



Prime Minister

Agree that the deputy secretary  
may circulate the draft White  
paper to OD on Monday?

A.J.C. 26/11

MO 5/21

PRIME MINISTER

FALKLAND ISLANDS WHITE PAPER

I am sending you the draft Falkland Islands White Paper before I circulate it to OD next week for discussion on 7th December. I plan to publish it on 14th December in time for a debate before Christmas. I will also be making a press statement on 14th December when I can fill in any of the details which cannot be fitted in to the White Paper itself with the tight printing deadlines.

2. I attach the draft which is, of course, still subject to minor changes. As you will see, it is in three parts. Part I covers the chronology of the campaign in uncontroversial but positive terms; Part II covers the major lessons particularly on the equipment side but also on the operational and logistic aspects of the campaign; and Part III - which you will wish to look at particularly - describes how we propose to adjust the future programme to take account of the Falkland Islands campaign. So much has now been written about the campaign that it is difficult to say anything particularly new, especially within the constraints of security and commercial confidentiality. But I think that the draft has come out reasonably well and that the White Paper will have a warm reception both generally and with our own supporters. Nothing of course, will satisfy the few extreme elements of the Naval lobby who will be satisfied only with the abandonment of Command 8288 - last year's policy paper. Such a course is, however, financially, politically and militarily impossible.

3. You will see that paragraph 311 in Part III lists a number



of quite significant enhancements to our forces. The detail on some of these is not specified in the draft and you will wish to know where matters currently stand:

a. We are assessing the competing claims of DC 10 and Lockheed Tri-star aircraft to satisfy the strategic tanker/freighter requirement. This is a complicated matter. I shall try to buy Tri-star but there are significant operational advantages for the DC 10. I shall keep you informed. I intend to reach a decision in time for an announcement on 14th December. The White Paper itself need not specify the particular type of aircraft to be bought.

b. On replacement destroyers and frigates, the tenders are still being evaluated and proposals have yet to be put to me, but a decision will be reached in time for the White Paper. My current thinking is that we should order now a total of four Type 22 frigates - one of these would be a non-Falklands order on which we have already made a preliminary announcement. One each of these orders is likely to go to Vosper Thorneycroft and Cammell Laird with the remaining two going to the lead yard for the Type 22, Yarrows. The final Falklands replacement order can be placed in the spring - there is no need to order more than 4 ships now and there are some advantages in handling the long term programme here in leaving our options on the last ship open for a little bit longer. But I still need to give further consideration to the political pros and cons of the timing of the final replacement ship order and I will keep you informed.

c. You will see that I intend to take all available ships out of the Standby Squadron and keep them operational for the next 2/3 years to cover the Falklands commitment.



d. We are not yet in a position to order the replacement for the landing ship Sir Galahad. In any case it helps us to keep this open for the moment because the order might go to the Australians as an offset for a purchase by them of a new Invincible-class aircraft carrier - though I have to say that I think the prospects for this order are not all that good. If an Australian order does not materialise, obviously we shall build the landing ship here.

4. There is one further point I should mention about our plans for the Royal Dockyards. Taking account of the increased number of ships which we can now afford to maintain in the Fleet and the extra load which results, I have looked again at the planned rundown at Portsmouth which, as you will recall, was due to reduce from a dockyard employing around 6,000 people to a naval base employing about 1300. I now intend that the naval base should be expanded to allow it to provide some capability for restorative refits and some weapon updating and that the mixed naval/civilian work force there should increase to some 2,800. We will have tough negotiations with the Unions to limit the demarcation and other problems which have bedevilled Portsmouth for years. We must not lose this unique opportunity of achieving greater productivity as a quid pro quo for agreeing to an extra 1500 men. We should make progress, with a consultative paper being issued on the same day as the White Paper. Our plans for Chatham will not be changed and we shall still achieve most of the overhead reductions which we sought at the time of Cmnd 8288.

5. Subject to your views I propose to circulate the draft on Monday prior to my departure to Brussels for the NATO meetings.

SW

CONFIDENTIAL

## FALKLANDS WHITE PAPER

## PART I

THE OPERATION

101. On 2 April 1982 in an act of unprovoked aggression against British sovereign territory and British people Argentine forces invaded the Falkland Islands. The next day they invaded South Georgia. These invasions were launched despite urgent calls upon the Argentine Government from the President of the USA, the President of the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the Secretary General of the UN to desist from military action. The invasion was immediately condemned by the UN Security Council in its Resolution 502. That Resolution went on to call for an immediate withdrawal of the Argentine forces occupying the Falkland Islands, and for a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

102. The Government made clear from the first its willingness to accept and abide by Resolution 502. We engaged in intense and prolonged diplomatic activity in pursuit of a peaceful solution. But we could not depend upon it. We therefore took military steps intended to put pressure on Argentina to withdraw and to make possible our repossession of the Islands by force if that should ultimately prove necessary. Three days after the invasion the first ships left the United Kingdom of what was to become the largest task force in recent history.

Subs  
were  
sent -  
before  
then.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

103. While diplomatic efforts continued the net was gradually drawn more tightly around the Argentine garrison on the Falklands. On 12 April we imposed a maritime exclusion zone of 200 miles around the Falklands against Argentine naval ships. On 23 April we warned that any approach by Argentine forces which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British forces in the South Atlantic would be dealt with appropriately. On 25 April the task force re-possessed South Georgia. The recapture of South Georgia dealt a psychological blow to the Argentine Government and provided clear evidence of the United Kingdom's resolve and willingness to resort to military action if all other courses were closed. It also gave the task force an anchorage nearer the Falklands. On 29 April we warned that all Argentine vessels shadowing the task force would be liable to attack. Despite this increasing military pressure, however, Argentina showed no signs of yielding on any points which could make negotiations possible.

104. We took further measures: on 30 April a total exclusion zone was imposed; on 1 May Port Stanley airfield was bombed; and on 7 May we warned that any Argentine warship or military aircraft over 12 miles from the Argentine coast would be treated as hostile. Even at this stage the way was open for the Argentine Government to accept a peaceful withdrawal of their troops. They declined, and it became clear that the Falklands would have to be retaken by force.

105. The first major landing on the Falkland Islands was made at San Carlos Water on the night of 20/21 May. In the actions which followed there were inevitably setbacks and casualties. Nevertheless, just over three weeks

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

later Major General Moore, the Land Force Commander, accepted the surrender of General Menendez and his force at Port Stanley. It was by any standards a brilliant campaign, marked by exceptional logistic planning and improvisation, and carried through with outstanding skill and fortitude.

#### DEPLOYMENT

106. To despatch a task force in such a short space of time was a remarkable achievement. It was the result of close cooperation between the Services, the Merchant Navy, the Royal Dockyards and commercial ports, the stores and transport organisations of the Ministry of Defence, and Industry. The task force had to be stocked and provisioned for at least three months at sea. Many of the merchant ships required extensive modification to prepare them for their new role. Eventually nearly 120 ships were deployed. These included 46 warships, 23 from the Royal Fleet Auxiliary; and 53 merchant ships whose civilian crews were all volunteers.

107. The Falkland Islands lie 8,000 miles south-west of the United Kingdom and over 3,500 miles from Ascension Island; but only 400 miles from the Argentine mainland. The task force needed to be self-sufficient in food, water, fuel, ammunition and all the other military equipment it was likely to require. Sound transport and logistic arrangements were vitally important. The ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and the Merchant Navy and the Royal Air Force's transport aircraft were to be the task force's lifeline. Merchant shipping alone transported 9,000 personnel, 100,000 tons of freight and 95 aircraft to the South Atlantic. The supply chain carried 400,000 tons of fuel. Royal

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Fleet Auxiliary support ships transferred ammunition, dry cargo and fuel on some 1200 occasions, in addition to more than 300 helicopter transfers. British forces established a joint "forward operating base" at Ascension Island. The Royal Air Force moved over 5,800 people and 6,600 tons of stores through Ascension Island in more than 600 sorties by Hercules and VC10 aircraft. Hercules aircraft also made some 40 supply drops to the task force which entailed mid-air refuelling in round-trips lasting in many cases over 25 hours. This massive logistic effort enabled the warships and the aircraft of the task force to operate continuously without returning to distant bases for reprovisions.

108. In the space of seven weeks a task force of 28,000 men and over 100 ships had been assembled, sailed 8,000 miles, effectively neutralised the Argentine navy and fought off persistent and courageous attacks from combat aircraft which outnumbered our own by more than six to one. This in itself was no mean feat, but the task force then put ashore 10,000 men on a hostile coast while under threat of heavy air attack; fought several pitched battles against an entrenched and well-supplied enemy who at all times out-numbered our forces; and brought them to surrender within three and a half weeks.

#### FROM SOUTH GEORGIA TO SAN CARLOS

109. The first action at sea took place off South Georgia when on 25 April the Argentine submarine Santa Fe was attacked on the surface some five miles from the main harbour at Grytviken. She was badly damaged and subsequently beached. The same day the Island was repossessed by Royal Marines and Special

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Forces, which comprise the Special Air Service (SAS) and the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) of the Royal Marines. On 1 May a Vulcan followed by Sea Harriers carried out their first attacks on the Falklands, and the first Argentine aircraft were shot down. The carrier group made a major demonstration of force, simulating an amphibious landing off Port Stanley which successfully drew the Argentines and revealed some of their defensive positions.

110. On 2 May HMS Conqueror detected the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano, accompanied by two destroyers, sailing near to the total exclusion zone. Other Argentine ships were also thought to be probing our defences to the north of the Zone. The Belgrano, and her escorts armed with Exocet missiles, posed a clear threat to the ships of the task force. She was therefore attacked and sunk by torpedoes. Thereafter major Argentine warships remained within 12 miles of the Argentine coast and took no further part in the Campaign. Argentine submarines continued to pose a serious threat, but no task force ships were successfully attacked.

111. The task force suffered its first major loss on 4 May. HMS Sheffield, while on forward radar picket duty was hit by an Exocet missile launched from an Argentine Super Etendard aircraft. The missile hit fuel tanks amidships and serious fires started, which filled the central section of the ship with acrid smoke. After nearly four hours, with the fires increasing in intensity, the Captain gave orders to abandon ship. 20 members of her crew died.

112. By mid-May the task force had accomplished two of its main tasks: the

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

movement of the troops safely to the South Atlantic and the establishment of control of the seas around the Islands. The role of the carriers, HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible, was crucial at this and subsequent stages - in providing air defence and the means of attacking enemy ships and ground positions while their helicopters provided constant anti-submarine protection.

