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PRIME MINISTER

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MEETING WITH MR MANDELA

You are to meet Mr Mandela tomorrow. He comes at 1200 for an hour's talks, followed by lunch. He is due to leave at around 1400. He will be accompanied by Mr Mbeki, the ANC's Director of International Relations, seen by many as Mandela's eventual successor.

Sir Robin Renwick will also attend. I have asked him to come at 1140 to brief you.

You will find abundant briefing in the folder, including some notes by Robin Renwick. The main issues which you will want to cover are:

- your overall approach to South Africa;
- your view of de Klerk, who deserves support;
- the need for the ANC to give up armed struggle;
- the importance of getting into negotiations soon;
- constitutional issues and the need for protection for minority rights;
- the absurdity of nationalisation;
- relaxation of sanctions will continue;
- our positive measures of help;
- your eventual visit to South Africa;
- the IRA point. On this, Mandela must realise he has made a major error of judgment: I would let him wriggle rather than take him to task.

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The impression we want to emerge from the meeting is of some  
courteous straight-talking - of which Mandela will have heard  
regrettably little elsewhere, agreement to disagree on  
sanctions, but recognition by Mandela of your very considerable  
influence on events in South Africa and his wish to see you  
play a major part there.

By all accounts he responds better to charm and a reasoned  
approach than to confrontational tactics.

You will find in the folder:

- some notes by Robin Renwick;
- his telegrams;
- a fuller brief by the FCO;
- the record of your telephone conversation with Mandela;
- his programme.

C DP

CHARLES POWELL

3 July 1990

P.S. He has just cancelled  
his meeting with the CBI  
in order to rearrange  
his meeting with you.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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London SW1A 2AH

3 July 1990

Dear Charles,

Nelson Mandela

The Foreign Secretary had talks with Nelson Mandela this morning. I enclose a copy of the record.

Everything that has been said about Mr Mandela's dignity and presence holds good. If he is at all frail, it did not show. He was very alert but his tone on matters of policy was harder and tougher than expected. But there were signs of a changing position on some issues:

Nationalisation

This is clearly receding as an issue. Mr Mandela said that the problem was the unfair distribution of resources and that he was looking for ways of rectifying this. He was meeting business leaders and asking them to suggest solutions. Government participation was only one option. Businessmen should come up with alternatives to nationalisation.

Sanctions

As the Foreign Secretary said, there is an element of shadow boxing in all this. Mr Mandela does not want sanctions lifted until it is clear to him that apartheid is being dismantled, but he has modified his position to the extent of being ready to see sanctions lifted when the commitment to change is made clear, in a declaration, rather than waiting for the new constitution to be in place. He and the Foreign Secretary did not spend much time on this issue since it is no longer in practice very central.

Armed struggle

The gist of what Mr Mandela said was to the effect that, with negotiations under way, the armed struggle need not be actively pursued.

Elections

Mr Mandela argued that there must be elections to decide who will sit at the negotiating table. He would not accept that the white electorate has already voted since that would mean a blacks-only election. But he did recognise that an election now could spell defeat for President de Klerk. Mr Mandela talked of compromise on the issue. He may be trying to

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exercise leverage on the South African Government whom he suspects of trying to 'stack' the negotiation table with small, unrepresentative black parties so that the ANC would be in a minority.

Continuing contacts

In his speech at lunch, Mr Mandela described his visit to London as the climax of his tour. He attaches importance to our influence. He told the Foreign Secretary he would keep in touch with Robin Renwick but hoped he could telephone the Prime Minister on occasion.

Yours,  
*Stephen Wall*

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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INFO PRIORITY LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA, KAMPALA, CAIRO, EC POSTS  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, OTTAWA  
INFO PRIORITY CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, TOKYO  
INFO ROUTINE MASERU, GABORONE, MBABANE, WINDHOEK, NAIROBI

FROM SAFD.

VISIT OF NELSON MANDELA: TALKS WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE.  
SUMMARY.

1. Mandela spoke without notes. His tone at the plenary session was quite tough on substance and his manner single-minded. The atmosphere throughout was friendly. He raised all the obvious issues, including the next steps in the negotiating process, the armed struggle, sanctions and economic issues. At lunch, he spoke of his visit to Britain as being the climax of his tour.

