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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 November 1986

The purpose of this meeting is to listen. You will want to keep your thoughts until after you have seen President Reagan. Dear Charles, If you wish to mention details for your visit, they are 30 Nov / 1 April, 20-22 April. COP 12/11

Soviet Ambassador's Call on the Prime Minister: 13 November

I enclose a brief for Mr Zamyatin's call at 0945 on Thursday 13 November. He will be accompanied by Mr Kossov of the Soviet Embassy as interpreter.

In telling Mr Zamyatin that the Prime Minister would be ready to see him, we made very clear to him that this was on the firm understanding on the part of the Prime Minister that after her visit to Washington she would wish to convey her thoughts to Mr Gorbachev through Sir Bryan Cartledge in Moscow. The Foreign Secretary made this point strongly when he saw Mr Zamyatin at the Soviet National Day Reception. Zamyatin said that while he could not speak in Mr Gorbachev's name, he expected the General Secretary to receive Sir Bryan.

The main purpose of Zamyatin's call is to put Gorbachev's views on arms control prior to the Prime Minister's visit to Washington. We have not included detailed briefing on arms control points, believing that for the most part the Prime Minister will want to keep her powder dry for her message to Gorbachev.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

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Private Secretary

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SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER:

13 NOVEMBER 1986

Points to Make

1. Useful to hear General Secretary's views before visit to Washington. Look forward to renewing personal contact when I visit Moscow.

2. On return from Washington aim to reply to Gorbachev's last message, and convey thoughts on way forward. Shall instruct Sir Bryan Cartledge to deliver. Agreed to see you on firm understanding that he will be received.

3. Ready to see Ligachev (or Dobrynin) when Supreme Soviet Delegation visits UK early next year.

Arms Control

4. We in Europe want movement on INF and 50% cuts in strategic arms. Clear where responsibility will lie if no movement because of SDI linkage.

5. Role of nuclear weapons: cannot be treated in isolation without taking into account overall balance of forces in Europe including conventional and chemical.

6. Conditions for UK contributing to nuclear reductions unchanged.

Syria/Terrorism

7. Soviet response to our decision to break relations with Syria disappointing. Syria Soviet ally. But our decision based on firm evidence of Syrian involvement with Hindawi. Now making this available in Moscow

.../and



and to your Embassy. Our action endorsed by European partners.

7. Look to Soviet Union to match condemnation of terrorism and readiness for bilateral talks with appropriate response. Syrian claims of innocence do not stand up.

CSCE/Human Rights

8. Human rights improvements fundamental to building confidence between East and West.

9. Noted Shevardnadze's proposal for CSCE conference on humanitarian issues in Moscow. Will study carefully at Vienna along with other proposals in this field. Best first step would be Soviet action, eg over prisoners of conscience, Jewish emigration.



ESSENTIAL FACTS

UK/Soviet Relations

1. Vienna telnos 168 and 169, reporting the Foreign Secretary's meeting with Shevardnadze on 4 November, are attached.
2. The Prime Minister saw the Soviet Ambassador on 28 April, when he handed over a message from Gorbachev. Sir Bryan Cartledge has not yet been received by Mr Gorbachev in Moscow. The Foreign Secretary has stressed (to Zamyatin) that Prime Minister has agreed to see Zamyatin on this occasion on the firm understanding that Sir Bryan Cartledge will be received by Gorbachev after her visit to Washington, to deliver a message conveying her thoughts on the way forward.

Visits

3. Mr Shevardnadze stressed to Sir Geoffrey Howe on 4 November in Vienna that the Soviet side wanted the Prime Minister soon to propose dates for her visit to Moscow. Call on Gorbachev would be the ideal occasion.
4. Russians have hinted that the Supreme Soviet delegation (we have proposed first week of February 1987) will be headed by Ligachev or Dobrynin (the Chairmen of the two Foreign Affairs Commissions of the Supreme Soviet). Ligachev would be more interesting. The Prime Minister has agreed in principle to receive the leader on this basis.
5. Other forthcoming visits: Mr Walker to Moscow and Chernobyl in mid-December; Mr Renton to Moscow in January; Mr Jopling to Moscow in February, during a British agricultural exhibition.

Syria/Terrorism

6. Soviet statements following the British decision to break off relations with Syria described our action as groundless, unfriendly and provocative. We have taken this up with the Russians in both London and Moscow, including with Shevardnadze (Vienna telno 169). As a result, HM Ambassador, Moscow now instructed to give the Russians full briefing on our evidence of Syria's involvement in the Hindawi affair. EC Foreign Ministers (except Greece) agreed on 10 November on measures against Syria.

7. Shevardnadze suggested bilateral talks on terrorism to the Prime Minister in July. We have accepted, and proposed dates in late November/early December.

CSCE/Human Rights

8. Vienna Follow-Up Meeting opened on 4 November. Agreed aim is to complete business by July 1987. First phase (until Christmas) is devoted to review of implementation.

9. Shevardnadze unexpectedly proposed Moscow conference on Basket III (human contacts, information, culture, education etc). Foreign Ministers of Twelve agreed on 10 November that delegations in Vienna should study proposal, with other new proposals; premature to accept or reject the idea/venue. But if such a meeting were to go ahead, West would require proper access for press, interested groups and individuals, and a concrete mandate focussing on implementation of existing commitments.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

11 November 1986

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