



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 November 1981

Dear Michael,

King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister

I enclose briefing for King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister at 10.00 hours on 17 November.

It has not yet been seen by the Secretary of State, but a copy will go in his weekend box.

Yours ever,

F N Richards
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St



KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER :
17 NOVEMBER AT 10 AM

Points to make

Arab-Israel

1. Pleased to hear that King's visit to Washington successful.
Some signs of shift in US thinking (eg Reagan on Fahd) but
Israelis putting pressure on them.

Fahd principles

2. Lord Carrington encouraged by visit to Riyadh. Saudis
seeking Arab support at Fez. Great opportunity for Arabs to
show that they are ready to negotiate peace with Israel.

3. Ten cannot endorse Fahd - too specific on some points for
negotiation. But welcome as common Arab negotiating position.
Looking to period post - April 1982 for further progress towards
comprehensive settlement.

Sinai MFO

4. Four would-be participants discussing with US, who made
request. Believe should be able to find a basis on which we can
participate while making clear commitment to existing Venice policy
and independence of other aspects of Camp David process.

Lebanon

5. Did King discuss with Americans? Israelis making threatening
noises. But so far Americans have successfully restrained them
from invasion. Hope Habib will be able to build on ceasefire
when he returns to area.

6. Recent meeting of Arab Follow Up Committee produced useful
decisions. Remains to be seen if they can be implemented. Saudis

/told



told Lord Carrington they still hoped for progress. Hope there will be some movement before campaign for Presidential election (August 1982) closes off possible compromises.

Secretary of State's visit to Jordan and Syria

7. Secretary of State looking forward to visit to Jordan in the Spring.

Israeli excavations in Jerusalem [if raised]

8. Fully recognise special importance of Jerusalem to all parties. Britain will not accept any unilateral initiative to change the status of the City. We have always made clear our view that Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem is illegal.

West Bank and Gaza

9. Disturbing that Israeli military administration is cracking down again on West Bank, after disturbances at Bir Zeit and elsewhere.

10. Israel's decision to 'civilianise' administration of West Bank/Gaza more publicity than substance so far. What is King's view of proposals? Will any Palestinians be persuaded to accept senior positions?



KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER:

17 NOVEMBER AT 10 AM

Essential Facts

1. King Hussein arrives on 15 November and leaves on 18 November. The visit is as usual a private one. The King is on his return journey to Amman from the United States, where he paid a State visit on 2 and 3 November followed by a private visit to the West Coast and to Canada. The King was due to see Mr Trudeau during his visit to Canada.

2. The King accompanied by Queen Noor will visit New Scotland Yard on the afternoon of 17 November. The visit was arranged at the King's request, apparently out of no more than personal interest.

A 3. Records of the King's call on the Prime Minister and his
B discussion with the Secretary of State on 28 October are attached.

Arab-Israel

4. King Hussein was pleased with his visit to Washington, where he seemed to establish a good relationship with President Reagan. Washington telnos 3317 and 3347 reporting the visit are attached. The press has since reported that King Hussein told the Americans that he was willing to negotiate with Israel on the basis of the Fahd principles. The Americans have informed the Israelis, who have unsurprisingly rejected this offer.

5. Further background material on the Secretary of State's visit to Riyadh is attached (Riyadh telno 3). The Jordanians, although initially reserved about the principles (perhaps because of traditional Saudi-Hashemite hostility) have since indicated that they support them fully.

/Sinai



Sinai

E 6. The latest position is set out in Washington telnos 3383-4 and FCO telnos 493-4 to Paris (attached). We are still discussing with the Greeks the text of the statement by the Ten. There are clearly rumours about Arab reaction. If we can obtain Greek agreement to the texts as now proposed, the next step is to work out a timetable for delivering the letters to the US, Egypt and Israel governments, making our national statements and releasing the statement of the Ten. When King Hussein was in London he appeared relatively relaxed about our participation as long as it was made clear that we were not involving ourselves in Camp David as a whole. It is important that the announcement be made as long in advance of the FeZ Summit as possible, since the temptation for the Arabs to put pressure on us not to participate will otherwise be irresistible. It would be useful to enlist the King's support against Arab retaliation on participants in the Force.

Lebanon

7. Haig remains worried about an Israeli invasion. Israeli ministers have made statements warning that they may have to take action against Palestinian groups in South Lebanon whom they accuse of having violated the ceasefire (in fact except for the occasional incident the PLO have been content to gain political credit by keeping the ceasefire). Although the Israelis could mount air, sea or limited ground attacks at short notice, we believe that they are unlikely to move against the Palestinians before Habib's next visit, now due in early December (but not yet announced by the Americans).

8. The chances of Habib making progress in building on the ceasefire in ways envisaged by the now defunct US/UN plan (eg further deployment of UNIFIL) are not good. Although the PLO have hinted that they might make concessions in exchange for Israeli movement, the Israelis are adamant in refusing any move which would mean in effect negotiating with the PLO. In any case they are in no mood for concessions. The Americans have told us that Habib's main aim will be to prevent any deterioration in the
/situation



situation and to boost the Saudi role in Central Lebanon.

9. In Central Lebanon the ministerial meeting of the Arab Follow Up Committee (AFUC) on 7 November produced decisions as expected on coastal monitoring to prevent illegal imports of arms, and measures to lessen tension on the demarcation line in Beirut. Chances of successful implementation are slim. But meanwhile security in West Beirut has recently improved following a Syrian move to disarm all militias there. There is evidence however to suggest that the Syrians, while pretending to be helpful, may be quite happy to see AFUC make little progress until after the Presidential elections (August 1982). There is likely to be more tension and less incentive to compromise as the election approaches.

10. Lord Carrington told the Saudis during his recent visit how much we appreciated their efforts in Lebanon. The Saudis do not despair of making progress and hinted that they would try to have the Presidential election postponed.

Secretary of State's visit to Jordan

11. The Secretary of State has agreed to visit Jordan and Syria in the early part of 1982. The Jordanians welcome the visit at any time suitable to Lord Carrington.

Israeli excavations in Jerusalem

12. This is a long standing Arab complaint. It has recently been revived by the Jordanians, who have circulated a note in Amman as well as at the UN demanding that pressure be brought to bear on Israel to stop excavations in Jerusalem.

13. The allegations, some wildly exaggerated, are that Israel's true purpose in continuing excavations in Jerusalem is to progressively 'Judaize' the City by obliterating Arab and Islamic monuments. The Jordanians also claim that recent excavations are undermining the Temple Mount on which the Al Aqsa Mosque, the



third most holy sanctuary in Islam is situated.

14. UNESCO has debated the issue regularly. The Ten have consistently abstained on the grounds that resolutions produced by the Arabs were either highly political (and therefore unsuitable for UNESCO) or contained highly exaggerated claims. Arab allegations are not borne out by the annual reports of the UNESCO Director General's Special Representative, Professor Lemaire, who, while making minor criticisms of the Israeli work, has stated that there is no threat to the structure of the Temple Mount.

15. The Syrians repeated Jordanian complaints against the Israelis in a recent UN resolution. All the Ten abstained. We want to avoid having to pronounce on the rights and wrongs of the Israeli excavations, and prefer to reply on our already stated position on Jerusalem, ie that Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967 is in contravention of the 4th Geneva Convention and that we will not accept any unilateral initiative to change the status of the City.

West Bank

16. The Israeli Military Administration has recently resorted to curfews, roadblocks and the closure of the main Arab university at Bir Zeit in response to a series of demonstrations. Following the stabbing of an Israeli settler in Hebron last month, houses of two suspects were demolished and the house of a third sealed up.

17. The demonstrations were sparked off mainly by an Israeli decision to replace military personnel in the Military Administration by civilians, and to recruit local Palestinians to senior positions (while retaining the Military Government as the supreme authority). Palestinians see this move as the first step towards formal annexation of the West Bank.

18. Although a civilian governor of the West Bank has been appointed, it is doubtful whether the Israelis will succeed in



persuading Palestinians to take up senior positions. The
Defence Minister, Mr Sharon, may only be hoping to create the
illusion of a new initiative to help boost the autonomy talks,
and attract enough Palestinians into senior positions to
convince the Americans that real 'autonomy' has been achieved.