DETAIL

2. Mandela had talks with the Secretary of State on 3 July at 1 Carlton Gardens. The plenary session lasted about an hour. This was preceded by half an hour tete-a-tete and followed by a lunch.

3. Mandela referred to South Africa's historical ties with

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Britain and to the special role this gave Britain. For this reason he wished to give the government a full briefing. He referred to the Cape Town talks and listed the obstacles to negotiation (return of exiles, political prisoners, political trials, the State of Emergency and repeal of repressive legislation). He said that the ANC had studied the report of the working party established at Cape Town. It was clear that satisfactory progress had been made and that the removal of the remaining obstacles was a mere formality. On repressive legislation, a start had been made and he accepted de Klerk's assurances that what had not already been done would be done in the next legislative session. Mandela had been prepared for the next round of talks with the SAG to take place in his absence abroad. But he appreciated de Klerk's wish not to hold the next meeting until he (Mandela) was back.

4. The key question was now to decide who should sit at the negotiating table. The SAG said elected leaders must be involved, including those of the homelands, town councils and a host of other organisations. Their intention appeared to be to ensure that the ANC would be in a minority. The ANC argued that in these cases elections had taken place when the ANC was banned. There had to be elections on a non-racial basis to decide who should sit at the negotiating table. The government could not be exempted. Those whose legitimacy was thus established would decide on the constitution. However, he also made it clear that compromise was possible and said that he was worried at the possibility that de Klerk might lose any election. He said too that he was not advocating a constituent assembly as such. It was for those elected to attend the negotiating process to decide the body which would draw up a new constitution. (Comment: It was not clear whether the insistence on elections was a negotiating position to counter that of the SAG.)

~~of any minority.~~

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5. On the issue of minority rights, Mandela was firm in rejecting any suggestion of a right of veto for whites or indeed of any minority over the majority. He referred to Judge Olivier's recommendations for a Bill of Rights enforceable by an independent judiciary and to his opinion that such protection of individual rights should be enough. The problem was to build up white confidence. He said that in March 1989 he had sent a memorandum to the SAG on the need to remove white fears of domination by the blacks and hence for structural guarantees. Mandela said he was confident that these issues could be resolved by discussion, that the ANC had ideas (not elaborated) but could not compromise on the principle of one person one vote.

6. In this discussion, as in several other points in the talks, he referred to President de Klerk's integrity and to his confidence that he and de Klerk could work together to resolve the problems. He also repeatedly stressed his sense of urgency. He confirmed that negotiations need not be delayed by the ANC Congress in December: they could begin as soon as agreement was reached on who should participate.

7. Mandela introduced the subject of the armed struggle by saying that the ANC had first proposed talks with the SAG in 1986, pointing out that there was no sense in the continuing slaughter. The fact was that the methods of political action were determined by the oppressor. If channels of communication were kept open, there was no need for violence. Western countries had appeared to take more account of the violence of the oppressed than that of the oppressor. It was the ANC who had taken the initiative to scale down violence and to propose talks to remove the obstacles to negotiation. The Harare Declaration promised a cessation of violence before negotiations began. Meanwhile, in South Africa police violence continued and right-wing extremists were arming themselves with apparent



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impunity. How could the ANC call off the armed struggle in such circumstances and leave themselves unable to defend their people? It was for the SAG to create the conditions in which the armed struggle could be called off.

8. The Secretary of State emphasized that HMG had not been slow to condemn the violence of apartheid. Channels of communication were now opened. The ANC should make use of that and point out that the need for armed struggle had gone.

9. Mandela said that the ANC was addressing economic questions in meetings with South African businessmen. They wanted the support of business for their programme of economic reform. The Secretary of State asked if this included nationalisation. Mandela replied that state ownership was well known in South Africa and was nothing new. The problem was an unfair distribution of resources. There were various options to rectify this. Government participation was one. The ANC would consider any other solution. South African business should come forward with ideas. He was meeting business leaders on his foreign trip in order to correct misconceptions. (He addresses the CBI on 4 July.) Decisions would not be forced down people's throats in South Africa. A commission would be appointed to consider possible solutions and in particular how to encourage new investment.