113. The question now was whether to settle into a blockade or go for a full scale landing. Although we considered a blockade of the Islands, it became clear that climatic and other factors could prolong such an approach and seriously jeopardise our forces. We decided, therefore, on an amphibious landing, followed by whatever action proved necessary to retake the Islands. San Carlos was chosen as the site for the landing because it offered a good anchorage which could be protected against submarine attack and was an area known to be lightly defended by the enemy and difficult for him to reinforce rapidly. The low hills surrounding the inlet afforded good protection against the risk of Exocet attack. By now men of the SAS and the SBS, had for some time been reconnoitring East and West Falkland. Taking advantage of the intelligence they had gained, and under cover of a naval bombardment, the SAS carried out a daring night raid on Pebble Island on 15 May. They destroyed 11 Argentine aircraft on the ground.

114. On 20 May the main amphibious force moved towards San Carlos Water, taking advantage of an overcast sky and poor visibility, and keeping strict radio silence. Meanwhile Special Forces mounted a series of diversionary raids at various points around East Falkland. Under cover of naval gunfire men of the 3rd Commando Brigade (3 Cdo Bde) including the 2nd and 3rd Battalions,

CONFIDENTIAL

*Very much  
we were  
told a  
No one  
just want  
possibly  
Doubts  
let's  
of raising  
the time*

CONFIDENTIAL

the Parachute Regiment (2 PARA and 3 PARA) embarked in their landing craft and headed for the shore. The landing was made over four beaches. Helicopters operated continuously moving stores and helping to establish the beach-head. The operation achieved complete tactical surprise. 5,000 men were safely landed, and what little opposition there was quickly collapsed. British losses in this phase were two helicopters and their crews.

115. The next morning brought clear blue skies, but the landing force had won a vital few hours to establish defensive positions and begin to set up their Rapier fire units. At mid-day the Argentine air force began a series of fierce and protracted attacks against the beach-head and the ships supporting it.

116. The Sea Harriers on combat air patrol provided the outer layer of defence. The second layer was provided by a pair of ships known as the 'missile trap', positioned off the northern entrance to Falkland Sound. These were usually a Type 42 destroyer armed with Sea Dart and a Type 22 frigate with Sea Wolf. The next layer of defence, which became known as the 'gunline', was a group of three or four ships inside the entrance to the Sound using every gun and missile system they possessed to fight off the incoming Argentine aircraft. Finally within the anchorage itself (nicknamed 'bomb alley'), where there were often up to eight troop or stores ships at any one time, the small calibre guns and Sea Cat missiles from the assault ships HMS Intrepid and HMS Fearless, together with Blowpipe missiles, machine guns and notably the Rapier fire units on shore provided the final layer of defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

117. The Argentine pilots were courageous and persistent in their attacks and ships of the task force suffered loss and damage during the first few days after the landing. On the gunline we lost HMS Ardent and HMS Antelope on 21 and 23 May; 24 men died. Six other ships were damaged between 21 and 24 May. But the Argentines paid a heavy price. On 21 May our forces shot down at least [18] out of [40] attacking aircraft. When attacks resumed on 23 May [9] out of [17] attacking aircraft were destroyed; on 24 May a further [9] were shot down. Air attacks on the beach-head now become much less frequent and British forces were safely established ashore. The battle of San Carlos had been won.

118. On the 25 May, Argentina's National Day, the Argentine air force made a major effort against the task force. HMS Coventry had been in the "missile trap" to the north west and had successfully controlled Sea Harriers and shot down two aircraft herself. She was attacked at low-level by waves of Skyhawk aircraft which overwhelmed her defences. She capsized quickly. Survivors were rescued by HMS Broadsword and helicopters; 19 men died.

119. Later that same day the merchant ship Atlantic Conveyor, which had delivered Harriers to the task force and was carrying much-needed supplies, including helicopters, was hit by two air-launched Exocet missiles and set on fire. The fire spread rapidly and the ship was abandoned with the loss of 12 lives. A third attack on the task force by air-launched Exocet on 30 May was successfully countered.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM SAN CARLOS TO FITZROY

120. With the establishment of a firm bridge-head the advance on Port Stanley became the next objective. One threat to the flank of any attack on Port Stanley lay in the significant Argentine garrison and airfield at Darwin and Goose Green. 2 PARA was given the task of removing that danger and seeking an early victory. Overnight on 26/27 May one company of 2 PARA secured Camilla Creek House. After a 12 mile night approach march the rest of the battalion joined them and lay up for the day. An artillery troop of three 105mm light guns was flown into position to assist the impending assault which started at 0200 hours on 28 May.

121. 2 PARA began by attacking Port Darwin, supported by Naval gunfire. The settlement was secured by mid-afternoon but the battalion were then faced with an advance on Goose Green where the enemy were dug into strong defensive positions which had to be approached across the open ground of a narrow isthmus. Harrier aircraft were called in to attack the Argentine positions. The battalion was attacked by Pucara light aircraft from Goose Green one of which was shot down by a Blowpipe missile. The battalion eventually overcame stiff resistance and pushed the enemy back into the settlement. A timely strike by the Harriers, \* ~~~~~ \* on defensive positions, considerably helped the progress of the paratroopers and the next day the Argentine Commander surrendered.

122. Besides securing the flank the battle was significant for three reasons. First it gave us a chance to assess the fighting qualities of the enemy.

\* ~~~~~ \* Passages deleted and  
closed, 40 years, under  
FOI Exemptions.

CONFIDENTIAL

C. Wayland  
1 May 2012

Second, it inflicted a serious blow to the strength of the Argentines; 46 were killed and approximately 1000 prisoners were taken. British casualties totalled 17. Third, and most importantly, by their outstanding performance against a numerically superior enemy 2 PARA established a psychological ascendancy over the Argentines which our forces never lost.

123. In the course of a remarkable march of 50 miles over difficult terrain in inhospitable conditions, 45 Cdo RM and 3 PARA secured Douglas Settlement and Teal Inlet on 30 May. Meanwhile the SAS established a patrol base forward on Mount Kent. 42 Cdo RM, making best use of the helicopter lift available, leap-frogged forward to secure Mount Kent and Mount Challenger, the western approaches to Port Stanley. On the same day Major General Moore assumed command of all land operations, and the 5th Infantry Brigade (5 Bde) came ashore.

124. The Land Force Commander decided to press on quickly with the advance on Port Stanley and to commit 5 Bde to the South. When it was discovered that the Argentines had evacuated Fitzroy Settlement 2 PARA moved forward rapidly to secure the area, which was an important point in the advance on Stanley. The 1st Battalion 7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles (1/7 GR) and the rest of 2 PARA advanced by sea and by air while the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards (2 SG), the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards (1 WG) and logistic support units were transported to Fitzroy by sea. The loss of Chinook helicopters on the Atlantic Conveyor had effectively precluded the option of air-lifting the bulk of 5 Bde. Passage by sea was therefore the only way to move forward quickly, maintaining the impetus of the advance and minimising

CONFIDENTIAL

the risk of Argentine counter attack. On the night 5/6 and 6/7 June the Scots Guards and elements of the Welsh Guards were successfully moved by HMS Intrepid and HMS Fearless. The deployment of the balance of the Welsh Guards was thwarted by appalling weather. On the night 7/8 June Sir Galahad was dispatched with support units and the remaining Welsh Guards. On 8 June the cloud lifted and, before the final elements had been disembarked from the landing ships, Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram were hit by an air strike at Fitzroy. Both ships were abandoned. The Sir Galahad, which had a large number of men on board, was burnt out. 50 men lost their lives, of whom 32 were from the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards. The courageous efforts of the helicopter pilots and rescue boat crews who took their craft again and again into the flames and blinding smoke rising from the stricken vessel prevented greater loss of life. But for the bravery of the seamen and the dedication of all those who assisted ashore the loss of life would have been much greater. Later that day a pair of patrolling Sea Harriers destroyed four Mirages over Choiseul Sound.

#### ADVANCE ON PORT STANLEY

125. Despite previous set-backs through loss of men and equipment, particularly helicopters, the first phase of the main battle for Port Stanley began when 3 Cdo Bde mounted a three battalion night attack on 11/12 June. Simultaneously targets further to the east were bombarded by Naval vessels. As a result of vigorous and aggressive patrolling the troops were able to achieve initial surprise and after a night of stiff fighting 3 PARA took Mount Longdon, 45 Cdo captured Two Sisters, and 42 Cdo captured Mount Harriet. British casualties

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

were 22 killed and 44 wounded. Throughout the following day, all these positions came under considerable enemy artillery fire, causing more casualties. The shelling was not, however, all one way: the Argentine defences were heavily bombarded by our own artillery and at night by Naval guns.

126. During the night 11/12 June HMS Glamorgan was withdrawing from a bombardment of shore positions around Port Stanley when she was hit by a shore-launched Exocet missile. Her company extinguished severe fires and the ship continued to be available for action. 13 men died. It was the last direct attack on a British ship in the campaign.

127. The second phase took place on the night of 13/14 June. In the north, in another superbly executed night attack, 2 PARA captured Wireless Ridge. Further south 2 SG had a hard fight to capture Tumbledown Mountain from a regular Argentine Marine battalion whose heavily defended machine gun emplacements put up fierce resistance for a number of hours. The Scots Guards secured their objectives and the Gurkhas moved through to take Mount William to the south-east. In this final phase we lost 20 men.

128. Large numbers of the enemy abandoned their positions, discarded their weapons and stood around disconsolately. British troops followed up to the edge of Port Stanley where they were ordered to halt and fire only in self defence, to avoid fighting in the town and among the civilian population. Soon afterwards white flags were reported over Stanley and General Moore accepted the Argentine surrender.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CHRONOLOGY

- 2 April Argentina invades the Falkland Islands.
- 3 April Argentina invades South Georgia; UN passes Security Council Resolution 502; first RAF transport aircraft deploy to Ascension Island.
- 5 April First task force ships sail from the United Kingdom.
- 12 April 200 mile maritime exclusion zone comes into effect.
- 25 April British Forces recapture South Georgia; submarine Santa Fe attacked and disabled.
- 30 April Total exclusion zone comes into effect.
- 1 May First attack on Falklands by Vulcans, Sea Harriers and warships; first Argentine aircraft shot down.
- 2 May General Belgrano sunk by HMS Conqueror.
- 4 May HMS Sheffield hit by Exocet missile; later sinks.
- 7 May Exclusion zone extended to 12 miles off the Argentine coast.
- 9 May Two Sea Harriers sink trawler, Narwal, which had been shadowing task force.
- 11 May HMS Alacrity sinks store ship Cabo de los Estados in Falkland sound.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

14/15 May Special Forces night raid on Pebble Island;  
11 Argentine aircraft destroyed on the ground.

