



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 April 1981

Dear Michael,

Call by King Hussein on the
Prime Minister

/ The King is calling at 9.30 am on
8 April. I enclose a brief. So far as
we know General Shaker will not
accompany the King on this call. But
the Jordanian Ambassador may.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

Francis Richards

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 9.30 AM ON 8 APRIL

Points to make

Arab-Israel

1. Next steps for Europe depend on results of Van der Klaauw mission, together with results of Israeli elections. Evolution of US policy also important. Options for the future open: UK ready to be active in Presidency if circumstances indicate progress is possible.
2. But too much should not be expected from Europe. In current phase of peace efforts, Arabs can make the most effective contribution to peace by demonstrating readiness to accept Israel. Jordan's influence on the PLO vital. Important that Palestine National Council meeting produces helpful result.
3. Syrian attitude to European efforts has moderated. But how can Syria be brought into the mainstream of peace efforts? Progress very difficult without at least tacit Syrian acquiescence.

Security in the Gulf

4. Gulf states' recent progress towards closer cooperation is welcome. How do you see it developing? We recognise local states should take the lead in determining their security requirements.

Defence Sales

- American Tel
112 - Flag
5 Tels.*
5. Tornado. Refer to letter of 31 March. Anxious to meet Arab requirements in any way we can. Germans have problems but expect we can reach accommodation. Important they should be in no doubt about strength of Arab interest. Helpful if Jordanians could speak to them direct.
 6. Stand by Tornado proposals and attach importance to reputation as reliable source of supply. Confident that satisfactory arrangements can be made.
 7. Sales to Iraq. Grateful for King's assistance. HDS had most useful visit to Baghdad in March.

/8. Sales

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8. Sales to Jordan. Keen to help meet Jordan's further defence needs. Rapier meets low-level air defence requirements well. What are the prospects?

9. How did Red Arrows' visit go? Any Jordanian interest in Hawk.

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Essential Facts

1. King Hussein arrives on 7 April and leaves on 18 or 19 April. It is as usual a private visit but with more official engagements than usual. The occasion of the visit is the Sovereign's Parade at Sandhurst on 10 April at which the King will represent the Queen. Prince Abdullah (his eldest son by his second (English) wife, Princess Muna) is passing out that day. Prince Abdullah is taking a Short Service Commission in the British Army and will be staying at Sandhurst until September and thereafter joining the 13/18th Hussars.

2. The King will also address the Army Staff College at Camberly on 8 April. He will see Mr Nott (when Defence Sales matters will be discussed in detail) and Lord Carrington on 15 April. He will fly Tornado on 14 April. The King is accompanied by the Jordanian Commander in Chief, General Sharif Zeid Bin Shaker.

3. The Record of the King's last call on the Prime Minister is attached. *(on 10.9.80: record removed at review)*

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Arab/Israel

4. The Lord Privy Seal visited Jordan at the beginning of February and Mr Van der Klaauw went at the end of February. Both visits served to underline Jordan's continuing strong support for the European initiative. The Jordanians were careful not to give Mr Van der Klaauw any hint that they might be prepared to play a role going beyond the Arab concensus. This fits in with King Hussein's current concern to demonstrate to the rest of the Arab world that he has no plans to fall in with a separate agreement with the Israelis (as the Syrians allege) even if the US should put pressure on him to do so. He has on several recent occasions stressed his acceptance of the PLO as the Palestinians' sole representative.

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Both to the Lord Privy Seal and to Mr Van der Klaauw the Jordanians expressed concern at the implications of Jerusalem being dealt with separately from the other occupied territories in the EC Working Paper. HM Ambassador now believes they are reassured that this does not imply that the requirement for Israeli withdrawal does not apply equally to Jerusalem, but that it reflects the special political and religious complications of the Jerusalem issue.

6. The King will have seen Mr Haig just before leaving for London. This will be an opportunity to compare impressions of US policy.

7. Despite the Jordanian breach with Syria (see below) and Syria's hold (not least in Lebanon) over the PLO the King has managed to keep open his lines to the PLO. Working contacts have continued and the King saw Arafat twice during the Islamic Summit at Taif. He told the LPS that he had briefed Arafat on the positive evolution of European views. He had put it to Arafat that he should represent the Palestinians and no other party and asked him whether he could carry a settlement through. Arafat had seemed nervous that the moment of decision might now be arriving. The Palestine National Council (the PLO "parliament") meeting due to begin in Damascus on 11 April will be a useful sign of the trend of PLO thinking.

Syria/Jordan

8. The Jordanians are preoccupied with their dispute with Syria. Since the confrontation on the border last November the momentum has been maintained by the discovery (and public disclosure) of a Syrian plot to assassinate Prime Minister Badran and the abduction of the Jordanian Chargé d'Affaires in Beirut (for which the Jordanians hold Syria responsible). We have tried to be as helpful as we can without getting

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drawn into the dispute. We spoke to the Syrians after the Muheisen kidnapping and asked them to help, through their military presence in Beirut, in tracing the Chargé.

