

Prime Minister

X is a reference to the fact that we told the Italians that we unfortunately could not find dates for a summit before the end of the year - but hoped to early next year.

ms

A. J. C. $\frac{4}{11}$

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FM ROME 031105Z NOV 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO. 456 OF 03 NOV 82

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN, DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, ATHENS, COPENHAGEN, WASHINGTON, BIS BUENOS AIRES

SAVING FOR INFO UKREP BRUSSELS AND UKDEL NATO

MY TELEGRAM NO. 553

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE MFA SUMMONED ME LAST EVENING TO MAKE TWO COMPLAINTS.
2. THE FIRST WAS THAT PRIME MINISTER SPADOLINI WAS VERY UPSET AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S REFUSAL TO SEE HIM, MORE ESPECIALLY AS SHE WAS SEEING THE FRENCH AND GERMAN LEADERS.
3. THE SECOND WAS THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO SPADOLINI OF 27 OCTOBER ABOUT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (LAST PARAGRAPH FOR ITALY) HAD BEEN RECEIVED VERY BADLY IN ROME. THIS WAS NOT THE WAY TO GET ITALY TO DO WHAT WE WANTED.
4. I SAID IT WAS WE WHO HAD GROUNDS FOR COMPLAINT. THE OTHER DAY I HAD HAD TO SEE THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO URGE HIM TO CHANGE ITALY'S UNSATISFACTORY POSITION ON THE FALKLANDS AND ON THE 1982 BUDGET REFUND.
5. MALFATTI THEN MADE THE CONNEXION BETWEEN THE FALKLANDS AND THE LONDON VISIT, AND SAID HE SUPPOSED THAT THE VISIT COULD NOT BE FAVOURABLY CONSIDERED UNTIL THE ITALIANS HAD PLEASSED US BY ABSTAINING ON THE ARGENTINE RESOLUTION. HE SAID HE WAS SURE THAT THEY WOULD IN THE END ABSTAIN.
6. WE WENT OVER THE ARGENTINE RESOLUTION AND I ADDED TO THE USUAL ARGUMENTS A NEW ONE, NAMELY THAT THE SITUATION MUST HAVE BEEN CHANGED FOR THE ITALIANS BY THE DRAMATIC REAPPEARANCE IN THE ITALIAN PRESS OF THE AFFAIR OF THE ITALIAN 'DISAPPEARED' IN ARGENTINA. (DETAIL IN MIFT, SAVING TO SOME POSTS). THIS WOULD GIVE COLOMBO AN ADMIRABLE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN AN ABSTENTION. ON THE OTHER HAND A FAVOURABLE VOTE WOULD PROBABLY NOW ATTRACT CRITICISM HERE. MALFATTI DID NOT CONCEDE THIS BUT THE POINT IS, I THINK, A VALID ONE AND MAY BE USEFUL IN NEW YORK.

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7. AT THE END, MALFATTI BEGGED ME EARNESTLY TO DO WHAT I COULD TO SALVAGE A QUICK IN-AND-OUT VISIT TO LONDON BY SPADOLINI AFTER IT WAS KNOWN THAT THE ITALIANS HAD ABSTAINED. HE ALSO BEGGED ME NOT TO EXCLUDE COLOMBO, WHO ALSO HAD POLITICAL REASONS TO WISH TO AVOID A SNUB.
8. AS I EMERGED FROM THE MINISTRY, I MET MY IRISH COLLEAGUE WHO HAD BEEN ON INSTRUCTIONS TO FIND OUT HOW THE ITALIANS WOULD VOTE. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN TOLD THEY WERE MOVING TOWARDS AN ABSTENTION.
9. ALL THIS WAS BEFORE I HEARD ON THE BBC THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THE ITALIANS TO DIFFERENTIATE THEMSELVES FROM THE AMERICANS, THE FRENCH AND PERHAPS OTHERS IN THE COMMUNITY, BUT THE NEW FACTOR OF THE 'DISAPPEARED' MAY BE OF HELP.
10. FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

ARCULUS

(Repetition to BIS BUENOS AIRES
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.)

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