10. Mandela said that one purpose of his tour was to ask the international community to maintain sanctions. In this he had succeeded. Mandela argued that the decision to call for sanctions had been made by the ANC and they could only be called off by decision of its Congress. Nevertheless, he was concerned at the harm sanctions were doing to the economy. Sanctions were the price to be paid for the end of apartheid. At present they helped de Klerk resist the right wing, who portrayed him as a puppet of the UK and US. They added to the sense of urgency on both sides to reach a settlement before damage to the economy

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became irretrievable. He claimed a favourable response in Europe and the US, quoting the vote of the European Parliament. He suggested that even the Bush administration had come round to his point of view. The ANC hoped soon to reach the stage when they could call for a review. The commitment to irreversible change in the UN Declaration was the key, but he did not interpret this as suggesting that sanctions could not be lifted until a new constitution was in place. When sufficient mutual trust had been established with the SAG, the ANC would be content with a declaration of commitment to change.

11. The Secretary of State countered that the argument about sanctions was to some extent shadow-boxing. As Mandela had said, the key issue for the future was investment. This was not to be turned on and off by governments. Decisions were taken by firms. Apartheid discouraged investment. But it was not something that would suddenly begin to flow when apartheid was dismantled. The Secretary of State added that at the Dublin Council opinion had been confused, but there was a general view that the time was approaching when a relaxation would be appropriate. Several countries were already discreetly relaxing sanctions.

12. Mandela offered to explain how he had become embroiled in controversy over the IRA. He had been drawn into making a statement of general principle that he favoured peaceful solutions to conflict. There could be no justification for slaughter. He had declined to take a view of the specific issue. The Secretary of State emphasized that all in Ireland had access to elections. Friends of the IRA had put themselves forward and had been rejected by the electorate.

13. On the question on Inkatha and Natal, Mandela said that the ANC were addressing the question of black unity. Five of the six homelands were now working with the ANC. Inkatha/ANC rivalry was no longer the issue. The SAG had been using the

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differences in an attempt to try to eliminate the ANC. Why else had the SAG failed to use its strength to suppress the conflict? He suggested that the SAG had created a monster which they could not now control. He claimed that Chief Buthelezi had no significant political force behind him and provoked hostility even among Zulus. He hoped to be able to talk to him, but present circumstances made this impossible. When he had proposed a meeting at a rally in Durban, it had provoked uproar. He suggested that Oscar Dhlomo had resigned as Secretary-General of Inkatha because of his failure to persuade Buthelezi of the need to talk to the ANC. In his earlier, private, talk with the Foreign Secretary, Mandela spoke less harshly of Buthelezi. He was a friend. He was grateful to him for refusing to negotiate with the SAG while Mandela was still in prison. But Buthelezi was making it impossible for him to conduct a dialogue with Inkatha.

14. As the meeting was about to end, Mandela asked for financial help, not simply to cope with the return of exiles but also to rebuild the ANC: a budget had been prepared to give to HMG which would be handed over later. The ANC had set up a trust to which such funds could be paid. The Board included prominent South Africans such as van Zyl Slabbert, Franklin Sonn and Maponya. Donors would have a right to be represented on the trust to ensure their funds were properly used. A number of African countries had already made generous promises. The Nigerians had already given 5 million dollars. The Secretary of State replied that the Dublin Council had agreed that the European Community would consider help for exiles. He mentioned UK aid with nation-building. We would await the document promised on the ANC's request for aid.

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Seeby

Mr. Powell

I attach a check list for the meeting with Mandela.  
This should be read with my telno. 126 (attached).

2. I attach also a list of all the South African companies  
in which the state already has control or a major interest.  
The Prime Minister might like to glance at this - or even  
hand it over to Mandela.

3. Mandela shows his age. His attention wanders during  
long statements. It is better to go for short exchanges  
and to keep drawing him out.

