

Prime Minister

PS/10. DOWNING STREET.

GRS 550
CONFIDENTIAL
FM MADRID 071210Z APRIL 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 221 OF 7 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR GIBRALTAR (PERSONAL)

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MIPT: TALK WITH SPANISH PRIME MINISTER ON GIBRALTAR

1. THIS MEASURED RESPONSE BY FELIPE GONZALEZ WAS IN MARKED CONTRAST WITH THE NIT-PICKING APPROACH ADOPTED IN LONDON BY MORAN. IT SHOWED THE IMMENSE DIFFERENCE IN CALIBRE BETWEEN THE TWO MEN. I RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION THAT GONZALEZ HAD BEEN ANTICIPATING MY APPROACH, HAVING PRESUMABLY BEEN BRIEFED BY THE KING (MY TELEGRAM NO 205). IT WAS INTERESTING THAT HE RECEIVED ME ENTIRELY ALONE. HE ALSO ACCEPTED WITH SATISFACTION MY SPEAKING NOTES, WHICH HAD BEEN MADE SELF-EXPLANATORY AND ACCOMPANIED WITH THE RELEVANT SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS. THIS SHOULD ENABLE THE PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL STAFF, WITH WHOM WE HAVE GOOD LINKS AT A LOWER LEVEL, TO ANALYSE THE SITUATION DISPASSIONATELY WITHOUT HAVING TO ACCEPT EVERYTHING FED TO THEM BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER. WE SHALL HOPE TO LEARN MORE IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS THROUGH THESE SOURCES ABOUT THE LINE GONZALEZ ACTUALLY TAKES WITH MORAN.

2. THE SITUATION IS THUS THAT THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT ARE NOW COMMITTED TO RECONSIDERING THE POSITION ADOPTED IN LONDON BY MORAN, THOUGH OF COURSE WITHOUT ANY COMMITMENT THAT THIS POSITION WILL NECESSARILY BE CHANGED. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHICH STAND-POINT WILL PREVAIL: THE WIDER VIEW WE HAVE PUT TO GONZALEZ, WITH WHICH HE APPEARED TO SYMPATHISE, OR THE LEGALISTIC ATTITUDE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS EXPERTS. I AM THUS IN NO POSITION AT THE MOMENT TO GIVE YOU FIRM CLARIFICATION OF THE SPANISH ATTITUDE, REQUESTED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. ON BALANCE I FEAR THAT THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST EARLY IMPLEMENTATION WILL STILL LOOM LARGE, PARTICULARLY BEFORE THE IMPORTANT MUNICIPAL AND AUTONOMY ELECTIONS ON 8 MAY. GONZALEZ'S IMPLIED PLEA FOR TIME FOR CONSIDERATION COULD HAVE BEEN A HINT ABOUT THAT TIMING. FROM A NARROW STAND-POINT, THE PRESENT SITUATION ON THE FRONTIER SUITS SPAIN WELL: AND THE LATTER CAN HOPE FOR NO EARLY RESULTS FROM NEGOTIATIONS WITH BRITAIN TO SATISFY PUBLIC OPINION HERE. NEVERTHELESS, BOTH THE KING AND PRIME MINISTER HAVE BEEN QUICK TO HOIST IN OUR ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE NEED FOR A WIDER PERSPECTIVE.

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3. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND WITH ALL DUE RESERVE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS, I RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD DO AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE TO ROCK THE BOAT UNTIL WE KNOW THE OUTCOME OF THE PROMISED RECONSIDERATION BY THE SPANISH PRIME MINISTER. THE LATTER'S CAUTIOUS AND NOT UNPROMISING RESPONSE INTRODUCES A NEW FACTOR INTO THE SITUATION. AFTER ALL, HE MIGHT JUST HAVE RE-AFFIRMED THE LINE OF HIS OWN FOREIGN MINISTER. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT NOW FOR THE TIME BEING TO DO AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE TO STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF MORAN IN JUSTIFYING TO HIS PRIME MINISTER THE NEGATIVE ATTITUDE HE ADOPTED IN LONDON.

4. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT:

(A) THIS EMBASSY SHOULD BE GIVEN EARLY AUTHORITY TO INFORM THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTRY IN ADVANCE, PERHAPS AT A COMPARATIVELY JUNIOR LEVEL, OF THE FLEET VISIT TO GIBRALTAR NEXT WEEK WHICH WILL INCLUDE HMS INVINCIBLE WITH PRINCE ANDREW:

(B) ANY MEASURES WHICH MAY HAVE TO BE TAKEN TO DEFEND THE GIBRALTAR ECONOMY (MY TELEGRAM NO 219) SHOULD BE DEFERRED, IF POSSIBLE, TO SEE WHAT IMPACT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO GONZALEZ HAS ACTUALLY MADE ON THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT. IN ANY CASE, BEFORE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MEASURES SHOULD THEY STILL PROVE NECESSARY, IT WOULD BE WISE TO EXPLAIN THEM IN ADVANCE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HERE.

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GIBRALTAR

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GRS 670
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FM MADRID 071147Z APRIL 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 220 OF 7 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR GIBRALTAR(PERSONAL)

YOUR TELNO 103: GIBRALTAR.

1. THE SPANISH PRIME MINISTER RECEIVED ME ALONE THIS MORNING.
I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED. MY MAIN POINTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) RETURN MESSAGE OF GOOD WILL FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

(B) BOTH FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY LAST
DECEMBER THEIR INTENTION TO IMPLEMENT THE LISBON AGREEMENT
BY THE SPRING OF THIS YEAR.

(C) SUBSEQUENTLY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD WELCOMED THE
SPANISH DECISION TO REMOVE THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE PASSAGE
OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF PEDESTRIANS. BUT THIS WAS NO
SUBSTITUTE FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LISBON AGREEMENT.

(D) THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOU HAD THEREFORE LEARNED
RECENTLY WITH SURPRISE AND CONCERN DURING SR MORAN'S VISIT
TO LONDON THAT THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT REQUIRED FURTHER CLAR-
IFICATION BEFORE THE LISBON AGREEMENT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED.
IN OUR VIEW NO SUCH CLARIFICATION WAS NEEDED.

(E) YOU HAD STATED PUBLICLY THAT, IF THE SPANISH SIDE
WISHED TO RAISE THE MATTER OF SOVEREIGNTY, IT WAS ENTITLED
TO DO SO.

(F) AS REGARDS THE TREATMENT OF SPANIARDS IN GIBRALTAR, WE
HAD GONE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION IN THE
EXCHANGES OF LETTERS OF 8 JANUARY 1982.

(G) HMG ACCORDINGLY BELIEVED THAT THE LISBON AGREEMENT
SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEY WERE PREPARED
TO NAME AN EARLY DATE FOR THE SIMULTANEOUS OPENING OF
NEGOTIATIONS AND RESTORATION OF FULL MOVEMENT. WE BELIEVED
THAT IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL PARTIES TO GET GOING
QUICKLY WITH THE PROCESS OF BRINGING TOGETHER MORE FULLY
THE PEOPLE OF THE ROCK AND THE CAMPO. THIS REPRESENTED THE
ULTIMATE KEY TO THE WHOLE PROBLEM.

(H) THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOU HOPED THAT SR GONZALEZ WOULD
NOW RECONSIDER THE MATTER, VIEWING IT FROM THE WIDEST POSSIBLE
PERSPECTIVE. IN THIS CONNECTION I REFERRED TO HMG'S SUPPORT
FOR SPANISH ENTRY INTO THE COMMUNITY AND OUR COMMON INTEREST
IN SPAIN TAKING HER RIGHTFUL PLACE AS PARTNER AND ALLY AMONG
THE WESTERN NATIONS.

