

D E D I P

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKDEL WILLIAMSBURG 301550Z MAY 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 14 OF 30 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, ROME, OTTAWA, TOKYO,
UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW.

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS/MINISTERS

FOLLOWING FROM BULLARD, PERSONAL FOR GILLMORE

OUR TEL NO 008: WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT: STATEMENT ON DEFENCE AND
DISARMAMENT.

1. THE STATEMENT IN TUR IS A STRIKING DOCUMENT TO EMERGE, WITH A MINIMUM OF PREPARATION, FROM AN ECONOMIC SUMMIT INCLUDING COUNTRIES WHOSE POSITION ON THESE QUESTIONS IS AS INDIVIDUAL AS THOSE OF FRANCE, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES. YOU MAY FIND USEFUL SOME EXPLANATION OF HOW IT HAPPENED. GRATEFUL IF DISTRIBUTION OF WHAT FOLLOWS COULD BE KEPT VERY SMALL, ALTHOUGH YOU WILL NO DOUBT BE CONSIDERING SOME MORE GENERAL GUIDANCE TO POSTS.
2. THE AMERICANS, AS YOU KNOW, HAD WORKED BEFORE THE SUMMIT TO GET AGREEMENT TO A STATEMENT ABOUT THE INF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THEM AT GENEVA AND WITH PUBLIC OPINION. THE REACTION WAS MIXED. THE AMERICANS DECIDED NOT TO PRESS THE MATTER, BUT REMAINED KEEN TO GET SOMETHING AT WILLIAMSBURG IF THE OPPORTUNITY AROSE. THIS WAS A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE STATEMENT, AS WAS THE STRONG DESIRE OF SHULTZ TO DO SOMETHING TO ENCOURAGE THE JAPANESE TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN WESTERN POLICY.
3. ANOTHER WAS THE PRIME MINISTER'S VIEW, WHICH SHE EXPLAINED AT HER BRIEFING MEETING ON THE FLIGHT TO WILLIAMSBURG, THAT IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO ISSUE A STATEMENT CONFINED TO INF, BUT VERY HELPFUL TO PRODUCE ONE WHICH SET OUT THE WESTERN APPROACH TO DEFENCE AND DISSARMAMENT MORE GENERALLY. A DRAFT WAS WORKED OUT ON THE PLANE, AND THE IDEA OF MAKING A STATEMENT OF THIS KIND WAS ENTHUSIASTICALLY ENDORSED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND MR SHULTZ IN PARALLEL BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON OUR ARRIVAL AT WILLIAMSBURG. COPIES OF THE DRAFT WERE LEFT WITH THE AMERICANS, AND THE PRIME MINISTER SPOKE TO THE IDEAS IN THE DRAFT, WITHOUT FORMALLY REVEALING ITS EXISTENCE, AT THE HEADS OF DELEGATION DINNER THE FIRST EVENING.

A. J. C. ¹/₆
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4. IN DISCUSSION AT THE DINNER, MITTERRAND FIRST ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE IN PRINCIPLE FOR A STATEMENT OF THIS KIND TO ISSUE FROM WILLIAMSBURG, BUT HE FINALLY LEFT IT THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO LOOK AT A TEXT. TRUDEAU CONTRIBUTED VARIATIONS ON THE THEME THAT THE SOVIET PEOPLE WANT PEACE, WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER AND NO DOUBT OTHERS THOUGHT ALARMINGLY WET. (WE DISCOVERED LATER THAT HE TOO HAD A DRAFT DECLARATION IN HIS POCKET, WHICH HIS DELEGATION PASSED TO THE AMERICANS. FALL WAS GIVEN A BRIEF SIGHT OF IT, AND FOUND IT RATHER BETTER THAN WHAT TRUDEAU HAD BEEN SAYING. BUT IT WAS NOT THE SORT OF TEXT THE AMERICANS WANTED AND IT FOUND LITTLE REFLECTION IN THE DRAFT THEY TABLED THE NEXT MORNING).