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3317 OF 5 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, CAIRO

INFO SAVING TO BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, JERUSALEM

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US/JORDAN

1. HOWELL (COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR THE LEVANT) BRIEFED US TODAY ON KING HUSSEIN'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON FROM 2-5 NOVEMBER WITH REAGAN, BUSH, HAIG AND WEINBERGER. THE KING ALSO HAD A NUMBER OF MEETINGS WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. HE HAS NOW LEFT WASHINGTON FOR A VISIT TO CALIFORNIA.
2. HOWELL DESCRIBED THE VISIT AS A RESOUNDING SUCCESS. REAGAN AND HUSSEIN HAD ESTABLISHED A GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP. HOWELL THOUGHT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE KING AND THAT HE WAS COMING TO REALISE THAT ARABS WHO OPPOSED THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS WERE NOT NECESSARILY MONSTERS.
3. THE AMERICANS BELIEVED THAT THEY HAD SUCCEEDED IN REASSURING HUSSEIN, BY THEIR REFERENCES TO THE NEED TO MAINTAIN QUOTE THE UNIQUE AND ENDURING CHARACTER OF JORDAN UNQUOTE THAT THEY DID NOT ACCEPT THE SHARON THESIS OF A PALESTINIAN STATE IN JORDAN.
4. THEY ACCEPTED THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS NOT GOING TO JOIN THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS BUT HAD NEVERTHELESS GIVEN HIM SATISFACTION BY REAFFIRMING THE US COMMITMENT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 I.E. WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES IN RETURN FOR PEACE. HOWELL COMMENTED THAT HE HAD HAD QUITE A STRUGGLE TO GET THIS LINE ACCEPTED IN THE US BUREAUCRACY: THE CLINCHING ARGUMENT HAD BEEN THAT 242 WAS THE FOUNDATION OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS AND HAD BEEN ACCEPTED AS SUCH BY BEGIN. HE ADDED THAT THE EXTENT OF POSSIBLE MINOR BORDER ADJUSTMENTS HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE KING. VELIOTES TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF FAHD'S EIGHT POINTS: THE JORDANIANS HAD MAKE KNOWN THEIR VIEWS ON THEM IN ADVANCE OF THE KING'S VISIT.
5. HOWELL SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN USEFUL DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC ISSUES AND THAT HUSSEIN BROADLY SHARED THE ADMINISTRATION'S CONCERNS ON THIS SCORE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE JORDANIANS HAD BEEN SATISFIED BY THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED ON ARMS SUPPLIES (OF WHICH HE WAS UNABLE TO GIVE DETAILS) BOTH DURING THE KING'S VISIT AND AT THE MEETINGS OF THE US/JORDAN MILITARY COMMISSION WHICH PRECEDED IT. HE ADDED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NO INTENTION AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT OF SUPPLYING MOBILE I-HAWK MISSILES OR ADVANCED FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. THE JORDANIANS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE TO CHOOSE THEIR MOMENT FOR PUTTING SALES PROPOSALS TO CONGRESS. THIS WOULD BE DONE WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS.

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3347 OF 6 NOVEMBER

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MY TELNO 3317 : US/JORDAN

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1. STOESSEL TOLD ME ON 5 NOVEMBER THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD DONE HIS BEST TO PLAY DOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS FOR THE SUPPLY OF SAMS. HE HAD SAID THAT THE NECESSARY TRAINING WOULD TAKE PLACE IN MOSCOW SO THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE A LOT OF RUSSIANS IN JORDAN.
 2. STOESSEL SAID THAT HUSSEIN HAD APPROACHED THE AMERICANS FOR SIMILAR WEAPONS BUT HAD NOT BEEN CONTENT WITH THE TERMS AND DATE OF DELIVERY. HE THOUGHT THAT THE KING MIGHT WELL HAVE BEEN HOIST WITH HIS OWN ATTEMPT AT BLACKMAIL.
 3. STOESSEL ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT HUSSEIN HAD BEEN VERY PLEASED WITH HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND THAT HE HAD ESTABLISHED A GOOD BASIS OF RELATIONS WITH REAGAN.

4. IN A SPEECH TODAY TO THE LOS ANGELES WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL HUSSEIN SAID
QUOTE

I AM AWARE THAT THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT IS REGARDED IN THE UNITED STATES AS A GREAT AND HISTORIC ACHIEVEMENT. FOR OUR PART, WE SEE THE FAILURE OF CAMP DAVID NOT IN WHAT IT DID BUT IN WHAT IT FAILED TO DO. WE REJOICE IN EGYPT'S RECOVERY OF SINAI AND, AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY SAID, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO ATTAIN A FINAL COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT WHICH ISRAEL AND ALL HER NEIGHBOURS CAN ENJOY FOR ALL TIME IN OUR PART OF THE WORLD WHERE THE SECURITY OF ALL CAN BE GUARANTEED. SUCH A PEACE MUST HOWEVER ACCORD TO THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE EXACTLY THE SAME TERMS THAT CAMP DAVID ACCORDED TO EYPT ISRAEL MADE A DEAL WITH EGYPT TRADING TERRITORY FOR PEACE. THE SAME PRINCIPLES MUST APPLY TO OTHERS, PARTICULARLY TO THE PALESTINIANS, IN TERMS OF THEIR FULL RIGHTS OVER THEIR NOW OCCUPIED NATIVE SOIL. UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS I WOULD SUGGEST THAT A REAL SECURE LASTING PEACE IS ISRAEL'S FOR THE ASKING UNQUOTE.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3 OF 4 NOVEMBER.

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, JEDDA, PARIS, BONN, PRIORITY TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, ROUTINE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS AND OTHER EEC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO RIYADH : ARAB ISRAEL : FAHD PROPOSALS

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD TWO HOURS OF TALKS WITH PRINCE SAUD THIS MORNING, FOLLOWED BY A SHORT CALL ON THE KING AND TALKS WITH PRINCE FAHD (AT BOTH OF WHICH PRINCE SAUD WAS PRESENT). THE SAUDI PROPOSALS WERE THE MAIN TOPIC OF THE TALKS WITH SAUD AND FAHD : DISCUSSION OF OTHER SUBJECTS (INCLUDING THE SINAI FORCE) IS RECORDED SEPARATELY.

2. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SAUDI PROPOSALS WAS NOT IN ANY NOVELTY IN THEIR COMMENTS BUT IN THEIR CONSOLIDATION INTO A SINGLE PACKAGE TO FOCUS INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. IF ENDORSED AT THE FEZ SUMMIT, THEY WOULD REACH A NEW LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE. ARAFAT HAD GIVEN THEM CONSTANT SUPPORT UP TO AND DURING HIS VISIT TO RIYADH WHICH ENDED ON 3 NOVEMBER. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN A CONSTANT MEASURE OF OPPOSITION TO THE PROPOSALS WITHIN THE PLO, GENERALLY REFLECTING OUTSIDE INTERESTS, NOT LEAST THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION. DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW, ARAFAT HAD FOUND THE RUSSIANS FORTHCOMING ON SOME NON-SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE PLO, BUT OPPOSED TO THE 8 POINTS, SA'UD THOUGHT THAT THE PLO WOULD SUPPORT THE 8 POINTS AT THE SUMMIT. THE LIBYANS WOULD BE OPPOSED, AS (THOUGH WITH LESS DETERMINATION) WOULD THE SYRIANS (PRINCE ABDULLAH LATER TOLD ME HE BELIEVED THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT OPPOSE). THERE WAS NOW A PROSPECT OF AN ARAB CONSENSUS ON THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH HAD NOT BEEN ACHIEVED SINCE CAMP DAVID. IN ANSWER TO MY QUERY, HE SAID THAT UNANIMOUS ENDORSEMENT AT FEZ WOULD NOT BE ESSENTIAL, PROVIDED THAT A LARGE MAJORITY INCLUDING THE PLO WERE IN FAVOUR. HE HOPED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THIS CONSENSUS TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD. HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY US REACTIONS, WHICH HE HOPED REFLECTED A TURNABOUT IN US OPINION.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ONE COULD NOT REALISTICALLY EXPECT ANYTHING TO HAPPEN UNTIL NEXT APRIL: THE EGYPTIANS COULD NOT INDICATE ANY CHANGE OF COURSE UNTIL THEY HAD SINAI BACK. OBVIOUSLY THE NEXT STEP MUST BE NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING THOSE MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED, WHO WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE THE PLO. IF THE PLO ACCEPTED A STATEMENT AT FEZ WHICH SIGNALLED THAT SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD LEAD TO RECOGNITION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, THIS WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE EUROPEANS TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH THE PALESTINIANS. US ATTITUDES DID INDEED

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SEEM TO BE EVOLVING AWAY FROM THEIR EARLIER EXCLUSIVE PREOCCUPATION WITH SOVIET DOMINATION TO MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEMS (AS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S WASHINGTON POST INTERVIEW). THIS EXPLAINED THE SHARP ISRAELI REACTION TO THE 8 POINTS. THEY FEARED THAT THEY WERE SO OBVIOUSLY REASONABLE THAT THE WEST WOULD ENDORSE THEM. THE AMERICANS MUST BE PERSUADED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE LINES REPRESENTED THE ONLY WAY FORWARD: HE HOPED THAT THE COMBINED EFFORTS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT AND THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (WHERE ONE MIGHT CONSIDER WHETHER A HELPFUL STATEMENT COULD BE MADE) MIGHT DO SOMETHING TO ACHIEVE THIS.

