he had discussed regional security, particularly in the Gulf area, during his visit to Washington. It had been agreed that the Americans and Jordanians should look at the problems together. The Prime Minister said that there was a need for contingency plans. But she doubted whether these could be worked out at Summits. Sharif Sharaf agreed.

The Prime Minister commented that the United Kingdom still remained out of favour with the Saudi Government and that this was very worrying. King Hussein said that as soon as he returned to Amman he would get in touch with the Saudi authorities and see what could be done. Sharif Sharaf said that in private the Saudis admitted that they had over-reacted. Mr. Moberly said that the latest signals from Jeddah were more encouraging.

The discussion ended at 1000 hours.

*Paul*

25 June 1980



PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 275 OF 9 SEPTEMBER

MIDDLE EAST: FOLLOW-UP TO THORN MISSION

1. I ASKED MERTZ (POLITICAL DIRECTOR, MFA) TODAY HOW HE SAW THE FOLLOW-UP DEVELOPING.

2. AS I SUSPECTED, THORN HAS TAKEN A DRAFT OF HIS REPORT ON HIS MISSION AWAY WITH HIM THIS WEEK TO GREECE ON HOLIDAY. MERTZ SAID THAT HE HAD REPORTED TO THORN THE ALMOST UNANIMOUS WISH OF THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS LAST WEEK (THE FRENCH APART) FOR THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE SIGHT OF THORN'S PIECE OF PAPER. BUT MERTZ SAID THAT THORN WAS STILL HESITANT ABOUT COMMITTING HIS THOUGHTS TO WRITING. MERTZ THOUGHT THAT THORN WOULD MAKE AN ORAL PRESENTATION TO HIS COLLEAGUES IN BRUSSELS ON 15 SEPTEMBER AND KEEP HIS DRAFT UP HIS SLEEVE. IF THERE WAS A STRONG DEMAND FOR A WRITTEN REPORT, THORN WOULD PRODUCE IT A FEW DAYS LATER. MERTZ SUGGESTED THAT MINISTERS WOULD NOT HAVE MUCH TIME IN BRUSSELS NEXT WEEK TO DISCUSS THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE TO TACKLE THE SUBJECT AGAIN A WEEK LATER IN NEW YORK AND IN OCTOBER AS WELL.

3. ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE FOLLOW-UP, MERTZ SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO KEEP CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH KING HUSSEIN, PARTICULARLY BEARING IN MIND THE ARAB SUMMIT AT THE END OF NOVEMBER. HE SAW ADVANTAGE IN DRAWING UP A LIST

..... TO PUT TO THE ARABS. SO WHAT DID THEY



THE END OF NOVEMBER. HE SAW ADVANTAGE IN DRAWING UP A LIST OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TO PUT TO THE ARABS: EG WHAT DID THEY MEAN BY SELF-DETERMINATION AND TO WHOM WOULD THEY HAND THE TERRITORIES BACK? ALTHOUGH THE ARABS WERE PROFOUNDLY DIVIDED, IT WOULD BE VERY DESIRABLE TO SEE IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO REACH AN ARAB CONSENSUS ON THESE POINTS. AND THE PROCESS WOULD FILL IN TIME. MERTZ ALSO SAW MERIT IN PRINCIPLE IN INTRODUCING A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. HE SAID, HARPING BACK TO THE LAST POLITICAL DIRECTOR'S MEETING, THAT ALTHOUGH ROBIN HAD PRESENTED THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR WORKING OUT A PLAN OF ACTION LEADING TO A GLOBAL STATEMENT IN A RATHER STARK WAY, MERTZ WAS CLEARLY ATTRACTED BY THE SUGGESTION. HE SAW ADVANTAGE IN HAVING A PLAN EVEN IF IT COULD ONLY BE IMPLEMENTED GRADUALLY. MERTZ SAID THAT THORN HAD BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO THE IDEA OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WHO COULD MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THE MISSION. THEY HAD EVEN CONTEMPLATED SUGGESTING PAUL HELMINGER (MINISTER OF STATE, MFA) BUT HAD ABANDONED THE IDEA BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH VERY GOOD, HE LACKED THE NECESSARY INTERNATIONAL STANDING. NOR WOULD IT BE PRACTICABLE TO LAUNCH THORN'S SUCCESSOR (EG COLETTE FLESCH) INTO THE FRAY JUST FOR DECEMBER. THE MAIN REQUIREMENT WOULD BE TO FIND SOMEONE OF STATURE. SIMONET MIGHT BE A POSSIBILITY. MERTZ SAID THAT THORN WOULD WANT TO MAINTAIN HIS CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES HE HAD MET. BUT THORN WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO EMBARK ON A FURTHER PROTRACTED MIDDLE EAST TOUR GIVEN HIS MANY OTHER COMMITMENTS BETWEEN NOW AND THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL. THORN HAD ONLY MANAGED TO DO HIS WALK-ABOUT BY CRAMMING IT INTO THE SUMMER BREAK. MERTZ WONDERED WHETHER ANY FOREIGN MINISTER, PARTICULARLY FROM ONE OF THE LARGER PARTNERS WITH MORE BILATERAL COMMITMENTS THAN LUXEMBOURG, COULD MANAGE THE PHYSICAL COMMITMENT INVOLVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OTHER OBLIGATIONS. THIS PRACTICAL CONSIDERATION, COUPLED WITH POSSIBLE DUTCH HESITATIONS, MADE MERTZ TAKE THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IDEA ALL THE MORE SERIOUSLY.

4. PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

THOMAS

NNNN

SENT AT 091400Z DG





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 August 1980

*Dear Michael,*

Visit by King Hussein to London

King Hussein will be making a further private visit to London between 1-11 September. He will be visiting Farnborough on 5 September and the production line of the Chieftain tank at RAF Leeds on 8 September.

The King has invariably seen the Prime Minister during his several visits to London over the last year and HM Ambassador in Amman has recommended that the Prime Minister should, if there is time, receive him again on this occasion. He points out that the King sets great store by these meetings which have been an important factor in the helpful role Jordan has played in supporting the European initiative with the other Arabs.

We have no pressing business to discuss with King Hussein but a meeting now would helpfully build on the goodwill established by the Prime Minister's previous meetings and provide an opportunity to hear the King's views on progress of the Thorn Mission and Arab reactions to it.

HM Ambassador returns to Amman from leave on 10 September and would be available to attend a meeting before that date if the Prime Minister wished. The Secretary of State will be on holiday at this time.



*G G H Walden*

(G G H Walden)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
Private Secretary  
No 10



29 AUG 1950





B/F

<sup>John</sup>  
9/9/80

1 September, 1980.

Visit by King Hussein to London

The Prime Minister has seen George Walden's letter to me of 29 August about King Hussein's forthcoming visit to this country. She would be happy to see King Hussein here at No.10 on Wednesday, 10 September, at 12 noon. I should be grateful if you could let me have a brief the previous evening.

The Prime Minister would be content for Mr. Urwick to be present.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

C. Jebb, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

WJFM





10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

Would you like to see King Hussein on Wednesday 10 September when our Ambassador will be in London?

There is an E meeting in the morning; you are giving the Cheshire handicapped school children tea; and you have the "Now" dinner speech in the evening. We could therefore fit in King Hussein at 12 noon on a busy day.

Agreed  
m.  
MAD

29 August 1980