Robin Renwick

(Robin Renwick)

MANDELA: CHECK LIST

- Welcome.
- Glad to see Mandela's statement in Strasbourg that he has no doubt of HMG's determination to put an end to apartheid: disagreements solely about means.
- Have worked hard to help secure Mandela's release, unbanning of ANC, freeing of political activity so negotiations can take place to work out fully democratic constitution.
- Mandela has said he believes he can reach agreement with De Klerk. How does he see this developing?
- On constitution, must be based on one person, one vote. Mandela also has talked of need for "structural guarantees" to reassure white minority. That will be necessary to persuade minority to relinquish power: also to ensure real freedom later. ANC are agreed on multi-party system, independent judiciary, free press, Bill of Rights. Should seek to reach agreement with De Klerk first on Constitutional principles. We do not regard protection for minority rights as incompatible with genuinely democratic constitution. Possibility of two chamber system, President/Prime Minister. Protection for minorities in Indian, New Zealand, Belgian and Swiss constitutions.
- On ANC demand for Constituent Assembly, that will not be



attainable before main elements of constitution agreed (as in Zimbabwe and Namibia). It would mean majority rule before negotiations take place. That will not be agreed. Need to reach agreement on main points of constitution first: then referendum and one person, one vote elections.

- On obstacles to negotiations, hope ANC will reach agreement on basis of joint working group on definition and release of political prisoners.
- On armed struggle, understand Mandela's situation at time of Verwoerd when no negotiations possible. But now must stop talking about violence. Not being asked to dis-arm his people. But to suspend "armed struggle" while negotiations take place.
- De Klerk facing strong right wing opposition. International response weak. The most effective help Mandela can give De Klerk is to stop talking about violence.
- On Natal, violence not coming only from Inkatha. Buthelezi held out for Mandela's release, unbanning of ANC. He also will have role in negotiations. Need for leaders to talk to each other.
- On nationalisation, real issue is distribution of wealth. We are urging repeal of Land and Group Areas Acts and affirmative action to help black South Africans get access to agricultural land and equal opportunities generally. Investment desperately needed, Population increase 1 million per annum. Need for external help with black education and housing. Look at

rest of Africa, e.g. Zambia.

- Sum up: will support on fully democratic constitution, one person, one vote and repeal of all remaining apartheid legislation Form of protection for minorities will have to be negotiated between black and white leaders. Hope will not try to insist on Constituent Assembly: that would block negotiations. Reach agreement on principles first. Stop talking about armed struggle. Agree to disagree on sanctions: but arms embargo will remain. Will help with black education and housing. Have worked for real democracy everywhere else in world: agreements between us more important than disagreements. Future will depend on agreement between Mandela and De Klerk.

## ORGANISATIONS IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A INTEREST

NAME OF ORGANISATION	CAPITAL	SHARE HOLDERS	PERCT.	PERSONNEL
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP.	4382000000	STATE	100	500
ATLANTIS DIESEL ENGINE (PTY) LTD		IDC	100	2162
ALUSAF (PTY) LTD		IDC GENCOR	30,7 69,3	2907
ATLANTIS ALUMINIUM (PTY) LTD		IDC		60
INDUSTRIAL SELECTIONS LTD.		IDC	100	
HTP MARKETING AND MANUFACTURING		IDC	100	
KANGWANE ECONOMIC DEV.CORP.		IDC		150
NATIONAL SELECTIONS LTD.		IDC		
NATIONAL SORGHUM BEER BREWERIES		IDC		4500
PHOSPHATE DEVELOPMENT CORP.		IDC		3000
FOSKEM (PTY) LTD		PH.DEV.CORP.		
QWAQWA DEVELOPMENT CORP.LTD		IDC		150
SAPEKOE (PTY)LTD		IDC		20000
SMALL BUSINESS DEV.CORP.		IDC/ PRIV.SECTOR		600
SOEKOR (PTY)LTD		IDC		220
FINDEVCO (PTY)LTD		IDC	100	
KONOIL (PTY)LTD		IDC	100	
IMPOFIN (PTY)LTD		IDC	100	
MOSSGAS AND MOSSREF				
ARMAMENTS CORPORATION OF S.A.		STATE		2000
ATLAS AIRCRAFT CORP.		ARMSCOR		
ELOPTRA (PTY)LTD		ARMSCOR		500
INFOPLAN (PTY)LTD		ARMSCOR		
KONCHEM (PTY)LTD		ARMSCOR		