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2. THE SPANISH PRIME MINISTER ASKED ME TO THANK THE PRIME MINISTER FOR THIS IMPORTANT MESSAGE. HE WOULD CONSIDER IT CAREFULLY. HE HOPED SHE WOULD BEAR IN MIND HIS WARM INVITATION TO VISIT SPAIN. SHE WOULD BE MOST WELCOME, THOUGH HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE MIGHT BE A POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR HER BEFORE THE SOLUTION OF THE CURRENT ISSUE REGARDING GIBRALTAR IE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LISBON AGREEMENT. HE HAD NEVER FORGOTTEN THE WARM WELCOME GIVEN HIM BY THE PRIME MINISTER WHEN HE VISITED BRITAIN AS LEADER OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY JUST AFTER THE ATTEMPTED COUP IN FEBRUARY, 1981. ON THAT OCCASION AND SUBSEQUENTLY, IN HER GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS ENLARGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY, MRS THATCHER HAD SHOWN HERSELF TO BE A TRUE FRIEND OF SPAIN.

3. SR FELIPE CONZALEZ ADDED THAT HE WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S BASIC MESSAGE THAT THE GIBRALTAR QUESTION, A SMALL BUT IMPORTANT IRRITANT, MUST BE VIEWED AGAINST THE WIDER BACKGROUND OF THE JOINT INTEREST OF NEARLY ONE HUNDRED MILLION PEOPLE IN THE UK AND SPAIN IN SEEING SPAIN TAKE HER PROPER PLACE AMONG THE FREE NATIONS OF WESTERN EUROPE. THIS WAS VERY MUCH IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS OWN POLICY. HE WISHED TO REAFFIRM TO THE PRIME MINISTER HIS INTENTION THAT SPAIN WOULD BE A GOOD FUTURE PARTNER IN THE COMMUNITY AS WELL AS A RELIABLE ALLY IN DEFENCE MATTERS, IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY PARTICULAR PROBLEMS REGARDING SPANISH MEMBERSHIP OF THE ALLIANCE. HE AGREED THAT THE GIBRALTAR QUESTION MUST BE VIEWED AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND. HE ACCEPTED THE PRIME MINISTER'S SUGGESTION THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED BY THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT. HE WOULD TALK ACCORDINGLY TO HIS FOREIGN MINISTER. MEANWHILE, IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO CONTINUE TO TAKE THINGS CALMLY AND AVOID ADVERSE PUBLIC REPERCUSSIONS. I WOULD BE AWARE OF THE STRENGTH OF DOMESTIC FEELING WITHIN SPAIN OVER THE DEFENCE OF NATIONAL POSITIONS. THIS WAS A PROBLEM FOR THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT ITSELF.

4. I THANKED SR FELIPE GONZALEZ FOR THIS CORDIAL MESSAGE. I SAID THAT HMG WERE LIKEWISE DISPOSED TO PLAY THE PROBLEM DOWN IN PUBLIC RELATIONS TERMS BUT IT WAS AN ESSENTIAL MATTER FOR GIBRALTAR ITSELF WHERE IT WOULD BE A RACE AGAINST TIME TO PREVENT A SHARP DETERIORATION IN PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING SPAIN. HENCE THE NEED FOR SPEED. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE UNDERSTOOD. HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH SR MORAN WOULD BE ON AN URGENT BASIS. MEANWHILE HE HOPED THAT THE LATTER COULD BE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH YOU. HE WELCOMED THE POSSIBILITY THAT YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO TALK IN THE MARGINS OF THE COMMUNITY MEETING ON 25 APRIL. -2-

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5. I LEFT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER MY SPANISH SPEAKING NOTES, EXPLAINING THAT THEY HAD BEEN DRAFTED HERE AND NOT IN LONDON. THEY REPRESENTED THE GIST OF WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOU HAD INSTRUCTED ME TO SAY ORALLY. (ENGLISH VERSION TO SED BY TODAY'S BAG.)

6. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

PARSONS

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SIR J BULLARD
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