

Limited
IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

(19)

PS (6)
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/PUS
SIR J. LEAHY
MR EVANS
SIR J. BULLARD
MR SQUIRE
MR THOMAS

Hd(SAF)
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Hd. NEWS DEPT
No 10 Dist-Duty Clerk
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CONFIDENTIAL
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NAMIBIA

1. AT GENSCHER'S INSTIGATION THIS WAS DISCUSSED FOR NINETY MINUTES OVER DINNER BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE SEVEN COUNTRIES TAKING PART IN THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT, OR RATHER BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP WITH THE JAPANESE AND THE ITALIAN SITTING INTERESTED BUT SILENT THROUGHOUT.
2. GENSCHER'S THEME WAS THAT THE CONTACT GROUP MUST FIND SOME WAY OF MAKING FASTER PROGRESS TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION OF UN RESOLUTION 435: BUT HOW?.
3. SHULTZ GAVE AN UP-BEAT ACCOUNT OF THE LATEST AMERICAN CONTACTS WITH THE ANGOLANS, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS SHOWING IMPATIENCE AT THE SLOWNESS OF PROGRESS, ALARM AT THE TENDENCY TOWARDS VIOLENCE, BUT ALSO UNDERSTANDING OF THE REALITIES. HE ALSO SPOKE IN ENCOURAGING TERMS ABOUT HIS TALK WITH NUJOMA AND WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE FRONT LINE STATES.
4. CHEYSSON, IN A LONG STATEMENT, DESCRIBED THE APPROACH OF FRANCE AS VERY DIFFERENT. HE FELT THAT THE CONTACT GROUP WAS TURNING IN CIRCLES AND NOT FACING FACTS. NUJOMA WAS UNTRUSTWORTHY. MANY OF THE WHITES IN NAMIBIA WERE OPTING FOR INDEPENDENCE. ANGOLA WAS IN SUCH DESPERATE STRAITS THAT SHE WOULD SIGN ANY AGREEMENT IF ONLY THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD WITHDRAW. FRANCE HAD SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED LEAVING THE CONTACT GROUP, AND WOULD HAVE DONE SO IF IT HAD NOT BEEN FOR APPEALS TO HER FROM THE FLS. THE CRUCIAL QUESTION, IN CHEYSSON'S VIEW, WAS WHETHER SOUTH AFRICA WAS READY TO WITHDRAW FROM NAMIBIA OR NOT: AND IF SO, ON WHAT CONDITIONS.
5. BULLARD (WHO REPRESENTED THE UK BECAUSE THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS REPRESENTING THE PRIME MINISTER AT THE HEADS OF DELEGATIONS' DINNER) AGREED WITH GENSCHER ON THE NEED TO ACCELERATE THE MOMENTUM. HAD THE TIME COME TO PRESS SOUTH AFRICA TO BEGIN WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTHERN ANGOLA? AND FOR THE UNITED STATES TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA? SHULTZ DID NOT TAKE UP THE FIRST POINT. ON THE SECOND, HE SAID THAT THE US WAS NOT GOING TO MOVE INTO LUANDA TO FINANCE A SOVIET SATELLITE. THEY WOULD PREFER TO RESPOND WHEN THERE WAS SOMETHING TO RESPOND TO.

WHEN THERE WAS SOMETHING TO RESPOND TO.

6. AFTER SOME FURTHER RHETORICAL QUESTIONS FROM CHEYSSON ABOUT THE REAL INTENTIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA, GENSCHER RECALLED THE MEETING AT MONTEBELLO AT WHICH HAGIG HAD TOLD AMERICA'S PARTNERS IN THE CONTACT GROUP (A) THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE CUBANS SHOULD GET OUT OF ANGOLA AND (B) THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD ASSUME THE TASK OF BRINGING THIS ABOUT. THIS, SAID GENSCHER, HAD BEEN THE START OF THE SPECIAL ROLE WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAD BEEN PLAYING. BEFORE THAT THE CONTACT GROUP AS A WHOLE HAD SOMETIMES HELD TALKS WITH THE PARTIES, IN WHICH GENSCHER HIMSELF HAD PARTICIPATED. HE EMPHASISED HOW HIGH WERE THE STAKES IN A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT. THE SOVIET HOPE WAS TO BRING ABOUT A RACE WAR IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THEY HAD FAILED TO DO THIS IN RHODESIA/ZIMBABWE. IF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND FOR NAMIBIA, THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE LOST THEIR LAST CHANCE IN AFRICA. IT WAS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL TO CARRY FORWARD RESOLUTION 435 WITH "THE UTMOST INTENSITY".

7. MCEACHEN AND CHEYSSON, PICKING UP GENSCHER'S REMARK, THEN BEGAN TO SPECULATE ABOUT THE POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES OF CONCERTED ACTION BY THE CONTACT GROUP WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS. SHULTZ, BY THIS TIME SHOWING SIGNS OF EXHAUSTION AFTER A LONG AND DIFFICULT DAY, SAID HE SENSED A MASSIVE VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES. HE WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO DROP OUT OF THE WHOLE AFFAIR. BUT HE THOUGHT THAT PUTTING QUESTIONS TO SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE A WASTE OF BREATH; THE RIGHT WAY WAS TO PUT SOMETHING SUBSTANTIVE IN FRONT OF THEM AND CALL ON THEM TO RESPOND TO IT.

8. GENSCHER SAID THAT NOBODY WANTED TO CHANGE THE AGREEMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD SEEK TO NEGOTIATE A CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA AS PART OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION FOR NAMIBIA. THE QUESTION WAS HOW THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP COULD HELP. THERE HAD BEEN JOINT DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY BEFORE, AND THIS COULD BE RENEWED. THE TWO URGENT REQUIREMENTS WERE TO KEEP THE GROUP TOGETHER AND TO ACCELERATE THE PACE OF ITS WORK.

9. AFTER BULLARD AND OTHERS HAD ENDORSED THESE TWO OBJECTIVES, CHEYSSON SAID THAT THE IDEAS VENTILATED DURING THIS DISCUSSION WOULD REQUIRE CONSIDERATION. MEANWHILE HE WAS OPPOSED TO ANY STATEMENT TO THE PRESS. FRANCE WOULD BE WILLING TO STAY WITH THE CONTACT GROUP SO LONG AS SHE FELT SHE WAS DOING SOMETHING, BUT NOT IF SHE WERE MERELY PASSIVE. SHULTZ POINTED OUT THAT THE CONTACT GROUP HAD ACHIEVED THE VIRTUAL COMPLETION OF THE NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES.

10. AT BULLARD'S SUGGESTION IT WAS AGREED THAT CHEYSSON SHOULD MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A FURTHER MEETING OF THE FIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN THE MARGINS OF THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN PARIS ON 9 AND 10 JUNE.

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12. FCO PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER AS APPROPRIATE.

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