



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 November 1986

*Dear Charles,*Prime Minister's Message to Mr Gorbachev

The Prime Minister told the Soviet Ambassador on 13 November that she would ask Sir Bryan Cartledge to convey her considered response to Mr Gorbachev's message directly to him on her return from Washington (your letter of 13 November to me).

I now enclose a draft reply. This aims to reinforce the points made in the Prime Minister's Washington statement (and conveys to Gorbachev personally a copy of that statement). The Prime Minister underlined to Mr Zamyatin that relations with the Soviet Union could not be conducted solely on the basis of arms control. The draft therefore includes passages on Afghanistan, human rights and terrorism.

The Foreign Secretary recalls that the Prime Minister agreed to see the Soviet Ambassador on the clear understanding that Sir Bryan Cartledge would be able to see Gorbachev. He therefore proposes to instruct Sir Bryan, on this occasion, to press for a meeting with Gorbachev. But he also intends to give Sir Bryan discretion to deliver the Prime Minister's letter via Shevardnadze, should Gorbachev not be willing to see him.

Other points which we propose to include in the Ambassador's instructions are:

- (i) that he should draw attention to the dates which the Prime Minister has already proposed, through Zamyatin, for her visit to Moscow, and seek an early response;
- (ii) that the Embassy should follow-up in detail, at working level in the MFA, the passage on family reunification which has been incorporated in the draft of the Prime Minister's letter, and should urge that as many cases as possible should be cleared out of the way before the Prime Minister's visit.

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Finally, the Foreign Secretary believes it would be right to let the White House know in broad terms what her letter to Gorbachev says about her meeting with President Reagan.

*Yours ever,*

*Colin Budd*

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Private Secretary

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DSR 10 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM: PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Your Reference

BUILDING: ROOM NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: Copies to:

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

MR GORBACHEV

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

..... In Confidence

Thank you for letting me have your thoughts on arms control before my recent visit to the United States. I was glad to see your Ambassador on 13 November.

CAVEAT .....

Following my talks with President Reagan, I have asked Sir Bryan Cartledge to share with you my thoughts on the way forward.

I welcome your confirmation that you wish to continue your dialogue with President Reagan. [I hope that it will produce early progress] An important lesson of Reykjavik was the immense difficulty of achieving an all-embracing arms control agreement in one bound. In my view such a project is not realistic. A progressive approach based on smaller more attainable steps, seeking progress in areas where progress is most likely to be made, <sup>has a better chance</sup> ~~seems to me more likely to be successful.~~

*I gave Mr. Zamiatin my*

*responded immediately on some of the points which you raised. But,*

Enclosures flag(s) .....

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For this reason

That is why I identified with President Reagan at Camp David on 15 November the areas which should be given the highest priority: ~~an~~ INF agreement, with restraints on shorter range systems; a 50% cut over five years in US and Soviet strategic offensive weapons; and a ban on chemical weapons. ~~You will have seen the statement I~~

~~issued following the Camp David meeting.~~ <sup>also</sup> I want to draw particular attention to two points underlined in it: ~~the~~

~~at Camp David:~~  
 continuing validity of NATO's current strategy; and the importance of a stable overall balance, with the elimination of conventional disparities as nuclear weapons are reduced.

The President and I also agreed on the need to press ahead with the SDI research programme which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. I see no reason why this should be a stumbling block, and I hope that you will work with us to ensure that it is not. The US position, Mr Karpov's comments to me when he came here in October, and Mr Shevardnadze's statement that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept a broad definition of research, all suggest to me that a solution should be possible. In the meantime we must press on in areas where progress can be made, quite independently of the continuing discussions on SDI. I very much regret your decision to relink the INF negotiations with the SDI research programme. There is no logic in such a link; and you had of course previously agreed that the two issues should be treated separately.

Effective verification would be an essential element in all these areas.

President Reagan and I agreed at Camp David that a chemical weapons ban should be among our priorities. I therefore welcome your agreement to use the British proposals of July as the basis for discussion. Your acceptance of a stringent verification regime in this area would bring the prospect of an agreed ban closer. Our experts are ready to discuss these matters with yours ~~at any time.~~

Mr Zamyatin told me that you were disappointed by the reaction to the Reykjavik meeting of some Western European leaders, whom he described as almost frightened at the prospect of a Soviet-American understanding. There is no question of this. We want arms control agreements and will continue to work for them. But they must be agreements which enhance, not damage, our security.

I understand that in your meeting at Reykjavik with President Reagan you also touched briefly on regional questions. Unresolved regional disputes are dangerous. In particular the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan seriously undermines confidence between East and West. The key to peace in that troubled country, is the early and complete withdrawal of all the occupying forces. (You have said you want to withdraw your forces: that would be a statesmanlike and courageous step, which the world would applaud.)

I am glad you were able to discuss human rights questions with President Reagan. In Britain too they are of great concern to a very wide range of people: there is keen interest here in the extent to which individuals in ~~the~~ <sup>your country</sup> Soviet Union are free, for instance, to exercise their religious beliefs, or monitor their country's implementation of the Helsinki accords; to join their families abroad, or simply go abroad for medical treatment. Nothing would do more to promote public confidence between East and West than for these freedoms to become standard in the Soviet Union.

I also attach great importance to the early resolution of cases of divided families in which the UK has a legitimate interest. I know you do too. I hope you will instruct your people to deal quickly with as many as possible of these cases. They are few in number and their resolution would be widely noted and welcomed in Britain.

At the Vienna CSCE meeting we are all working for better implementation of all participating states of the commitments freely undertaken at Helsinki, Madrid and Stockholm. I am glad that Sir Geoffrey Howe was able to meet Mr Shevardnadze in Vienna and discuss these questions with him.

They also discussed international terrorism, and agreed that our experts should get together to talk about this problem. I welcome this. No country can be sure of remaining immune to this modern scourge, and we all share an interest in eliminating it. That is why Geoffrey Howe provided you with a full account of the conclusive evidence of official Syrian involvement in the recent and potentially devastating terrorist incident in the UK. The decision to break diplomatic relations was not of our making. It was the inevitable result of unacceptable behaviour on the part of the Syrian authorities.

I look forward to discussing these and other questions with you when I come to Moscow. I should like then to explore with you ways of strengthening contacts between people in our two countries, and increasing mutual knowledge and understanding.

SAVIGT UNION Contact with Souler Ambassadors

Sep 79.