4. PRINCE SA'UD RAISED THE QUESTION OF CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL BY THE PLO. HE HOPED THAT BRITAIN WOULD NOT FALL INTO THE VICIOUS CIRCLE IN WHICH THE US HAD BECOME CAUGHT BY PLACING CONDITIONS ON ITS WILLINGNESS TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH THE PALESTINIANS. THE PROSPECT OF A DIALOGUE MIGHT BE ONE ELEMENT WHICH WOULD HELP MOVE THE PALESTINIANS, BUT THE CART MUST NOT BE PUT BEFORE THE HORSE. PALESTINIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE 8 POINTS WOULD GIVE 80 PER CENT OF CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION, AND THIS QUESTION SHOULD NOT THEREAFTER REMAIN AN OBSTACLE TO DIALOGUE. HE AGREED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD ATTACK ANY SERIOUS ALTERNATIVE TO CAMP DAVID. HE WAS, HOWEVER, CONCERNED THAT THE US APPEARED TO WANT THE 8 POINTS TO REMAIN AS GENERAL PRINCIPLES WHICH THE ARABS WOULD KEEP IN MIND IN THEIR APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS, RATHER THAN A FIRM NEGOTIATING POSITION. HE WAS REMINDED OF THE FLEXIBILITY AND COMPROMISE WHICH THEY HAD SOUGHT FROM SADAT AT THE OUTSET OF THE CAMP DAVID NEGOTIATIONS. NOTHING WOULD BE ACHIEVED BY NEGOTIATIONS WHICH DID NOT HAVE A CLEAR-CUT BASIS. THE US ARGUMENT SEEMED BASED ON THE FALSE PREMISE THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT SECURE ENOUGH TO COMPROMISE: WOULD ISRAEL EVER EXPRESS MINIMUM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS WHICH FELL SHORT OF GUARANTEED MILITARY SUPERIORITY TO THE COMBINED STRENGTH OF THE ARAB STATES? THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT VELIOTES HAD BEEN WORRIED THAT THE 8 POINTS WOULD BECOME A BOTTOM LINE PRESENTING A RIGID ARAB POSITION: PRINCE SA'UD SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD PERHAPS BEEN MORE EXPLICIT IN SPEAKING TO THE SAUDIS. THE ARABS NEEDED A COMMON POSITION TO RECONCILE THE INTERESTS OF THE VARIOUS ARAB PARTICIPANTS: ACCEPTING THE 8 POINTS COULD NOT POSSIBLY MAKE THEIR POSITION MORE RIGID THAN IT ALREADY WAS.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT BRITAIN ALREADY HAD CONTACTS WITH THE PLO. BUT IF THE EC PRESIDENCY COULD EXACT A PRICE FROM ARAFAT FOR A MEETING, THIS WOULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON US THINKING WHICH AN UNCONDITIONAL MEETING COULD NOT HAVE.

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IF, AFTER FEZ, ARAFAT WOULD CONFIRM HIS CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST, THIS WOULD DEMONSTRATE TO THE AMERICANS THAT THE PLO WAS NO LONGER THE TERRORIST ORGANISATION DEDICATED TO THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL THAT ISRAEL CLAIMED IT WAS, WOULD OPEN THE WAY TO DIRECT AMERICAN CONTACT WITH THE PLO AND PLACE THEM UNDER GREAT PRESSURE TO MOVE THE ISRAELIS TOWARDS NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO. PRINCE SA'UD REPEATED THAT HE HOPED THAT LORD CARRINGTON COULD MEET ARAFAT WITHOUT FURTHER CONDITIONS ONCE THE PLO HAD ACCEPTED THE 8 POINTS. THE PLO EXISTED TO LIBERATE OCCUPIED PALESTINE, AND COULD NOT ACCEPT THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION AT THIS STAGE WITHOUT DESTROYING IS OWN CREDIBILITY. TO PUSH ARAFAT TO GO FURTHER THAN HE COULD WOULD DO THE PEACE PROCESS A DISSERVICE. THE PLO COULD ONLY COME CLOSER TO CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION THAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE 8 POINTS AS PART OF THE OUTCOME OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IT WAS HARD TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO NEGOTIATE WHILE PLO SPOKESMEN (EG QADDOUMI LAST SUMMER) CONTINUED TO SAY THAT THEY COULD NEVER LIVE AT PEACE WITH ISRAEL. EVEN AN OBLIQUE INDICATION THAT THE PLO WOULD LIVE AT PEACE WITH ISRAEL AFTER SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE US AND ISRAEL TO TALK TO THE PLO. PRINCE SA'UD SAID THAT WE SHOULD IGNORE EXTREMIST RHETORIC. HOWEVER SADAT'S FATE WOULD WARN ARAFAT AGAINST GETTING OUT ON A LIMB. IT WAS TO THE US THAT PRESSURE NOW NEEDED TO BE APPLIED.

6. SIR J GRAHAM SAID THAT THE QUESTION WAS ONE OF CLARITY. WE HAD TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT WE HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT THE RIGHT OF STATES IN THE AREA TO LIVE IN PEACE INCLUDED ISRAEL. EXTREMIST RHETORIC MADE PROGRESS DIFFICULT. PRINCE SA'UD SAID THAT CLARITY MIGHT NOT IMPROVE THINGS. EVERYBODY KNEW THAT THE RIGHT OF STATES TO LIVE IN PEACE INCLUDED ISRAEL. BUT ONLY MOVEMENT ON THE PART OF THE US COULD FRUSTRATE THE AIM OF EXTREMIST RHETORIC, WHICH WAS TO MAKE NEGOTIATIONS IMPOSSIBLE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN MIGHT BE UNWILLING TO MAKE ANY CONTENTIOUS MOVES ON THE MIDDLE EAST WITH THE SCARS OF THE AWACS DEBATE FRESH ON HIM.

7. IN TALKS WITH PRINCE FAHD, THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGAIN ARGUED THAT ENDORSEMENT OF THE 8 POINTS AT FEZ AND SUBSEQUENT MORE EXPLICIT CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE BY THE PLO OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE COULD OPEN THE WAY FIRST TO A EUROPEAN AND THEN AN AMERICAN DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO. PRINCE FAHD SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD ARAFAT THAT TO ZE SIRST WITH HIS ENDORSEMENT OF THE 8 POINTS WOULD HELP THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE. DESPITE SOME OPPOSITION IN THE PLO, THE ARAFAT FACTION SEEMED TO BE IN A POSITION TO DELIVER THIS SUPPORT. IF, AFTER FEZ, EUROPE AND THE US COULD ACCEPT THE 8 POINTS, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO ADDRESS THEM.

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8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS USED ARAB NON-RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AS AN EXSCUSE FOR REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE. THEY WOULD CLAIM THAT PRINCE FAHD'S 7TH POINT DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THEIR RIGHT TO EXIST, BECAUSE THE ARABS DID NOT RECOGNISE THAT ISRAEL WAS A STATE. IF, FOLLOWING HIS TALKS WITH PRINCE FAHD AND PRINCE SA'UD, HE WERE TO SAY IN RESPONSE TO ANY QUESTIONS, THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT IN THE SAUDI VIEW THE SEVENTH POINT INCLUDED ISRAEL, WOULD FAHD FEEL OBLIGED TO CONTRADICT HIM? PRINCE FAHD SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS, AS A COUNTRY IN THE REGION, NATURALLY INCLUDED. BUT WHY DID ISRAEL NOT FIRST ACCEPT THE 8 POINTS, AND OFFER CONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL PROVIDED THAT THE ARABS RECOGNISED THE ISRAELIS' RIGHT TO EXIST? INSTEAD, THEY REFUSED TO DISCUSS THE STATUS OF THE GAZA STRIP OR THE WEST BANK: THEY WANTED TO RECEIVE AND TO GIVE NOTHING. THE MAIN SUBJECT OF THE EIGHT POINTS WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE: THE 7TH POINT DEALT WITH ONE CONSEQUENCE OF THIS.

9. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE SAUDI PROPOSALS MADE IT POSSIBLE TO SEE A WAY AHEAD. HE HOPED THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL COULD SAY SOMETHING HELPFUL ABOUT THEM. PRINCE FAHD SAID THAT IT WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE TEN TO ISSUE SUCH A STATEMENT BEFORE THE FEZ SUMMIT MEETING ENDED ON 28 NOVEMBER. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHETHER THIS WOULD STIMULATE AN UNHELPFUL REACTION FROM THE MORE EXTREME ARAB GOVERNMENTS. PRINCE FAHD SAID THAT IT WOULD, ON THE CONTRARY, PUT THEM UNDER PRESSURE TO BE MORE

FORTHCOMING. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE WOULD DO HIS BEST WITH HIS COLLEAGUES, BUT COULD MAKE NO PROMISES. NOR WOULD HE BE ABLE TO OFFER MORE THAN A GENERAL STATEMENT OF SUPPORT: THE TEN WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ENDORSE EACH INDIVIDUAL PRINCIPLE. PRINCE SA'UD SAID THAT THE SAUDIS NEEDED FIRST A STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FROM THE TEN BEFORE THE FEZ SUMMIT DEBATED THE 8 POINTS, AND SECOND A REACTION FROM THE TEN IF A STATEMENT BASED ON THEM WAS MADE AT FEZ. PRINCE FAHD ADDED THAT IF THIS OPPORTUNITY WAS LOST, IT WAS HARD TO IMAGINE WHEN THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER.

10. FOR DISCUSSION OF THE SINAI FORCE AT THESE TWO MEETINGS, SEE MIFT.

FCC PASS ALL

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3383 OF 10 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE TO EC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO AND TEL AVIV

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 490 TO PARIS: SINAI FORCE

1. WE HAD A FURTHER MEETING WITH HAIG TODAY, FOLLOWING THE SAME FORMAT AS YESTERDAY (MY TELEGRAM NO 3363).

MIFT CONTAINS THE RECORD AGREED BY THE FOUR NOTETAKERS.

2. I SPOKE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JOINT INSTRUCTIONS, CHANGING THE ORDER SO AS TO CONCLUDE BY FOCUSING ON THE NEW DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE FOUR. HAIG IMMEDIATELY VOLUNTEERED THAT THIS WAS AN EXCELLENT STATEMENT AND THAT HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH IT. HE SHOWED SOME UNEASE ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THIS STATEMENT AND THE FULLER STATEMENTS TO BE MADE BY EACH GOVERNMENT IN EXPLANATION OF THEIR DECISION. HE WONDERED WHY ANY FURTHER STATEMENT WAS NECESSARY. HE APPEARED FINALLY TO ACCEPT THE EXPLANATION THAT THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS WOULD USE THE MATERIAL WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN OUT OF THE ORIGINAL DRAFT IN EXPLAINING THE DECISION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT NATIONAL PRACTICE, TO THEIR PARLIAMENTS OR PUBLIC. BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT WE SHALL HEAR MORE FROM HIM ON THIS WHEN HE HAS THOUGHT ABOUT IT. I SENSED A CONCERN THAT ~~SOME~~^{FOUR} SIMILAR STATEMENTS MAY BE SEIZED ON BY THE ISRAELIS AS OVERRIDING THE STATEMENT COMMUNICATED TO THEM. (THERE WAS A SLIGHT AMBIGUITY BETWEEN THE FRENCH INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH APPEARED TO ENVISAGE ABSOLUTELY IDENTICAL STATEMENTS, AND OUR OWN WHICH REFERRED TO USING THE WHOLE OF THE STATEMENT IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER. IN EXPLAINING OUR INTENTIONS TO HAIG WE LEFT ROOM FOR SOME FLEXIBILITY FOR INDIVIDUAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE FORM THOUGH NOT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATERIAL TO BE PRESENTED.)

3. HAIG'S PRINCIPAL CONCERN WAS WITH THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THEN TEN, WHICH HE THOUGHT MIGHT UNDO THE GOOD EFFECT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE FOUR. HE AGAIN QUESTIONED WHY ANY STATEMENT OF THE TEN WAS NECESSARY AND ARGUED FOR A DELAY BEFORE PUBLICATION AND FOR ONE TEXTUAL CHANGE. (THE TEXTUAL CHANGE IS NOT VERY SIGNIFICANT (SEE MIFT) AND THE THREE AMBASSADORS AND I AGREED SUBSEQUENTLY TO RECOMMEND IT TO OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS AS IT TENDS TO BRING THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN CLOSER INTO LINE WITH THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR.) THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR AND I TOLD HAIG THAT WE SAW NO PROSPECT FOR DELAY BUT THAT WE WOULD REPORT HIS SUGGESTION. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR STRUCK A MORE EFFUSIVE NOTE AND TOLD US AFTERWARDS THAT HE WAS IMPRESSED BY HAIG'S CONCERN ON THIS POINT AND WOULD RECOMMEND DELAY TO ROME.

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4. HAIG WAS AGAIN VERY CALM AND EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS ONLY LOOKING FOR WAYS TO CARRY THE OPERATION FORWARD AND TO AVOID POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ISRAELIS WHICH COULD UNDO THE WHOLE EFFORT AND LEAD TO A MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. AFTER THE FORMAL DISCUSSION HAD ENDED HE COMMENTED THAT WE HAD MADE VERY GOOD PROGRESS TODAY.

5. THE ONLY IMMEDIATE OUTSTANDING QUESTION IS THEREFORE THE POSSIBLE TEXTUAL CHANGE IN THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN AND THE QUESTION OF WHETHER IT COULD BE DELAYED AFTER THE ISSUE OF THE OTHER STATEMENTS. WE SHALL NEED FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS.

6. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/MR HURD FOR SIR N HENDERSON BY 0830 HOURS.

FRETWELL

[ADVANCED AS REQUESTED]

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FM WASHINGTON 110132Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3384 OF 10 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO AND TEL AVIV

MIPT : SINAI FORCE

1. FOLLOWING IS THE AGREED REPORT :

1. HEADS OF MISSION OF THE FOUR SAW SECRETARY HAIG THIS EVENING. THE BRITISH CHARGE SPOKE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREED INSTRUCTIONS.

2. HAIG SAID THAT THE REVISED STATEMENT OF THE FOUR WAS EXCELLENT. HE COULD NOT VISUALISE HOW ANYONE COULD TAKE OFFENCE AT IT. BUT HE HAD PROBLEMS WITH THE REST OF THE FOUR'S MESSAGE WHICH SEEMED LIKELY TO GIVE RISE TO THE SAME PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AS THE ORIGINAL STATEMENT OF THE FOUR.

3. HAIG STRESSED THAT WE WERE ALL FACING A COMMON PROBLEM. HE WAS ONLY OFFERING HIS BEST JUDGMENT OF WHAT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELIS WHILE TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS OF ALL THOSE CONCERNED

4. ON THE PROPOSED NATIONAL STATEMENTS THE FOUR HEADS OF MISSION EMPHASISED THAT ALL THE POINTS IN THE FOUR'S ORIGINAL DRAFT STATEMENT WOULD BE MADE. HAIG EXPRESSED SOME UNEASE, PARTICULARLY AT THE PROSPECT THAT THE SAME POINTS WOULD BE MADE IN ALL FOUR CAPITALS AND THAT PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS MIGHT LEAD THE BRITISH TO GO FURTHER EVEN THAN THAT STATEMENT.

5. ON THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE TEN HAIG COMMENTED THAT HE COULD NOT CONTEST THE FIRST SENTENCE. DESPITE BEGIN'S RECENT STATEMENT, HE WOULD BE WILLING TO INSIST THAT THE EC HAD THE RIGHT TO STICK TO THE VENICE DECLARATION. THE REFERENCE TO PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION WAS TROUBLESOME BUT LESS SO IN THIS CONTEXT. HOWEVER THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT WAS UNNECESSARILY ABRASIVE. HE THEREFORE WISHED TO SUGGEST THAT IT SHOULD BE AMENDED BY THE REPLACEMENT OF THE WORDS QUOTE ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI UNQUOTE BY QUOTE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EGYPT/ISRAEL TREATY UNQUOTE.

