

PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR EVANS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

ADVANCE COPY

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MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MR ILETT ) TREASURY  
MR LITTLER )

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OFFICE  
DIO )

MR M. PATTISON ; FID  
MR C. ROTH ; ~~ODA~~ , ODA

MR A TITCHENER ; DOT  
MR C W ROBERTS , IAT )

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 937 OF 03 NOVEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON PARIS THE HAGUE BRUSSELS  
ROME  
INFO PRIORITY ATHENS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG UKREP BRUSSELS

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 164 TO ABIDJAN: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. MALLABY SPOKE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TUR TO ZELLER (FEDERAL CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE) THIS MORNING AND TO PFEFFER (POLITICAL DIRECTOR MFA) OVER LUNCH. HE ADDED THAT US VOTING INTENTIONS WERE NOT ENTIRELY RELEVANT TO GERMANY'S DECISION, NOT LEAST BECAUSE THE FRG AND THE UK ARE PARTNERS IN POLITICAL COOPERATION.

2. ZELLER CALLED BACK LATER TO SAY THAT THE QUESTION OF THE GERMAN VOTE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE FEDERAL CABINET THIS MORNING. THE NEED FOR SOLIDARITY WITH A PROTECTING POWER IN BERLIN AND A EUROPEAN PARTNER HAD INFLUENCED THE CABINET'S TENDENCY TOWARDS ABSTENTION. THE GERMANS WOULD MAKE KNOWN TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS

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NEED FOR SOLIDARITY WITH A PROTECTING POWER IN BERLIN AND A EUROPEAN PARTNER HAD INFLUENCED THE CABINET'S TENDENCY TOWARDS ABSTENTION. THE GERMANS WOULD MAKE KNOWN TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS THAT THIS WAS THEIR TENDENCY. ZELLER MADE CLEAR THAT THERE WAS SO FAR NO DEFINITE GERMAN DECISION TO ABSTAIN BY SAYING THAT THE INTENTIONS OF OTHER EC MEMBERS WERE OF GREAT INTEREST TO GERMANY AND THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WERE KEEN NOT TO BE ALONE AMONG THE EUROPEANS IN ABSTAINING. MALLABY ARGUED THAT GERMANY WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO BE ALONE IN ABSTAINING AND ALSO DREW ATTENTION TO THE PRIME MINISTERS VISIT TO PARIS TOMORROW.

3. THE DISCUSSION WITH PFEFFER ABOUT THE FALKLANDS AT THE UN FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY ON ONE ABOUT LAST WEEK'S ANGLO-GERMAN SUMMIT WHICH PFEFFER AGREED HAD BEEN A NOTABLE SUCCESS. HE ALSO AGREED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO BERLIN HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AND HAD EVOKED A VERY POSITIVE RESPONSE IN BERLIN AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. MALLABY GAVE PFEFFER A SPEAKING NOTE BASED ON TUR WITH AN ANNEX ABOUT MAYOTTE. PFEFFER DID NOT ATTEMPT TO ARGUE THAT THE ARGENTINE RESOLUTION WAS SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED. HE SAID THAT GENSCHER WOULD HIMSELF TAKE THE FINAL DECISION ON HOW TO VOTE. THE OUTCOME COULD STILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE VOTING INTENTIONS OF OTHERS. BUT PFEFFER CONTINUED THAT GENSCHER'S PRESENT VIEW WAS THAT THE BRITISH ROLE IN BERLIN, UNDERLINED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT, SHOULD CAUSE GERMANY TO ABSTAIN. PFEFFER DID NOT SEEM TO ASSUME THAT GERMANY WOULD BE ALONE IN ABSTAINING, AND HIMSELF SUGGESTED THAT FRANCE MIGHT YET ABSTAIN FOLLOWING THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO PARIS. MALLABY ARGUED THAT THE GERMAN DESIRE TO BE IN GOOD COMPANY IN ABSTAINING POINTED STRONGLY TOWARDS A GERMAN EFFORT TO PERSUADE AS MANY COUNTRIES AS POSSIBLE, NOTABLY AMONG THE TEN, TO ABSTAIN TOO. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT GERMANY'S TENDENCY TOWARDS ABSTENTION SHOULD BE DECLARED TO OTHERS AS CLEARLY AS POSSIBLE: IT WOULD BY NO MEANS BE GOOD ENOUGH TO SAY THAT GERMANY HAD NOT YET DECIDED HOW TO VOTE.

4. PFEFFER ASKED THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO COMPARE NOTES ABOUT OTHERS VOTING INTENTIONS WITH THE FEDERAL MFA RIGHT UP TO THE VOTE. GRATEFUL FOR REPITITION OF RELEVANT TELEGRAMS.

TAYLOR

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