21 May 3 Cdo Bde RM establish beach-head at San  
Carlos; HMS Ardent lost; 20 Argentine aircraft  
destroyed.

23 May HMS Antelope crippled (sinks on 24 May); at  
least 7 Argentine aircraft destroyed.

24 May 8 Argentine aircraft destroyed; some damage to  
ships.

25 May HMS Coventry lost and Atlantic Conveyor hit by  
Exocet (sinks 28 May); 5 Argentine aircraft  
destroyed.

28 May 2 PARA recapture Darwin and Goose Green; over  
900 prisoners taken.

29 May 45 Cdo secure Douglas settlement; 3 PARA  
recapture Teal Inlet.

30 May 42 Cdo secure Mount Kent and Mount Challenger.

31 May 5 Infantry Brigade lands at San Carlos.

8 June Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram hit at Fitzroy;  
10 Argentine aircraft destroyed.

11/12 June Mount Harriet, Two Sisters and Mount Longdon  
secured; HMS Glamorgan hit by shore-based  
Exocet - damaged but seaworthy.

13/14 June Tumbledown Mountain, Wireless Ridge and Mount  
William secured; General Menendez surrenders.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

20 June South Thule secured.

25 June Mr Hunt, Civil Commissioner, returns to Port Stanley

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PART IITHE LESSONS LEARNEDINTRODUCTION

201. The Falklands Campaign was in many respects unique. We must be cautious, therefore, in deciding which lessons of the campaign are relevant to the United Kingdom's main defence priority - our role within NATO against the threat from the Soviet Union and her allies. The basic ingredients for success were present from the outset: a firm resolve; flexibility of forces, equipments and tactics; human ingenuity; and well trained officers and men.

202. The campaign provided the Royal Navy's first experience of battle in the missile age. At San Carlos British forces undertook the first large scale amphibious operation for many years. And in the land battles for Port Stanley they experienced an infantry battle at brigade strength and in extreme weather conditions. Our analysis of the campaign is continuing; some new lessons have been learned; many more old lessons have been reinforced. The following sections describe the principal lessons and the steps we are taking to apply them.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

203. The higher management of the crisis was conducted by a small group of Ministers which was chaired by the Prime Minister and met almost daily.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The Attorney General attended meetings when legal advice was required. Those in attendance always included the Chief of the Defence Staff, as the Government's principal military adviser. This group of Ministers ensured that the diplomatic, economic and military strands of our policy were properly coordinated. On the military side it established clear guidelines within which commanders were to conduct the operations, without making any attempt to direct the battle from 8,000 miles away. The group was briefed daily on the current military situation by the Chief of Defence Staff, who conveyed guidance and issued instructions direct to the Commander in Chief Fleet, the overall commander of the operation. This short and clear chain of command made possible quick reaction to events and to the needs of the forces in the

South Atlantic. Care was taken to avoid British military action which would jeopardise our diplomatic efforts, but at no time did diplomatic or political considerations inhibit the task force from taking all measures necessary to defend itself.

204. Effective political control and higher command of the operation required good communications between the United Kingdom and the task force. The vital importance was shown of satellite communications in operations conducted at great distance. We currently plan to acquire a new British military satellite and to provide a terminal in all major surface warships, which will be a significant improvement. There were times during the Falklands Campaign when the flow of signal traffic to the task force threatened to exceed the capacity of the available systems. This never delayed the transmission of important operational messages but it did affect some other traffic. As the task force sailed south it became increasingly important to receive frequent

CONFIDENTIAL

*It is  
our wish to  
go into  
their details.*

*This will  
cause  
trouble -  
we shall  
be asked  
to spend  
with us*

CONFIDENTIAL

detailed situation reports from the area of operations both as general background for decision makers in Whitehall and as the essential basis for early and accurate announcements to Parliament, press and media on events in the South Atlantic. Hard pressed local commanders were not always able to provide these and for the future we are considering how they might be enabled to do so. It will not, of course, be the intention to impose any detailed direction of actions in the field which must remain the responsibility of the commander on the spot.

205. We have studied the management of the crisis carefully. In particular we have looked at the effectiveness of inter-Departmental coordination and the liaison between the Ministry of Defence and operational headquarters, which in this case was the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief Fleet.

*what?* Some small changes would be helpful to the management of any future crisis and these will be introduced. In every important respect the Government and military machine worked extremely well during the crisis.

MEN

206. The most important factor in the success of the task force was the skill, stamina and resolution displayed by individual Servicemen. The value of professional, volunteer, highly trained and carefully selected armed forces was amply demonstrated. The specialised training of a substantial proportion of the landing force - such as the commandos - was a particularly significant asset. The quality of British Servicemen was exemplified by the defence of the landing at San Carlos; by the determined assault on heavily

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

defended enemy positions at Goose Green; by the remarkable series of night attacks before the fall of Port Stanley; and by the outstanding performance of the Harrier and helicopter pilots.

207. The manner in which the task force responded to the many challenges and difficulties it encountered totally vindicated the priority we attach to training at all levels from the teaching of individual skills to large scale exercises. The Campaign highlighted the importance of both physical and mental toughness. To achieve and maintain this we need to keep readiness and training at as high a level as possible.

#### MARITIME OPERATIONS

208. The operations of the task force at sea were guided by three established principles of maritime warfare: containment of enemy forces, defence in depth and keeping the initiative. The course of the campaign emphasised the relevance of these principles, and the importance of both a balanced fleet and the support of ships from the Merchant Navy. The key questions of warship performance and maritime anti-air warfare are discussed in paras [217-220] and [224-229].

209. Amphibious Warfare. The experience gained by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines from their extensive training in amphibious operations proved vital. The landings at San Carlos clearly demonstrated the capability of HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid to launch and support amphibious operations and of the value of suitably adapted merchant ships to support such operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3 Cdo Bde RM, reinforced by 2 PARA, 3 PARA and other elements proved ideally suited for the task. The helicopters deployed with the landing force played an invaluable part and we are now taking steps to improve our helicopter lift capability in support of amphibious operations. The weather, terrain and the likely requirement to land away from established ports were similar to the conditions British forces would face in Norway, on NATO's northern flank. The success of the Falklands Campaign bore out our confidence, and that of our Allies, in the ability of British amphibious forces to react swiftly and effectively to emergencies in and away from the NATO area.

210. Nuclear-Powered Submarines. Our nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) played a crucial role. After the sinking of the General Belgrano the Argentine surface fleet effectively took no further part in the Campaign. The SSNs were flexible and powerful instruments throughout the crisis, posing a ubiquitous threat which the Argentines could neither measure nor oppose. Their speed and independence of support meant that they were the first assets to be deployed, enabling us to declare the maritime exclusion zone early. They also provided valuable intelligence to our forces in the total exclusion zone.

#### LAND OPERATIONS

211. The most decisive factors in the land war were the high state of individual training and fitness of the land forces, together with the leadership and initiative displayed especially by junior officers and NCOs. The Campaign underlined the importance of night operations and aggressive patrolling,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

which were particularly important during the determined series of attacks around Port Stanley, where assaults were conducted against a prepared enemy with clear fields of fire. A number of lessons will be reflected in training priorities and equipment plans. The present types of weapons proved effective but the infantry need to be supported by greater direct and indirect firepower in attack. Milan and 66 mm anti-tank weapons proved highly effective against prepared enemy positions, but there is also a requirement for an area attack weapon such as a grenade launcher.

212. The infantry would not have been able to carry their objectives without the support they received from artillery and Naval bombardment. The ability of the 105 mm light guns to bring down instant and accurate fire at night or through smoke and fog contributed significantly to the final collapse of Argentine morale. The importance was underlined of all ranks being trained and able to call for fire.

#### SPECIAL FORCES

213. The Special Air Service and the Special Boat Squadron played a key role in the Campaign. They operated in advance of the main land forces to gather essential intelligence, and also conducted widespread raids to confuse and disorganise the Argentine forces. This tactic was notably successful in assisting the landing force to come ashore virtually unopposed at San Carlos. Later, they moved ahead of the main force to reconnoitre the high ground around Mount Kent, from which the final assault was launched on the Argentine positions in front of Port Stanley.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

214. In the most demanding circumstances the Special Forces were thoroughly tested in the skills and tactics which they would employ in any future war in the NATO area. Their response has justified our confidence that existing selection and training methods produce Special Forces which are well prepared for the calls that might be made on them in general war. The combination in a single patrol of intelligence-gathering skills and the capacity to mount highly destructive raids gives military commanders a flexible and potent weapon. Experience in the Falklands confirmed this, as well as providing useful lessons for the future, particularly about improvements in equipment.

#### EQUIPMENT

215. Weapons systems depend for their effectiveness not only on their inherent quality but also on the thorough and realistic training of their operators, and on first class maintenance, spares and servicing. The British Armed Forces are primarily organised and equipped for operations in the NATO area against the Warsaw Pact. In the South Atlantic they faced a different challenge. Particularly aircraft but also other equipments were constantly in demand to perform unfamiliar tasks which were important to the operation. In doing so they had to overcome the effects of a long sea passage and damp on land-based missiles, electronics and other equipments. On the other hand, some conditions were easier than they would be in NATO operations; for example, the virtual absence of electronic counter-measures (ECM) in the Argentine inventory.

216. Nevertheless, the Campaign provided a unique opportunity to test our equipment in combat. Experts have assessed the performance of individual

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

equipments and their support arrangements. Generally the equipment and weapons systems - designed mainly for operations in NATO - performed well in particularly demanding circumstances: as well as, and sometimes better than, expected. The operational availability of equipment was impressive. In most cases the need was confirmed for improvements already planned. We discuss in the remainder of this section the performance of the main weapons platforms and the contribution of equipment in the roles in which it was deployed.

### Warships

217. Operations in support of an amphibious landing within range of enemy aircraft and without the assistance of AEW aircraft or land-based all-weather fighters inevitably risked ship losses. The losses the task force suffered were tragic and heavy but they were less than we had feared, given the difficulties encountered. In addition to the four warships one RFA and one merchant ship which lost, eight other warships and two RFAs suffered varying degrees of damage. In most cases the ships continued to take part in operations, making good damage through the efforts of their crews aided by specialist teams. The Carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible were effective and flexible command ships and provided good platforms for air operations. For example, on 1 May HMS Hermes tasked 12 Sea Harriers in attacks on Port Stanley and Goose Green, yet one hour after their return home the same aircraft were airborne for air defence patrols.

*Is this  
wise? We  
were never  
able to make  
an estimate.*

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

218. In our assessment of the lessons to be drawn for warship design we have had the benefit of a valuable independent review conducted by members of the Marine Technology Board of the Defence Scientific Advisory Council. It is clear that RN ships are strong and reliable platforms able to operate continuously at sea even in the most difficult weather conditions. No fundamental design defects have been identified.

219. There has been comment on the use of aluminium in the construction of ships. The facts are that aluminium was used in the superstructure of the Type 21 class of frigate and to a small extent in a few other classes, but not in the Type 42 destroyers, such as HMS Sheffield. In addition, aluminium is sometimes used for non-structural minor bulkheads, ladders and ventilation trunking. By use of aluminium it is possible to make significant savings in the weight of the ships above the water-line, and there is no evidence that it has contributed to the loss of any vessel. It has, however, been recognised that this metal loses strength in fires and therefore its extensive use in the construction of RN warships was discontinued several years ago.

