



PM/82/84

PRIME MINISTER

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

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Agree (para. 7) that we should not try to amend the Latin American draft but simply lobby hard against it and urge, by high-level messages, our friends to support us.

Yes

A. J. C. 15/10

Falklands: UN Tactics

1. The General Assembly debate on the Falklands is now likely to take place at the beginning of November. I enclose the text of the Latin American draft Resolution which has now been tabled. As you will see, it is drafted in a way likely to attract a large number of positive votes, since at first sight it is a simple call for negotiations with no timetable and no pre-judgement of the sovereignty question. Nevertheless, it is clearly quite unacceptable to us: its references to colonialism are offensive; it refers to non-aligned statements and communiqués which endorsed the Argentine sovereignty claim; and the ideas either of direct negotiation with Argentina following the events of this summer or of a renewed mission of good offices by the Secretary-General are non-starters.
2. There is no doubt therefore that we should vote against the Resolution in this form.
3. Our Mission in New York estimate that, on the most favourable assumptions for us, the draft will attract 104 positive votes, about 48 abstentions and a handful of negative votes. On the worst assumptions it would receive 131 positive votes and about 22 abstentions. We have always known that the Argentines could command a large majority. Their dilution of their draft has naturally increased their prospects. The political significance of their majority will depend to a considerable extent on whether they can attract any of the Europeans (and we suspect that the French are playing a dirty game and may intend to vote for) - or the Americans.
4. We and the Mission in New York have given considerable thought to our best tactics in this situation. We have concluded that the choice lies between maintaining and stepping up our current lobbying exercise against the text as it now stands and an attempt to amend the text in such a way that, while inoffensive to us, it would force Argentina either to vote against her own draft or to drop

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the idea of a Resolution altogether.

5. My view is that with vigorous lobbying, and a very strong pitch at the French, we may yet succeed in getting the Europeans, the Americans and a significant number of other friends to abstain. This would make the result respectable for us and not a triumph for the Argentines. Given the nature of the UN, it is not surprising that we should be unable to muster the support for our position on negotiations that we had for our position on use of force earlier. But this would still leave us facing a UN resolution calling on us to negotiate, which could pave the way for further pressure on us next year and beyond, when our arguments for support from our friends will be weaker than they are now in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. This would not of course affect the situation on the ground or have much political impact here. But it would leave us in a somewhat uncomfortable position at the UN.

6. As far as possible amendment of the Resolution is concerned, we have concluded that simple attempts to insert references to self-determination or the non-use of force into the resolution would be likely to fail. Sir J Thomson has therefore proposed a more sophisticated amendment which we could persuade others to sponsor and which could be expected to attract a lot of positive votes and to embarrass the Argentines. He suggests that we should replace operative paragraph 1 of the draft with the following:

'requests the governments of Argentina and of the United Kingdom to bring about conditions which would permit a resumption of the search, with the participation of representatives of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), for a peaceful solution to their differences within the framework of Article 73 of the UN Charter'.

However I see three drawbacks:

- (i) There is no way of controlling the General Assembly debate or voting once the amendment is launched, and we might find such an exercise backfiring on us as counter amendments were tabled;



- (ii) the offensive paragraphs in the preamble and the reference to the Secretary-General's good offices would remain;
- (iii) to give the manoeuvre any impetus we should have to be willing ourselves to contemplate abstaining or even voting in favour of the amended draft. This would be interpreted as a weakening of our position and as preparation for negotiations in future, even if we cannot agree to them now.

7. On balance, my conclusion is that we should steer clear of sophisticated UN tactics and go for a straight negative lobbying exercise, accepting that the Latin American resolution will nevertheless pass and remain on the record to our future disadvantage. In my view, this should be done through messages from you and me to our ^{opoids} numbers in a wide range of friendly countries. These would say simply that the Argentine-inspired Resolution on the Falkland Islands is deeply offensive to us, both because of its prejudicial comments on colonialism and its references to the decisions of the non-aligned movement and because it is a blatant and hypocritical attempt by Argentina to achieve by diplomatic means what she has so recently failed to achieve by force. Having seen previous negotiations with Argentine unilaterally broken off and followed by an unprovoked armed attack on the Islands, in defiance of international law and international opinion, the British people would simply not understand how any friendly and responsible government could vote for such a Resolution.

