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US/SOVIET RELATIONS

1. AT MEETING ON 16 NOVEMBER WITH MY US, FRENCH AND FRG COLLEAGUES TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON THE BILATERALS WHICH TOOK PLACE FOLLOWING BREZHNEV'S FUNERAL, HARTMAN GAVE US THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF WHAT TOOK PLACE WHEN VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH AND MR SCHULTZ SAW ANDROPOV. GROMYKO, ALEXSANDROV-AGENTOV OF THE PARTY SECRETARIAT AND SUKHODRIEV (INTERPRETER) WERE ALSO PRESENT ON THE SOVIET SIDE.

2. ANDROPOV OPENED THE MEETING BY EXPRESSING, IN WARM TERMS, THE APPRECIATION WHICH HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES FELT AT THE US GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO SEND A HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATION TO THE FUNERAL AND ALSO FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN'S GESTURE IN SIGNING THE BOOK OF CONDOLENCES AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. THIS, HARTMAN OBSERVED, WAS THE ONLY OCCASION THROUGHOUT THE MEETING WHEN HE REFERRED TO 'HIS COLLEAGUES'. ANDROPOV WENT ON TO STRESS, IN TERMS SIMILAR TO THOSE USED BY GROMYKO WITH YOU, THE ELEMENT OF CONTINUITY IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S EXTERNAL POLICIES. HE WISHED HOWEVER TO TAKE THE OCCASION TO CONVEY HIS FEELING AND THAT OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE THAT, ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS WISHED FOR A RELATIONSHIP WITH UNITED STATES WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR COOPERATION AND PROGRESS IN THE PROBLEMS WHICH DIVIDED THEM, THE ACTUAL SITUATION WAS FRAUGHT WITH COMPLEXITY AND DIFFICULTIES. THESE DIFFICULTIES HAD ARISEN BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAD 'SQUANDERED' ITS ASSETS' BY NOT FOLLOWING UP THE AGREEMENTS PREVIOUSLY ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. HE WISHED THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION TO KNOW THAT SOVIET POLICY WAS BASED UPON THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY, NON-INTERFERENCE AND COOPERATION. THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAINED ITS STRENGTH BUT WANTED TO SEEK A BETTER RELATIONSHIP. THEY HAD THEIR OWN PERSPECTIVES AND THE UNITED STATES HAD ITS VIEW OF THE WORLD. BUT IF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CONTINUED ON THEIR PRESENT COURSE THE RESULT COULD ONLY BE CATASTROPHE. IN AN OBLIQUE REFERENCE TO THE GENEVA TALKS, ANDROPOV ADDED THAT, IF BOTH SIDES PRESENTED PROPOSALS WHICH DIFFERED SO WIDELY, NO AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE. IT WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY THAT BOTH SHOULD SEEK THE MEANS FOR A BETTER RELATIONSHIP. TURNING TO GROMYKO, HE OBSERVED THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS WERE USED TO EXCHANGING HARSH WORDS BUT HE AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHOULD BE MEN OF PEACE. THERE WAS MUCH FOR THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO DO. HARTMAN COMMENTED THAT, ALTHOUGH A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS NOT MENTIONED THROUGHOUT THE CALL, THERE WAS A HINT AT THIS POINT THAT A SUMMIT WOULD BE DESIRABLE.

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/3. IN REPLY

3. IN REPLY, BUSH ALSO STRESSED THE INTEREST OF THE US GOVERNMENT IN PEACE AND IN REACHING AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE US GOVERNMENT WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRESENT STATE OF THE RELATIONSHIP. WITHOUT ELABORATING, HE IDENTIFIED AS THE PRINCIPAL AREAS OF CONCERN: (A) THE STRATEGIC BALANCE AND THE BUILD-UP OF ARMAMENTS: (B) POLAND: (C) AFGHANISTAN: (D) HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NEED FOR AGREED INTERNATIONAL NORMS OF CIVILISED BEHAVIOUR. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S POLICY WAS TO MAINTAIN MILITARY STRENGTH BUT NOT TO GET INTO THE ARMS RACE. IT WAS NECESSARY FOR BOTH SIDES TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS WHICH WOULD RESULT IN REAL REDUCTIONS AND THE US ADMINISTRATION SOUGHT WIDER EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BUT THE ISSUES HE HAD LISTED HAD PREVENTED THIS.

4. IN RESPONSE ANDROPOV HAD AGAIN SAID 'YOU HAVE YOUR VIEWS, WE HAVE OURS'. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS OUTSTANDING ISSUES, IF WE DO NOT WE SHALL END UP IN MORE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO REACH AGREEMENT.

5. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS HARTMAN SAID THAT NO SPECIFIC AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS, NOTHING WAS SAID ON AFGHANISTAN.

6. ANDROPOV WAS VERY DIRECT IN MANNER. HE SPOKE WITHOUT FRILLS, THOUGHTFULLY AND IN A CULTIVATED STYLE. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS CORDIAL. HE SPOKE THROUGHOUT IN RUSSIAN BUT INDICATED AT SOME POINTS THAT HE UNDERSTOOD ENGLISH. HE HAD A PREPARED TEXT BUT FREQUENTLY AD-LIBBED. HE APPEARED TO HAVE A FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP WITH GROMYKO WHO OCCASIONALLY INTERVENED TO BRIEF HIM.

7. SEE ALSO M I F T

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