220. Some important lessons have been learned about the rapid spread of fire and smoke in ships, and about the use of materials which can prove hazardous in fires. Cabling fitted in older ships can prove inflammable; this hazard will be greatly reduced in new ships. Urgent studies are now in hand aimed at improving the survivability of existing ships and incorporating lessons in future designs. Examples of measures which will be taken include improved fire zones; changes to the design of watertight doors and hatches; the provision of more escape hatches; improvements to the smoke tightness

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

of bulkheads; the re-siting of fuel tanks; reductions in inflammable materials; and additional fire pumps, breathing apparatus and personal breathing sets.

#### Aircraft

221. Harrier. 28 Sea Harriers and 14 RAF Harrier GR3s were eventually deployed to the South Atlantic. Over 1100 combat air patrol missions and 90 offensive support operations were flown by Sea Harriers and 125 ground attack and tactical reconnaissance sorties by Harrier GR3s. These aircraft were a major success, showing themselves to be flexible, robust, reliable and effective. Sea Harriers, which are intended largely for air defence, were also employed in the ground attack and reconnaissance roles: the Harrier GR3s, primarily ground attack aircraft, were converted within a week to use Sidewinder AIM 9L air-to-air missiles in the air defence role. There was [95%] availability at the beginning of each day and 99% of all planned missions were flown. Sea Harrier demonstrated itself to be more than a match for Argentine conventional fixed wing aircraft with 20 confirmed and 4 probable kills, of which 16 and 2 respectively are attributable to Sidewinder AIM 9L missiles. Six Sea Harriers were destroyed, of which two were lost in action - one to small-arms fire and one to a Roland surface to air missile. Four GR3s were also lost in action, all to ground gunfire. Most aircraft engaged in offensive support survived damage, which usually resulted from intense Argentine anti-aircraft gunfire. The need was demonstrated for certain improvements to Sea Harrier to provide greater endurance and weapon carrying capacity and a better radar. As a result Sea Harriers, starting with those already deployed in HMS Illustrious, are being given greater endurance by the fit of larger

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

drop tanks, and increased armament by the fit of four rather than two Sidewinder missiles. Improvements to the Sea Harrier's radar and radar warning receiver systems are planned. The need to improve Sidewinder AIM 9L being urgently examined.

222. Nimrod. The Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft was given a simple, effective air-to-air refuelling capability and sixteen aircraft have been modified in this way. This, with the addition of vision aids, improved navigation equipment, and a variety of weapons including Harpoon, Stingray and Sidewinder, has greatly enhanced its overall capability. A total of 34 Nimrods will eventually be modified to enable them to carry anti-shipping and air-to-air missiles. The Nimrods' Searchwater radar performed well, enabling crews to monitor shipping at long range outside missile engagement zones of possible enemy warships. The full capability of this radar is still being developed and exploited.

223. Helicopters. Almost 200 helicopters of seven different types (Sea King, Wessex, Lynx, Gazelle, Wasp, Scout and Chinook) were deployed. After the loss of three Chinooks and six Wessex in the Atlantic Conveyor, there was a shortage of helicopters to support the ground forces even though a squadron of Sea King anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters had been converted to the support role. A graphic illustration of the Chinook's capability was supplied by the single aircraft to survive the sinking of the Atlantic Conveyor; without spares and ground support, it flew 109 hours in combat conditions, carrying up to 80 armed troops in a single lift. In addition helicopters were also heavily committed in the ASW or anti-surface vessel warfare (ASVW)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

role, logistics, search and rescue, casualty evacuation and reconnaissance or support roles. Naval helicopters operated at over three times peacetime rates. Lynx performed well and the Sea King Mk 4 with its large internal and external load capability was particularly useful. Of the Army helicopters, Gazelle is designed to be used predominantly as a reconnaissance and command and communications helicopter. Without offensive armament and in a country devoid of natural cover it proved vulnerable to ground fire and we are currently assessing ways of enhancing its battlefield survivability.

#### Air Defence

224. The battle for air superiority was vital to the success of the campaign. In NATO operations in the Eastern Atlantic the Royal Navy would be supported by land-based aircraft and, when available, the carrier strength of the United States Navy. In the South Atlantic, the task force was faced with an efficient land-based air force of over 200 frontline aircraft, and its greatest handicaps were the shortage of fighter aircraft and the lack of airborne early warning (AEW). Sea Harriers were outnumbered six to one. AEW aircraft could not be deployed at all. The task force relied on a mix of systems for air defence. These comprised electronic detection systems, fighter aircraft, electronic counter-measures (ECM), medium and short range missiles, medium-calibre guns and, finally, close range point defence systems such as rapid-firing guns and hand-held missile launchers. These systems between them destroyed a total of [73] enemy aircraft confirmed and a further [14] probables. By the time of the final assault on Port Stanley the Argentine air force had been effectively neutralised as a fighting force. Our assessments of Argentine

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

air losses and of the performance of individual missile systems are shown at Annex B.

225. The value of the medium range air defence missile Sea Dart was evident in the eight kills it achieved. The known capability of the system also deterred many attacks and forced the Argentine aircraft to fly at low altitude, which often prevented their bombs from fuzing and made them easier targets for other systems. There are areas in which the Sea Dart can be improved and these are either in hand or being studied.

226. Although designed primarily as a self-defence weapon against missiles, the capable Sea Wolf point defence system was used against aircraft attacking accompanying vessels which lacked this capability. In this role it shot down five Argentine aircraft. No opportunity arose to use Sea Wolf against missiles. The flexibility of this system was shown by the speed with which its software was adapted to cope with low-level aircraft attacks. A package of improvements for Sea Wolf is already in hand.

227. As acknowledged above the absence of airborne early warning (AEW) was a severe handicap against Argentine air attacks mounted at very low level especially given that the radars deployed at San Carlos suffered considerable interference from surrounding high land. This also proved an important limitation in the task force's ability to deal with the threat from Exocet by intercepting the aircraft carrying it before the missile could be launched. The difficulty of guaranteeing detection of low-flying aircraft made it prudent for the carriers to operate well to the east of the Falklands, which

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

limited the patrol time of Sea Harriers. This shortcoming has now been remedied in part by the deployment in HMS Illustrious of two Sea King helicopters equipped with modified Searchwater Radars, which taken with the deployment of Sea Harriers with greater endurance represents a major improvement in our carrier-borne air defence capability. We are considering what further steps might be taken to improve the AEW capability of the Fleet, bearing in mind that the Nimrod AEW Mk 3 will be deployed in the Eastern Atlantic from 1984. In the Falklands we now have RAF Phantoms which, when on combat air patrol, can provide some early warning of low-level air attack.

228. We responded to the threat posed by Exocet by devising and deploying very quickly electronic and other counter-measures. For example, chaff was extensively and successfully used. We will rely on a mix of ECM and point defence systems for defence against surface skimmers. Apart from the provision of AEW, a number of measures are planned to enhance the ability of RN warships to deal with this threat. The improved Sea Wolf system already ordered, for example, has an all weather capability against low level missiles and several programmes are in hand to improve our ship-borne ECM capability.

229. Other areas for improvement which have been identified in the shipborne anti-air warfare field include:

- a. The need for a point defence weapon system for high value units. As an interim measure the American Vulcan-Phalanx gun system has been mounted on HMS Illustrious and HMS Invincible and low-level air defence guns have been fitted to a number of other ships. A longer term study urgent?

CONFIDENTIAL

*This sounds weak.*



CONFIDENTIAL

of close-in weapon systems is in progress to identify the most cost-effective fit for the future.

b. The need for more realistic training. In particular all ships need to be fitted with a wide range of on-board trainers if the Royal Navy is to optimise the performance of its high technology systems. There is also the need for more realistic targets for the peacetime training of anti-air warfare (AAW) weapon system operators.

c. Shipborne surveillance radars and command and weapon control systems. Various improvements are being urgently examined.

230. As to land-based air defence, Rapier performed well and had a major impact on the campaign. It was employed only in the optical mode to provide land-based low level air defence after the landings on 21 May. The conditions for the operation of Rapier were severe. The system had been exposed to the rigours of a long sea voyage, and was without its second-line support. Enemy air attacks were generally prosecuted at below 100 feet, often in valleys shrouded by mist and in poor light. The proximity of friendly forces such as ships and helicopters often inhibited the Rapier operators from engaging targets. Nevertheless, it scored 14 confirmed kills and 6 probables, about 50% of valid firings, and the success rate from valid firings after the system had settled down is estimated to be about two in three. A series of improvements to the system's reliability and speed of reaction has already been developed and is being incorporated in Rapiers, in the United Kingdom and Germany. We have also planned for some time to introduce later in the decade a further

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

series of improvements to the missile, fuze, the radars and of the capability of the system against multiple targets.

231. Blowpipe is a point defence missile system designed to be operated, and carried limited distances, by one man. In this campaign it was used extensively against fast crossing targets for which it was not designed, and subjected to far rougher handling than it had been designed to withstand. Despite this it brought down nine enemy aircraft and a further two probables, a success rate of some 18%. Experience in the campaign has confirmed a need for the series of improvements already in hand, which include enhancements to the missile warhead and motor and the introduction of an improved aiming unit and an alerting device. These improvements should be completed in stages over the next six years.

#### Anti-Surface Vessel Warfare (ASVW)

232. The strategic dominance of the SSN and its crucial part in the campaign have already been described in paragraph 210. Apart from the sinking of the cruiser General Belgrano surface action was confined to engagements against patrol craft and small merchant vessels. The helicopter mounted air-to-surface guided weapon Sea Skua was deployed for the first time and performed excellently. It scored eight hits with eight firings, destroyed one patrol craft and seriously damaged two other Argentine ships. The 4.5 inch gun also proved to be accurate and effective in the anti-surface ship role.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Anti-Submarine Warfare

233. In the face of the threat from Argentine submarines, ships and aircraft carried out extensive anti-submarine operations. The ability to sustain such operations was proved. However, the operations highlighted the difficulties of conducting ASW in shallow water. We have already planned a number of improvements in our ASW capability and will be examining what other measures are now required.