## ORGANISATIONS IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A INTEREST

NAME OF ORGANISATION	CAPITAL	SHARE HOLDERS	PERCT.	PERSONNEL
LYTTELTON ENGINEERING WORKS		ARMSCOR		2000
MUSGRAVE MANUFACTURES		ARMSCOR		160
PRETORIA METAL PRESSINGS (PTY)LTD		ARMSCOR		
NASCHEM (PTY)LTD		ARMSCOR		
SWARTKLIP PRODUCTS (PTY)LTD		ARMSCOR		
TECNETICS (PTY)LTD		ARMSCOR		
SASOL LTD.		STATE/ PRIV. SECTOR		33000 /
ALLIED TAR AND ACID REFINERY		SASOL		
FELBITEM (PTY)LTD		SASOL		
HWH INVESTMENTS (PTY)LTD		SASOL		
INSPAN INVESTMENTS (PTY)LTD		SASOL		30
LESLIE COAL DEVELOPMENT (PTY)LTD		SASOL		
NATIONAL PETROL REFINERIES		SASOL		878
SA GAS DISTRIBUTORS (PTY)LTD		SASOL		30
SASOL EXPLOSIVES (PTY)LTD		SASOL		
SASOL FERTILIZER (PTY)LTD		SASOL		
SASOL FUELS MARKETING CO.(PTY)LTD		SASOL		
SASOL INDUSTRIES		SASOL		
SASOL TECHNOLOGY		SASOL		
SASOL THREE (PTY)LTD		SASOL		
SASOL TOWNSHIPS LTD.		SASOL		
SASOLCHEM (PTY)LTD		SASOL		
SECUNDA COLLIERIES		SASOL		
TOSAS (PTY)LTD		SASOL		134
TOSAS HOLDINGS (PTY)LTD		TOSAS	100	0



## ORGANISATIONS IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A INTEREST

NAME OF ORGANISATION	CAPITAL	SHARE HOLDERS	PERCT.	PERSONNEL
TWENTE WOONSTELLE (PTY)LTD		SASOL		
AFRICAN METAL CORPORATION LTD.		STATE		143
ESCOM		STATE		60000
S.A.BROADCASTING CORP.		STATE		6200
SFF ASSOCIATION		STATE		615
SA INVENTIONS DEV. CORP.		STATE/CSIR		4740
SA BANKNOTE CO (PTY)LTD		STATE		450
ALEXCOR		STATE		
TRANSNET (SATS)		STATE		221730
DEPT.OF POST&TELECOMMUNICATIONS		STATE		98000
SOUTH ATLANTIC CABEL CO.(PTY)		POST & TELEC.		
THAMES WIRE AND CABLE (PTY)LTD		POST & TELEC.		
DEPT. OF TRANSPORT		STATE		3700
STATE PRINTER		STATE		
DEPT. OF FORESTRY		STATE		
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF SA		STATE		700
LANDBANK OF SA		STATE		1000
SA RESERVE BANK		STATE		2462
COUNCIL FOR MINERAL TECHNOLOGY		STATE		650
COUNCIL FOR SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH (CSIR)		STATE		4808
HUMAN SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL		STATE		
SA BUREAU OF STANDARDS		STATE		2000
SA TOURISM BOARD		STATE		200
NATAL PARKS BOARD		STATE		
NATIONAL PARKS BOARD		STATE		

## ORGANISATIONS IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A INTEREST

NAME OF ORGANISATION	CAPITAL	SHARE HOLDERS	PERCT.	PERSONNEL
ABBATOIR CORP. (ABCORP)		STATE		



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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London SW1A 2AH

2 July 1990

Dear Charles,

Visit of Nelson Mandela

Mr Nelson Mandela, Deputy President of the African National Congress, will call on the Prime Minister at 12.00 am on 4 July for talks followed by lunch. We expect Mr Mandela to be accompanied by Mr Thabo Mbeki, ANC Director for International Affairs.

Mr Mandela's visit is formally in response to the Prime Minister's invitation issued at the time of his release from prison on 11 February. He will be a guest of the FCO while in Britain, and will have talks and lunch with the Foreign Secretary on 3 July. Before the meeting with the Prime Minister, he will have addressed a special meeting of the CBI. Details of Mr Mandela's visit programme are attached.