9. The Jordanians are very sensitive on the subject of their troubles with Syria. We were mildly rebuked last November when (in an effort to help) we told their Ambassador here that we did not believe Syrian troops were on the border in sufficient strength to attack. The Jordanians accused us of minimising the Syrian threat.

Iran/Iraq

10. The King's close political support for Iraq in the Gulf war continues. Aqaba continues to be the main channel of bulk imports to Iraq. But there are still no Jordanian troops in Iraq. The King visited Iraq in March.

Gulf Security

11. The King takes the view that both Iraq and Jordan have a place in discussions of Gulf security *and is somewhat put out by their exclusion.* Crown Prince Hassan speaking to Ministers in London last month emphasised the need to avoid an internal threat to the Gulf States and said that bringing in outside forces would feed extremism. Six Gulf States (Saudi Arabia plus the five small Gulf States) are to have a meeting at Head of State level in Abu Dhabi on 26 May to ratify the agreement reached in Riyadh on 4 February for the setting up of governmental machinery to coordinate political and economic cooperation. (The Prime Minister sent a message of congratulations to Gulf leaders after the 4 February agreement.) Though defence cooperation has not been mentioned publicly, Gulf ministers have told us privately that their common defence interest underlies all their efforts. The

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Iraqis, though apparently favouring these developments, probably wish to join - and so to lead - the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Defence Sales

B 12. Tornado. The Prime Minister's exchanges of messages with King Hussein are attached with Amman telno 116 reporting the King's reaction on receipt of the Prime Minister's letter of 31 March. By then the King had seen a MOD/BAe presentation of Tornado in Amman. HB Ambassador believes the King's interest to be well and truly aroused but that he is still worried whether we shall be able to overcome German reservations. The Ambassador explained the difficulty of persuading the Germans that Tornado sales were a serious prospect; the King suggested that his exchange with the Prime Minister might be released to the Germans and that the Jordanians themselves approach the German Ambassador in Amman. We have replied that we believe the latter most likely to be effective.

13. MOD's talks in Bonn on 27 March established that the Germans will be unlikely to produce a decision on sales to the Middle East before the summer. But they raised no objections to our bilateral marketing efforts.

Defence Sales to Iraq

C 14. The King has been particularly helpful in pursuing sales prospects in Iraq. Lord Trenchard's report to the Prime Minister on the recent visit to Amman and Baghdad by HDS is attached.

Defence Sales to Jordan

15. The first batch of the 274 advanced Chieftain tanks ("Khalid")

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which we contracted to sell in November 1979 is due for delivery in June. Sir Ronald Ellis will be discussing the programme separately with General Bin Shaker.

16. There is a further sales prospect in Rapier. Jordan's confrontation with Syria last November pointed up her lack of an adequate low level air defence system and Iraq is providing the money to fill the gap. The King saw a non-firing demonstration of towed Rapier in February (tracked Rapier broke down) and a firing demonstration has been arranged for later this month. The RJAF seem interested in towed Rapier; the army seems likely to buy the French competitor Roland.

17. The King has recently expressed new interest in Hawk. The Red Arrows accompanied by a BAe team visited Amman in late March.

Defence Training

18. The King asked the Prime Minister in September 1979 for help in training the Jordanian Armed Forces. Since then DMAO have produced several detailed reports on Jordanian training requirements and training assistance both in the UK and in Jordan has been stepped up.

D 19. A Personality Note on the Jordanian Ambassador, who may accompany the King, is attached.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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GRS 236

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FM FCO 232000Z JAN 81
TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 22 OF 23 JANUARY
AND TO JEDDA, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DOHA, MUSCAT,
INFO TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, BONN, ROME, PARIS.

MIPT: TORNADO

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE:
BEGINS. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU AND OTHER ARAB LEADERS ARE CLOSE TO MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT THE LONG TERM RE-EQUIPMENT OF YOUR AIR FORCES. AS YOU KNOW, THE TORNADO AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN DEVELOPED IN BOTH A STRIKE AND INTERCEPTOR VERSION AND IS ABOUT TO ENTER SERVICE IN THE ROYAL AIR FORCE, TOGETHER WITH THE GERMAN AND ITALIAN AIR FORCES. IT WILL BE THE MOST ADVANCED AIRCRAFT OF ITS TYPE IN THE WORLD.
2. I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS WITH YOU AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES THE SALE OF THIS AIRCRAFT AND FOR THIS PURPOSE IS PREPARED TO LAY ON A PRESENTATION AND EVALUATION FLIGHT AS SOON AS YOU WOULD WISH. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CONSULT OUR OTHER PARTNERS IN THE PROJECT EVENTUALLY ONCE WE HAVE ESTABLISHED AN INTEREST IN TORNADO BUT I THOUGHT I SHOULD LET YOU KNOW OF THE UK'S POSITION AND TO SAY HOW DISAPPOINTED WE WOULD BE IN VIEW OF THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US, PARTICULARLY IN THE FIELD OF ARMS SUPPLIES, IF A DECISION OF THIS NATURE WERE TO BE TAKEN WITHOUT ANY OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE VERY REAL ALTERNATIVES THAT EXIST.
3. PERHAPS YOU WOULD LET ME KNOW DIRECTLY IF YOU WISH US TO INITIATE THE ACTION I HAVE PROPOSED. MESSAGE ENDS.

