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INFO IMMEDIATE STUTTGART (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL MADRID,
INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO AND EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, TOKYO,
UKDIS GENEVA, HELSINKI,
INFO SAVING ULAN BATOR, PEKING, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA,
UKMIS VIENNA

MY TEL NO 645: GROMYKO'S SPEECH TO THE SUPREME SOVIET:

EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

1. "THE CONSISTENT, TIRELESS STRUGGLE FOR PEACE IS THE SOUL OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY", WHICH RESTED ON THE "GRANITE FOUNDATION" OF MARXIST/LENINIST TEACHING.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

2. THE CURRENT SITUATION COULD BE DESCRIBED AS STORMY. THE COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS WAS DETERMINED BY THE CONFRONTATION OF TWO LINES: ONE DIRECTED AT THE PRESERVATION AND THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE, THE OTHER AT UNDERMINING ITS MAINSTAYS. THE SOVIET UNION PURSUED THE FORMER.

CSCE

3. THE SOVIET UNION ADHERED TO THE CAUSE OF CONTINUING THE ALL-EUROPEAN PROCESS. THE MADRID CONFERENCE SHOULD BE CONCLUDED WITH AN AGREEMENT ON A CDE (GROMYKO DID NOT MENTION THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT).

STRATEGIC PARITY

4. THE TEMPTATION TO DOMINATE THE WORLD BY THREATENING THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAD PROVED MORE COMPELLING FOR THE AMERICANS THAN THE REALISATION OF THE NEED TO BAN THEM. THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE POST-WAR PERIOD IMPERIALIST CIRCLES HAD STUBBORNLY SOUGHT MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. BUT STRATEGIC PARITY HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AND CONTINUED TO BE THE GUARANTEE OF INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PRESERVE THIS PARITY.

/THE

5. THE AMERICANS WERE NOT ONLY ARMING THEMSELVES BUT ENCOURAGING THEIR ALLIES TO DO THE SAME. TO UNDERCUT STRATEGIC PARITY THEY WERE WILLING TO GO TO ANY LENGTHS TO GET NEW MISSILES INTO WESTERN EUROPE. WITH A VARIETY OF NUCLEAR DOCTRINES AND A "SHAMELESS WAR PROPAGANDA" "MILITARIST INTOXICATION" PERVADED THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN THE USA. BUT THIS WAS CAUSING ALARM AMONG THE SOBER-MINDED IN THE US AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. THE RESULTING ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE ALLEGED HAND OF MOSCOW.

SOVIET PEACE PROPOSALS

6. SOVIET INITIATIVES AND PROPOSALS COMPRISED AN ALL-EMBRACING PROGRAMME. IT WAS ALLEGED THAT THEY WERE NOT RADICAL ENOUGH, BUT THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSED THE MOST RADICAL OF POSSIBLE SOLUTION, UNIVERSAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT. VERIFICATION HAD NEVER BEEN A BLOCK FOR MOSCOW. THE SOVIET UNION HAD THE RIGHT TO EXPECT OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS TO MAKE A NO-FIRST USE PLEDGE.

PRAGUE DECLARATION

7. MUCH TIME HAD ELAPSED SINCE THE WARSAW PACT IN ITS SUMMIT DECLARATION HAD PROPOSED AN AGREEMENT WITH NATO CONTAINING A RECIPROCAL COMMITMENT NOT TO USE FORCE. THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES WERE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY EXPLANATIONS AND TO EMBARK ON NEGOTIATIONS FORTHWITH. NATO'S REACTION IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE JUNE COUNCIL WAS "QUITE INCOMPREHENSIBLE". NATO SEEMED STILL UNABLE OR RELUCTANT TO ADMIT HOW RADICALLY AN AGREEMENT ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE WOULD IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD.

GENEVA TALKS

8. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT RETREAT FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY "AND IT WILL BE GOOD IF THOSE IN WASHINGTON REALISE THIS". IN BOTH SETS OF TALKS IN GENEVA THE AMERICANS FOLLOWED AN OBSTRUCTIONIST LINE, OFFERING THE SOVIET UNION UNACCEPTABLE UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT.

START

9. THE "FACE-LIFTED POSITION" ON STRATEGIC ARMS RECENTLY ANNOUNCED BY THE US PRESIDENT WAS COINED IN THE SAME SPIRIT. IT WAS TAILORED TO THE FURTHER EXPANSION OF AMERICAN MILITARY PROGRAMMES. THE AMERICAN APPROACH WAS UNCHANGED: TO LIMIT ONLY SOME COMPONENTS OF STRATEGIC FORCES, TURNING A BLIND EYE TO OTHERS AND THEREBY SEEKING TO DISRUPT THE EXISTING STRUCTURE OF SOVIET FORCES. "SO THE FLEXIBILITY HERE IS PURELY FOR SHOW. THE AMERICAN POSITION DOES NOT OFFER AN OUTLET TO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS."

