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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 162

OF 180900Z APRIL 91

INFO IMMEDIATE LUXEMBOURG (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
INFO PRIORITY HARARE, LUSAKA, LAGOS, NAIROBI, DAR ES SALAAM
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, JOHANNESBURG, CANBERRA
INFO IMMEDIATE OTTAWA, WELLINGTON, EC POSTS

SOUTH AFRICA: MEETING WITH MANDELA

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION WITH MANDELA OF THE ANC'S 'ULTIMATUM' TO THE GOVERNMENT. I MADE CLEAR THAT DE KLERK WOULD NOT DISMISS THE TWO MINISTERS AND THE ANC WOULD PUT THEMSELVES IN THE WRONG IF THEY SOUGHT TO SUSPEND NEGOTIATIONS. MANDELA CONVINCED THAT RIGHT WING ELEMENTS ARE BEHIND SOME OF THE VIOLENCE. INSISTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST DO MORE TO STOP IT. ON THE ANC DEMAND FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, I SAID THAT WE THOUGHT THE WAY FORWARD WAS TO REACH AGREEMENT FIRST ON CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES. ON SPORT, THE ANC APPEAR TO FAVOUR SELECTIVE RELAXATION OF THE BOYCOTT, AS SPORTS UNITY IN INDIVIDUAL SPORTS IS ACHIEVED.

DETAIL

2. I HAD LUNCH WITH MANDELA IN JOHANNESBURG YESTERDAY. HE HAD SPENT THE MORNING ATTENDING THE TRIAL OF HIS WIFE.

BLACK UNITY

3. I ASKED HIM ABOUT THE MEETING WITH THE PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS IN HARARE. MANDELA SAID HE GOT ON WELL PERSONALLY WITH MAKWETU. BUT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES ON VARIOUS ISSUES (INTER ALIA THE PAC DO NOT SUPPORT THE ANC'S DEMAND FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT). MANDELA AGREED THAT THE PAC STANCE ON NEGOTIATIONS WAS UNREALISTIC. THEY PRETENDED NOT TO BE IN CONTACT WITH THE GOVERNMENT BUT WERE IN FACT INDIRECTLY DISCUSSING THINGS WITH THEM. THEY WERE AGREED ON THE DEMAND FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. THE TWO PARTIES HAD AGREED TO ATTEND A 'PATRIOTIC CONGRESS' IN SOUTH AFRICA IN AUGUST. I ASKED IF INKATHA WOULD BE INVITED TO THAT. MANDELA SAID THAT IT WOULD. I SAID THAT, FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF THEIR PRESIDENT (MOSALA) TO BRITAIN, I THOUGHT THAT AZAPO SCARCELY COUNTED ANY MORE.

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MANDELA AGREED.

VIOLENCE

4. MANDELA SAID THAT INKATHA WERE CAUSING A LOT OF PROBLEMS FOR THE ANC. INKATHA SUPPORTERS IN THE HOSTELS AND THE TOWNSHIPS IN THE TRANSVAAL WERE ACTING VERY AGGRESSIVELY. ANC SUPPORTERS HAD BEEN DRIVEN OUT OF THE ZONKISIZWE SQUATTER CAMP. THE POLICE WERE CONNIVING AT ALL THIS. HE WAS CONSTANTLY BEING CALLED AT HOME AT NIGHT BY ANC SUPPORTERS REPORTING ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THEM AND THE POLICE OFTEN DID NOT REACT. HE HAD JUST SEEN A MAN WHO HAD BEEN SHOT BY THE POLICE QUITE UNJUSTIFIABLY.