8. If you agree, we will recommend in due course appropriate messages. We will need to lean particularly heavily on our European partners.

9. In the meantime we will send appropriate instructions to our Mission in New York and to a wide range of other posts.

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10. I am copying this to OD colleagues and to Sir R Armstrong. It would be helpful to have any comments very quickly, since Sir J Thomson needs instructions as soon as possible.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'FP', with a horizontal line underneath.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
18 October, 1982

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ARGENTINE DRAFT RESOLUTION

The General Assembly,
having considered the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),
realising that the maintenance of colonial situations is incompatible with the United Nations ideal of universal peace,
considering that its resolution 1514 of 14 December 1960 was inspired by the coveted goal of ending colonialism in all areas and in all forms, one of which encompasses the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),
recalling its resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 and 31/49 of 1 December 1976,
recalling further Security Council resolutions 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982 and 505 (1982) of 26 May 1982,
taking note of the statements and communiques of the Movement of Non-Aligned countries on the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

1. requests the Governments of Argentina and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);
2. requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of this resolution to undertake a renewed mission of good offices in order to assist the parties in complying with the request made in paragraph 1 above;
3. requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the progress made in the implementation of this resolution;
4. decides to include in the provisional agenda if its thirty-eighth session the item entitled 'Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)'.

Sir J Thomson's amendment to operative para 1

1. requests the Governments of Argentina and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to bring about conditions which would permit a resumption of the search, with the participation of representatives of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), for a peaceful solution to their differences within the framework of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter.

Article 73

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

- (a) to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;
- (b) to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;
- (c) to further international peace and security;
- (d) to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to co-operate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialised international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and
- (e) to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

18 OCT 1982

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Argentina 38

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 October 1982

FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Thank you for your letter of 26 October. The Prime Minister does not wish to send a message to Mrs. Gandhi on this subject. Otherwise, she agrees that the proposed messages should be despatched but the words at the foot of the first page of the enclosure from "To support her" to "thinking in Argentina" should be deleted and the following should be substituted: "This would be an outright denial of the principle of self-determination and should not be encouraged in any way."

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 October 1982

Dear Idm,

Falklands at the General Assembly

In my letter of 22 October I said that we would be recommending that the Prime Minister send messages to Community Heads of Government once the results of the discussion in the margin of the Foreign Affairs Council on 25 October were known. You will have seen that Mr Pym went over the ground again in Luxembourg very firmly. We now recommend that the Prime Minister should send messages to the other Heads of Government and I enclose a draft, tailored for the various countries, for this purpose. To have the maximum impact, these should issue on 27 October, to allow time for a proper consideration in capitals.

You may have noticed the omission of India from the list of countries in my letter of 22 October. Our High Commissioner was doubtful about the utility of a message to Mrs Gandhi. We have reflected on this further and are inclined to think that the Prime Minister might nevertheless like to consider sending a message. It seems right, at a time when we are intervening at the highest level with so many other Commonwealth and Non-Aligned countries, that we should make our views plain to India, as a leading member of the Commonwealth and as the in-coming Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement. I enclose a draft for the Prime Minister's consideration.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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[TO EC PARTNERS EXCEPT GERMANY]

' . Next week sees the start of a debate on the Falkland Islands at the United Nations General Assembly with the vote due on 4 November. I am writing to ask you for your understanding and support.

[GERMANY ONLY]

Although we are to meet in only a few hours time I thought I should send you this message about next week's debate on the Falkland Islands at the United Nations since I am writing today to the Heads of other Community governments on the same subject.