CARRINGTON
LIMITED
NENAD
MED
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WED

15/1/81
S/L J. GRAHAM TO P. DE BELLE
S/L A. ACLAND TO FERGUSON
TO J. ROBERT

15/1/81
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INFO SAVING ABU DHABI DOHA KUWAIT MUSCAT RABAT ISLAMABAD ROME
TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 22 OF 23 JANUARY (NOT TO RABAT AND ISLAMABAD):
TORNADO

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF KING HUSSEIN'S REPLY TO THE PRIME
MINISTER'S MESSAGE IN YOUR TUR:

BEGINS.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

JUST UPON MY DEPARTURE TO THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT I RECEIVED
YOUR MESSAGE ON THE SUBJECT OF TORNADO.

A GROUP OF COUNTRIES IN OUR AREA INCLUDING IN ADDITION TO
JORDAN, IRAQ, KUWAIT, THE GULF STATES, OMAN AND SAUDI ARABIA
(WE HAVE ALSO TALKED TO MORROCO AND ADVISED PAKISTAN OF OUR
THOUGHTS) HAVE BEEN TALKING FOR A WHILE OF THE NEED TO GRADUALLY
STANDARDIZE OUR MILITARY EQUIPMENT UPON THE MOST MODERN SYSTEMS
THAT MEET OUR FUTURE REQUIREMENTS. WE HAVE FELT A GROWING URGENCY
TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION TO ENHANCE OUR CAPABILITIES INDIVIDUALLY
AND COLLECTIVELY IN THE FACE OF COMMON THREATS, BY HAVING COMPATIBLE
SYSTEMS AND THE UNIVERSAL TRAINING AND ABILITIES TO USE THEM,
TOGETHER WITH ESTABLISHING WITHIN THE AREA ALL FACILITIES TO
SERVICE AND MODIFY WHEN NECESSARY, AND IMPROVE UPON THEM THROUGH
SENDING OUR PEOPLE, IN RELEVANT CASES, TO WORK WITH THEIR
MANUFACTURERS SO THAT THEY CAN THEN REPRESENT THE NUCLEUS OF A
TECHNOLOGICALLY ABLE AND QUALIFIED ELEMENT WITHING THIS AREA
WHICH CAN CHANGE US, IN TIME, FROM BEING PURE CONSUMERS OF
MANUFACTURED SYSTEMS, TO COUNTRIES THAT ARE ABLE TO DEPEND
GROWINGLY ON THEIR OWN HUMAN RESORCES TO SERVICE, MODIFY AND
INPROVE MANUFACTURED SYSTEMS LEADING TO AN ABILITY TO HANDLE
MODERN TECHNOLOGY.

WE HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR A NEW AIR SUPERIORITY FIGHTER WITH
ADVANCED ARMAMENTS AND ELECTRONICS WHICH CAN ADEQUATELY MEET
THE CHALLENGE UNTIL THE END OF THE CENTURY AND POSSIBLY BEYOND,
AND WE HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR AN AIRCRAFT THAT CAN MEET OUR
REQUIREMENTS FOR A LONG-RANGE FIGHTER BOMBER THAT CAN DEAL WITH A

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/VARIETY

VARIETY OF GROUND TARGETS, TOGETHER WITH ELECTRONIC PACKAGES AND EQUIPMENT TAILORED TO MEET OUR EVERY REQUIREMENT. OUR TENDENCY HAS BEEN TO MOVE AWAY FROM THE SUPERPOWERS AND PARTICULARLY TOWARDS THE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. WE FEEL THAT FOR MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY TO BE ABLE TO KEEP ABREAST OF MODERN DEVELOPMENT IN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL AND OBVIOUSLY WHEN COLLECTIVELY WE APPROACH POSSIBLE SUPPLIERS, THE MATERIAL COSTS WOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERABLY MORE ACCEPTABLE DUE TO THE SIZE OF THE ORDERS. THE VITAL QUESTIONS ARE:

A. WHERE CAN WE GET OR HELP DEVELOP AND THEN RECEIVE THE MOST SUITABLE RANGE OF EQUIPMENT?

B. EQUALLY AS IMPORTANT IF NOT MORE SO BASED ON PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE, IS WHAT SATISFACTORY GUARANTEES CAN WE ALL RECEIVE THAT EQUIPMENT WILL BE FORTHCOMING - BOTH CONTRACTED FOR OR ANY IMPROVED EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE USED BY US ON OUR AIRCRAFT YET TO BE DEVELOPED AT LATER STAGES - WITHOUT ANY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARISING THAT MIGHT CAUSE THE MANUFACTURERS TO STOP OR TEMPORARILY HALT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ORIGINAL AGREEMENT WHICH IS, AFTER ALL, ONE REASON WHY WE ARE MOVING TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND AWAY FROM THE MONOPOLIES OF THE SUPERPOWERS. A PROMISING AIRCRAFT NOT YET FULLY DEVELOPED IS THE D. MIRAGE 4000 AND A DIALOGUE HAS BEEN ONGOING BETWEEN US AND BOTH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND THE MANUFACTURERS ON THIS ISSUE. WE HAVE GONE A LONG WAY IN DEFINING OUR TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS AS AGAINST THE PRESENT AND FORESEEN THREATS. WE DID NOT CONSIDER TORNADO DUE TO -

1. THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S RELUCTANCE TO SELL ARMS TO OUR AREA.

2. OUR UNCERTAINTY OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS GUARANTEEING THE FULFILMENT OF AN AGREEMENT UNTIL "A" IS RESOLVED AND ALSO IN VIEW OF PRECIOUS EMBARGOES WHICH WE, FOR EXAMPLE, WERE AFFECTED BY FROM TIME TO TIME DUE TO POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IMPOSED UPON US BY HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT.

3. TORNADO IS A DEVELOPED AIRCRAFT WHICH APPEARS EXCELLENT IN ITS ORIGINAL ROLE SEMICOLON HOWEVER, THE A.D.V. VARIANT SEEMS MORE SUITED TO INTERCEPT AND DESTROY LONG-RANGE ENEMY BOMBERS FROM GREAT DISTANCES, RATHER THAN BEING ALSO A SUPERIORITY FIGHTER.

E OBVIOUSLY ALL OF THESE IMPRESSIONS ARE INCONCLUSIVE SINCE WE HAVE AS YET NEVER HAD THE CHANCE TO LOOK SERIOUSLY AT TORNADO PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF YOUR MESSAGE AND ALSO SINCE TORNADO IS AN UNKNOWN AIRCRAFT TO US TECHNICALLY BEYOND WHAT IS AVAILABLE IN PUBLICATIONS.

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I HAVE RELAYED YOUR MESSAGE TO ALL CONCERNED AND SENSED AN INTEREST TO LOOK AT TORNADO BASED ON THE ANSWERS WE ALL RECEIVE FROM YOU OVER THE QUESTIONS I AM NOW RAISING. HOWEVER, I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT TIME IS PRESSING AND THAT TALKS ON THE D. MIRAGE 4000 AIRCRAFT ARE FAIRLY WELL ADVANCED AND IT IS THUS MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE RECEIVE FROM YOU DEAR PRIME MINISTER, AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY YOUR KIND RESPONSES WHICH WOULD EITHER GIVE US THE CHANCE TO LOOK AT TORNADO IN BOTH VARIANTS AS WELL AS D. MIRAGE 4000 OR TO CONTINUE ON OUR ORIGINAL COURSE.

WITH MY WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS AND SINCEREST WISHES,

YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,

HUSSEIN I

ENDS.

2. ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW IN CONFIDENTIAL BAG LEAVING HERE ON 25 FEBRUARY.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

URWICK

LIMITED
NENAD
MED
DEFENCE D
WED
AS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUNG
SIR J GRAHAM
SIR A ACLAND
MR JC MOBARLY
MR PH MOBARLY
MR FERGUSSON

[PASSED SAVING
AS REQUESTED]

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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GRS 458

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DESKBY 310745Z

FM FCO 301420Z MARCH 81

TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 113 OF 30 MARCH

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (SIC Z8G)

MIPT

1. TEXT BEGINS:

YOUR MAJESTY,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 18 FEBRUARY. I AM GLAD TO HEAR THAT MY MESSAGE ABOUT TORNADO REACHED YOU IN TIME FOR YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES TO TAKE NOTE OF IT AT THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT. I AM ALSO MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE TROUBLE YOU HAVE TAKEN TO SET OUT THE VARIOUS FACTORS AFFECTING YOUR THINKING ON A NEW ADVANCED COMBAT AIRCRAFT.

FOR OUR PART WE FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT THE ARAB COUNTRIES WISH TO STANDARDISE THEIR MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND DEVELOP AN INDIGENOUS MANUFACTURING CAPABILITY OF THEIR OWN. WE WELCOME THE SPIRIT OF CO-OPERATION IN WHICH YOU DISCUSSED THESE OBJECTIVES WITH US AND WE ARE READY TO ASSIST YOU IN ANY WAY WE CAN IN ACHIEVING THEM. I HAVE RECENTLY RECEIVED A REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION WHICH YOU AND YOUR SENIOR COMMANDERS HAD WITH SIR RONALD ELLIS AND MR JEFFS EARLIER THIS MONTH. I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE WARM WELCOME WHICH YOU EXTENDED TO THEM AND I HOPE THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE ANSWERED SOME OF THE POINTS IN YOUR LETTER. FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF OUR PROPOSALS WILL BE CONVEYED TO YOU IN THE PRESENTATIONS WHICH BRITISH AEROSPACE ARE MAKING IN AMMAN ON 30 AND 31 MARCH AND WE VERY MUCH LOOK FORWARD TO ARRANGING A FLIGHT IN TORNADO FOR YOU DURING YOUR VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM IN APRIL.