Land Warfare

234. In general the land forces found most of their equipment well able to withstand the rugged treatment it received on the Falklands. Of special interest were:-

a. Mobility. The ground forces were heavily dependent on helicopters and tracked vehicles for mobility. The tracked combat reconnaissance vehicles, Scorpion and Scimitar, performed very well in boggy conditions, covering an average of 350 miles each. One vehicle withstood a shell which landed  $1\frac{1}{2}$  metres away; another ran over a mine which severely damaged the vehicle but left the crew unharmed. The Combat Engineer Tractor was also an essential and effective vehicle on this demanding terrain. The extensive use of mines by the Argentine army was a notable problem. An assessment of the Army's ability to breach mine-fields rapidly had been set in hand before the Campaign.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- b. Artillery and Naval Gunfire Support. The main land-based artillery support for the ground forces was provided by the 105mm Light Gun, which together with its ammunition was deployed mainly by helicopter. Its performance was excellent. The five batteries engaged fired nearly 17,500 rounds. Some guns fired as many as 500 rounds in 24 hours. Task Force ships fired 8,000 rounds of ammunition in highly accurate Naval gunfire support attacks on ground targets.
- c. Anti-Armour and Personal Weapons. The self-loading rifles and general purpose machine guns proved effective small arms, notwithstanding that the weight of weapons and ammunition presented physical and logistic problems in such unfavourable terrain. These problems will be eased considerably by the new small arms which should enter service in the mid-1980s. The 81mm mortar proved versatile and effective. Although not used in their primary role, anti-armour weapons such as Milan were very effective against strong defensive positions.
- d. Night Fighting. A requirement was demonstrated for more night fighting equipment. Since the conflict we have placed orders for the procurement of general purpose night vision goggles for the infantry and night-flying goggles for the Army Air Corps. Further purchases of both types are planned.
- e. Combat Clothing. In the exceptionally demanding conditions of the Falkland Islands winter a number of shortcomings were identified clothing and personal equipment. Replacement of some of these items has already commenced.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Air-to-Ground Warfare

235. Although there was only limited opportunity to observe the effectiveness of our own land-based air power in combat conditions, several lessons emerged - both from our own operations and those of the Argentines - which are important for future procurement policy. The most significant among these are:

- a. Attack on Airfields. In the longest range bombing missions yet flown, Vulcan bombers attacked Port Stanley airfield but with only 1000 lb bombs they were unable to close the runway for more than a short period. The need was underlined for an advanced airfield attack weapon such as JP 233.
  
- b. Defence Suppression. Although combat aircraft were quickly fitted with chaff and flare dispensers and some active ECM equipment, which proved vital in the event, the lack of defence suppression weapons to attack enemy radars exposed the Harriers to heavy and accurate ground-fire. However, Vulcan attacks were made on radars close to Port Stanley using Shrike anti-radiation missiles, with some success; the procurement of anti-radiation missiles is included in our forward plans.
  
- c. Close Air Support. The campaign exposed the limitations of the traditional method of forward air control of close air support operations. In the later stages laser target marking from the ground was used, enabling laser-guided bombs to make direct hits on their targets. For the future, tactical ground-air communications will be improved, and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

the efficiency of laser target marking will be further explored.

d. Air Reconnaissance. The absence of a dedicated overland air reconnaissance capability was a serious handicap in the Campaign, and the resulting lack of precise information on enemy dispositions presented an additional hazard to the ground forces. We plan to improve our tactical reconnaissance capability.

e. Sea-Skimming. The Campaign showed the potential of air-launched, sea-skimming missiles. We have already equipped a number of Nimrod aircraft with the Harpoon anti-ship missile and we will further improve our existing capability in this area by the early acquisition of the advanced Sea Eagle missile, which has a longer range and more discriminating capability than Exocet.

#### PROCUREMENT AND IMPROVISATION

236. In the exceptional circumstances of the campaign our procurement processes proved adaptable to meet the wide variety of military needs against very tight timescales. New operational demands were satisfied in record times through the ready availability of a broad spectrum of scientific and engineering expertise in the Ministry of Defence research establishments and of the comprehensive resources of the United Kingdom's defence industry. The Campaign demonstrated the value of a broadly based national defence industry, and the benefits of an in-house research capability.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

237. Those concerned at all levels in both Government and Industry worked hard to enhance our operational capabilities by specific threat assessment and computer modelling work, material and software modifications to equipment, rapid development of new equipment capabilities and accelerated introduction of equipments into service. Examples included the development of important, often vital, equipments by combining existing items in new ways, such as the creation of AEW equipment using Nimrod Searchwater radars in Sea King helicopters (in only eleven weeks); the invention, production, proving and delivery in record time of many new equipments, including manportable radar jammers (10 days from order to delivery); the accelerated introduction into service of HM Ships Illustrious and Brazen and weapons such as the Sea Skua anti-ship missile; and the adaptation of Vulcan, Hercules and Nimrod aircraft for air-to-air refuelling.

238. The urgency of the requirement frequently warranted the acceptance of lower engineering and safety standards; and emergency arrangements worked well for the limited period of the operation. Overriding priority was given to the operation at all times and decisions were determined by what could be achieved in the limited time available.

239. The experience of the campaign is being put to full use in the continuing quest for greater efficiency in the procurement process. It would be unrealistic to expect sweeping changes since the bulk of the emergency practices used were special to the operation and because equipment requirements were narrowed to the immediate task of countering specifically known Argentine capabilities. Budgetary and cash limit restraints were removed although the principles of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

accountability and cost-effectiveness continued to apply.

LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL

240. A military operation of this scale required the specialised skills of many thousands of managers, engineers and technicians. They performed a multitude of roles, particularly in the logistics field, which were essential to the success of the operation but which did not require detailed political direction. As was to be expected they responded well to the need for speed of action in following well established procedures and for improvisation whenever this was likely to assist the operational commander.

241. The logistic support of the Falklands campaign was a major success. Despite lines of communication which stretched half way round the world, the task force rarely lacked essential supplies, and equipment and spares were maintained at high levels of availability. The task force was equipped and despatched in a remarkably short time, reflecting the high state of readiness and training of all three Service . Four lessons stand out.

242. First rates of usage, particularly of ammunition, missiles, and anti-submarine weapons were significantly higher than anticipated. Last year we announced plans to increase substantially war reserve stocks in order to improve staying power; scalings for 'out of area' operations will be reviewed in the light of experience in the Falklands Campaign.

243. Second we need to consider the level of logistic support maintained for

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

'out of area' operations. Since the late 1960s there has been a steady reduction in the Services capability to support large forces outside the NATO area. All the demands of the task force were met, but only by giving it first call on resources and by using some stocks earmarked for NATO. The Services' logistic capability to support 'out of area' operations has to be considered in the light of the Government's overall policy for such operations and this is discussed in Part III. We shall, however, review the size and composition of the special stockpile being created to support 'out of area' land operations. We shall also consider whether logistic support could be organised as part of a flexible system able to support forces whether inside or outside the NATO area.

244. Third, air-to-air refuelling is vital in supporting operations at long range. For example, RAF Harriers flew non-stop to the South Atlantic from Ascension Island with tanker support. In the operations from Ascension Island, the relatively small amount of fuel carried by the Victor tanker aircraft resulted in a large proportion of the available tanker force being used for each Vulcan, Nimrod and Hercules sortie. A large capacity strategic tanker aircraft is needed to provide greater operational flexibility in the future and our proposal for this is discussed in Part III.

245. Finally the campaign brought home the significant contribution which civil resources can make to the nation's strength in a crisis. This was discussed in the Statement on the Defence Estimates for 1982 (Cmnd 8529). Our intention to review the use of national logistic and manpower resources in this way has now been given even greater impetus. The smooth and rapid implementation of existing contingency plans to use merchant shipping in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

support of the Services was a major success story of the Campaign. More than 50 ships were taken up from trade, from passenger liners to trawlers. They provided vital support across the entire logistic spectrum. Tankers carried fuel for ships, aircraft and land forces. Liners, such as the QE2 and Canberra, and ferries gave service as troop carriers. Ships, such as the Atlantic Conveyor, carried helicopters, Harriers, heavy equipment and stores. Other vessels were taken up as hospital ships, repair ships or tugs. All of these ships were manned by volunteer, civilian crews, supplemented by small naval parties.

246. Amongst the more notable conversions made to merchantmen were:-

- a. The fitting of flight decks which were designed and constructed in a matter of days and subsequently stood up to extremes of weather. Whilst no substitute for operational flight decks, these temporary facilities were invaluable.
- b. The provision and fitting of equipment for all merchant ships to enable them to replenish at sea.
- c. The equipping of trawlers as minesweepers (in addition to the deployment of the new Hunt Class mine counter-measures vessels to the South Atlantic), which swept some ten enemy buoyant mines.
- d. The provision of additional communication, navigation and cryptographic equipment.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

e. The provision of shipboard water production plants.

247. Civil air carriers supplemented the efforts of the RAF Air Transport Force and between April and June transported more than 350 tons of freight, including helicopters, to Ascension Island.

248. The Dockyards, civilian ports, stores depots, marines services and staff in Government Departments and Industry played a major part in despatching and sustaining the task force. All gave unstinted assistance working long hours including weekends and Bank holidays. British Rail and the road haulage firms reacted rapidly to move vast quantities of stores and equipment to the docks.

249. As a consequence of the Campaign we have decided that militarily useful features should be incorporated in the replacement for Atlantic Conveyor, involving principally a prefabricated helicopter flight-deck. We also have an option to take up the ship for a period each year for exercises. For the longer term a working party of the Shipping Defence Advisory Committee will examine ways in which merchant ships likely to be required in any future emergency might be designed, modified or equipped for possible use in support of the Armed Forces or for self-defence.

250. The manpower demands of the campaign were met almost entirely by our regular forces, and there was no general recall of reservists. It was, however, necessary to effect a selective call-out of a small number of Naval reservists

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

and to retain some Naval personnel who might otherwise have been due to leave. The call out worked smoothly but the exercise indicated the need to consider the legislation on the recall of reservists. As we pointed out in Cmnd 8529 the various categories of Reserves would play an essential part in any future war in the NATO area. Some enhancements to our capabilities have already been made, for example by the expansion of the Territorial Army and other steps are being studied.

251. The outstanding feature of the medical and casualty evacuation system was the dedication of the doctors and medical staff both in the field and on board ship. Casualties were in surgery within six hours or less and, as a result of the skill of our medical teams, over 90%<sup>1</sup> survived. Extensive use was made of helicopters and hospital ships. VC10s were used in an aero-medical role to return casualties speedily to the United Kingdom. There were some difficulties in the initial planning of medical support for the Operation. These are being studied with a view to making the most effective and economical use of medical resources from all three Services in future operations.

252. The casualty reporting systems of all three Services were rapidly expanded for the operation. For example the Royal Navy set up their own casualty coordination centre at HMS Nelson in Portsmouth. It collated information

Note

1. In all 255 task force lives, Service and civilian, were lost in the operation. A further 777 were injured. In many cases these injuries were not serious and the men were quickly able to rejoin their units. Over 700 of the injured are now fully employed once more.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

from the task force via Fleet Headquarters and passed it to casualty action centres in Service locations. Families were able to telephone with enquiries and at the height of the operation thousands of calls were dealt with every day. Wherever possible, next of kin were informed before news of an incident was made public. This was done by personal visits in the case of death or serious injury. In some cases the expectation that news could reach the public early from other sources, such as Argentine claims, led to an announcement before all next of kin had been told.