6. HAIG MADE CLEAR HIS STRONG PREFERENCE THAT THERE BE NO STATEMENT AT ALL BY THE TEN. IF THERE HAD TO BE SUCH A STATEMENT HE HOPED THAT IT COULD BE AMENDED AS HE HAD PROPOSED AND THAT HIS EARLIER PROPOSAL FOR A DELAY OF SOME TEN DAYS BETWEEN THE ISSUE OF THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR AND THAT OF THE TEN COULD BE ACCEPTED. IS SUCH A DELAY WERE NOT POSSIBLE, AT LEAST HE HOPED THAT THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN WOULD BE AMENDED.

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7. HAIG COMMENTED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE PRESSING FOR THE LATEST TEXT OF THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR OF WHICH THEY HAD SEEN AN EARLIER VERSION. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THEIR LIKELY REACTION TO THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN. (IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD THIS TEXT) IN CONCLUSION HAIG SAID THAT HE REMAINED WORRIED BUT THAT GOOD PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE.

8. THE FOUR HEADS OF MISSION AGREED SUBSEQUENTLY TO RECOMMEND THAT THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN BE AMENDED AS HAIG SUGGESTED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS WORDING WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE AMENDMENT ALREADY AGREED TO IN (1) OF THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR.

2. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/MR HURD (TO SHOW TO SIR N HENDERSON).

FRETWELL

[ADVANCED AS REQUESTED]

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FM FCO 111800Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE PARIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 493 OF 11 NOVEMBER 81

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, ROME, THE HAGUE, DUBLIN,
COPENHAGEN, BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, ATHENS, UKREP BRUSSELS.
INFO PRIORITY ALL ME POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, TOKYO, LISBON,
MADRID, ANKARA, UKDEL NATO, OTTAWA.

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION: POLITICAL COMMITTEE, LONDON,
10-11 NOVEMBER.

SINAI FORCE

SUMMARY

1. THE DISCUSSION CONCERNED THE BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION BY THE UK, FRANCE, ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS IN THE SINAI FORCE. (OTHER ASPECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST DISCUSSION ARE BEING TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY). WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE GREEKS, THE TEN WERE GENERALLY CONTENT WITH THE PROCEDURE PROPOSED TO THE AMERICANS (WASHINGTON TELNOS. 3383-4 - NOT TO ALL) AND WITH THE AMENDMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN PROPOSED BY HAIG. THE GREEKS UNDERTOOK TO SEEK THEIR GOVERNMENT'S AGREEMENT. DISCUSSION ON THE RELATIVE TIMING OF NATIONAL STATEMENTS BY THE FOUR AND THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN WAS INCONCLUSIVE. MIFT CONTAINS THE VARIOUS TEXTS AS THEY NOW STAND, SUBJECT TO GREEK AGREEMENT.

DETAIL

2. BULLARD (PRESIDENCY) CIRCULATED A NOTE EXPLAINING WHERE THE FOUR HAD GOT TO IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AMERICANS, INCLUDING THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNICATION TO BE GIVEN BY THE FOUR TO THE US, EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS AND THE PROPOSED US AMENDMENT TO THE TEN'S STATEMENT. HE ADDED THAT WE WERE NOW HOPEFUL THAT AN EARLY AND SATISFACTORY SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND ON THIS BASIS. REININK (NETHERLANDS) AND DUPONT (FRANCE) AGREED AND

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SAID THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT THE PROPOSED US AMENDMENT TO THE TEN'S STATEMENT. BOTTAI (ITALY) ALSO AGREED. HE SUGGESTED THAT IN ADDITION TO THE PROPOSED US AMENDMENT THE TEN SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DROP FROM THE LAST SENTENCE OF THEIR STATEMENT THE WORDS 'AND INDEPENDENT OF'. TO SAY THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS WERE DISTINCT FROM THE REST OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT. KIMBERG (DENMARK) SUPPORTED THIS AND SUGGESTED THAT SIMILAR CHANGES BE MADE IN THE MATERIAL TO BE USED BY THE FOUR IN THEIR NATIONAL STATEMENTS. HOWEVER PHRYDAS (GREECE) RECALLED THE DIFFICULTY HIS GOVERNMENT HAD PREVIOUSLY HAD WITH THE TEXTS, BECAUSE OF THEIR FEAR THAT ACCEPTANCE OF CERTAIN WORDING WOULD IMPLY AGREEMENT WITH THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. HE FEARED THE CHANGE PROPOSED BY THE US TO THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN, HOWEVER SMALL IT MIGHT SEEM, WOULD CREATE THE UTMOST DIFFICULTY FOR GREECE. HE THEREFORE RESERVED HIS POSITION.

3. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION REVEALED THAT THE REST OF THE TEN EXCEPT GREECE WERE CONTENT BOTH WITH WHAT WE HAD PROPOSED TO THE US AND WITH THE US AMENDMENT TO THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN, WITH OR WITHOUT THE FURTHER AMENDMENT SUGGESTED BY BOTTAI. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS INCLUDING THE UK APPEALED TO THE GREEKS TO ACCEPT THE US AMENDMENT. THE EGYPT-ISRAEL TREATY WAS A CORRECT APPLICATION OF RESOLUTION 242 AND COULD LEGITIMATELY BE SEPARATED FROM THE REST OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. PHRYDAS UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THESE REPRESENTATIONS TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND TO TRY TO ELICIT A REPLY FROM THEM TOMORROW 12 NOVEMBER.

4. BULLARD THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF TIMING. THE FOUR COULD NOT YET SAY WHEN THEY WOULD WISH TO ISSUE THEIR NATIONAL STATEMENTS, WITH WHICH THE LETTER FROM THEM TO THE US, EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO BE PUBLISHED. BUT THE QUESTION ALSO AROSE OF THE US REQUEST FOR A GAP BETWEEN NATIONAL STATEMENTS BY THE FOUR AND THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN. ONE CONSIDERATION WAS THAT TEN STATEMENTS HAD MORE IMPACT WHEN ISSUED ON THE OCCASION OF A MINISTERIAL MEETING. THIS POINTED TO THE TEN MAKING THEIR STATEMENT EITHER AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING ON 17 NOVEMBER OR AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON 26/27 NOVEMBER, DEPENDING ON WHEN THE FOUR ACTED. MACKERNAN

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(IRELAND) SAID HE COULD AGREE WITH THIS PROCEDURE. BUT THE IMPORTANT GAP WAS BETWEEN DELIVERY OF THE LETTER BY THE FOUR TO THE THREE CAMP DAVID PARTIES AND THE FOUR'S NATIONAL STATEMENTS. WOULD NOT A SHORT GAP LEAD TO A STRONG ISRAELI REACTION, NO MATTER HOW SATISFIED THEY MIGHT BE WITH THE LETTER ITSELF? REININK SAID THAT THE GAP BETWEEN NATIONAL STATEMENTS AND THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN SHOULD BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE. DUPONT SAID THAT NATIONAL STATEMENTS AND THE TEN'S STATEMENT SHOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS OR AS NEARLY SO AS POSSIBLE. PFEFFER (FRG) WAS INCLINED TO AGREE. HE SAW THE ARGUMENT FOR A MINISTERIAL MEETING ISSUING A STATEMENT BY THE TEN BUT IN OTHER RESPECTS A GAP HAD MANY DISADVANTAGES.

5. BULLARD SAID THAT THE PRESIDENCY WOULD NEED TO CONSULT WITH THE OTHER THREE WOULD-BE CONTRIBUTORS ON THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE TIMING OF THE DELIVERY OF THE LETTERS TO THE US, EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND OF NATIONAL STATEMENTS. THEREAFTER WE WOULD CIRCULATE BY COREU A SUGGESTED TIMETABLE INCLUDING THE TIMING OF STATEMENT BY THE TEN, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 494 OF 11 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, ROME, THE HAGUE, DUBLIN,
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INFO PRIORITY ALL HE POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, TOKYO, LISBON,
MADRID, ANKARA, UKDEL NATO, OTTAWA.

MIPT:

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION: POLITICAL COMMITTEE:
SINAI FORCE.