AS I BELIEVE YOU ARE NOW AWARE, OUR PROPOSALS CENTRE ON A NEW AIRCRAFT BASED ON TORNADO TECHNOLOGY BUT SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF JORDAN AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES BY THE LATE 1980S. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS AIRCRAFT WILL BE SUPERIOR TO

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THE MIRAGE 4000 AT ABOUT THE SAME COST. IF YOU DECIDED TO PURSUE THIS COURSE, A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE UK AND WE WOULD WANT TO CONSIDER WHAT INDUSTRIAL COLLABORATION WITH THE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES WOULD BE FEASIBLE. MEANWHILE, PENDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW AIRCRAFT, WE EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO OFFER THE TORNADO AIRCRAFT IN BOTH THE IDS AND ADV VERSIONS WHICH SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR SUPPLY IN 3 TO 4 YEARS' TIME.

I HAVE MADE A PERSONAL APPROACH TO HERR SCHMIDT ON THIS. OUR PROPOSALS MAY PRESENT SOME DIFFICULTY FOR THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT BUT I EXPECT THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO REACH AN ACCOMMODATION. AS I AM SURE YOU WILL APPRECIATE, IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT OUR GERMAN AND ITALIAN PARTNERS SHOULD BE FULLY AWARE OF THE STRENGTH OF ARAB INTEREST IN THE AIRCRAFT.

YOU ALSO ASKED ME ABOUT CONTINUITY OF SUPPLY. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THIS GOVERNMENT ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO OUR REPUTATION AS A RELIABLE ARMS SUPPLIER AND I FEEL CONFIDENT THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO DEVISE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH PROVIDE THE SAFEGUARDS WHICH YOU REQUIRE.

I VERY MUCH LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN DURING YOUR VISIT HERE IN APRIL.

MARGARET THATCHER

CARRINGTON

LIMITED
DEFD
NENAD
MED
WED
SIR J GRAHAM
SIR A ACLAND
MR J MOBERLY
MR. P. MOBERLY

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GR 500

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FM AMMAN 311625Z MAR 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 116 OF 31 MAR

AND T^O IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR PS/HDS)

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD

INFO SAVING TO BONN

YOUR TELS NOS 112 AND 113: TORNADO.

1. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN TODAY SHORTLY AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF TWO DAYS OF PRESENTATIONS ON TORNADO BY A BRITISH AEROSPACE TEAM (ON WHICH MY AIR ATTACH IS TELEGRAPHING A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT). THE KING HAD IN FACT ASKED ME TWICE IN THE LAST 24 HOURS WHEN HE COULD EXPECT A RESPONSE TO HIS LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF 18 FEBRUARY: THE ARRIVAL OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY COULD NOT THEREFORE HAVE BEEN MORE TIMELY. THE KING READ IT CAREFULLY, WAS EVIDENTLY WELL PLEASED WITH ITS CONTENTS AND SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THE MATTER FURTHER WITH MRS THATCHER AT THEIR MEETING IN LONDON ON 8 APRIL.
2. THE KING SAID HE HAD BEEN QUITE SATISFIED WITH THE PRESENTATION HE HAD ATTENDED ON 3rd MARCH BUT THAT HE HAD NOT YET HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEBRIEF HIS AIR FORCE ADVISERS ON THE MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WHICH TOOK PLACE EARLIER TODAY. HE SAID IT WAS, HOWEVER, THE POLITICAL ASPECTS WHICH WORRIED HIM MOST AND PARTICULARLY WHETHER WE WOULD SUCCEED IN OVERCOMING THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT'S RESERVATIONS. WHEN I REFERRED TO THE DIFFICULTY WE WERE HAVING IN CONVINCING THE GERMANS THAT THE SALE OF TORNADO TO MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES WAS A SERIOUS PROSPECT (BONN TELNO 194 OF 23 MARCH REFERS) THE KING SAID HE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE PRIME MINISTER BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO HERR SCHMIDT OR AT A SUITABLY HIGH LEVEL WITHIN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT IF THIS WOULD HELP. HE WOULD ALSO CONSIDER ASKING THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF TO SPEAK TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR HERE.
3. THE KING WENT ON TO SAY THAT GERMAN RELUCTANCE TO SELL LEOPARD II TO SAUDI ARABIA AND ALSO THEIR REFUSAL TO SUPPLY HELICOPTERS TO IRAQ FOR WHICH THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY ENTERED INTO CONTRACTS HAD MADE A PARTICULARLY BAD IMPRESSION ON THE IRAQIS. HE WOULD, HOWEVER, BE COMMUNICATING THE GIST OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO SADDAM HUSSAIN WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO AND HE MADE IT CLEAR HOW MUCH IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHES TO CARRYING THE IRAQIS WITH HIM FROM THE OUTSET ON TORNADO. YOU WILL SEE FROM MY AIR ATTACHE'S TELEGRAM ON THE TORNADO PRESENTATIONS THAT, WHILE THE JORDANIANS SEEM TO BE FOCUSSED MAINLY ON THE PROPOSED NEW AIR SUPERIORITY AIRCRAFT DERIVED FROM TORNADO WHICH WOULD BE DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY TO MEET ARAB REQUIREMENTS, THE IRAQIS SEEM TO BE SHOWING GREATER INTEREST IN THE IDS VARIANT OF TORNADO.
4. THE MOD SALES/BAE TEAM WILL OF COURSE BE REPORTING MORE FULLY ON THEIR RETURN. I HAVE, HOWEVER, SEEN THE KING ON FOUR SEPARATE OCCASIONS DURING THE LAST 48 HOURS AND BELIEVE HIS INTEREST HAS BEEN WELL AND TRULY AROUSED. ABOVE ALL, I THINK HE HAS GRASPED