253. There were some errors and delays. It was difficult to establish the extent of casualties immediately after an incident at sea because of the constant helicopter transfer of personnel between ships, and the fact that survivors might be recovered by different means to different ships. It could take many hours to establish who was missing while other operations continued. Given these difficulties, the system worked as well as could be expected and improved during the Operation.

254. By the end of the Campaign our forces had taken a total of 11,500 Argentine prisoners of war. The operational situation and the climate increased the considerable difficulties in handling so many prisoners - especially given the shortage of buildings on the Islands and the loss of tentage for 4,500 men in the Atlantic Conveyor. Nonetheless, all prisoners received adequate food, clothing and medical attention. The procedures laid down in the Third Geneva Convention were followed as closely as possible, although many prisoners had to be accommodated in ships. The International Committee of the Red Cross judged this unusual step reasonable in the cir-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

cumstances. The problems raised by handling prisoners of war will be given more emphasis in training and planning in future.

#### PUBLIC RELATIONS

255. The Government's firm objective from the outset was to provide as quickly as possible accurate information on developments in the diplomatic and military fields. In addition to the frequent reports which Ministers made to Parliament, No 10 Downing Street Press Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office provided regular briefings for the British and international press and for defence attaches. Abroad, our diplomatic missions with the help of the Central Office of Information launched and maintained an intensive effort with their local media to present the British case fully and accurately and, where necessary, to counter Argentine disinformation. At the same time they kept other Governments informed of the latest developments, canvassing support both in foreign capitals and at the United Nations. Arrangements were also made to convey a substantial British press corps to the South Atlantic.

254. It was crucial that public opinion, both at home and abroad, understood and supported our cause. Without the support of the British people it would not have been possible to mount and sustain the operation. It was vital to retain the support of friends and Allies abroad. That this was largely achieved is a measure of our success in providing a reliable account of the diplomatic and military developments. Of course there were problems. The need to delay or, in some cases, prevent altogether the publication of certain

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

information on military operations caused considerable controversy at the time and continues to be the subject of widespread debate. It is easy to overlook the factors influencing the public release of certain categories of information. At all times our practice had to be consistent with the overriding dictates of national and operational security and the protection of the lives or the men and women of the task force in the South Atlantic. At the same time, we were concerned to ensure that as far as possible their families were caused the minimum of distress. Regrettably, press speculation and false Argentine propaganda sometimes obliged us to release information about the operation sooner than family considerations would otherwise have dictated. Another factor contributing to our difficulties was the absence on some occasions of sufficiently detailed and up to date situation reports from the task force. To some extent this can be attributed to the limitations imposed by our communications systems, which did not always have the capacity to meet the requirements of the press, on top of the vast flow of vitally important operational traffic.

257. These matters deserve careful and considered analysis. The Ministry of Defence has therefore commissioned a wide ranging study by the University College of Cardiff into the relationship between the media and the Government in a time of armed conflict. In addition, the House of Commons Defence Committee is currently conducting an extensive inquiry into the way in which these matters were handled during the crisis and we shall wish to take its report into account in our analysis. Meantime, a number of practical improvements are being made in the light of the Falklands experience, including new arrangements for accrediting journalists to military units and more

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

extensive training opportunities for public relations officers. The Ministry of Defence is also discussing with the press the extent to which the difficulties which arose could be avoided in future. [ A special working party will be set up to consider whether any new measures, including the introduction of a system of censorship, are necessary in order to protect military information immediately before or during an operation. ]

*We shall  
constantly  
be asked  
about its  
progress*

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

PART III - THE FUTURE

301. We have learned a great deal from the Falklands campaign. Many of the lessons are not new but they are no less important for that - we have seen again the value of professional, well-motivated forces capable of responding quickly and imaginatively to the unexpected. The Armed Forces have demonstrated their capability to operate out of the NATO area in the most difficult circumstances and on the other side of the world; and they have gained direct experience of such an operation and the logistic effort necessary to support it. We now intend to introduce new and additional equipments to increase their mobility, flexibility and readiness for operations within the NATO area and elsewhere.

302. This is not to say that we now take a different view of the major threat to the security of the United Kingdom, which comes from the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. The remorseless growth in the size and sophistication of the Soviet Armed forces, and the disposition of Soviet leaders to exploit their military power for political purposes - directly or indirectly - continue unabated. It is still in Europe that we and our Allies face the greatest concentration of Warsaw Pact forces. In "The Way Forward" (Command 8288) we identified the four main roles in which the Armed Forces help to counter that threat: providing an independent element of strategic and theatre nuclear forces committed to the Alliance; defending the United Kingdom homeland; a major land and air contribution on the European mainland; and deploying a major maritime capability in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel. These roles remain the priority for our defence effort - and the enhancement and modernisation of the forces devoted to these tasks must still have the first call

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

on our resources.

303. "The Way Forward", however, also drew attention to the significance of threats posed to Western interests outside the NATO area. In countering these threats, our military effort plays a part at three levels:

a. Military assistance and training to countries of importance to Western interests which request our help, (this year we have military training teams varying in size from one man to more than 150 in more than 30 countries; and we are training about 5,000 foreign and Commonwealth students at defence establishments in this country).

*I shall be asked for a list*

b. Periodic deployment of British forces, for example naval task groups, to demonstrate a presence, to acquire experience of conditions away from the European theatre, and to exercise with the forces of our Allies and friends.

c. Maintenance of a capability to intervene unilaterally or with Allies either to protect our national interests, or in response to a request for help from our friends.

It is this last capability which has just been demonstrated so effectively in the Falklands Campaign.

304. The policy of successive Governments has been that operations outside the NATO area should be undertaken by forces whose primary role is in support of the Alliance. The Falklands Campaign showed that many elements of the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Armed Forces have the basic characteristics of flexibility and mobility which make them well suited to respond to unforeseen challenges arising outside Europe. We were already planning before the Falklands emergency a number of measures to enhance this capability by:

- the designation of a two-star headquarters to command forces committed to such operations;
- the fitting of station-keeping equipment to a number of Hercules aircraft, which would considerably enhance the ability to deploy a parachute assault force at night or in poor weather;
- the establishment of a stockpile of weapons, equipment and stores which could be drawn on to support operations outside the NATO area without diverting NATO stocks; and
- the greater use of civilian assets, such as merchant ships, to provide logistic and other support for our forces.

We had also already announced that the two assault ships HMS Fearless and Intrepid were to be retained in service. These ships emphatically proved their worth in the Falklands conflict, and will remain an important element in our amphibious capability.

305. We should like to have done more in this area. Unfortunately the defence budget has for several years been under intense and consistent pressure, which has made it difficult to meet the escalating real cost of the

*This page will  
cause trouble - and  
isn't really Jani who one  
looks like witness  
previous*

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Armed Forces' equipment for their primary roles, and left little margin for additions of this kind.

306. The success of last year's review of the defence programme in matching resources to our revised forward plans had already won us a degree of flexibility to make adjustments to the defence programme. In addition, as already announced, the cost of the Falklands Campaign and of replacing the ships and other equipment lost, together with the extra costs of maintaining a substantial garrison in the Falklands, are all to be found from monies additional to the 3% increase in real terms by which the defence budget is planned to grow annually over the period until 1985/86 covered by existing public expenditure plans. These developments mean that we can now finance significant force enhancements over the next few years.

307. We have already announced that:

- following our experience in the Falklands, we intend that two aircraft carriers should be available for deployment at short notice. To ensure this a third carrier will be maintained in refit or reserve and we shall not proceed with the sale of HMS Invincible
- restrictions on Armed Forces training and activity levels have been lifted. This will help to maintain the high standards of professionalism and fitness demonstrated by all three Services during the conflict.

308. During the conflict a great variety of equipments and improvements were specially introduced for the forces involved in the operation, exceeding

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

£200M in value and including:

- a. Vulcans, Nimrod and Hercules aircraft were equipped for the air-to-air refuelling receiver role, and Vulcan and Hercules aircraft were also converted to the tanker role.
- b. Nimrod aircraft were modified to carry bombs, the Harpoon anti-ship missile, and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.
- c. the purchase of additional Sidewinder AIM 9L air-to-air missiles for Harriers and conversion of RAF Harrier GR3 aircraft to carry them.
- d. introduction of laser guided bombs for RAF Harrier GR3 aircraft.
- e. adaptation of the Sea Wolf shipborne missile system more effectively to deal with low level aircraft attacks.
- f. fitting of a close-in weapon system to HMS Illustrious.
- g. accelerated introduction into service of the Sea Skua anti-ship missile and Sub-Harpoon submarine launched anti-ship missiles.
- h. further development of ship-borne chaff and electronic counter measures to deal with sea-skimming missiles; and development of these for tactical aircraft and helicopters.

Most of this equipment remains available for use by the Services, whether in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

the South Atlantic or elsewhere.

309. The replacement of ships and other equipment lost in the Falklands campaign will enhance the capabilities of the Services, since replacements will be newer and in many cases more capable than their predecessors: The major orders are for:

- a. replacement of the two Type 42 destroyers and two Type 21 frigates. [ ] Type 22 frigates are to be ordered now (including 1 Type 22 order not related to the Falklands losses). [ ] of these ships will be of the new Batch III design equipped with the 4.5" gun.
- b. a replacement for the logistic landing ship, RFA SIR GALAHAD. Detailed design work on the new ship is in hand and we expect to place an order during 1983. RFA SIR TRISTRAM is to be brought back to Britain and we hope that it can be repaired.
- c. the replacement of all lost Harrier aircraft and Sea King, Lynx and Chinook helicopters. (See also paragraph 311 below).

310. We shall maintain a sizeable garrison on the Falkland Islands for the foreseeable future including air defence radars, RAF Phantom, Harrier and Hercules aircraft, Chinook and Sea King helicopters, Rapier air defence systems, an infantry battalion, and supporting arms. Nuclear-powered submarines, destroyers, frigates and patrol craft with afloat support will be deployed in the South Atlantic; and the Ice Patrol ship - HMS Endurance - will be retained in service there. These forces can be reinforced as necessary by

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

others already identified for this purpose and we shall periodically mount exercises to test our reinforcement capability - this will be significantly enhanced by the further improvements outlined below.

