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TELNO 765
OF 211100Z NOVEMBER 86

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN SECRETARY
PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT LETTER TO CHARLES POWELL

BEGINS THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ON 13 NOVEMBER THAT SHE WOULD ASK SIR BRYAN CARTLEDGE TO CONVEY HER CONSIDERED RESPONSE TO MR GORBACHEV'S MESSAGE DIRECTLY TO HIM ON HER RETURN FROM WASHINGTON (YOUR LETTER OF 13 NOVEMBER TO COLIN BUDD).

I NOW ENCLOSE A DRAFT REPLY. THIS AIMS TO REINFORCE THE POINTS MADE IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S WASHINGTON STATEMENT (AND CONVEYS TO GORBACHEV PERSONALLY A COPY OF THAT STATEMENT). THE PRIME MINISTER UNDERLINED TO MR ZAMYATIN THAT RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF ARMS CONTROL. THE DRAFT THEREFORE INCLUDES PASSAGES ON AFGHANISTAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY RECALLS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED TO SEE THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ON THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT SIR BRYAN CARTLEDGE WOULD BE ABLE TO SEE GORBACHEV. HE THEREFORE PROPOSES TO INSTRUCT SIR BRYAN, ON THIS OCCASION, TO PRESS FOR A MEETING WITH GORBACHEV. BUT HE ALSO INTENDS TO GIVE SIR BRYAN DISCRETION TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER VIA SHEVARDNADZE, SHOULD GORBACHEV NOT BE WILLING TO SEE HIM.

OTHER POINTS WHICH WE PROPOSE TO INCLUDE IN THE AMBASSADOR'S INSTRUCTIONS ARE:

(I) THAT HE SHOULD DRAW ATTENTION TO THE DATES WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAS ALREADY PROPOSED, THROUGH ZAMYATIN, FOR HER VISIT TO MOSCOW, AND SEEK AN EARLY RESPONSE:

(II) THAT THE EMBASSY SHOULD FOLLOW-UP IN DETAIL, AT WORKING LEVEL IN THE MFA, THE PASSAGE ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION WHICH HAS BEEN INCORPORATED IN THE DRAFT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER, AND SHOULD URGE THAT AS MANY CASES AS POSSIBLE SHOULD BE CLEARED OUT OF THE WAY BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

FINALLY, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY BELIEVES IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO LET THE WHITE HOUSE KNOW IN BROAD TERMS WHAT HER LETTER TO GORBACHEV SAYS ABOUT HER MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. ENDS

2. NOW SEE MIFT.

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INWARD

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN SECRETARY
PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV

1. MIPT. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO
GORBACHEV.

BEGINS THANK YOU FOR LETTING ME HAVE YOUR THOUGHTS ON ARMS
CONTROL BEFORE MY RECENT VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. I WAS GLAD
TO SEE YOUR AMBASSADOR ON 13 NOVEMBER. FOLLOWING MY TALKS WITH
PRESIDENT REAGAN, I HAVE ASKED SIR BRYAN CARTLEDGE TO SHARE WITH
YOU MY THOUGHTS ON THE WAY FORWARD.

I WELCOME YOUR CONFIRMATION THAT YOU WISH TO CONTINUE YOUR
DIALOGUE WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. I HOPE THAT IT WILL PRODUCE
EARLY PROGRESS. AN IMPORTANT LESSON OF REYKJAVIK WAS THE IMMENSE
DIFFICULTY OF ACHIEVING AN ALL-EMBRACING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT
IN ONE BOUND. IN MY VIEW SUCH A PROJECT IS NOT REALISTIC. A
PROGRESSIVE APPROACH BASED ON SMALLER MORE ATTAINABLE STEPS,
SEEKING PROGRESS IN AREAS WHERE PROGRESS IS MOST LIKELY TO BE
MADE, SEEMS TO ME MORE LIKELY TO BE SUCCESSFUL.

THAT IS WHY I IDENTIFIED WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AT CAMP DAVID
ON 15 NOVEMBER THE AREAS WHICH SHOULD BE GIVEN THE HIGHEST
PRIORITY - AN INF AGREEMENT, WITH RESTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE
SYSTEMS: A 50 PERCENT CUT OVER FIVE YEARS IN US AND SOVIET STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE WEAPONS; AND A BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. YOU WILL HAVE
SEEN THE STATEMENT I ISSUED FOLLOWING THE CAMP DAVID MEETING. I
WANT TO DRAW PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO TWO POINTS UNDERLINED IN IT:
THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF NATO'S CURRENT STRATEGY; AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF A STABLE OVERALL BALANCE, WITH THE ELIMINATION OF
CONVENTIONAL DISPARITIES AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE REDUCED.

