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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 272315Z OCT 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1743 OF 27 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 1717: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. I HAD NINETY MINUTES WITH MRS KIRKPATRICK THIS MORNING (27 OCTOBER) ABOUT HALF OF WHICH AT HER REQUEST WAS DEVOTED TO ARAB/ ISRAEL AND NAMIBIA. ON THIS I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY. SHE LIKED THE CONVERSATION ON NAMIBIA AND THIS PROVIDED A USEFUL BACKGROUND TO THE FALKLANDS.

2. MRS KIRKPATRICK SHOWED NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AND SO I DID NOT MENTION IT. BUT I MADE CLEAR THE STRENGTH OF BRITISH OPINION FROM THE PRIME MINISTER DOWNWARDS. I SAID THAT AS A RESULT OF THE ARGENTINE ACTIONS EARLIER THIS YEAR THE QUESTION WAS NO LONGER ONLY A DISTANT AND MINOR DISPUTE (AS MANY PEOPLE SAW IT) BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES WHICH OTHERWISE GET ON PRETTY WELL TOGETHER. EVENTS EARLIER THIS YEAR HAD RAISED THE SANCTITY OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN THE UN CHARTER AND DECENT STANDARDS OF BEHAVIOUR IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. SINCE COMING TO NEW YORK I HAD FOUND A MUCH HIGHER LEVEL OF SYMPATHY WITH THE BRITISH POSITION THAN MOST OF OUR FRIENDS SEEMED TO SUPPOSE. FOR EXAMPLE NEARLY EVERYONE THOUGHT THE ARGENTINES WERE WRONG TO PRESS THE MATTER SO SOON AFTER THEIR ILLEGAL AND ABOMINABLE BEHAVIOUR; MANY DELEGATIONS WERE SAYING THERE SHOULD BE A COOLING OFF PERIOD. THERE WAS EQUALLY WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR OUR STAND ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE. THERE WAS ALSO GREAT SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA THAT PEOPLE MATTERED AS MUCH IF NOT MORE THAN LAND AND THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION MUST BE OBSERVED IN THIS AS IN OTHER CASES. MOREOVER THE FALKLANDS WAS INDUBITABLY ARTICLE 73 TERRITORY AND THAT ARTICLE APPLIED IN ITS ENTIRETY. OUR LEGAL CASE LIKE OUR MORAL ONE WAS IMPECCABLE. GIVEN THIS AND OUR CLOSE ALLIANCE THERE WOULD BE GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT IN THE UK IF THE US GOVERNMENT DID NOT VOTE AGAINST THE LATIN RESOLUTION.

3. MRS KIRKPATRICK SAID THAT BECAUSE OF OUR FRANK AND CORDIAL RELATIONS SHE WOULD LIKE TO EXPOSE TO ME HER PERSONAL THINKING ON THE WHOLE SITUATION. SHE WAS ABSOLUTELY FED UP WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WHO HAD BEHAVED NOT ONLY BADLY BUT ALSO STUPIDLY AND WERE EVEN NOW CONDUCTING THEIR CASE POORLY. SHE DID NOT CARE ABOUT THEM. IN ANY CASE THEY WOULD FALL PROBABLY WITHIN A MONTH. WHAT SHE DID CARE ABOUT WAS AMERICAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE REST OF THE LATIN AMERICAN WORLD. WE SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT THAT EVEN THE MOST SENSIBLE AND DEMOCRATICALLY INCLINED GOVERNMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA, EG PERU, VENEZUELA AND BRAZIL, FELT PASSIONATELY THAT THE US MUST VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE LATIN DRAFT. IF THE FALKLANDS WERE AS I HAD

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SAID A SYMBOL OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES THEY WERE ALSO A SYMBOL OF THE FUTURE US-LATIN RELATIONSHIP. THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE HAD ALREADY CAUSED A SERIOUS CHANGE IN THE COMPLEXION OF LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL THINKING. THE WHOLE HEMISPHERE HAD BEEN PUSHED IN THE DIRECTION OF CUBA AND NICARAGUA WHO HAD THUS ACQUIRED AN INFLUENCE THEY WOULD NOT OTHERWISE HAVE ACHIEVED. WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE ENORMOUS PRESSURE WHICH ALL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES (EVEN CHILE SHE SAID) WERE EXERTING IN WASHINGTON OFTEN AT THE TOP LEVEL. SHE HOPED WE WERE SPEAKING TO SHULTZ (I ASSURED HER THAT OLIVER WRIGHT KEPT CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH HIM). THE LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL TEMPERAMENT HAD A DUAL ASPECT: ON THE ONE HAND THERE WAS A STRONG ANTI-YANKEE STRAIN WHILE ON THE OTHER THERE WAS ADMIRATION FOR MACHISMO. THE LATIN AMERICAN BUREAU (WHO WERE RUNNING THE OPERATION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT) WERE PARTICULARLY INFLUENCED BY THE FORMER. SHE HERSELF HALF THOUGHT (AND BY THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION DECLARED HERSELF TO BE MORE OR LESS CONVINCED) THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE AS MUCH RESPECTED IN LATIN AMERICA FOR BARING ITS BREAST AND STANDING UP FOR ITS PRINCIPLES. HOWEVER IT WAS ALL VERY DIFFICULT AND PARTLY BECAUSE OF HER PERSONAL EMOTIONAL INVOLVEMENT SHE HAD ABSTAINED FROM ANY ACTION ON THE FALKLANDS QUESTION SINCE SHE HAD TOLD SHULTZ AND EAGLEBURGER SOME WEEKS AGO THAT THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT AS IT STOOD WAS IN HER OPINION UNACCEPTABLE. SHE HAD SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE QUESTION TO THE WHITE HOUSE. SHE WAS HESITATING WHETHER TO JOIN IN THE DISCUSSION NOW TAKING PLACE IN WASHINGTON OR WHETHER TO LET THE 'WAVES WASH OVER HER' AND ALLOW WASHINGTON TO RUN THE AFFAIR.