Objectives

Our objectives for this visit are:

- to ensure that Mr Mandela is clear that UK policy has been directed towards persuading those in power in South Africa to end apartheid and negotiate a new constitution;
- to persuade Mr Mandela to move quickly with President de Klerk to get negotiations under way: in particular by ending the rhetoric of armed struggle;
- to explore his thinking on how the negotiations will be organised and to discourage ideas which suggest that a negotiation with the SAG can be avoided (eg by the device of a constituent assembly);
- to encourage recognition that a growing economy is essential to the success of the process of change and will require sensible economic policies which encourage investment.

Mr Mandela's objectives are likely to be :

- to ensure that the UK's special position of influence is exercised to the advantage of the ANC;
- to argue against further relaxation of sanctions;

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- to advise the Prime Minister not to visit South Africa for the present.
- to obtain moral and financial support for the ANC, including help with the return of exiles.

Mr Mandela and the ANC

Mr Mandela's international tour has been successful. Mr Mandela has been given a hero's welcome in the United States. Those who meet him are impressed by his personal qualities. A man who can emerge from 27 years in jail with his personality evidently unscathed and be able to win the confidence of the South African President is clearly remarkable. But Mr Mandela's adjustment is far from complete. His continuing espousal of sanctions may be negotiating tactics but his public praise in the United States for Cuba and Qadhafi sounds like time-warped jargon and the idea he put forward in the United States for a nationwide election prior to constitutional negotiations was, as the Americans told him, unworkable. There are some signs that economic realities are beginning to impinge, with less talk of wholesale nationalisation but the process of education will take time. The more contact Mr Mandela can have with leading industrialists - and with bodies like the World Bank whose analysis of bad economic management in Africa has been pretty devastating, the better. Mr Mandela remains the key to the peaceful process of ending apartheid. The relationship he has established with President de Klerk is crucial to the success of the dialogue we have sought to promote. For his part, Mr Mandela recognises that the Prime Minister has a special position of influence on President de Klerk.

The following is a check-list of the subjects the Prime Minister may wish to cover. They are further elaborated upon in Sir Robin Renwick's telegrams (enclosed).

Opening Remarks

The Prime Minister might stress that we entirely share the ANC's objective of the replacement of apartheid with a non-racial democratic system of government. Our efforts have been directed towards persuading the SAG that it is in their interests to release Mandela and engage in dialogue.

Obstacles to Negotiation

- The way ahead depends on the ANC. President de Klerk has already lifted the State of Emergency (except in Natal) and agreed to the recommendations of the joint SAG/ANC Working Party on political prisoners and the return of exiles. When will Mandela do the same? Mr Mandela told President de Klerk that he would not reply until mid-July, when he returns to South Africa. According to press interviews in the US,

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Mr Mandela regards agreement with the SAG on these points as settled. If so, why can he not inform de Klerk? Hope no new obstacles arising.

- Rhetoric of armed struggle is also an obstacle. The ANC have committed themselves with the SAG to "stability and a peaceful process of negotiations" (Groote Schuur minute). Continuance of rhetoric is inconsistent with this. It complicates de Klerk's problems on his right. It also incites youth in townships to violence. Not the way to encourage dialogue. Should not leave President de Klerk seeming to make all the concessions.

### Natal

- The continuing violence between supporters of ANC and Inkatha is contrary to the new spirit of co-operation within South Africa. It is important that Mr Mandela and Chief Buthelezi start a dialogue which can lay the foundations for peace. Chief Buthelezi's support among rural Zulus means that he cannot be excluded from the negotiations ahead.

### Negotiations

- President de Klerk says that 1991 would be the year of negotiations. He understands that the ANC need time to reorganise inside South Africa and have a congress due in December.

- Next important decision is who will participate in the negotiations. De Klerk has an open mind, but he will not return to the white electorate before negotiations end with a new constitution. This would be political suicide.

- Concept of an elected Constituent Assembly (one-person, one-vote on a common voters' roll) to agree the new Constitution, is clearly unworkable. The transition to majority rule will have to be negotiated with the minority government: that is the reality of power in South Africa and the text of the ANC's negotiating skill. They are not alone. They will have the support of the international community in pressing for an end to apartheid and the development of a democratic constitution.