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

10. THE US PROPOSALS ON CBMS COULD NOT GLOSS OVER THE UNCONSTRUCTIVE AND LOPSIDED NATURE OF THE AMERICAN APPROACH. THEY ADDED UP TO NO MORE THAN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION. THE AMERICANS REJECTED THE MORE FAR-REACHING SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR PREVENTING CRISES AND STRENGTHENING TRUST.

WILLIAMSBURG AND NATO MEETINGS

11. THE "MANY POMPOUS WORDS" ABOUT TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND ARMS REDUCTIONS IN THE WILLIAMSBURG STATEMENT AND THE NATO COUNCIL COMMUNIQUE DID NOT CHANGE THE MILITARISTIC, AGGRESSIVE ESSENCE OF THE COURSE FOLLOWED BY THE US AND NATO. AS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD WARNED IN ITS STATEMENT OF 26 MAY THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES WOULD BE FORCED TO TAKE MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO STRENGTHEN THEIR DEFENCE CAPABILITY. IT WAS STILL NOT TOO LATE FOR THE US AND ITS ALLIES TO RESPOND TO THE CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS OF THE USSR. A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE FREEZE ON NUCLEAR ARSENALS WOULD BE A HELPFUL FIRST STEP.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

12. THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERED THAT TRI-PARTITE TALKS WITH THE US AND GREAT BRITAIN ON THE ELABORATION OF A CTB TREATY SHOULD BE RESUMED. IT ALSO HOPED THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION WOULD MODIFY ITS ATTITUDE TO THE TREATIES ON UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS AND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, AND THAT THEY WOULD ENTER INTO FORCE.

ABM AND SPACE

13. THE DECISION TO BEGIN DEVELOPMENT OF A BROAD-SCALE ABM SYSTEM WAS A STEP TOWARDS SEVERING THE LINK BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS. THE US ADMINISTRATION HAD SO FAR NOT REPLIED TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT SCIENTISTS FROM THE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD DISCUSS THE IMPLICATIONS. THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY ON THE NON-DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS OF ANY KIND IN OUTER SPACE WAS A PRIORITY TASK. THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO ENTER INTO TALKS WITHOUT DELAY.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

14. THE SOVIET UNION HOPED THAT ITS NEGOTIATING PARTNERS WOULD AGREE TO WORK OUT A CONVENTION BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. PARALLEL STEPS WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT WOULD BE USEFUL.

US FOREIGN POLICY

15. THE MAIN CREED OF AMERICAN POLICY WAS THE OPEN ADVOCACY OF "ROLLING BACK" SOCIALISM. ONE AMERICANS CLAIMED THAT THEIR FOREIGN POLICY WAS HIGHLY MORAL BUT IN FACT IT WAS AT ODDS WITH MORALITY. IT WAS POSING A GRAVE THREAT TO PEACE. THE WORLD EXPECTED THE US LEADERSHIP TO SHOW GREATER RESPONSIBILITY AND COMMONSENSE.

US-SOVIET RELATIONS AND CANADA

16. THE SOVIET UNION CONSISTENTLY ADVOCATED NORMAL AND STABLE RELATIONS WITH CAPITALIST COUNTRIES. IT WANTED SMOOTHER RELATIONS WITH THE US IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THIS WAS IMPORTANT TO PREVENT WAR. THE SOVIET UNION APPRECIATED THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAD DEVELOPED WITH CANADA.

WESTERN EUROPE

17. THE SOVIET UNION HOPED THAT WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WOULD NOT ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BE DRAGGED INTO PLANS WHICH POSED A GRAVE THREAT TO PEACE. IT WANTED GOOD RELATIONS AND FRUITFUL COOPERATION WITH FRANCE, WITH WHICH A GOOD DEAL HAD BEEN DONE TO PROMOTE EUROPEAN COOPERATION, AND ALSO WITH ITALY, BRITAIN, SPAIN AND ALL OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. RELATIONS WITH ITS GOOD NEIGHBOUR FINLAND WERE BEING PUT ON AN EVEN FIRMER BASIS AS A RESULT OF PRESIDENT KOIVISTO'S RECENT VISIT AND THE EXTENSION OF THE SOVIET-FINNISH FRIENDSHIP TREATY.

FRG

18. THE SOVIET UNION WANTED RELATIONS WITH WEST GERMANY IN THE SAME KEY AS IN RECENT YEARS. IN PARTICULAR IT FAVOURED EXPANDED ECONOMIC CONTACTS. BUT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ATTACH PRIORITY TO SECURITY QUESTIONS IN ITS CONTACTS WITH THE PRESENT WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY DURING CHANCELLOR KOHL'S FORTHCOMING VISIT.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

SUTHERLAND

FCO/WH

EESD

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)