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT PROPOSED BY THE FOUR TO THE US FOR A
LETTER FROM THE FOUR TO THE US, EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS:
'THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED
KINGDOM, AFTER CONSULTING THEIR PARTNERS IN THE TEN, HAVE DE-
CIDED, SUBJECT TO THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES AND TO AGREEMENT
ON THE PRACTICAL AND LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS, TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE
MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS IN SINAI, AT THE REQUEST OF THE
GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES. THE FOUR
GOVERNMENTS STATE THAT THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO IS BASED ON
THE UNDERSTANDING THAT:

- (I) THE FORCE EXISTS SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAINTAINING PEACE
IN SINAI FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. IT HAS NO OTHER ROLE:
- (II) THE FORCE IS BEING ESTABLISHED IN ITS PRESENT FORM IN THE
ABSENCE OF A UN DECISION ON AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE AND ITS
POSITION WILL BE REVIEWED SHOULD SUCH A DECISION BECOME POSSIBLE:
- (III) PARTICIPATION BY THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS IN THE FORCE WILL
NOT BE TAKEN EITHER AS COMMITTING THEM TO OR EXCLUDING THEM FROM
PARTICIPATION IN SUCH OTHER INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING ARRANGE-
MENTS AS HAVE BEEN OR MAY BE ESTABLISHED IN THE REGION: AND
- (IV) PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO BY THE FOUR GOVERNMENT IS WITH-
OUT PREJUDICE TO THEIR WELL KNOWN POLICIES ON OTHER ASPECTS OF

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THE PROBLEMS OF THE AREA.'

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE TEN, INCLUDING THE PROPOSED US AMENDMENT (ORIGINAL TEXT IN BRACKETS) BUT NOT THE PROPOSED ITALIAN AMENDMENT:

'THE TEN CONSIDER THAT THE DECISION OF FRANCE, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN SINAI MEETS THE WISH FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY TO FACILITATE ANY PROGRESS IN THE DIRECTION OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN THE VENICE DECLARATION, NAMELY THE MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE RIGHT TO EXISTENCE AND SECURITY OF ALL THE STATES IN THE AREA, INCLUDING ISRAEL, AND THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE FOR ALL THE PEOPLES, WHICH IMPLIES RECOGNITION OF THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, INCLUDING THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. THEY BELIEVE AT THE SAME TIME THAT ~~THESE~~ ARRANGEMENTS [ASSOCIATED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EGYPT-ISRAEL PEACE TREATY (WITH ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI)] ARE DISTINCT FROM AND INDEPENDENT OF [THE REST OF] THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS.'

3. FOLLOWING IS A DRAFT BASIC TEXT FOR USE IN NATIONAL STATEMENTS GIVEN ONLY TO THE OTHER THREE PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS: 'WE HAVE AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROPOSED MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS IN SINAI. WE AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS HAVE NOTIFIED THE UNITED STATES, EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS OF THIS IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS: (TEXT OF PARA. 1 ABOVE).

THIS DECISION IS A SYMBOL OF OUR DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT FOLLOWING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHICH WOULD BRING JUSTICE FOR ALL THE PEOPLES AND SECURITY FOR ALL THE STATES OF THE AREA. WE WELCOMED THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS THAT GOAL. SIMILARLY WE WELCOME THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE REALISATION OF THE CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL CONTAINED IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, WHICH SPECIFICALLY DECLARED INADMISSIBLE THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR, AND WE BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

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HAS A DUTY TO PLAY ITS PART, AS NECESSARY AND WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED, IN PEACE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE ARE READY TO PARTICIPATE ALSO IN SUCH ARRANGEMENTS IN THE OTHER TERRITORIES CURRENTLY OCCUPIED IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. WE REGARD OUR SUPPORT FOR THE ARRANGEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EGYPT-ISRAEL PEACE TREATY AS QUITE DISTINCT FROM AND INDEPENDENT OF THE REST OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS.

IN ADDITION, WE WISH TO EXPRESS OUR FIRM SUPPORT FOR THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE AND OUR BELIEF IN THE NEED FOR STABILITY AND CONTINUITY IN EGYPT. OUR DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MFO FOLLOWS FROM THE POLICY, AS STATED IN THE DECLARATION ISSUED AT VENICE IN JUNE 1980 AND IN SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS. THIS POLICY, WHILE INSISTING ON GUARANTEES FOR THE SECURITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, PLACES EQUAL EMPHASIS ON JUSTICE FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. IT ALSO HOLDS THAT THE PLO MUST BE INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS LEADING TO A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE.

WE PLEDGE OURSELVES TO SUPPORT THE MFO. WE ALSO REPEAT THAT, TOGETHER WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE TEN, WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN ALL WAYS CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH WE HOLD.'

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 ✓ the transition
 ✓ Mr Chapman
 RR 4/11
 The Greeks and Italians
 have asked if we are
 giving a community
 briefing. I think
 we should, and it
 also covers Libya

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 PS/LPS
 PS/Mr Hurd
 PS/PUS
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 News D
 Mr Bullard
 Mr Day
 WAD

3 pm
 Friday

VISIT OF KING HUSSEIN: DISCUSSION OVER LUNCH

1. There was a wide-ranging discussion over lunch on 28 October. The following is a very summary record, since on most of the topics covered, very little new emerged and no notes were taken.

Lebanon

2. The King said that there was little progress or prospect of progress. The Syrians were not out to annex Lebanon, but undoubtedly made a reconciliation difficult because they wished to ensure a continuation of their own influence there. In this context, he was critical of Saudi policy. They seemed to think that massive subsidies were the answer to every problem. In the crisis at the end of November 1980 the Jordanians had welcomed Saudi mediation, but had been much concerned to discover that Syrian agreement to withdraw their forces from the frontier had been bought by a massive Saudi donation.

Oman

3. At one point I picked up a remark by King Hussein to the Prime Minister about the dangers of the Americans 'embracing' Egypt too obviously. I said that the King, as we knew, had a close relationship with Sultan Qaboos. We found ourselves in a somewhat embarrassing position, since in speaking both to the Omanis and to the Americans we might be thought to be concerned solely for our own position in Oman, but we had been worried by the risks to Qaboos of too manifest and obvious embrace by the Americans. The King said that the Sultan was very alive to this danger and was worried about it. He agreed that, as elsewhere in the Middle East, the Sultan needed to take account of his own public opinion.

/Libya

Libya

4. Although the King had spoken earlier at the meeting with the Prime Minister of Libya as an arsenal of Soviet arms, he agreed, and indeed volunteered, that much of the Soviet equipment supplied to Libya was in effect rusting or deteriorating in the sun. He agreed that there was little or no military threat to Egypt and noted that the Sudan was already beginning to play the threat down. He said that it was difficult to discern any consistent thread in Libyan policy, but it was noticeable that when really isolated Qadhafi became more amenable. Mr Moberly made the point that all the Libyans tended to defer to Qadhafi and it was his assessment that it was Qadhafi that called the tune. General Khammash remarked that there were strains of insanity in Qadhafi and in Libyan policy.

5. Speaking of Chad, the Secretary of State made the point that one had to admit that if it were truly the case that Libya had been invited in by Goukouni, they had a not unreasonable position. After all, we supported the intervention of Senegal in Gambia at the invitation of the Gambian Government.

Morocco and West Sahara

6. King Hussein had mentioned the situation in West Sahara to the Prime Minister. Over lunch, he agreed with the Secretary of State that King Hassan had managed things very cleverly at the OAU meeting in Nairobi. Asked whether King Hassan was sincere in his acceptance of a referendum, the King said that some solution along those lines had to be found. The Jordanian Ambassador remarked that one difficulty would be the definition of the Saharians. King Hussein recounted a bizarre story, to match our own experiences at the time, of how he had received an emissary from King Hassan with a draft letter, which he was invited to sign, to the President of France urging the latter to press King Hassan to agree to self determination in West Sahara. Curious as it was, he said that he had signed it.

The Dead Sea Canal

7. There was some discussion of whether the Israelis were serious in this project and the Jordanian Ambassador expressed anxiety that they were obtaining subscriptions from individuals, especially in the Jewish community in Britain. The King said that the project, if it were carried through, would inundate the Jordanian potash works on the Dead Sea and do a lot of damage. We tried to explain the difficulties of preventing private individuals from subscribing, even though the Government's official attitude was that the project was illegal.