THE PRESIDENT AND I ALSO AGREED ON THE NEED TO PRESS AHEAD
WITH THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAMME WHICH IS PERMITTED BY THE ABM
TREATY. I SEE NO REASON WHY THIS SHOULD BE A STUMBLING BLOCK,
AND I HOPE THAT YOU WILL WORK WITH US TO ENSURE THAT IT IS NOT.
THE US POSITION, MR KARPOV'S COMMENTS TO ME WHEN HE CAME HERE IN
OCTOBER, AND MR SHEVARDNADZE'S STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION
WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A BROAD DEFINITION OF RESEARCH, ALL
SUGGEST TO ME THAT A SOLUTION SHOULD BE POSSIBLE. IN THE
MEANTIME WE MUST PRESS ON IN AREAS WHERE PROGRESS CAN BE MADE,
QUITE INDEPENDENTLY OF THE CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS ON SDI. I VERY
MUCH REGRET YOUR DECISION TO RELINK THE INF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
SDI RESEARCH PROGRAMME. THERE IS NO LOGIC IN SUCH A LINK; AND
YOU HAD OF COURSE PREVIOUSLY AGREED THAT THE TWO ISSUES SHOULD BE
TREATED SEPARATELY.

PRESIDENT REAGAN AND I AGREED AT CAMP DAVID THAT A CHEMICAL
WEAPONS BAN SHOULD BE AMONG OUR PRIORITIES. I THEREFORE WELCOME
YOUR AGREEMENT TO USE THE BRITISH PROPOSALS OF JULY AS THE BASIS
FOR DISCUSSION. YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF A STRINGENT VERIFICATION
REGIME IN THIS AREA WOULD BRING THE PROSPECT OF AN AGREED BAN
CLOSER. OUR EXPERTS ARE READY TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WITH
YOURS AT ANY TIME.

MR ZAMYATIN TOLD ME THAT YOU WERE DISAPPOINTED BY THE
REACTION TO THE REYKJAVIK MEETING OF SOME WESTERN EUROPEAN
LEADERS, WHO HE DESCRIBED AS ALMOST FRIGHTENED AT THE PROSPECT OF
A SOVIET-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF THIS.
WE WANT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR
THEM. BUT THEY MUST BE AGREEMENTS WHICH ENHANCE, NOT DAMAGE, OUR
SECURITY.

I UNDERSTAND THAT IN YOUR MEETING AT REYKJAVIK WITH
PRESIDENT REAGAN YOU ALSO TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON REGIONAL QUESTIONS.
UNRESOLVED REGIONAL DISPUTES ARE DANGEROUS. IN PARTICULAR THE
CONTINUED SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN SERIOUSLY UNDERMINES
CONFIDENCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THE KEY TO PEACE IN THAT
TROUBLED COUNTRY, IS THE EARLY AND COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL THE
OCCUPYING FORCES. YOU HAVE SAID YOU WANT TO WITHDRAW YOUR
FORCES; THAT WOULD BE A STATESMANLIKE AND COURAGEOUS STEP, WHICH
THE WORLD WOULD APPLAUD.

I AM GLAD YOU WERE ABLE TO DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS
WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. IN BRITAIN TOO THEY ARE OF GREAT CONCERN
TO A VERY WIDE RANGE OF PEOPLE: THERE IS KEEN INTEREST HERE IN
THE EXTENT TO WHICH INDIVIDUALS IN YOUR COUNTRY ARE FREE, FOR
INSTANCE, TO EXERCISE THEIR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, OR MONITOR THEIR
COUNTRY'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS; TO JOIN THEIR
FAMILIES ABROAD, OR SIMPLY GO ABROAD FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT.
NOTHING WOULD DO MORE TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE BETWEEN EAST
AND WEST THAN FOR THESE FREEDOMS TO BECOME STANDARD IN THE SOVIET
UNION.

I ALSO ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE EARLY RESOLUTION OF
CASES OF DIVIDED FAMILIES IN WHICH THE UK HAS A LEGITIMATE
INTEREST. I KNOW YOU DO TOO. I HOPE YOU WILL INSTRUCT YOUR
PEOPLE TO DEAL QUICKLY WITH AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF THESE CASES.
THEY ARE FEW IN NUMBER AND THEIR RESOLUTION WOULD BE WIDELY NOTED
AND WELCOMED IN BRITAIN.

AT THE VIENNA CSCE MEETING WE ARE ALL WORKING FOR BETTER
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE COMMITMENTS
FREELY UNDERTAKEN AT HELSINKI, MADRID AND STOCKHOLM. I AM GLAD
THAT SIR GEOFFREY HOWE WAS ABLE TO MEET MR SHEVARDNADZE IN VIENNA
AND DISCUSS THESE QUESTIONS WITH HIM.

THEY ALSO DISCUSSED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, AND AGREED THAT
OUR EXPERTS SHOULD GET TOGETHER TO TALK ABOUT THIS PROBLEM. I
WELCOME THIS. NO COUNTRY CAN BE SURE OF REMAINING IMMUNE TO THIS
MODERN SCOURGE, AND WE ALL SHARE AN INTEREST IN ELIMINATING IT.
THAT IS WHY GEOFFREY HOWE PROVIDED YOU WITH A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE
CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF OFFICIAL SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE RECENT
AND POTENTIALLY DEVASTATING TERRORIST INCIDENT IN THE UK. THE
DECISION TO BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WAS NOT OF OUR MAKING. IT
WAS THE INEVITABLE RESULT OF UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOUR ON THE PART
OF THE SYRIAN AUTHORITIES.

I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE AND OTHER QUESTIONS WITH
YOU WHEN I COME TO MOSCOW. I SHOULD LIKE THEN TO EXPLORE WITH
YOU WAYS OF STRENGTHENING CONTACTS BETWEEN PEOPLE IN OUR TWO
COUNTRIES, AND INCREASING MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING.
ENDS

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