5. AT THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON SUNDAY MORNING, THE AMERICANS CIRCULATED A DRAFT WHICH BURT HAD PRODUCED OVERNIGHT. IT DREW EXTENSIVELY ON OUR DRAFT, ADDING SOME AMERICAN THINKING AND A GOOD DEAL OF DETAIL ON INF. CHEYSSON EXPLAINED THAT HE AND MITTERRAND HAD THOUGHT FURTHER OVERNIGHT, AND COULD NOW AGREE TO A STATEMENT. THE RESULT OF THE MORNINGS WORK (INCLUDING A SESSION AT WHICH POLITICAL DIRECTORS WENT OFF TO DRAFT) WAS A TEXT AGREED FOR SUBMISSION TO HEADS OF DELEGATION WITH ONLY TWO RESERVES (BOTH CANADIAN, ON REFERENCES TO THE ZERO OPTION AND TO THE EXCLUSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS). ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE FOR SHULTZ TO ISSUE AN AGREED TEXT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AT LUNCHTIME.

6. SUBMISSION TO HEADS OF DELEGATION PROVED NOT TO BE THE ANTICIPATED FORMALITY. MITTERRAND PULLED THE RUG FROM UNDER CHEYSSON, AND RENEWED HIS MUCH EARLIER OBJECTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF ISSUING A STATEMENT. TRUDEAU DUG IN ON THE ZERO OPTION AND ON BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS. FOREIGN MINISTERS WERE SENT BACK TO WORK OVER LUNCH, AND A NEW TEXT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE AFTERNOON PLENARY WHICH TURNED INTO A VERY DIFFICULT AND AT TIMES BAD-TEMPERED DRAFTING SESSION. THE PROBLEM WAS TO FIND A WAY OF DROPPING THE REFERENCE TO THE ZERO OPTION WITHOUT GIVING THE IMPRESSION (ALL TOO CLEAR FROM TWO FORMULAE PREPARED BY MITTERRAND) THAT ANY AGREEMENT ON INF WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO AVOID ALL DEPLOYMENT. TRUDEAU SEEMED NOT TO HAVE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE INTERIM PROPOSAL INVOLVED DEPLOYMENT, AND WENT SO FAR AT ONE STAGE AS TO SAY THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN

THAT THE INTERIM PROPOSAL INVOLVED DEPLOYMENT, AND WENT SO FAR AT ONE STAGE AS TO SAY THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN IN OFFICE WHEN THE DOUBLE DECISION WAS TAKEN AND DID NOT REGARD HIMSELF AS COMMITTED BY IT. THE TEXT FINALLY AGREED ON THIS POINT, AND THE SATISFACTORY REFERENCE TO BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS, WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED WITHOUT SOME VERY VIGOROUS INTERVENTIONS FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

7. WE CAME UNCOMFORTABLY CLOSE TO THE BRINK, AND THE RISK OF A VERY PUBLIC FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT MUST HAVE BEEN APPARENT TO ALL. THE AMERICANS WERE TO SOME EXTENT TO BLAME BECAUSE THEIR DRAFT WAS INSUFFICIENTLY SENSITIVE TO OTHER POINTS OF VIEW. BUT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT MITTERRAND AND TRUDEAU BEHAVED BADLY.

8. SHULTZ WAS EVIDENTLY BRUISED BY THE EXPERIENCE AND CONFESSED AS MUCH AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' DINNER ON SUNDAY EVENING (WHICH I ATTENDED IN PLACE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, WHO WAS REPRESENTING THE PRIME MINISTER AT THE HEADS OF DELEGATION DINNER). HE SAID IT HAD BEEN ONE OF THE MOST DISAPPOINTING DAYS OF HIS LIFE AND DESCRIBED THE ATMOSPHERE AS 'RANCID'. THE RESPONSE WAS STRIKING: A GENERAL AND SPONTANEOUS ENDORSEMENT OF THE VALUE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE TEXT WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED AND (FROM THE EUROPEANS) THE RUEFUL REFLECTION THAT THE PROCESS OF TAKING DECISIONS IN THE COMMUNITY WAS OFTEN MUCH WORSE THAN WHAT SHULTZ HAD JUST EXPERIENCED. I HOPE THAT THIS VIEW - WHICH LOOKS TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TEXT RATHER THAN TO THE WAY IT WAS NEGOTIATED- WILL PREVAIL. BUT SHULTZ DID NOT LOOK CONVINCED AND THERE WILL BE LESSONS TO BE DRAWN ON THE PROCEDURAL SIDE (EVEN THOUGH SOME MAY ARGUE THAT SUCH A TEXT WOULD NEVER HAVE EMERGED AT ALL IF IT HAD BEEN PROCESSED IN A MORE ORTHODOX WAY).

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