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CONFIDENTIAL

THE ADVANTAGES TO THE ARABS OF ENTERING INTO ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PURCHASE OF A FAMILY OF AIRCRAFT WHICH ALREADY EXISTS RATHER THAN THE MIRAGE 4000 WHICH IS STILL ONLY IN PROTOTYPE FORM. BUT THE FRENCH HAVE A LONG LEAD AND WE STILL HAVE A LOT OF LEEWAY TO MAKE UP, PARTICULARLY ON THE POLITICAL ASPECTS. THE FACT THAT KING HUSSEIN WILL NOW BE ACCOMPANIED ON HIS VISIT TO THE UK BY DR TOUQAN, HIS SCIENTIFIC ADVISER, IS A MOST ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT AND BAE AND MOD SALES ARE ALREADY PLANNING AN APPROPRIATE PROGRAMME FOR HIM.

FCO PASS SAVING TO BONN

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

URWICK

LIMITED

DEF-D

NENAD

MED

WED

SIR J. GRAHAM

SIR A. ACLAND

MR. J. C. MOBERLY

MR. P. H. MOBERLY

SECRET

(C)



MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 6621 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

D/MIN/TT/19/7

Mr. Crosby
Mr. Jenner

23 March 1981

Rem
24/3

MED
cc RP
PS/LRP
PS/WR/blend
PS/PUS
Sir T. Graham
Mr Bullard
Sir A. Acland

Dear Prime Minister

As you know from the letter from Peter Carrington's office dated 4th March, Sir Ronald Ellis, Head of Defence Sales, had discussions with the Iraqis on the overhaul of Chieftain tanks, and the long term supply of new tanks, in the course of his visit to Jordan from 10th to 13th March. The subject of Tornado was also discussed with King Hussein and Lieutenant General Sharif Zeid bin Shaker, Commander in Chief, Jordanian Armed Forces. I thought you would wish to know the outcome of his visit.

Mr P. P. ...
Mr J. ...
NEWA 17
Def. Dept

By arrangements made by King Hussein, Sir Ronald Ellis, accompanied by the Assistant Under Secretary of State (Sales), was flown in a Royal Flight aircraft to Baghdad on Thursday, 12th March, returning the same day, where meetings took place with President Saddam Hussain, Air Chief Marshal Adnan Khairallah Tulfah, Deputy Premier and Minister of Defence, and senior officers. A short record of both the principal meetings is attached. As you will see, the President particularly asked that his good wishes and message should be passed to you.

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These meetings represent a significant step forward in establishing a working relationship with Iraq, which, if we play it well, should produce both political and major commercial benefits. Contracts worth over £150m have been concluded in the last six months including one for £34m (for armoured recovery vehicles through Jordan) during Sir Ronald's visit. It is clear that they are disenchanted with the Soviets and wish to develop their contacts with Western countries, but not the United States, and without impinging on their independence as a country. Our willingness to supply arms will be a key indication of our intentions and the test case could

/ be ...

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP

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be our assistance in overhauling and repairing the 140 or so captured Chieftain tanks.

The President was realistic about the political difficulties of supplying armaments to them whilst the war continued, and said he did not wish to cause any country difficulties in this respect. In our case, he is agreeable to arranging the repair of tanks through Jordan, and on other sensitive items is prepared to negotiate, if necessary, on the basis that supply could not take place during the current conflict.

Contrary to earlier advice from Jordan, the Iraqis did not ask for the supply of new tanks and this, therefore, is not an issue at this stage. The refurbishment of the captured tanks is the first priority and it has been agreed that a small team from International Military Services should pay a further visit to Iraq to categorise those that only need maintenance to bring them into running order, and those that would need repair in Jordan. Spares would be supplied to Jordan and HDS made it clear that we could not supply ammunition whilst the war is on. Nevertheless, as discussed in OD on 29th January, our role in restoring these tanks to fighting trim could cause the Government difficulties when the matter became public, which we must assume it will.

Fortunately, the IMS exercise will take three to four months to complete, during which time advice on the line to take in public will be prepared and submitted for consideration by OD together with the circumstances under which it will be proposed the work should be undertaken, and whether it should go ahead.