Tornado/P-110

8. The King said that he was entirely content with the information he had received from BAe. The Spaniards had asked him about the P-110 and he wondered how he should respond. It

/was

was agreed that this should be left to us. I mentioned that it seemed to us that there was likely to be continuing difficulty over obtaining FRG agreement to the sale of Tornado. I should be grateful if Defence Department could follow this up with Defence Sales and keep Amman and Madrid informed.

Khalid Tank


9. In response to Mr Blaker's question, the King said that he was content with the progress on resolving the technical problems of the Khalid tank and remarked that two or three tanks had already arrived in Jordan.

Military Training Courses

10. The King said that there were no problems on this front and cooperation was going well. Mr Blaker expressed our readiness to cooperate in any way.

Hospital of St John and Jerusalem

11. The Secretary of State thanked King Hussein for his efforts to raise funds for the hospital in the UAE.


John Graham

28 October 1981



Subject filed on
Middle East
Site: PE 7

Jordan
file

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T. 152/81**

31 October 1981

fs. *[Signature]*

Dear Ron.

First may I congratulate you most warmly on the outcome of the vote on AWACS in the Senate. This is good news for all the West's friends in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. And I am sure they will all appreciate your fantastic personal efforts which led to this result.

The immediate purpose of this note is to tell you of my talks with King Hussein this week. I know he is visiting you in Washington on Monday next. He is a deeply worried man though he speaks, as always, in low key and with the utmost courtesy. You may find it useful before you see him to have a brief account of the main points we covered in our talks.

Hussein told me that one of his worries is that Egyptians may be misled into concluding an agreement with the Israelis, about the West Bank, over the heads of the Palestinians, which the latter would be bound to reject. He himself very much hopes that Egypt will be able to return to the Arab fold, although he recognises the difficulties for many Arabs, not least because of the process of normalisation of relations between Egypt and Israel; but an agreement in the current autonomy talks that was rejected by the Palestinians would set back the prospects very severely. He said he had written to Mubarak in these terms.

/We discussed

We discussed also Fahd's eight-point plan. We had not at that time of course seen your helpful comment that they could form a beginning point for negotiations. He said that he doubted whether it would be possible for the Arabs to endorse Fahd's points as they stand at the Summit meeting in Fez if only because of Syrian opposition. Nevertheless, it might be possible for the Arabs to agree on something that was effectively the same, although expressed in different words. There could be dangers in this if the proposals came to be regarded as the irreducible minimum Arab demand; but if as you have said they can be presented as a negotiating position, it would be valuable.

In a survey of the Arab world ranging from Morocco and Mauritania in the West to the Iran/Iraq war in the East, Hussein expressed anxiety about the spreading problems that afflict so many countries in the area. He has of course no time for Qadhafi, but does not see the Libyan Army as a threat either to Egypt or indeed to the Sudan - Chad was another matter. Nearer home he himself is clearly worried by the current Israeli tendency to argue that the Palestinians, if they want a state, should seek it in Jordan, to the east of the River Jordan. This, of course, is a position which no Arab country could accept, and we have made it clear that it is not the Western position. Western countries have always taken the view that Resolution 242 calls for peace and withdrawal from occupied territory to be negotiated together, and that must mean withdrawal on the West Bank.

The one ray of hope, I believe, is that more and more Arabs are coming to see, and indeed acknowledge in public, the need for genuine negotiations with Israel. This movement will be Sadat's memorial, whatever other Arabs may say. Hussein of course has long believed in the need and now Fahd's proposals point in the same direction. If only the Palestinians could be brought to make clear their readiness to negotiate and live with the outcome and if, in their turn, the Israeli Government could show sufficient flexibility to allow the Palestinians to engage

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eventually in negotiations, whether direct or indirect, we might have some hope of bringing about a comprehensive peace in the region. It will require much ingenuity and patience and I can assure you that we will try to play our part.

Every good wish to you and Nancy.

Yours ever

Roosevelt

The President of the United States of America

(For favor of
onward transmission
by RCO 1/11/81)

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Jorde

28 October 1981

King Hussein

I enclose a record of the conversation which took place here earlier today between the Prime Minister and King Hussein.

MODBA

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND
KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON WEDNESDAY,
28 OCTOBER 1981 AT 1200 HOURS

Present:-

Prime Minister	King Hussein
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	General Khammash
Sir John Graham	H.E. Mr Ibrahim Izziddin
Mr. M.O'D. B. Alexander	

AWACS

The Prime Minister commented on the great efforts being made by President Reagan to secure the passage through the Senate of the agreement to sell Saudi Arabia AWACS. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it now looked as though the President might win. King Hussein questioned whether it would be altogether disastrous if the President were to lose. The Prime Minister asked whether defeat in the Senate would not be humiliating for both President Reagan and the Saudi Government. King Hussein replied that the humiliation had already occurred. If the Senate approved the sale, it would of course be the end of a period of agony. But if the sale was rejected, the US Administration might be prompted to consider a different approach to the problems of the Middle East. They might ask themselves who had more authority, President Reagan or Mr. Begin. The Prime Minister commented that King Hussein seemed to be ready to make a virtue of whatever decision was reached by the Senate.

Sinai MFO

The Prime Minister asked the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to explain the situation on the Sinai Multilateral Force. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the British Government had been put in a difficult position. The

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Americans had asked Australia, New Zealand and Canada to contribute to the Force. The Australian Government had, in effect, invited their Press to ascertain whether or not Australian participation would be acceptable to the Australian public. Public opinion polls had appeared to suggest that 80 per cent of the Australian electorate disliked the prospect. As a result the Australian Government, and subsequently the New Zealand Government, had said that they could only contribute if HMG also did so.

The Americans had then approached the UK. We had made it clear to them that we had hoped not to be asked. We pointed out the difficulties which participation raised for us and said we could only consider joining in if our European allies were also involved. Egypt had asked France who, somewhat surprisingly, had agreed. Italy had volunteered. Both had made UK participation a condition of their own participation. The situation therefore was that unless we agreed, the five others would refuse. We should then be accused of sabotaging the return of Arab land to Arabs. After some hesitation, we had decided to make a contribution. We were doing so:-

- (a) because we wanted to see Sinai returned to Egypt; and
- (b) because, in our view, our support for the arrangements could be differentiated from our attitude towards the rest of the Camp David process.

The statement which the four participating Governments would be issuing would be explicit on the latter point and would make it clear that we saw the return of Sinai in the context of Resolution 242 and its declaration that the acquisition of territory by war was inadmissible. We considered our position would be respectable and defensible. Crown Prince Fahd and Prince Saud, to whom the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had spoken in Cancun, had been inclined to accept that our participation in the arrangements would be tolerable provided we, and our European partners, distanced ourselves from Camp David.

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It would of course have been better if we had not been asked to provide a contingent. But if we had refused we would probably have lost our ability to influence the United States in the future. Moreover it was possible to perceive a slight shift in the position of the US Administration towards the PLO. President Reagan had referred to the PLO while he was in Cancun. Insofar as his position had moved, this was probably due to the activities of Mr. Begin. If the MFO could be successfully launched and if there could be general acceptance of Principle 7 in Crown Prince Fahd's list, a situation might be created in which it would be possible for the United States to enter into overt contact with the PLO. The Prime Minister said that the difficulty about the MFO had been that everyone's participation had depended on that of the UK. She herself had protested at the situation in which we had been put and had stressed the special nature of our position in the Middle East.

But it had become clear that a UK presence, however small, was needed to give respectability and stability to the arrangements. We had therefore agreed. There was now a need to build on this to secure a shift in American opinion. King Hussein indicated that he understood the arguments advanced by the Prime Minister and by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. He regarded it as essential that there should be no link between this limited action and the Camp David process. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary confirmed that the statement to be issued by the participating Governments would be explicit on this point.

US Policy on the Middle East

King Hussein said that he regarded his impending visit to Washington as the most important he had ever made. He was going to see if there was any basis for progress. President Sadat's death had been due to his inability to carry out the programme he had laid down, e.g. in his appearance before the Knesset. He had been frustrated and let down by Israeli intransigence. Events on the ground bore no relation even to those agreements which had been reached. Israeli policy on settlements was an obvious example. It was now being claimed in Israel that there was no Palestinian problem, only a Jordanian problem. The tilt towards

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Israel in US policy had to be corrected. Since Camp David it had been impossible for anyone to act independently or for those in the area to act as intermediaries. Hence the welcome accorded to the efforts of the Europeans at Venice and subsequently. If the US was determined to forge ahead on its own, an impossible position would be created. He hoped therefore to find out whether they were interested in seeking the help of others.