5. I SAID THAT INKATHA SUPPORTERS ESPECIALLY IN THE HOSTELS HAD BEEN ACTING AGGRESSIVELY, BUT THE VIOLENCE WAS COMING FROM ALL SIDES AND THE POLICE WERE FINDING IT VERY DIFFICULT TO COPE. WHEN I SAW BUTHELEZI ON 3 APRIL HE HAD BEEN PLEASED BY HIS MEETING WITH MANDELA. BUT THAT HAD BEEN FOLLOWED BY THE ATTACK ON INKATHA IN THE ANC 'ULTIMATUM' TO THE GOVERNMENT. BUTHELEZI HAD BEEN UNDERSTANDABLY ANNOYED AND I WAS GLAD THAT MANDELA HAD TELEPHONED HIM TO TRY TO RESTORE RELATIONS WITH HIM. MANDELA SAID THAT BUTHELEZI WAS VERY AUTHORITARIAN. HIS COLLEAGUES WERE AFRAID OF HIM AND DID NOT STAND UP TO HIM. I SAID THAT THE PEACE TALKS WITH INKATHA MUST CONTINUE. I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO END ALL THE VIOLENCE. BUT THE FACT THAT THEIR LEADERS WERE MEETING AND THE ORGANISATIONS WERE IN CONTACT DID HELP TO CONTAIN IT. MANDELA SAID THAT THE ANC/INKATHA TALKS WOULD CONTINUE BUT WAS EVASIVE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINT VISITS BY HIM AND BUTHELEZI TO THE VIOLENCE-AFFECTED AREAS.

6. WE THEN DISCUSSED THE ANC'S 'ULTIMATUM' TO THE GOVERNMENT. I SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN A MISTAKE TO CALL ON DE KLERK TO DISMISS TWO OF HIS MINISTERS (MALAN AND VLOK) BY A GIVEN DEADLINE. NO GOVERNMENT COULD ACCEPT BEING DICTATED TO IN THAT WAY. VLOK AND MALAN WERE DIFFERENT ANYWAY. I ADDED THAT AT HIS BRIEFING THE OTHER EC REPRESENTATIVES HAD BEEN TOO POLITE TO TELL HIM THIS, BUT NO WESTERN GOVERNMENT WOULD SUPPORT THE IDEA OF BREAKING OFF NEGOTIATIONS.

7. MANDELA SAID THAT HE AND ALL HIS COLLEAGUES WERE ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT MUCH OF THE VIOLENCE WAS BEING ENCOURAGED BY RIGHT WING ELEMENTS IN THE POLICE. HE HAD ACCEPTED OUR ADVICE AND HAD SAID PUBLICLY THAT FACTION FIGHTING ALSO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MANY OF THE DEATHS. BUT THE ANC BELIEVED THAT WEAPONS WERE BEING DISTRIBUTED TO SOME OF THOSE GROUPS TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO ATTACK THE ANC 'COMRADES'.

8. I SAID THAT WE ACCEPTED THAT THERE COULD BE SOME RIGHT WING INVOLVEMENT. ONE AWB MEMBERS HAD JUST BEEN SENTENCED TO DEATH FOR SHOOTING BLACK PEOPLE IN A BUS NEAR DURBAN. THERE MIGHT BE INCIDENTS IN WHICH ARMS WERE BEING GIVEN TO ANTI-ANC GROUPS. BUT IT WAS QUITE WRONG TO BELIEVE OR TO SUGGEST PUBLICLY THAT DE KLERK HAD ANY INTEREST IN ENCOURAGING THE VIOLENCE. ON THE CONTRARY, IT WAS HAVING THE WORST POSSIBLE EFFECT AMONG HIS OWN SUPPORTERS.

9. MANDELA ACKNOWLEDGED THIS AND THAT THE SAME WENT FOR DE KLERK'S CLOSEST MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES (VILJOEN, BAREND DU PLESSIS ETC). BUT MANDELA REMAINED ADAMANT THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST DO SOMETHING TO STOP THE VIOLENCE. I SAID THAT WE HAD ENCOURAGED THE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE THEIR STATEMENT OFFERING A MULTI-PARTY CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS THE VIOLENCE. WE DID NOT REGARD THAT AS JUST A PROPAGANDA PLOY. VLOK ALSO HAD ANNOUNCED ACTION TO CURTAIL THE CARRYING OF ''TRADITIONAL'' WEAPONS. DE KLERK KEPT TELLING US THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST ANY MISCONDUCT BY THE SECURITY FORCES IF THE ANC COULD PRODUCE HARD EVIDENCE. MANDELA SAID THAT IT OFTEN WAS DIFFICULT TO DO THIS.

10. I ASKED IF MANDELA WAS PREPARED TO SEE DE KLERK TO DISCUSS THE ANC MEMORANDUM IN DETAIL WITH HIM. MANDELA SAID THAT DE KLERK HAD OFFERED A DISCUSSION THROUGH THE JUSTICE MINISTER, COETSEE, BUT HAD NOT DONE SO DIRECTLY. BUT HE HAD RAISED ALL THESE ISSUES IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH DE KLERK, WHO SIMPLY REFERRED THEM TO VLOK, AND NOTHING THEN HAPPENED. I SAID THAT WE HOPED THAT ON THEIR RETURN FROM THEIR OVERSEAS VISITS, DE KLERK AND MANDELA WOULD MEET AND GO THROUGH ALL THE ISSUES IN DETAIL. MANDELA HEDGED ON THIS. I HOPED ALSO THAT THE ANC WOULD NOT MAKE THE DISMISSAL OF THE TWO MINISTERS A PRE-CONDITION FOR CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS, THEY WERE NOT GOING TO ACHIEVE THAT. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, MANDELA GAVE SOME GROUND, SAYING THAT THE ANC VIEW ON THAT WOULD DEPEND ON THE TOTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE.

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

11. I SAID THAT IF PROGRESS COULD BE MADE TOWARDS AGREEMENT ON A NEW CONSTITUTION BASED ON UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE, ALL THE TRANSITIONAL PROBLEMS WOULD BECOME EASIER TO MANAGE. THAT WAS WHY WE HAD ENCOURAGED THE ANC TO PUT FORWARD THEIR PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES, AS THEY HAD NOW DONE. THE GOVERNMENT HAD PUBLISHED BROAD PRINCIPLES ON 1 FEBRUARY AND THERE WAS A DEGREE OF CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THEM. THE TWO SIDES WERE AGREED INTER ALIA ON A MULTI-PARTY

DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, JUSTICIABLE BILL OF RIGHTS, BI-CAMERAL PARLIAMENT AND SOME ELEMENT OF REGIONALISM. THE MAIN ARGUMENT WAS LIKELY TO TURN ON THE COMPOSITION AND POWERS OF THE UPPER HOUSE. WE HAD TOLD THE GOVERNMENT THAT WE WOULD NOT SUPPORT ANY RACIALLY-BASED VETO AND I ALSO HAD SOUGHT TO DISSUADE THEM FROM PROPOSING MINORITY REPRESENTATION ON A RACIAL BASIS. THEY HAD MOVED AWAY FROM THAT CONCEPT. MANDELA ACKNOWLEDGED THE DEGREE OF CONVERGENCE ON CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES.

12. I SAID THAT, APART FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTION (THAT A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WOULD MEAN MAJORITY RULE BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE) IT WOULD TAKE A YEAR OR EIGHTEEN MONTHS TO ORGANISE ELECTIONS IN WHICH ALL SOUTH AFRICANS INCLUDING THOSE IN THE HOMELANDS, COULD PARTICIPATE. THE VOTING ARRANGEMENTS (PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, CONSTITUENCY OR SOME MIX OF THE TWO) WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED. DE KLERK WOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION MUST BE CHANGED CONSTITUTIONALLY IE THAT THE PRESENT PARLIAMENT MUST VOTE ITSELF OUT OF POWER, AND IT COULD ONLY DO THAT WHEN THERE WAS AGREEMENT AT ANY RATE ON THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION. THAT CONSTITUTION MIGHT THEN FINALLY BE ENACTED BY THE NEW PARLIAMENT. IN OTHER WORDS, A 'CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY' MIGHT BE POSSIBLE AT A LATER STAGE IN THE PROCESS, BUT CERTAINLY NOT AT THE BEGINNING. THIS WAS WHY WE KEPT URGING THE ANC AND THE GOVERNMENT TO GET INTO MULTI-PARTY DISCUSSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES. THAT IDEA WAS EMBODIED IN THE HARARE DECLARATION AND IN THE STATEMENT MANDELA HIMSELF HAD MADE IN JANUARY.

13. MANDELA SEEMED INTERESTED IN THIS. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE FRONT LINE STATES CONTINUED TO SUPPORT IT PUBLICLY, THEY WERE NOT ALL KEEN ON THE IDEA OF A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. IN HARARE, MUGABE HAD SUGGESTED THAT PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE BY OTHER MEANS. I SAID THAT NO DOUBT REFLECTED MUGABE'S OWN EXPERIENCE AT LANCASTER HOUSE.

SPORT AND SANCTIONS

14. MANDELA DID NOT RAISE THAT LIFTING OF THE EC BAN ON IRON AND STEEL. I SAID THAT WHEN HE SAW THE PRIME MINISTER, MR MAJOR WOULD WANT TO ASK AMONG OTHER THINGS ABOUT THE ANC'S ATTITUDE ON THE QUESTION OF SPORT. WE WANTED TO SEE THE LIFTING OF THE SPORTS BOYCOTT IN CASES WHERE SPORTS UNITY HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AND GENUINELY NON-RACIAL STRUCTURES HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. WE DID NOT WANT THIS TO APPEAR AS A DEFEAT FOR THE ANC. IN FACT THEY COULD CLAIM A GOOD DEAL OF THE CREDIT AS THE ANC LEADER RESPONSIBLE FOR SPORT, STEVE TSHWETE, HAD PLAYED A LEADING ROLE IN PROMOTING UNITY IN CRICKET AND RUGBY.

MANDELA SAID THAT HE SUPPORTED THE POSITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE ON THE RE-ADMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA TO INTERNATIONAL SPORT. TSHWETE CONSIDERED THAT SELECTIVE LIFTING OF THE SPORTS BOYCOTT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE AS UNITY WAS ACHIEVED. MBEKI POINTED OUT THAT SOCCER WAS LIKELY TO BE THE FIRST IN THE QUEUE AND CONTACTS WERE NOW BEING MADE WITH THE ALL-AFRICAN GOVERNING BODY FOR SOCCER. I SAID THAT SPORT WAS IMPORTANT TO ORDINARY PEOPLE. MANDELA FROM TIME TO TIME SAID THAT 'NOTHING HAD CHANGED' IN THE TOWNSHIPS AND IT WAS TRUE THAT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS WERE CONTINUING TO DETERIORATE. THE ENDING OF THE SPORTS BOYCOTT IN SOCCER WOULD BE POPULAR WITH BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS. RENEWED INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN CRICKET AND RUGBY WOULD HELP DE KLERK VIS-A-VIS THE RIGHT WING.

MRS THATCHER

15. THERE WAS A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF MRS THATCHER'S VISIT. MANDELA SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE HER WHILE SHE IS HERE (BUT THIS SHOULD BE PROTECTED AS THAT WILL NOT BE THE VIEW OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE ANC). HE ASKED IF SHE WAS GOING TO SEE DR TREURNICHT. PRESSURE NEEDED TO BE PUT ON THE RIGHT WING PARTIES TO JOIN IN NEGOTIATIONS.

16. MANDELA CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE HELP WE HAD PROVIDED THROUGH THE POLITICAL AID FUND FOR EQUIPMENT FOR THE ANC NEGOTIATING TEAM AND FOR OTHER ASSISTANCE WE HAD GIVEN. HE LOOKED FORWARD TO HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 24 APRIL.

RENWICK

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