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TELNO 3463 OF 27 OCTOBER 1982,  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

CRABBIE'S TELELETTER OF 25 OCTOBER TO FEARN: US/FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING OUR CONVERSATION YESTERDAY WITH SMITH (STATE DEPT DIRECTOR FOR ARGENTINA AND CHILE), ENDERS SUMMONED THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON TO EXPLAIN CURRENT US THINKING ON THE DRAFT UNGA RESOLUTION. WE HAVE NOW BEEN SHOWN IN STRICT CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) THE RECORD OF THAT MEETING.
  
2. ENDERS HANDED THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR A DETAILED PAPER SETTING OUT THE US POSITION. THE POINTS CONTAINED IN THE PAPER WERE:
  - A. THE US WAS NEUTRAL ON THE QUESTION OF WHO HAD SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS:
  - B. THE US HAD SUPPORTED INSCRIPTION OF THE FALKLANDS ITEM ON THE UNGA AGENDA:
  - C. THE US COULD (REPEAT COULD) SUPPORT A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR NEGOTIATIONS PROVIDED THAT THE RESOLUTION DID NOT (NOT) PREJUDGE SOVEREIGNTY AND THAT IT DID NOT (NOT) IMPOSE AN UNREALISTIC TIMETABLE FOR SUCH NEGOTIATIONS:
  - D. THE US NOTED THE '' CONSTRUCTIVE AMENDMENTS'' WHICH THE ARGENTINES HAD ALREADY MADE TO THE RESOLUTION: HOWEVER THESE DID NOT FULLY MEET US CONCERNS:
  - E. THE PRESENT DRAFT WOULD THEREFORE NOT (NOT) ATTRACT US SUPPORT BECAUSE OF (I) ITS PERJORATIVE REFERENCES TO COLONIALISM IN THE PREAMBLE, (II) ITS REFERENCE TO UNGA RESOLUTIONS WHICH HAD THE EFFECT OF PREDETERMINING THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS, (III) THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF REFERENCES TO NAM RESOLUTIONS WHICH UNJUSTLY DESCRIBED THE SITUATION, AND (IV) UNNECESSARY AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE REFERENCE TO ''SOVEREIGNTY'' IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1.
  - F. THE US WOULD BE HAPPY TO REVIEW WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT ANY FURTHER CHANGES IN THE DRAFT IF THAT WAS CONSIDERED HELPFUL BY BOTH PARTIES.
  
3. IN HANDING OVER THE PAPER, ENDERS SAID THAT THE US COULD SUPPORT ''A SIMPLE CALL TO NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT ALL THE CONTENTIOUS AND UNHELPFUL RHETORIC'' CONTAINED IN THE PRESENT DRAFT. THE US COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT CONDEMN THEIR BRITISH ALLIES AS ''COLONIALISTS''. ENDERS ASKED WHETHER ARGENTINA WANTED THE US TO VOTE FOR A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD ACTIVELY HELP RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OR MERELY EXACERBATE IT: IF THE LATTER, THE US WOULD NOT (NOT) OBLIGE.
  
4. THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR CLAIMED THAT ARGENTINA HAD ASSEMBLED A CLEAR MAJORITY IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION. SPEAKING UNOFFICIALLY, HE ACCEPTED THE AMERICAN POINT ON THE NEED TO AVOID IMPOSING AN UNREALISTIC TIMETABLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS: HE

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DID NOT BELIEVE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR SOME TIME TO COME. HOWEVER ON SOVEREIGNTY, HE COULD NOT SEE WHY THE AMERICANS OPPOSED WHAT HAD BECOME STANDARD PART OF THE NORMAL UN LEXICON ON THE SUBJECT. REFERENCE TO UNGA AND NAM RESOLUTIONS WAS, HE THOUGHT, ESSENTIAL FOR ARGENTINA'S POSITION. THERE COULD BE NO RETREAT FROM THIS GIVEN THE EFFORT WHICH THE ARGENTINES HAD MADE OVER MANY YEARS TO BUILD UP A SOLID POSITION IN THE UNITED NATIONS. THE AMBASSADOR THOUGHT THAT THE US REQUIREMENTS WHICH ENDERS HAD EXPLAINED WOULD BE RECEIVED 'LIKE AN ICY SHOWER' IN BUENOS AIRES. HE FORESAW LITTLE POSSIBILITY OF MAJOR CHANGES BEING MADE TO THE EXISTING RESOLUTION TO ATTRACT US SUPPORT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WHICH ALL MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA IN BUENOS AIRES ATTACHED TO GAINING US SUPPORT.

5. THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WAS SERIOUSLY WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE UK WOULD INTRODUCE SPOILING AMENDMENTS WHICH PLACED THE DISPUTE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION. HE CONCEDED THAT SUCH AMENDMENTS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO HANDLE; BUT THEY WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO ARGENTINA SINCE IN CONFERRING THE RIGHT OF SELF DETERMINATION ON THE ISLANDERS, THE RESOLUTION WOULD EFFECTIVELY PREJUDE THE OUTCOME OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS (SIC). HE URGED THE AMERICANS TO OPPOSE BRITISH ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE SUCH AMENDMENTS. ENDERS REFUSED TO COMMIT HIMSELF ONE WAY OR ANOTHER.

6. WE HAVE HEARD FROM A SEPARATE STATE DEPARTMENT SOURCE THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IS UNDER STRONG PRESSURE FROM THE PEONISTS ACTUALLY TO 'TOUGHEN' ITS RESOLUTION RATHER THAN SOFTEN IT TO ATTRACT WIDER SUPPORT.

7. COMMENT: IN THANKING SMITH FOR THIS FULL AND EARLY ACCOUNT OF ENDERS' MEETING, WE REPEATED THE POINT THAT WE DID NOT (NOT) WELCOME OUR FRIENDS DISCUSSING WITH THE ARGENTINES WAYS OF 'IMPROVING' THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. NEVERTHELESS, WE WERE GLAD TO SEE THAT THE ARGENTINES FOUND GREAT DIFFICULTY IN MEETING THE AMERICAN REQUIREMENTS, AND ALSO THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBLE TACTICS WE MIGHT ADOPT: WE COULD GUARANTEE THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME IN THE DEBATE. WE AGREED TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE STATE DEPT AS THE DEBATE APPROACHED.

WRIGHT

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