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FM SAN JOSE 300100Z SEP 84

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 378 OF 30 SEP

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON MEXICO CITY TEGUCHIGALPA

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SAN JOSE MEETING: NICARAGUA

1. IN AN AUDIENCE WITH PRESIDENT MONGE DURING MEETING, YOU ASKED FOR HIS FRANK VIEWS ON THE NICARAGUAN PROBLEM.
2. MONGE SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES WOULD INVADE NICARAGUA. YET THE ADMINISTRATION COULD NOT ACCEPT A PRO-SOVIET AND PRO-CUBAN NICARAGUA. IT WOULD THEREFORE CONTINUE TO DESTABILISE NICARAGUA BY ALMOST ANY MEANS SHORT OF SENDING TROOPS. HE SAID, IN ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION ABOUT THE MORALITY OF THIS, THAT HIS ENTIRELY FRANK VIEW AS BETWEEN FRIENDS WAS THAT IT WAS NOT MORAL. BUT IT WAS ALSO UNDERSTANDABLE. THE U S HAD PUT OUT FEELERS TO SEE WHETHER THE COMANDANTES MIGHT ACCEPT A YUGOSLAV TYPE SOLUTION. BUT THEY HAD BEEN EVASIVE. HOPES OF A PLURALISTIC SOLUTION WERE EVAPORATING. MARXIST LENINIST REGIMES WERE NOT CAPABLE OF CHANGING DIRECTION.
3. MONGE BELIEVED THAT A SHIFT AWAY FROM THE HAWKS IN WASHINGTON POLICY-MAKING MIGHT INDUCE CERTAIN SIGNS OF MODERATION IN MANAGUA. BUT HE DID NOT THINK THE FUNDAMENTAL THRUST THERE WOULD BE CHANGED: THE COMANDANTES WERE IMMATURE, AND THE FACT THAT THERE WERE 9 OF THEM MADE ANY CHANGE OF COURSE INFINITELY DIFFICULT.

SUMMERSCALE

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