311. In the light of the conflict and in order to provide for the defence of the Falkland Islands without a major diversion of effort from the Armed Forces' primary NATO roles, we intend - with the funds now available - to make a number of further additions and improvements to the Armed Forces. These measures will increase our total force levels, though those forces based in the Falkland Islands will be at a lower state of readiness for NATO than when in the European theatre. The main enhancements to be made are:

- a. the purchase of at least [ ] wide-bodied tankers which will considerably enhance the capacity of the RAF's tanker force and will be a significant force multiplier for all the RAF's combat aircraft. *Additionally*, they will greatly enhance the Armed Forces' strategic mobility given their capacity also to carry large numbers of troops and heavy equipment, both for operations in Europe or elsewhere. They will transform our ability to support the Falkland Islands garrison, and to reinforce it quickly.
- b. subject to the satisfactory completion of negotiations currently in train, the purchase of at least 12 Phantom F-4 J aircraft which will form a squadron for the air defence of the United Kingdom to replace the squadron of Phantom FGR2 aircraft committed to the South Atlantic. The deployment between theatres of this increased total Phantom force will be adjusted as and when necessary and can be quickly

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

accomplished. For example, 2 Phantoms could be moved from Ascension Island to the Falkland Islands supported by a single strategic tanker.

c. the purchase of 24 additional Rapier fire units for the Army and the Royal Air Force.

d. in addition to the three Chinook replacements already referred to, the purchase of five more Chinook medium lift helicopters. Each has the ability to lift up to 80 men and add greatly to the mobility of our land forces; their value was clearly demonstrated by the contribution made by the single Chinook helicopter which was available in the Falkland Islands Campaign.

e. an increase in the number of operational Destroyers and Frigates. By running on ships to cover those lost in the Falklands campaign, we intend to maintain total numbers at about 55 at 1st April 1983 and 1984. Under previous plans, up to 4 ships would have been in a standby squadron by 1985. We have now decided, in view of the Falklands commitment, that over the next 2-3 years - which is as far ahead as we can plan at this stage - the destroyers and frigates previously planned to go into the standby squadron should be retained in the running Fleet thus enhancing ship availability.

f. The provision of point defence for our aircraft carriers Invincible, Illustrious and Ark Royal, the assault ships Intrepid and Fearless, the destroyer Bristol and all the Type 42 destroyers.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

g. In addition to replacement of all the battle losses, as announced in July, the purchase of an additional 7 Sea Harrier aircraft and 6 Sea King ASW helicopters.

h. The purchase of Searchwater radar and associated avionics equipments for Sea King helicopters in order to equip each of the operational aircraft carriers with an organic Airborne Early Warning capability.

i. In the light of rates of consumption during the Falklands campaign both of ammunition and stores, we are reviewing the size and composition of the stockpile intended to support operations outside the NATO area, and its relationship to NATO war stocks. We plan to increase substantially the number and range of items in this stockpile at a cost of at least £10M. Additional stocks of ammunition and other equipments are being procured for basing in the Falkland Islands.

312. As indicated in Part II there is a case for a number of other force and equipment enhancements in the light of the Falklands campaign. Many of these, for instance more modern radar systems for our ships, extra night vision equipment for the Army and the JP233 airfield denial weapon for the RAF are already provided for in our forward programmes; others are not. The scope for further improvements in our forces will be assessed against the available resources in the normal annual recosting of the defence programme as a whole which will be completed during the early part of the new year.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONCLUSION

313. The many useful lessons we have learned from the Falklands campaign, which are described in some detail in this White Paper, do not invalidate the policy we have adopted following last year's defence programme review. The Soviet Union, its policies and its military capabilities continue to pose the main threat to the security of the United Kingdom and our response to this threat must have the first call on our resources. Following the Falklands campaign, we shall now be devoting substantially more resources to defence than had been previously planned. In allocating these, we shall be taking measures which will strengthen our general defence capability by increasing the flexibility, mobility and readiness of all three Services for operations in support of NATO and elsewhere.

314. Above all, the success of the Falklands campaign demonstrated conclusively the superb quality and commitment of British servicemen. It also showed the crucial role of the merchant marine, of civil servants on Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships, in the dockyards and elsewhere, and of British industry, all of whom gave tireless and unstinting support to the Task Force. The quality and reliability of much service equipment was proved, as was the ingenuity and capacity for improvisation of the Services, defence establishments, and British industry. Finally, the campaign confirmed that the British people and their Government have the will and resolve to resist aggression and the fortitude to withstand setbacks and casualties. We and our NATO Allies can draw confidence from this: the deterrent posture of the NATO Alliance as a whole has been immeasurably strengthened.

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX ACOMPOSITION OF THE TASK FORCE AND SUPPORTING ELEMENTS1. SHIPS OF THE ROYAL NAVY

Ser	Type/Class	No	Ship
1.	Submarines:		
	Fleet:	5	<u>Conqueror, Courageous, Spartan, Splendid, Valiant</u>
	Oberon Class	1	<u>Onyx</u>
2.	ASW Carrier:	1	<u>Invincible</u>
3.	ASW/Commando Carrier:	1	<u>Hermes</u>
4.	Assault Ships:	2	<u>Fearless, Intrepid</u>
5.	Guided Missile Destroyers:		
	County Class	2	<u>Antrim, Glamorgan</u>
	Type 82	1	<u>Bristol</u>
	Type 42	5	<u>Cardiff, Coventry, Exeter, Glasgow, Sheffield</u>
6.	General Purpose Frigates:		
	Leander Class	4	<u>Andromeda, Argonaut, Minerva, Penelope</u>
	Rothesay Class	2	<u>Plymouth, Yarmouth</u>
	Type 21	7	<u>Active, Alacrity, Ambuscade, Antelope, Ardent, Arrow, Avenger</u>
	Type 22	2	<u>Brilliant, Broadsword</u>
7.	Offshore Patrol:		
	Castle Class	2	<u>Dumbarton Castle, Leeds Castle</u>
8.	Mine Counter-Measures		
	Hunt Class	2	<u>Brecon, Ledbury</u>
	Extra Deep Armed Team Sweep Trawlers <sup>1</sup>	5	<u>Cordella, Farnella, Junella, Northella, Pict</u>

Ser	Type/Class	No	Ship
9.	Ice Patrol Ship:	1	<u>Endurance</u>
10.	Survey Ships <sup>2</sup> :	3	<u>Hecla</u> , <u>Herald</u> , <u>Hydra</u>

Notes

1. Taken up from trade, commissioned and manned by RN personnel.
2. Employed as ambulance ships.

2. SQUADRONS OF THE FLEET AIR ARM

Serial	Sqdn	Aircraft	Embarked In:
1	737	Wessex Mk 3	County Class destroyers
2	800	Sea Harrier	<u>Hermes</u>
3	801	Sea Harrier	<u>Invincible</u>
4	809	Sea Harrier	<u>Hermes</u> , <u>Invincible</u>
5	899	Sea Harrier	<u>Hermes</u> , <u>Invincible</u>
6	815	Lynx Mk 2	<u>Invincible</u> , <u>Hermes</u> , Type 42 destroyers, Leander Class and Type 21 (except <u>Active</u> ) frigates
7	820	Sea King Mk 5	<u>Invincible</u>
8	824	Sea King Mk 2	<u>Fort Grange</u> , <u>Olmeda</u>
9	825	Sea King Mk 2	<u>Atlantic Causeway</u> , <u>QE2</u>
10	826	Sea King Mk 5	<u>Hermes</u> , <u>Fort Austin</u>
11	829	Wasp	<u>Active</u> , <u>Endurance</u> , <u>Plymouth</u> , <u>Yarmouth</u> , Survey ships, <u>Contender Bezant</u>
12	845	Wessex Mk 5	<u>Invincible</u> , <u>Fort Austin</u> , <u>Intrepid</u> , <u>Resource</u> , <u>Tidepool</u> , <u>Tidespring</u>
13	846	Sea King Mk 4	<u>Hermes</u> , <u>Fearless</u> , <u>Intrepid</u> , <u>Canberra</u> , <u>Elk</u>
14	847	Wessex Mk 5	<u>Engadine</u> , <u>Atlantic Causeway</u>
15	848	Wessex Mk 5	<u>Olna</u> , <u>Olwen</u> , <u>Regent</u> , <u>Atlantic Conveyor</u>

3. SHIPS OF THE ROYAL MARITIME AUXILIARY SERVICE

Ser	Type/Class	No	Ship
1.	Mooring and Salvage Vessel	1	<u>Goosander</u>
2.	Tug	1	<u>Typhoon</u>

4. SHIPS OF THE ROYAL FLEET AUXILIARY

Ser	Type/Class	No	Ship
1.	Fleet Tankers, Large:	5	<u>Olmeda, Olna, Olwen, Tidepool, Tidespring</u>
2.	Fleet Tankers, Small:	1	<u>Blue Rover</u>
3.	Support Tankers:	5	<u>Appleleaf, Bayleaf, Brambleleaf, Pearleaf, Plumleaf</u>
4.	Fleet Replenishment Ships:	4	<u>Fort Austin, Fort Grange, Resource, Regent</u>
5.	Stores Support Ships:	1	<u>Stromness</u>
6.	Helicopter Support Ship:	1	<u>Engadine</u>
7.	Landing Ships: Logistic	6	<u>Sir Bedivere, Sir Galahad, Sir Geraint, Sir Lancelot, Sir Percivale, Sir Tristram</u>

4. SHIPS TAKEN UP FROM TRADE

Ser	Ship	Ser	Ship	Ser	Ship
	<u>Liners</u>	18.	MV <u>Scottish Eagle</u>		<u>General Cargo</u>
1.	SS <u>Canberra</u>	19.	MV <u>Shell Eburna</u>	33.	MV <u>Avelona Star</u>
2.	RMS <u>Queen Elizabeth II</u>		<u>Roll-on Roll-off</u> <u>General Cargo</u>	34.	MV <u>Cedar Bank</u>
3.	SS <u>Uganda</u>	20.	SS <u>Atlantic Causeway</u>	35.	MV <u>Geestport</u>
	<u>Tankers</u>	21.	SS <u>Atlantic Conveyor</u>	36.	MV <u>Laertes</u>
4.	MV <u>Alvega</u>	22.	MV <u>Baltic Ferry</u>	37.	MV <u>Lycaon</u>
5.	MV <u>Anco Charger</u>	23.	MV <u>Contender Bezant</u>	38.	MV <u>Myrmidon</u>
6.	MV <u>Balder London</u>	24.	MV <u>Elk</u>	39.	MV <u>Saxonia</u>
7.	MV <u>British Avon</u>	25.	MV <u>Europic Ferry</u>	40.	MV <u>Strathewe</u>
8.	MV <u>British Dart</u>	26.	MV <u>Nordic Ferry</u>		<u>Offshore Support</u> <u>Vessels</u>
9.	MC <u>British Esk</u>	27.	MV <u>Tor Caledonia</u>	41.	MV <u>British Enterprise</u> <u>III</u>
10.	MV <u>British Tamar</u>		<u>Container Ship</u>	42.	MV <u>Stena Inspector</u>
11.	MV <u>British Tay</u>	28.	MV <u>Astronomer</u>	43.	MV <u>Stena Seaspread</u>
12.	MV <u>British Test</u>		<u>Passenger/General</u> <u>Cargo</u>	44.	MV <u>Wimpey Seahouse</u>
13.	MV <u>British Trent</u>	29.	MV <u>Norland</u>		<u>Tugs</u>
14.	MV <u>British Wye</u>	30.	TGV <u>Rangatira</u>	45.	MT <u>Irishman</u>
15.	MV <u>Fort Toronto</u>	31.	MV <u>Saint Edmund</u>	46.	MT <u>Salvageman</u>
16.	MV <u>Fort Rouge</u>	32.	RMS <u>Saint Helena</u>	47.	MT <u>Yorkshireman</u>
17.	MV <u>G A Walker</u>				<u>Cable Ships</u>
				48.	C S <u>Iris</u>

Note

1. In addition MVs Cordella, Farnella, Junella, Northella and Pict were taken up and commissioned as mine counter-measures vessels.