In all this, we have to acknowledge the active part played by King Hussein in helping us get thus far with Iraq. Although he has his own interests much at heart, he obviously feels that he now has a special relationship and trust with the United Kingdom.

As regards Tornado, King Hussein welcomed the UK initiative as an alternative to the French option. A British Aerospace team will be visiting Amman on 28th March to make a presentation of Tornado and their proposals for collaboration on an advanced aircraft for the 1990s and beyond to meet the requirements of the Arab countries. This is the start of a long haul and one can be sceptical of the outcome (particularly as the Jordanians appear to be looking to the Iraqis and not the Saudis as their main partner), but the immediate purpose is to counter the French initiative which we appear to have accomplished so far.

/ Plans ...

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
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Plans are also in hand for King Hussein to fly Tornado next month; an invitation has also gone to the Saudis and one will shortly go to Sultan Qaboos to send a team over to evaluate the aircraft. We have had to be careful in this respect not to let the Omanis, for the time being at least, get too far ahead of the Jordanians, who see themselves as the leaders on this project.

All this is going ahead on the basis that we do not get a negative response from the Federal Republic of Germany to your message to Herr Schmidt. He has now sent you a temporising reply and officials have been invited to go to Germany to discuss the Middle East requirement. In these circumstances we shall still press ahead on a national basis.

A reply to King Hussein's letter is being prepared separately and will be with you shortly.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Peter Carrington. He may feel that we are pressing ahead too fast, but if we don't I fear we could end up by letting the market go to French and American aircraft and there are naughty suggestions that the Germans would not mind selling Leopard while holding us up on Tornado.



Lord Trenchard

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

MEETING WITH THE DEPUTY PREMIER AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE
AIR CHIEF MARSHAL ADNAN KHAIKHALAH TULFAH
THURSDAY 12 MARCH 1981

1. HDS stressed that there was no lack of willingness on the part of UK Ministers to supply defence equipment to Iraq but there were three major problems involved.
2. The first was that Iraq was at war with Iran and this raised difficult political issues regarding neutrality, etc: we could not be seen to be unduly favouring one side in the conflict. Secondly, Western prices were bound to be greater than those that they had enjoyed from the Soviets. Thirdly, there was the problem of security and the presence of Soviet Advisers and the KGB in the country. Our equipments were largely designed for use in NATO and in many cases therefore were highly classified. We would have to consider a security agreement to ensure that our information was safeguarded.
3. The Minister of Defence welcomed HDS's visit and said that he fully accepted that these were real difficulties. On the first point they were pragmatic and were prepared to deal through Jordan if necessary, or not accept deliveries until the conflict was ended. He knew of the difference in prices but provided these we put forward were reasonable he did not regard this as an insuperable problem and suggested this was left to the experts. On the question of security, it was important to Iraq to show that there was no leakage of information. They had received requests from several sources, including the UK, for information on damage to equipments and had refused all of them. They would not give us information on the T.72 or the Soviets information on Chieftain. The same applied in respect of the French equipment they had.
4. HDS commented that in the light of the Minister's remarks he thought we had enough basis on which to negotiate and he would report back accordingly to his Secretary of State.
5. The Minister of Defence concluded the discussions by saying again how welcome the meeting was. It was a surprise and very sudden and he hoped that the next visit would be longer. He understood that we had already begun detailed discussions with Lt Gen Jenab and hoped that these would be constructive in agreeing the way ahead. Lt Gen Jenab had his full authority to discuss these matters.

MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN AND HEAD OF DEFENCE
SALES - THURSDAY 12 MARCH 1981

1. After the initial courtesies the President said that before they went on to discuss the main purpose of HDS's visit, which he well understood, he thought it was essential to get the politics right. We should realise that his people had thought badly of the British for reasons that we were well aware of - indeed they had been hostile. The Government was bound to take account of the people's views although it was not always the deciding factor and it had been his wish for some time to have good relationships with the UK. Indeed, he had told our Ambassador this in 1969 but doubted if the message had been understood. In those days perhaps Saddam Hussain was not as well known as he is today and not enough importance was attached to what he had said. However, that was now all behind us and he welcomed our visit. The President went on to say that the majority of opinion in the country was still against dealing with the US but that too could well change.

2. The proof of other country's intentions towards Iraq lay in the willingness to supply them with armaments. All countries wanted to take advantage of commercial trading relationships but one was not possible without the other. He desired to have good relations with European countries such as ourselves, France, Italy and Germany and once these had been established, for his part the links would be honoured and should be to the benefit of both parties. He quoted the example of France where he had allowed them to uplift oil at \$2 per barrel less than he could have got, but the French part of the bargain was to deliver the Mirage aircraft which they had on contract.

3. The President went on to say that although he wished to establish friendly relationships with other countries they had learnt from hard experience that these must be without prejudice to an independent Iraq, without alignment to any side.