### Constitution

- We want to see a new constitution acceptable to all South Africans. It is not for outsiders to prescribe the outcome, but we do not see how a new constitution will work if it is not based on one-person one-vote on the one hand and on the other protection for minorities. Many constitutional models have these provisions. A matter of checks and balances;

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- We do not consider ourselves to be mediators or arbitrators of South Africa's constitutional future, but we are willing to use our close contacts with all sides to help resolve misunderstandings.

### Economic Policy

- Economic policies lie at the heart of a successful political solution. Positive action will be required to rectify imbalances. Equally, the whites will have to be assured that they too have a future. It is no good simply planning to share out existing wealth; that will go nowhere. New wealth must be created. This will require economic policies to foster growth and attract investment;

- Nationalisation not the answer. Experience world-wide, especially in Africa and in Eastern Europe, shows the damage which can be wrought by excessive state intervention. ANC may want to talk to eg World Bank who have enormous experience of Africa's economic problems.

### Sanctions

- Investment cannot be turned on and off like a tap. South Africa competing with re-building economies in Eastern Europe and indeed in Africa. Continued call for sanctions will not help. (Mr Mandela thinks that once the ANC calls for the lifting of sanctions, investment will flood back in to South Africa).

- Our influence with SAG would have been destroyed if we had gone further down the sanctions road. Now that President de Klerk is doing what we asked of him, we must acknowledge that. He needs to show to his supporters that his policies are recognised.

### UK Aid

- We are stepping up our aid programme for black South Africans. We shall spend £7m this year in addition to the £4m we contribute to the European Community programme. We are concentrating on education (1000 students this year) and on community projects. This is intended not only to provide essential aid, but also as a political signal of our support for those who suffer from the apartheid system.

### Aid for the ANC (Defensive)

- The return and resettlement of exiles is primarily a matter for the South African Government. If the return is organised internationally UNHCR will be called in. If they need our help they will no doubt ask. At Dublin the European Council recognised that the resettlement of exiles in South Africa might be a task for the EC Positive Measures Programme. Any

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aid would of course have to be non-discriminatory and could not be restricted to the ANC alone.

- Political aid is another matter. Most Western governments find it difficult to give money direct to political parties. The ANC have already benefitted from our small scale scheme to give practical help on a non-discriminatory basis to black opposition groups.

*Yours,*  
*Stephen Wall*  
(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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**TUESDAY 3RD JULY 1990: MORNING:**

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7.25                    **AT HOTEL**

7.30 to 8.15                    **BLACK COMMUNITY**                    45 mins

Address: Park Lane Hotel, Piccadilly, W.1 - Ballroom

Contact: Lawson Naidoo

8.15 to 8.45                    //////////////// REST ////////////////                    30 mins

8.45 to 9.05                    **Paddy ASHDOWN Leader of the SLD and Sir David STEEL**  
**Former President of Anti-Apartheid Movement**                    20 mins

Address: Park Lane Hotel, Piccadilly, London W.1

Telephone: 071-499-6321

Contact: Beryl Baker

9.10 to 9.40                    **INTERVIEW WITH "NEWSNIGHT" BBC**                    30 mins

Address: Park Lane Hotel, Piccadilly, London W.1

Telephone: 071-499-6321

Contact: Beryl Baker

9.40 to 9.55                    //////////////// BREAK ////////////////                    15 mins

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9.55 to to 10.05    Proceed to:                    15 mins

(35)  
10.05 to 10.45                    **ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP**                    40 mins

Address: House of Commons,

Telephone: 071 219-4211 Contact: Richard Caborn

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10.50 to 11.10                    Proceed to:                    20 mins

11.15 to 14.30                    **Meeting with the Rt. Hon. DOUGLAS HURD MP,**                    3 hr.15 mins  
**Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

Address: 1 Carlton Gardens, London SW1Y 5JH

Telephone: 071 839 3411

Contact: Tim Dowse

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**TUESDAY 3RD JULY 1990 .. continued: AFTERNOON:**