6. ROYAL MARINES

Ser	
1.	3 Commando Brigade Headquarters and Signal Squadron Royal Marines
2.	40 Commando Royal Marines
3.	42 Commando Royal Marines
4.	45 Commando Royal Marines
5.	3 Commando Brigade Air Squadron Royal Marines
6.	The Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines
7.	The Special Boat Squadron
8.	Royal Marines Detachments (including landing craft crews)
9.	Air Defence Troop Royal Marines
10.	1st Raiding Squadron Royal Marines
11.	Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre Royal Marines
12.	The Bands of Her Majesty's Royal Marines Commando Forces and Flag Officer 3rd Flotilla
13.	Field Records Office Royal Marines

7. ARMY UNITS

Ser	
1.	Two troops The Blues and Royals
2.	4th Field Regiment Royal Artillery (less on battery)
3.	12th Air Defence Regiment Royal Artillery (less one battery)
4.	29th Commando Regiment Royal Artillery
5.	Elements 43 Air Defence Battery, 32nd Guided Weapons Regiment Royal Artillery
6.	Elements 49th Field Regiment Royal Artillery
7.	Elements Royal School of Artillery Support Regiment

Ser	
8.	Elements 33 Engineer Regiment
9.	36 Engineer Regiment (less one squadron)
10.	Elements 38 Engineer Regiment
11.	59 Independent Commando Squadron Royal Engineers
12.	Elements Military Works Force
13.	Elements 2 Postal and Courier Regiment Royal Engineers
14.	Elements 14th Signal Regiment
15.	Elements 30th Signal Regiment
16.	5th Infantry Brigade Headquarters and Signals Squadron
17.	Elements 602 Signal Troop
18.	2nd Battalion Scots Guards
19.	1st Battalion Welsh Guards
20.	1st Battalion 7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles
21.	2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment.
22.	3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment
23.	Elements 22nd Special Air Service Regiment
24.	656 Squadron Army Air Corps
25.	Elements 17 Port Regiment Royal Corps of Transport
26.	Elements 29 Transport and Movements Regiment Royal Corps of Transport
27.	Elements 47 Air Despatch Squadron Royal Corps of Transport
28.	407 Troop Royal Corps of Transport
29.	Elements The Joint Helicopter Support Unit
30.	16 Field Ambulance Royal Medical Corps
31.	Elements 19 Field Ambulance Royal Army Medical Corps
32.	Elements 9 Ordnance Battalion Royal Army Ordnance Corps



Ser	
33.	81 Ordnance Company Royal Army Ordnance Corps
34.	10 Field Workshop Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
35.	Elements 70 Aircraft Workshop Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
36.	Elements 160 Provost Company Royal Military Police
37.	6 Field Cash Office Royal Army Pay Corps
38.	601 Tactical Air Control Party (Forward Air Controller)
39.	602 Tactical Air Control Party (Forward Air Controller)
40.	603 Tactical Air Control Party (Forward Air Controller)

8. ROYAL AIR FORCE UNITS

Ser	Flying Squadrons	Aircraft
1.	1(F) Squadron <sup>1</sup>	Harrier GR3
	Detachments of:	
2.	10 Squadron	VC 10
3.	18 Squadron	Chinook HC Mk 1
4.	24 Squadron	Hercules C Mk 1
5.	30 Squadron	Hercules C1
6.	47 Squadron	Hercules C1
7.	70 Squadron	Hercules C1
8.	29 Squadron	Phantom FGR2
9.	42 Squadron	Nimrod Mk 1
10.	44 Squadron	Vulcan B2
11.	50 Squadron	Vulcan B2
12.	101 Squadron	Vulcan B2
13.	55 Squadron	Victor K2

Ser	Flying Squadrons	Aircraft
14.	57 Squadron	Victor K2
15.	120 Squadron	Nimrod Mk 2
16.	201 Squadron	Nimrod Mk 2
17.	206 Squadron	Nimrod Mk 2
18.	202 Squadron	Search and Rescue Sea King
Royal Air Force Regiment		Description
19.	3 (Regiment)	Wing Headquarters Unit
20.	15 (Regiment)	Squadron Detachment Field Squadron
21.	63 (Regiment)	Squadron (Rapier)
Other Units		
22.	Tactical Communications Wing	
23.	Tactical Supply Wing	
24.	Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team	

Note

1. Embarked in HMS Hermes and ashore.

## ANNEX B

## WEAPONS SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE AGAINST ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Serial	Weapon System	Aircraft Kills		
		Confirmed	Probable <sup>1</sup>	
1.	Sea Harrier with AIM 9L Sidewinder Missile	16	2	<i>Column deleted and closed, 40 yrs. under FOI exemption</i>
2.	Sea Harrier with 30mm ADEN Cannon	4	2	
3.	Sea Wolf	5	-	
4.	Sea Dart	8	-	
5.	Sea Cat	8	2	
6.	Rapier	14	6	
7.	Blowpipe	9	2	
8.	Stinger	1	-	
9.	Others <sup>4</sup>	7	-	
	Total <sup>5</sup>	72	14	<i>Alwayland 1/5/82</i>

## Notes:

1. A probable kill is one where there are reasonable grounds to believe an aircraft was destroyed, but there is insufficient weight of collateral evidence to claim a confirmed kill.
2. Missile system kill rates are expressed as total kills (including probables) as a percentage of total valid firings. 'Out-of-envelope', non-feasible and certain other engagements terminated, eg. for safety reasons, have been discounted, since they are not relevant to the assessment of system performance.
3. N/A = Not applicable.
4. Others comprise 4.5" gun, 20mm, 40/60mm Bofors, Rarden Cannon and small arms.
5. An estimated total of 117 Argentine aircraft were destroyed (including probables and those destroyed on the ground). This total comprises: 45 A4 Skyhawk, 27 Mirage, 20 Pucara, 4 Aeromacchi, 4 Mentor, 3 Canberra, 2 Skyvan, 1 C130 Hercules, 1 Lear Jet, 6 Puma, 2 Bell Huey and 2 Chinook (the last three aircraft types named being helicopters).

ANNEX CSHIP AND AIRCRAFT LOSSESShips

Serial	Date	
1	4 May	HMS <u>Sheffield</u>
2	21 May	HMS <u>Ardent</u>
3	23 May	HMS <u>Antelope</u>
4	25 May	HMS <u>Coventry</u>
5	25 May	<u>Atlantic Conveyor</u>
6	8 June	<u>Sir Galahad</u>

AircraftLost to Enemy Fire

Ser	Date	Aircraft Type	Parent Service
1	4 May	Sea Harrier	RN
2	21 May	Lynx <sup>1</sup>	RN
3	21 May	2 x Gazelle	RM
4	21 May	Harrier GR3	RAF
5	25 May	6 x Wessex 5 <sup>2</sup>	RN
6	25 May	Lynx <sup>2</sup>	RN
7	25 May	3 x Chinook <sup>2</sup>	RAF
8	25 May	Lynx <sup>3</sup>	RN
9	27 May	Harrier GR3	RAF
10	28 May	Scout	RM
11	30 May	Harrier GR3	RAF
12	2 June	Sea Harrier	RN
13	6 June	Gazelle	Army
14	12 June	Wessex 3 <sup>4</sup>	RN

Other Losses

Ser	Date	Aircraft Type	Parent Service
1	22 April	2 x Wessex 5	RN
2	23 April	Sea King Mk 4	RN
3	6 May	2 x Sea Harrier	RN
4	12 May	Sea King Mk 5	RN
5	18 May	Sea King Mk 5	RN
6	19 May	Sea King Mk 4	RN
7	20 May	Sea King Mk 4	RN
8	24 May	Sea Harrier	RN
9	29 May	Sea Harrier	RN
10	8 June	Harrier GR3	RAF

Notes

1. Lost in bomb attack on HMS Ardent
2. Lost in Atlantic Conveyor
3. Lost when HMS Coventry sank
4. Lost in missile attack on HMS Glamorgan



261



~~SECRET~~  
file

See  
Argentina

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 November 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS WHITE PAPER

The Prime Minister saw over the weekend your Secretary of State's minute of 26 November and the draft White Paper which he enclosed.

As I told you on the telephone this morning, the Prime Minister has no objection to the circulation of the draft to OD. But Mrs. Thatcher has made a number of comments on the text which I list below.

Part I: Paragraph 102

With regard to the last sentence, the Prime Minister has pointed out that submarines were despatched to the South Atlantic before the date mentioned.

Part I: Paragraph 113

The Prime Minister doubts the wisdom of raising in this Paper the question of our consideration of a blockade of the Islands. She recalls that at the time the advice was that a blockade was simply not possible.

Part I: Paragraph 121

*Passage deleted and closed, 40 years, under  
FOI exemption. Mayland, 1 May 2012*

Part II: Paragraph 203

The Prime Minister would prefer the sentence "The group was briefed daily ..... overall commander of the operation." to be deleted. She considers it unwise to go into this detail. Mrs. Thatcher has also pointed out that the sentence later in the same paragraph, beginning "Care was taken to avoid British military action which would jeopardise our diplomatic efforts" is likely to cause difficulty in that the Government will be asked to provide specific instances.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Part II: Paragraph 205

Part II: Paragraph 205

With regard to the penultimate sentence, Mrs. Thatcher has asked what the changes are which will be introduced?

Part II: Paragraph 217

The Prime Minister is inclined to doubt whether the Paper should say (as in the second sentence of the draft) that the losses which the Task Force suffered were "less than we had feared". She has pointed out that we were never able to assess in advance the likely losses.

Part II: Paragraph 228

The Prime Minister has commented that this paragraph sounds weak.

Part II: Paragraph 229

The Prime Minister has asked whether the words "A longer term study" should not read "An urgent study"?

Part II: Paragraph 257

As I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister asked why the University College of Cardiff had been asked to carry out a study of the relationship between the media and the Government in a time of armed conflict? Mrs. Thatcher would prefer the last sentence of this paragraph, referring to a special working party, to be deleted. She believes that the Government would be constantly asked to report on its progress.

Part III: Paragraph 305

Mrs. Thatcher has commented that this paragraph will cause trouble. She doubts whether it is really fair in the light of the increased provision that has been made for the Defence Budget.

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL