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FM WASHINGTON 062220Z OCT 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3270 OF 6 OCTOBER 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS,  
UKDIS GENEVA AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

SHULTZ/GROMYKO MEETINGS.

1. BURT (ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPE) BRIEFED NATO MISSIONS  
HERE THIS MORNING ON THE SHULTZ/GROMYKO MEETINGS IN NEW YORK.

2. BURT SAID THAT SHULTZ HAD ALREADY GIVEN SOME ACCOUNT OF HIS  
FIRST MEETING WITH GROMYKO ON 28 SEPTEMBER TO NATO FOREIGN  
MINISTERS AT LA SAPINIERE. THE TWO MEETINGS, TAKEN TOGETHER,  
HAD LASTED OVER SEVEN HOURS. AS ANTICIPATED, THERE HAD BEEN  
NO BREAK-THROUGHS, BUT A THOROUGH REVIEW OF ALL THE ITEMS ON  
THE US/SOVIET AGENDA. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS SERIOUS AND BUSINESSLIKE  
AND NOT RHETORICAL. GROMYKO HAD STUCK CLOSELY TO KNOWN SOVIET  
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POSITIONS. HE HAD BEGUN WITH AN EXPOSITION OF SUPPOSED SOVIET DOUBTS ABOUT THE WILLINGNESS OF THE U S TO BUILD ON THE ADVANCES OF THE 1970S. SHULTZ HAD SAID THAT THE PROBLEM WAS THAT SOVIET ACTIONS HAD VIOLATED THE SPIRIT OF THOSE AGREEMENTS EG. THE HELSINKI ACT. THE U S THEME HAD BEEN THAT THE SOVIET UNION FACED A CHOICE AS TO HOW THEY WISHED TO SEE US/SOVIET RELATIONS DEVELOP. THE U S WAS PREPARED FOR BETTER RELATIONS IF SOVIET CONDUCT WAS MODERATED: OR FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THINGS IF IT WAS NOT.

3. SHULTZ BEGAN BY EMPHASISING THAT SOVIET PERFORMANCE OVER HUMAN RIGHTS WAS A MATTER OF CONCERN TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: AND THAT ANY IMPROVEMENT IN THIS AREA WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON RELATIONS. THOSE RELATIONS WERE BEING AFFECTED BY THE SOVIET ARMS BUILD-UP, AND BY SOVIET BEHAVIOUR IN POLAND, AFGHANISTAN AND KAMPUCHEA. ON ARMS CONTROL, SHULTZ HAD STRESSED THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE U S APPROACH IN START AND INF. GROMYKO HAD AGREED THAT BOTH NEGOTIATIONS WERE PROCEEDING IN A BUSINESSLIKE MANNER. HE HAD MADE A CRITIQUE ON STANDARD LINES OF THE U S POSITIONS IN THEM. GROMYKO CLEARLY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO CONCENTRATE ON ARMS CONTROL, AND TO LIMIT DISCUSSION ON REGIONAL ISSUES, AND, OF COURSE, HUMAN RIGHTS. SHULTZ EMPHASISED THAT SOVIET GLOBAL CONDUCT WAS BOUND TO AFFECT U S PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET GOOD FAITH. THE INCREASED EMPHASIS WHICH WAS BEING PLACED BY THE U S ON THE VERIFICATION OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WAS A FUNCTION OF THE SOVIET PERFORMANCE IN RELATION TO THE HELSENKI FINAL ACT AND THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.

4. IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT THE SECOND MEETING ON 4 SEPTEMBER SHOULD FOCUS ON AREAS IN WHICH THE TWO SIDES MIGHT HOPE TO MAKE SOME PROGRESS. GROMYKO HAD LED OFF WITH A LONG STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST, ARGUING THAT AS A MAJOR POWER CLOSE TO THE REGION THE SOVIET UNION HAD TO BE INCLUDED IN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. HE DID NOT MAKE MUCH REFERENCE TO THE RECENT SOVIET SIX-POINT PLAN. HE EMPHASISED THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO A PALESTINIAN STATE, BUT ALSO SOVIET SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. ON THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, SHULTZ EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GULF TO THE U S. IF THE CONFLICT SHOULD SPREAD IN A WAY AS TO ENDANGER U S FRIENDS IN THE AREA, THIS WOULD BE A CAUSE OF GREAT CONCERN. GROMYKO SAID THAT IT WAS AN 'ABSURD' WAR THAT SHOULD BE ENDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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5. ON HUMAN RIGHTS CASES, GROMYKO CLAIMED THAT EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION HAD DECLINED BECAUSE US/SOVIET RELATIONS HAD DETERIORATED. ON THESE MATTERS, GROMYKO EMPHASISED, THE LAST WORD BELONGED TO THE STATE. ON THESE MATTERS IN THE WEST, SHULTZ RETORTED, THE LAST WORD BELONGED TO THE INDIVIDUAL.

6. ON AFGHANISTAN, GROMYKO ARGUED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS CAUSED BY OUTSIDE INTERVENTION. THE SOVIET UNION FAVOURED THE CURRENT TALKS UNDER THE U S SECRETARY-GENERAL'S AUSPICES. SHULTZ ALSO WELCOMED THE U N EFFORTS, BUT EMPHASISED THAT THE KEY PROBLEM REMAINED THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET FORCES.

7. SHULTZ EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT INCREASED SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS TO CUBA. GROMYKO SAID THAT NEITHER CUBA NOR NICARAGUA CONSTITUTED A THREAT TO THE U S: THEREFORE THE U S SHOULD NOT WORRY ABOUT THEM. SHULTZ SAID THAT THEY DID CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO OTHER STATES IN THE REGION.

8. ON NAMIBIA, SHULTZ EXPLAINED U S EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT AND HOW CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WAS RELATED TO THIS. IN THIS AREA, HE SUGGESTED, THERE WAS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION. GROMYKO SAID THAT THE CUBANS WOULD LEAVE ANGOLA ONLY AFTER THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD LEFT NAMIBIA. THE KEY DOCUMENT WAS THE CUBAN-ANGOLAN STATEMENT RELEASED LAST JANUARY. THERE WOULD ALSO NEED TO BE ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE ANGOLAN SECURITY. BUT THE SOVIET UNION FOR ITS PART WOULD LIKE TO SEE THIS PROBLEM RESOLVED.

9. ON ANOTHER SUBJECT WHICH OFFERED SOME POSSIBILITY FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION, SHULTZ RAISED NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U S HAD A COMMON INTEREST IN SEEKING TO PREVENT THIS. GROMYKO AGREED, EXPRESSING STRONG SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (COMMENT: THERE COULD BE SOME FOLLOW UP WITH THE RUSSIANS ON THIS SUBJECT: WE SHALL BE REPORTING SEPARATELY ON THIS).

10. THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE REAGAN/BREZHNEV SUMMIT, DID NOT COME UP IN EITHER MEETING. IT WAS AGREED THAT ANY FURTHER MINISTERIAL MEETING MIGHT TAKE PLACE BEFORE NEXT YEAR'S GENERAL ASSEMBLY (NO FIRM DATE AT THIS STAGE HAD BEEN SET FOR THIS).

11. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, BURT SAID THAT THE MEETINGS HAD BEEN DIFFERENT IN CHARACTER TO THOSE BETWEEN GROMYKO AND HAIG. OFFICIALS HAD BEEN PRESENT VIRTUALLY THROUGHOUT (EAGLEBURGER,



11. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, BURT SAID THAT THE MEETINGS HAD BEEN DIFFERENT IN CHARACTER TO THOSE BETWEEN GROMYKO AND HAIG. OFFICIALS HAD BEEN PRESENT VIRTUALLY THROUGHOUT (EAGLEBURGER, BURT AND THE U S AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW ON THE U S SIDE: DOBRYNIN, KORNIYENKO AND SUKHODREV ON THE SOVIET SIDE). POLAND HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOVIET PERFORMANCE IN RELATION TO THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. GROMYKO HAD NOT RAISED SANCTIONS OR 'ECONOMIC WARFARE'. THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF THE PIPELINE. THE U S SIDE HAD PLACED CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC CASES, INCLUDING SOME CONCERNING PERSONS THE AMERICANS REGARDED AS U S CITIZENS WISHING TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION, WOULD BE PURSUED PRIVATELY WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS. THE RUSSIANS CLEARLY WERE SMARTING AT THEIR EXCLUSION FROM THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SHULTZ HAD MADE CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT RULE OUT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT A CONFERENCE WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THE BEST PROSPECT OF PROGRESS LAY IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS AND WITHIN THE BROAD CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK.

12. GROMYKO CLEARLY WAS CONCERNED TO PRESERVE THE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS FROM STRAINS IN OTHER AREAS. SHULTZ SAID THAT HE ATTACHED EQUAL IMPORTANCE TO THESE. THE U S ATTITUDE IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS, HOWEVER, COULD NOT BE DIVORCED FROM THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP AND SOVIET USE OF ITS MILITARY POWER. ON INF, GROMYKO HAD ARGUED THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES BECAUSE WE WERE ASKING THE SOVIET UNION TO DISMANTLE SYSTEMS ALREADY DEPLOYED IN RETURN FOR FOREGOING THE DEPLOYMENT WHICH HAD NOT YET TAKEN PLACE. SHULTZ HAD STRESSED THE ALLIANCE'S READINESS TO FOREGO THE DEPLOYMENT IF THE SOVIET UNION AGREED TO ELIMINATE COMPLETELY THIS CATEGORY OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE WEAPONS. THERE HAD BEEN NO DISPOSITION TO ENTER INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF EITHER THE START OR THE INF NEGOTIATIONS.

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