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14.35 to 14.45	<b>Proceed to Hotel</b>	10 mins
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14.45 to 15.45	////////// REST //////////	1 hr
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15.50 to 16.00	<b>Proceed to:</b>	10 mins
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16.00 to 17.00	<b>AAM NATIONAL COMMITTEES</b>	1 hr
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Address: Westminster Central Hall

Telephone: 071 222-8010

Contact: Mike Terry

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17.10 to 17.25	<b>Proceed to:</b>	15 mins
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17.30 to 18.30	<b>ANC MEMBERSHIP</b>	1 hr
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Address: TUC

Telephone: 071 636 4030

Contact: Lawson Naidoo

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18.30 to 18.45	<b>Proceed to Hotel</b>	15 mins
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18.45 to 19.40	<b>BRIEFING TO EDITORS</b>	45 mins
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Address: Park Lane Hotel, Piccadilly, W. 1 - Balcony Suite

Telephone: 071 499-6321

Contact: Frene Ginwala

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**EVENING:**

19.45 to 19.55	<b>Proceed to:</b>	10 mins
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20.00 to 22.00	<b>Business Dinner hosted by H.E. CHIEF EMEKA ANYAOKU</b>	2 hrs
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Address: Commonwealth House, 18 Northumberland Avenue, WC2

Telephone: 071-839-3411

Contact: Mary Mackie

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22.15	<b>PROCEED TO HOTEL FOR THE NIGHT</b>	15 mins
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WEDNESDAY 4TH JULY 1990: MORNING:

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7.15 AT HOTEL

7.30 to 7.45	Lemkin Video Promotion "Viva Mandela" Canon Collins Trust	15 mins
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7.45 to 8.00	Dr Vassos Lyssarides, President of EDEK and Mr Charilaos Costa.	15 mins
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8.00 to 8.15	Religious TV "Visions" Programme interview	15 mins
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8.15 to 8.45	///////////////// BREAK ///////////////////	30 mins
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8.45 to 9.15	Proceed to:	30 mins
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9.15 to 9.20	Arrive at CBI - Welcomed by SIR BRIAN CORBY CBI President	5 mins
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Address: Centre Point, Tottenham Court Road Junction, Downstairs

Telephone: 071 497-2596

Contact: Mendi Msimang

9.20 to 9.40	Address by MR NELSON MANDELA	20 mins
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9.40 to 10.00	Question and Answer Session	20 mins
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10.00 to 10.15	///////////////// BREAK ///////////////////	15 mins
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10.15 to 10.45	Private Meeting with CBI President and 6 to 8 Senior Representatives of companies	30 mins
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10.45 to 11.35	///////////////// REST /////////////////// ? J CBI	50 mins
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11.35 to 11.45	Proceed to:	10 mins
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11.55 to 14.00	PRIME MINISTER - Rt.Hon. MARGARET THATCHER	2.hr.5.mins
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Address: 10 Downing Street, London SW1

Telephone: 071 930-4433

Contact: Peter Bean (Press Officer) ask for Mendi Msimang

**WEDNESDAY 4TH JULY 1990 .. continued: AFTERNOON:**

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14.00 to 14.10	Proceed to Hotel	10 mins
14.10 to 14.40	//////////////////// REST //////////////////////	30 mins

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14.45 to 14.55	Proceed to:	5 mins
15.00 to 15.20	<b>Rt. Hon. NEIL KINNOCK M.P.</b>	20 mins
	Address: House of Commons, Shadow Cabinet Room	
	Telephone: 071 219-4211	
	Contact: Richard Caborn	

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15.30 to 15.45	Proceed to:	15 mins
15.45 to 17.00	<b>PRESS CONFERENCE</b>	1.hr.15.mins
	Address: Royal Commonwealth Society, Northumberland Avenue, WC1	
	Telephone: 071 930 6733	
	Contact: Frene Ginwala	

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17.00 to 17.10	Proceed to Hotel	10 mins
17.10 to 17.35	//////////////////// FRESHEN UP //////////////////////	25 mins

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17.40	<b>LEAVE HOTEL FOR AIRPORT</b>	50 mins
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18.30	<b>VIP LOUNGE AIRPORT</b>	45 mins
19.15	<b>DEPARTURE</b>	

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