[TO ALL]

2. The Argentine draft resolution calling upon us to enter into negotiations about the sovereignty dispute is wholly unacceptable to the British Government and the British people after the events of the Spring. Argentina envisages only one possible outcome to any such negotiations: the transfer of the Islands to herself against the wishes of the people who live there. ~~To support her in the vote would be to encourage her in this unprincipled ambition and to delay the prospect of putting an end to the dispute. The way forward does not lie through the passage of such resolutions but through the encouragement of an evolution of thinking in Argentina.~~

*This ~~is~~
would be an
outright denial
of the principle of
self-determination
and should not
be encouraged in
any way.*

[FRANCE, ITALY,

[FRANCE, ITALY, NETHERLANDS]

3. There is much support for our position in many parts of the world. But I have been most concerned to learn that consideration is being given in France/Italy/The Netherlands to voting with Argentina on 4 November. Voting with the aggressor in the recent conflict in this debate would simply not be understood in this country and would inevitably be widely seen as unfriendly. [FRANCE ONLY: We would never take sides against France in a vote on an issue of comparable concern to France at the United Nations.] I urge you most strongly at least to abstain when the vote is taken. [FRANCE ONLY: We were most grateful for French support during the conflict itself. I very much hope that you will not abandon the principles to which you held then, whatever reasons may be advanced for a change.]

[IRELAND]

There is much support for our position in many parts of the world. I very much hope I can look to Ireland not to side with Argentina against Britain in the coming debate.

[GERMANY, DENMARK, BELGIUM]

There is much support for our position in many parts of the world. But I have been most concerned to hear that some of our partners may be considering voting with Argentina. This would simply not be understood in this country and would give a most unfortuate impression of the meaning of the Community and the willingness of partners to stand by each other when vital interests are at stake. I feel sure I can rely on the Federal Republic/Denmark/

Belgium not to lend its weight to this hypocritical Argentine manoeuvre. I hope you will use your influence with other Community partners to discourage them from doing so either.

[LUXEMBOURG, GREECE]

There is much support for our position in many parts of the world. But I have been most concerned to hear that some of our partners may be considering voting with Argentina. It is good to know of the robust attitude that Luxembourg/Greece is taking. I shall be most grateful to you if you can use your influence with other Community partners to discourage them from voting with Argentina.

TO MRS GANDHI

I greatly appreciate your kindness in inviting me to stop in Delhi on my return from the Far East and I very much valued the talk we had. I hope it will not be long before we can find another opportunity to meet again, however informally.

I know that you will not mind my taking the opportunity to ask for your help in a matter of importance to me. Argentina has ^{had} tabled a draft resolution at the United Nations which calls on us to enter into negotiations about the future of the Falkland Islands. You will understand that after the events of the spring this is wholly unacceptable to the British Government and people. Argentina envisages only one possible outcome to any such negotiations: the transfer of the Islands to herself against the wishes of the people who live there. To support her in the vote would be to encourage her in this unprincipled ambition and to delay the prospect of putting an end to the dispute. The way forward does not lie through the passage of such resolutions but through the encouragement of an evolution of thinking in Argentina.

There is much support for our position in many parts of the world, including many Commonwealth and Non-Aligned countries. I feel sure that you share my attachment to the principle of self-determination, which Argentina refuses to recognise, and I hope that

/ you will

you will instruct the Indian representative in New York
to abstain on, if not vote against, the Argentine draft.

Argentina : Relations

Argentina

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 October, 1982

FALKLANDS: UN TACTICS

Thank you for your letter of 22 October.
The Prime Minister agrees that the messages to
Heads of Government which you enclosed should be
despatched.

A. J. COLES

J. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Prime Minister

Wrote doing & think.

Agree that messages may be sent?

A.J.C. 22/10

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 October 1982

Agreed mo.

Dear John,

Falklands: UN Tactics

Your letter of 19 October recorded the Prime Minister's agreement that high-level messages should be sent to appropriate countries as part of our campaign to muster support for the coming debate.

We suggest that the question of messages to European Community Heads of Government should be left on one side until we can take account of the discussion which is to take place during the Foreign Affairs Council in Luxembourg on 26-27 October. It would however be desirable to despatch messages to countries in other parts of the world at the beginning of next week. We are very conscious of the undesirability of devaluing the currency of high-level messages and expending too much credit on one issue. But having consulted our Posts, it is clear that in many cases a message from the Prime Minister may well make a decisive difference. We believe it is worth making a major effort to deny Argentina positive votes. We therefore recommend that the Prime Minister should send messages to Heads of Government in the following countries:

- a. United States
- b. Australia, Canada and New Zealand
- c. Portugal, Jordan and Pakistan
- d. Botswana, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, St Lucia, St Vincent, Trinidad, Vanuatu
- e. Cameroon, Gabon.

