

GRS 640

CONFIDENTIAL

*I do not think the  
F.C.O. are likely to find  
Sir John Thurston's arguments  
persuasive.*

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 211946Z OCT 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1696 DATED 21 OCTOBER 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, WASHINGTON

*A.F.C. 22.  
10*

YOUR TELNO 382: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

*mt*

1. IN ORDER TO CONDUCT THE CAMPAIGN HERE IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER IT IS IMPORTANT THAT I SHOULD FULLY UNDERSTAND YOUR THINKING AND CONVERSELY THAT I SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT THE TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH APPLY HERE ARE GIVEN WHATEVER WEIGHT THEY DESERVE. I AM THEREFORE GRATEFUL FOR THE INVITATION IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE TO LET YOU HAVE FURTHER THOUGHTS. MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM CONTAINS MORE DETAILED COMMENTS IN CASE YOUR DIFFICULTIES STEM AS MUCH FROM THE DETAILED WORDING AS FROM PURSUING THE WHOLE STRATEGY OF AMENDING THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION.

2. I AM NOT SURE HOW MUCH GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS MATTER INTERNATIONALLY, STILL LESS HOW MUCH THEY MATTER DOMESTICALLY. BUT TO THE EXTENT THEY DO, THE VOTE ON THE FALKLANDS IS IMPORTANT. THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT AS IT STANDS WILL BE CARRIED BY A SUBSTANTIAL MAJORITY. IF THEY ARE PREPARED TO TRIM IT HERE AND THERE TO GAIN YET FURTHER VOTES (AND PERHAPS EVEN IF THEY DO NOT) THEIR VOTE COULD EASILY BE AROUND A HUNDRED, IE THE SORT OF VOTE WE OBTAINED IN JANUARY 1980 AGAINST THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. AS YOU SAY, THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR HMG TO REGARD THIS AS A DIPLOMATIC 'DEFEAT', BUT THE ARGENTINES WOULD TREAT IT AS A SIGNIFICANT 'VICTORY'. THIS WOULD HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FUTURE. WHAT INCENTIVE WOULD THERE BE, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR THE PRESENT ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT (OR A SUCCESSOR) TO CHANGE COURSE IF ALREADY THEY CAN GATHER VOTES IN THESE NUMBERS FOR A CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY WITH THE PROSPECT OF STEADILY INCREASING THEIR MAJORITY IN THE YEARS TO COME?

3. THERE IS A MORE POSITIVE SIDE, HOWEVER, IN PAST YEARS WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY BEEN ON THE WRONG FOOT IN THE UN OVER THE FALKLANDS (AND OTHER COLONIAL QUESTIONS). THE PRESENT MOMENT, WITH MEMORIES OF THE ARGENTINE INVASION STILL FRESH, OFFERS A CHANCE WHICH WILL NOT RECUR TO CHANGE THE PATTERN FOR THE FUTURE. IF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FAR FROM ADOPTING A RESOLUTION IN ARGENTINE TERMS, WERE TO VOTE FOR AN AMENDED VERSION WHICH FOR THE FIRST TIME CATERED FOR OUR ESSENTIAL INTERESTS AND THOSE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS, OUR POSITION OVER THE FALKLANDS AND OUR PROSPECTS OVER EG GIBRALTAR WOULD BE GREATLY IMPROVED.

CONFIDENTIAL

*14*



# CONFIDENTIAL

4. TO MY MIND, THE CRUCIAL ELEMENT OF THE DRAFT AMENDMENT IS NOT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 'SEARCH' AND NEGOTIATIONS, NOR ANY OF THE OTHER PERFECTLY VALID DOUBTS YOU EXPRESS, BUT THE FACT THAT IT TURNS THE LATIN DRAFT INSIDE OUT. FIRSTLY, THERE IS THE FUNDAMENTAL SUBSTITUTION OF ARTICLE 73 FOR SOVEREIGNTY. SECONDLY, WHAT WAS ONCE A CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS BECOMES A RECOGNITION BY THE UN THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT (NOT) POSSIBLE AS MATTERS STAND. THE EFFECT OF THE AMENDMENT, IF ADOPTED, WOULD BE TO SUPPORT OUR POLICY THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE EXCLUDED UNTIL ARGENTINA CHANGES HER POSITION. THE ONUS WOULD BE ON HER, NOT ON US.

*And they  
are excluded  
even then.*

5. I SHALL REPORT FURTHER ONCE I AM ABLE TO ASSESS MORE ACCURATELY LIKELY VOTING FIGURES ON THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT. MEANWHILE I CANNOT STRESS TOO MUCH THAT THE CONSIDERABLE FUND OF SYMPATHY FOR US HERE WILL BEST BE MOBILISED BY GIVING DELEGATIONS SOMETHING RESPECTABLE AND POSITIVE TO VOTE FOR. THERE ARE MORE VOTES TO BE MOBILISED IN FAVOUR OF ARTICLE 73 THAN CAN BE GATHERED SIMPLY TO ABSTAIN ON A CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

THOMSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FAKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

FCO  
JND  
FID

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FAKLAND ISLANDS

2

CONFIDENTIAL