4. WITHOUT REFERRING EXPLICITLY TO THE ENDERS/ARGENTINE EXCHANGES DESCRIBED IN WASHINGTON TELNO 3463 MRS KIRKPATRICK SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH THE LATIN RESOLUTION WAS UNACCEPTABLE AS IT STOOD, SOME RELATIVELY MINOR CHANGES COULD MAKE IT ACCEPTABLE. SHE MUST TAKE ISSUE WITH MY COMMENT THAT IT WOULD BE VERY SURPRISING IF THE AMERICANS VOTED FOR IT: IT WOULD NOT TAKE MUCH FOR THIS TO HAPPEN AND SHE BY NO MEANS EXCLUDED A YES VOTE. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF A NO VOTE. IN ANSWER TO MY COMMENTS SHE ACCEPTED THAT OUR POSITION WAS LEGALLY IMPECCABLE: BETTER, SHE SAID, THAN OUR POLITICAL ONE. SHE ALSO ACCEPTED THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER IF THE ARGENTINES HAD REFRAINED FROM PRESSING A RESOLUTION BUT THERE WAS NO HOPE OF THIS. SHE FURTHER ACCEPTED THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-USE OF FORCE AND SELF-DETERMINATION WERE RELEVANT BUT SHE COULD NOT AFFORD TO ADMIT (BEARING PALESTINE AND OTHER PROBLEMS IN MIND) THAT SELF-DETERMINATION NECESSARILY MEANT SELF-GOVERNMENT. SHE AGREED THAT ARTICLE 73 APPLIED. NEVERTHELESS IF THE ARGENTINES WOULD DROP ANY REFERENCE TO A TIME LIMIT AND TO LANGUAGE WHICH WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHO COULD OPPOSE NEGOTIATIONS? IF THE RESOLUTION WAS AMENDED ACCORDINGLY THE US WOULD HAVE TO VOTE FOR IT.

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5. I SAID THAT ALTHOUGH WE DID INDEED HAVE A PROBLEM ABOUT THE WORD NEGOTIATIONS THE BIGGEST PROBLEM FOR US WAS THE ATTITUDE OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES NOTABLY THE US AND THE TEN. MRS KIRKPATRICK SAID THERE WAS NO CHANCE THAT THE NINE WOULD AGREE ON A COMMON ABSTENTION. FOR EXAMPLE IT WAS CERTAIN THAT FRANCE WOULD VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION AND GREECE TOO. I CORRECTED HER ON THE LATTER AND CAUTIONED HER ON THE FORMER. SHE SAID THAT IT HAD OCCURRED TO HER TO WONDER WHETHER THE UNITED STATES MIGHT NOT WORK FOR A TEXT WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE US AND THE NINE ALTHOUGH WE MIGHT HAVE TO ABSTAIN ON IT. I SAID THAT I ASSUMED SHE MEANT A TEXT WHICH WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ARGENTINES. SHE SAID ON THE CONTRARY SHE MEANT ONE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. I TOLD HER THIS WOULD IN NO WAY BE A HELPFUL ACTION AND I MUST ASK HER TO DESIST FROM IT. SHE AGREED NOT TO PURSUE THIS COURSE.

6. I ASKED HOW THE US WOULD SPEAK IF THEY DECIDED TO ABSTAIN. SHE HAD NOT DISCUSSED IT WITH WASHINGTON AND REALLY DID NOT KNOW. BUT AT THE MOMENT HER INCLINATION WAS TO BE ABSENT HERSELF FROM THE DEBATE. WE THEN DISCUSSED THE SORT OF SPEECH WHICH THE US DELEGATION MIGHT MAKE. SHE EVENTUALLY AGREED THAT IT SHOULD SUPPORT NON-USE OF FORCE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND ARTICLE 73. BUT IN MY VIEW IT WOULD NOT BE SAFE TO DEPEND ON THIS OFF THE CUFF DECISION AND WE SHALL HAVE TO WORK HERE AND IN WASHINGTON TO MAKE IT STICK. A GOOD SPEECH IN THE DEBATE OR AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE BEFORE THE VOTE COULD BE INFLUENTIAL WITH A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS. MRS KIRKPATRICK HAS ALMOST GOT TO THE POINT OF WASHING HER HANDS OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM. SHE MIGHT NOT OBJECT TO A CLEAR INSTRUCTION FOR HER DELEGATION TO DELIVER A SPEECH WHICH WOULD HELP US. BUT THIS OF COURSE WOULD HAVE TO BE WRITTEN BY SOMEONE OTHER THAN ENDERS AND THE LATIN AMERICAN BUREAU.

THOMSON

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