Mr Pym envisages sending messages to his Nordic colleagues and to Japan and a wide range of Arab, African and Asian countries.

I enclose a draft for the messages to President Reagan, Mr Fraser and Mr Trudeau; another for Mr Muldoon, Ratu Mara and Mr Price, whose support is already assured; a draft for Lee Kuan Yew in terms recommended by our High Commissioner; and a slightly different version of the first draft which

/might



might serve for the other recipients. We would propose to make small additions or adjustments to this core message to suit particular recipients, taking account of the nature of our relations, any action they have already taken in the Falklands context and so forth.

You may have seen (UKMis New York telnos 1696-7) that Sir J Thomson remains convinced that our interests would be better served by an attempt to amend the Argentine draft. We are looking again at his detailed arguments. If this leads to any change in our view about the undesirability of going down this road I will of course let you know.

It is most unlikely that the Foreign Secretary will agree with Sir J. Thomson.
A.F.C. 22.12.

Yours ever
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, MR FRASER AND
MR TRUDEAU

[TO WASHINGTON AND CANBERRA]

1. We are now approaching a debate on the Falklands at the United Nations General Assembly with the vote expected on or about 4 November. This is, as you will appreciate, of considerable importance to us and I wanted to let you know personally how strongly we feel about it.

[TO OTTAWA ONLY]

1. Francis Pym has told me of his most useful exchange of views with Allan MacEachen during his recent visit to Ottawa. I know that you will therefore be aware of the importance to us of the forthcoming debate on the Falklands at the United Nations General Assembly. But I wanted nevertheless to ask once again for your personal understanding and support.

2. The Argentine draft is wholly unacceptable to the British Government and to the British people. It suggests that the maintenance of the present status of the Islands is a threat to world peace and must be ended whatever the people of the Islands may want; it recalls three earlier ~~Ag~~ Argentine-inspired resolutions which were unacceptable to us and which the United

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States/Australia/Canada also declined to support; it refers to pronouncements of the Non-Aligned Movement which prejudged the dispute in Argentina's favour and dismissed the legitimate rights of the inhabitants of the Islands; and it calls upon us to resume negotiations.

3. Negotiations were of course in progress earlier this year when Argentina launched her military assault on the Islands without provocation or warning. Argentina subsequently ignored the appeals and instructions of the Security Council. Her action was widely condemned as a breach of the most important provisions of the UN Charter.

4. I am sure that you will understand how offensive it is to us that Argentina now comes before the General Assembly to seek a resumption of the negotiations which she herself broke off. The hypocrisy of this approach is shown up by the determination of the authorities in Buenos Aires (whatever their spokesmen may say in New York) to keep open the option of a resumption of hostilities. Moreover it is clear that Argentina still contemplates only one possible outcome to negotiations with Britain - the transfer of the Islands to Argentina in defiance of the wishes of the people. To support her in the coming debate would be
/to encourage

to encourage her in this unprincipled ambition and thus to set back the cause of peace. There can be no resolution of this issue until there is a fundamental change of heart on the part of Argentina. You will understand our insistence that the principles of the United Nations Charter, including those of self-determination and the non-use of force, are as applicable to this as to other international problems.

5. We have deeply appreciated the great help and understanding which we have received from the USA/the consistent support of Australia/Canada/ since the crisis burst upon us at the beginning of April. I now ask for your help once more in supporting us in the vote on the Argentine Resolution at the UN.



DRAFT MESSAGE TO THE NEW ZEALAND, FIJIAN AND BELIZEAN
PRIME MINISTERS

1. We are now making our final preparations for the debate in the United Nations on the Falkland Islands and seeking the understanding and support of our friends in many parts of the world in our rejection of the Argentine demand that we should enter into negotiations. Our people in Wellington/Suva/Belmopan and New York have been keeping us in close touch with your thinking and I wanted to let you know what a great source of strength and encouragement it is to me to know that you will once again be giving us robust support.


[FIJI ONLY]

2. I am most grateful to you for responding as you did to my request that you should bring our views to the attention of our colleagues at the recent regional meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government. This seems to have been a useful discussion and we shall be building on it in the days ahead.