4. He now welcomed the fact that UK Ministers took a favourable view towards Iraq and he very much hoped that when the conditions were right the Prime Minister and other Ministers would visit his country. Dr Hammadi, the Foreign Minister, was currently in UK having discussions. Turning to the purpose of HDS's visit he said that he understood that in the current circumstances the supply of certain arms could be politically embarrassing. He did not want to put any country in that position and he mentioned, as an example, a message he had just sent to President Giscard d'Estaing saying that if the continued supply of the Mirage aircraft was embarrassing during the French election campaign then Iraq would be prepared to wait. He confirmed that he was agreeable to using Jordan if necessary, if it was more convenient to arrange supply through that country, and he also

accepted that the supply of certain other items could be conditional on the cessation of the conflict with Iran. He asked for his greetings and message to be conveyed to the Prime Minister.

5. Discussion continued after lunch but this was largely about his political philosophy which he thought was not very well understood outside Iraq. He believed that it was essential to take account of the opinion of the people and to look after the interests of the majority! They all had to work together for the common good and he would not tolerate any actions to the contrary even from his own family. He told us that just recently in a traffic accident his 16 year old son had gone to draw his revolver and for this his son was still in jail. Other relatives who had sought to take advantage of their position had been confined to primitive quarters and fed with the minimum means of sustenance.

Comment

6. The President gave the appearance of a man who was rather tired and weary but he was impressive in the deliberate and clear way in which he spoke. He seemed to be totally realistic about the problems of supplying them with arms whilst the current conflict continued. It is clear that he has a high opinion of King Hussein who, he said, was not a man of the monarchy but of the people and would not be able to stay in power without the popular support he now enjoyed. There was no doubt about his wish to deal with the UK but we shall be judged by what we achieve and not by what we say. The opportunities for very large business of all kinds in the defence field are there to be exploited if we have the will and determination to do so.

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IZZIDDIN, IBRAHIM

Ambassador to London.

Born 1934, Amman. A graduate of the American University of Beirut (BA Political Science). A career civil servant, he has filled a remarkably wide variety of posts in the public service, in the Ministry of Communications, the Prime Minister's office, the Department of Press and Publications, the Press Section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alia, the then Ministry of Culture and Information, and the Royal Hashemite Diwan (Court) where he was Press Secretary to the King. Has served as Ambassador in Berne and Bonn before his present posting. He had a very good reputation with the Germans in Bonn and expresses the intention of keeping actively in touch with the FCO and more widely with moulders of opinion in London.

Married, but with no children. He is regarded as intelligent, honest and straightforward. His wife comes from a rich Circassian family. They are both friendly and enjoy Western social life. Reputedly keen on sports.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

You could see him
after questions on Tuesday,
2 April - Agree?

2 March 1981

Yes
think 2/3 out

Dear Michael,

Visit by King Hussein

King Hussein is planning to visit London in April. He has told our Ambassador in Amman that he very much hopes that it may be possible for him to meet the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington while he is here. I imagine the Prime Minister would, as usual, wish to see him.

We do not as yet have any firm dates but the Ambassador suggests that we might work on the basis of the King being here during the week beginning 6 April and he is sure that, if the Prime Minister were to offer a time then, the King would arrange his visit to include it. The King is due to address the Staff College at Camberley on 8 April and will be at Sandhurst, where he is taking this years Sovereign's Parade, from the afternoon of 9 April until the afternoon of 10 April. Sometime on 6 or 7 April might therefore be best.

If the Prime Minister agrees, the Secretary of State would welcome the opportunity to attend the meeting.


Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing st

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2 MAR 1981



Postage and communication charges

are always included



Jordan
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Dear Caroline, ^{cl.} 23/3.

20 March 1981

King Hussein's Visit to Britain

This is to confirm that we have now rearranged the King's call on the Prime Minister and it is now fixed for 09.30 on 8 April.

Yours ever
C. Jebb.

(C Jebb)
Assistant Private Secretary

Miss Caroline Stephens
10 Downing Street
LONDON



Send

10 DOWNING STREET

Note for the Kilo

I told Chris
Jebb that since
he would have
16300 - Tuesday
7th April or 0930
on Wednesday
8th April. No
alternative being
offered.

es.



Jordan

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 March 1981

Dear Caroline,

King Hussein's Visit to Britain

You indicated yesterday that if King Hussein were unable to see the Prime Minister at 4.30 on 7 April, there might be time available in the Prime Minister's diary on 8 April.

The Ministry of Defence, who are arranging the King's programme have said that 10.30-11.30 on 8 April would be possible or from 6.00 pm onwards that evening. Please let me know whether either of these times is possible for the Prime Minister. The Secretary of State returns from the Far East on 9 April.


Yours ever
C. J. J.

(C Q G Jebb)
Assistant Private Secretary


Miss Caroline Stephens
10 Downing Street

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS



16 MAR 1961



Jordan jfh

BF 6/4/81

3 March 1981

Visit by King Hussein

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 2 March. She would be happy to see King Hussein on 7 April at 1630 for an hour.

I should be grateful if you could let me have a brief the previous day.

MODBA

F.N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.