The Prime Minister said that she did not think the autonomy negotiations would get anywhere. She thought that King Hussein would receive a more sympathetic hearing from President Reagan himself than from Mr. Haig and his officials. King Hussein said that he had been told that President Reagan would listen. He hoped to be able to get him to do so. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that Mr. Haig had no idea what he was going to do if the autonomy talks failed. King Hussein therefore had a good opportunity to implant new ideas in President Reagan's mind. There was a blank sheet on which to write.

King Hussein said that he had heard that even before President Sadat's death Egypt had had no proposals for further action before April next year, i.e. after Israel had withdrawn from Sinai. This would have been a disaster itself. The initiative always seemed to be in the hands of the trouble-makers. He himself had written to President Mubarak to wish him well. He had suggested that President Sadat was a victim of his inability to implement his programme in full. He had urged President Mubarak to avoid giving legitimacy to any approach which would deny the rights of the Palestinians generally or of the rest of the Arabs in Jerusalem. He was anxious to see Egypt back in the Arab family. He had offered President Mubarak a dialogue. So far he had had no reply. The Prime Minister said that the re-opening of a dialogue between Egypt and Jordan could be very important. Sir J. Graham asked whether, if Egypt indicated that she was ready to re-join the fold, the other Arabs would be prepared to accept the results of the "normalisation" of Egyptian relations with Israel, e.g. the

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presence of the Israeli Embassy in Cairo. King Hussein said that this was indeed a major difficulty. He did not know the answer to the question. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary wondered whether Israel in the event would hand back Sinai or whether they would be nervous about the freedom of action which the return of the territory would give to Egypt. Again King Hussein said that he was uncertain as to the answer.

King Hussein said that he did not see why the United States could not open direct contacts with the PLO. He had said as much to ex-President Nixon recently and had asked him to convey the message to the US Administration. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that some prior move by the PLO would be necessary. The Americans were formally committed not to talk to the PLO unless and until the PLO had renounced terrorism and accepted Resolution 242. Hence the United Kingdom's efforts to break the log jam. King Hussein said that two of the principles left behind him by Dr. Kissinger had been unhelpful. He had asserted:-

- (a) that a strong Israel would also be responsible; and
- (b) that there should be no contacts with the PLO unless the conditions mentioned by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had been fulfilled.

There was now no reason why the Americans should not talk to the PLO. The Prime Minister commented that President Reagan would encounter major difficulties at home if he were to meet Yaser Arafat. Those difficulties might be less if he were, for instance, to see some of the Palestinian Mayors. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that sooner or later the Americans would have to talk overtly to the PLO. They had already done so privately.

King Hussein said that the tragedy was that American attitudes towards the area were so superficial. The strategic consensus was unreal. It was important that the Americans should not "smother" Egypt. The Foreign and Commonwealth

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Secretary said that President Reagan and Mr. Haig had a different sense of priorities from others. Mr. Haig in particular saw the problem in the Middle East primarily as one of global strategy. He thought in terms of the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan, of Islamic fundamentalism and so forth. He regarded the Arab/Israel dispute as secondary. This was of course wrong. The Arab/Israel dispute was crucial. If it could be resolved, other problems might become easier to deal with. A powerful speech by King Hussein pointing this out might be helpful. The Prime Minister said that the Arab/Israel dispute served, if anything, to increase Soviet influence in the area. It was a pity that security considerations made it so difficult for President Reagan to visit the Middle East. She agreed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that it would be an excellent idea if King Hussein were able to put specific propositions to the US Administration. The Arab case had never made the impact which it should in the United States. This was part of the reason for the trouble with the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary suggested that it would be helpful to think in terms of a timetable. Perhaps nothing should be attempted until the autonomy talks had collapsed and Sinai had or had not been returned to Egypt. But could not the Arabs as a whole issue a statement along the lines of Prince Fahd's seventh principle recognising the right of all states in the area to exist in peace. If the PLO would associate itself with this statement the US could take it up as evidence of a PLO willingness to recognise Israel and talks could get underway with the PLO.

/The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister suggested that Israel would do its best to prevent the autonomy talks from collapsing. Sir J. Graham agreed. He thought that Israel's approach, under the influence of Mr. Sharon, would be relatively subtle. They would try to keep the talks with Egypt going. They would talk about autonomy leading to self-determination even if in fact they saw it as autonomy leading to incorporation. The whole issue might lead eventually to further elections in Israel. The Prime Minister observed that she had never believed there could be such a thing as autonomy of a people without their having autonomy over the land which they inhabited. Sir J. Graham said that the Americans had regarded the transition from autonomy to self-determination as more or less self-evident. However Mr. Begin did not. Mr. Sharon was now trying to set up what might, somewhat unkindly, be described as a "quisling" group on the West Bank. This attempt would no doubt fail but it had to be given a chance to do so. The Prime Minister said that any form of interim government was bound to fail. Sir J. Graham said that Mr. Begin, like Mr. Ian Smith, might not realise this. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he doubted whether the Israeli ideas would ever get off the ground. King Hussein agreed.

The Jordanian Ambassador said that it was vital that Egypt should not sign any agreement with Israel related to autonomy. The Egyptian Foreign Minister had seemed very forthcoming after his recent visit to Israel. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that if Egypt did sign anything, it would be the end of any chances of a rapprochement between Egypt and the other Arab nations. King Hussein said that an entirely new approach was needed. President Mubarak must not give legitimacy to a process which had no chance of success. The Prime Minister said that she thought an Egyptian agreement with Israel would isolate President Mubarak and indeed put his life in jeopardy. She wondered whether Mr. Haig understood this. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that unfortunately the Americans regarded the autonomy talks as all that was available to them. They preferred to have something rather than nothing.

King Hussein then reviewed the problems in the area as a whole. He mentioned, in rapid succession, Mauritania, Libya, Sudan, South Yemen, North Yemen, Lebanon, Iran/Iraq, the Gulf and even Greece.

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He stressed the need for American understanding if these difficult problems were to be tackled successfully. The Prime Minister said that she was sure he would find President Reagan receptive. The President had to work under the limitations imposed by Congress and by the views of his electorate. The Israelis were, of course, excellent lobbyists. Nonetheless, if President Reagan could be brought to understand the Arab case, he would take action. No doubt the Saudis would already have put much of the case to him. King Hussein said that the Saudis were extremely polite, so much so that they failed to put their arguments convincingly. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that they were so polite that they often left a misleading impression. King Hussein said that he doubted whether the Saudis would ever provide a rallying point for the Arabs as a whole. But they would "go along" if matters could be put on a better course. The Prime Minister asked whether the Gulf Co-operation Council could not play a role. King Hussein said that the next summit might be helpful. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked about the meeting at Fez. King Hussein, while acknowledging that the meeting would be very important, said that he did not know what would happen there. The Prime Minister noted the co-incidence of dates with the European Council Meeting and said that those involved in the two meetings should try to keep in touch.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the problem with the Americans was they still did not appear to understand the extent to which they were alienating the moderate Arabs. King Hussein should try to persuade them of this. Sir J. Graham said that the Americans did not realise that leaders like King Hussein and King Khalid had problems of public opinion to deal with. They tended to regard Middle East governments as autocracies which could ignore the views of their citizens. If one forced one's friends to do unpopular things, eventually one undermined them. King Hussein said that he agreed fully. This had, of course, been President Sadat's problem. The handling of the question of Jerusalem was important in this context. Jerusalem mattered to all Arabs. It could never be merely the capital of Israel.

Sudan

Sir J. Graham drew attention to the problems of the Sudan.

He said that these were primarily economic. Events had forced Sudan into the Egyptian camp. As a result the Sudanese Government was being kept at arms length by the other Arab governments. This was a very short-sighted policy. If President Nimeiri did not get financial assistance, he would be forced to take extremely unpopular measures. The Sudanese economy should, eventually, be a relatively strong one. What he needed now was money to tide him over a difficult period. King Hussein agreed about the nature of the problem. The Prime Minister asked whether food aid would be any good. Sir J. Graham said that it ought to be possible for the European Community to make sugar available to him but there would be difficulties with other sugar producers. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that in any case we must make sure that some of the Community's recent food aid package went to the Sudan. Sir J. Graham said that it would be more helpful if other Arab governments, like Saudi Arabia and Iraq, could be more generous and consistent with their assistance. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he would mention the matter to the Saudis during his visit next week.

The discussion ended at 1250.

Handwritten signature

28 October 1981