DRAFT MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF SINGAPORE

1. I am asking for your help over the Falkland Island resolution in the United Nations. We simply cannot accept a call to negotiate with a country which only a few months ago brutally invaded the islands, which has still not renounced the use of force to have its way, and which obstinately rejects the right of the Islanders to self-determination.

2. In deciding our votes on the many issues debated at the United Nations we all constantly have conflicting considerations to bear in mind. But for each of us there is an issue where we really need to be able to count on the support of our friends. For us the Falkland Islands is such an issue.



CORE OF MESSAGE TO OTHER RECIPIENTS.

1. We are now approaching a debate on the Falklands at the United Nations General Assembly with the vote expected on or about 4 November. This is, as you will know, an issue of great importance to Britain and I thought that I should let you know personally how we see it and ask you for your understanding and support.

2. The Assembly will have before it a draft prepared by Argentina. This draft is wholly unacceptable to us. It suggests that the maintenance of the present status of the Islands is a threat to world peace and must be ended whatever the people of the Islands may want; it recalls three earlier Argentine-inspired resolutions which were unacceptable to us [and which your country also declined to support]; it refers to pronouncements of the Non-Aligned Movement which prejudged the dispute in Argentina's favour and dismissed the legitimate rights of the inhabitants of the Islands and it calls upon us to resume negotiations.

3. You will recall that negotiations were in progress earlier this year when Argentina launched her military assault on the Islands without provocation or warning. Argentina subsequently ignored the appeals and


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instructions of the Security Council. Her action was widely condemned as a breach of the most important provisions of the UN Charter. The consequences of this attack will be with us and the Islanders for a long time to come and we have lost many lives in our resistance to Argentine aggression.

4. I am sure that you will understand how offensive it is to us that Argentina now comes before the General Assembly to seek a resumption of the negotiations which she herself broke off. The hypocrisy of this approach is shown up by the determination of the authorities in Buenos Aires (whatever their spokesmen may say in New York) to keep open the option of a resumption of hostilities. It is clear that Argentina still contemplates only one possible outcome to negotiations with Britain - the transfer of the Islands to Argentina in defiance of the wishes of the people. To support her in the coming debate would be to encourage her in this ambition and thus to set back the cause of peace. There can be no resolution of this issue until Argentina accepts that the principles of the United Nations Charter, including those of self-determination and the non-use of force, are applicable to this as to every other international problem.

5. The British Government and the British people
/would

would now find it difficult to understand how friendly and responsible governments could side with the aggressor. We have been greatly heartened by the understanding our position has received from countries in many parts of the world since the crisis burst upon us at the beginning of April. We now ask that that understanding should be given practical expression in the vote at the United Nations. [In the spirit of/the good relations between our two countries, which we both hope to foster and develop,/our close ties/our close relationship in the Commonwealth/I ask you for your help.] [I have been much heartened by what I have heard of your attitude to the coming debate. I look forward to having your most valued support.]



22 OCT 1982

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Argentina*From the Secretary of State*CONFIDENTIAL*N.B.P.R.*

The Rt Hon Francis Pym MC MP
Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London
SW1A 2AL

*A.J.C. 27
/w.*

21 October 1982

Dear Francis,

THE FALKLANDS: UN TACTICS

Thank you for sending me a copy of your minute of 18 October to the Prime Minister.

As my Office has already told yours, I agree with your assessment that we should, on balance, steer clear of sophisticated UN tactics and go for a straight negative lobbying exercise. The alternative of seeking to amend the text is a high risk strategy, and my own view is that it would fail. If it did fail and the original Resolution were passed, we would be in an even more difficult and prejudicial position than if we had never attempted to amend the Resolution.

I am copying this to the recipients of your minute.

*Yours,
Arthur*

LORD COCKFIELD

CONFIDENTIAL

Argentina, Relations, 1730

22 OCT 1982





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Argentina

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 October 1982

FALKLANDS: UN TACTICS

The Prime Minister has seen the minute of 18 October by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on this question.

Mrs. Thatcher agrees with Mr. Pym's conclusion that we should not try to amend the Latin American draft, but simply lobby hard against it and, by high level messages, urge our friends to support us.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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