

cc/c

Ref. A087/1324

MR POWELL

Prime Minister
You will want to discuss with the Foreign Secretary. I remain opposed to a Declaration on East/West. The Fco dept is

Venice Economic Summit

This coming weekend there is to be a final meeting of Personal Representatives (with accompanying 'experts') in preparation for the Venice Economic Summit.

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e will cut no ice.*

2. On the economic side, the main purpose of the meeting will be to finalise the thematic paper, which has been re-drafted in the light of the discussion at the meeting of Personal Representatives ten days ago. I do not think that I need ask the Prime Minister for fresh instructions in that respect. We will work to the same instructions as those to which we were working at the last meeting. The coming meeting will in effect be laying the foundations for the communique drafting sessions which will take place during the Summit itself.

*edd
12/5*

3. The meeting of Personal Representatives will be immediately preceded by a meeting of Political Directors, who will seek to agree upon an agenda of political issues for discussion by Foreign Ministers, and will undertake preliminary drafting preparations for any political declarations which may be thought to be required. In that context, the acting Political Director and I need fresh instructions about the possibility of a declaration on East/West relations and arms control.

No

4. At the last meeting of Personal Representatives, in accordance with the Prime Minister's instructions, I agreed that East/West relations and arms control would probably be the main issue to be discussed by Heads of State or Government at their

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first working dinner on Monday 8 June. I said, however, and persuaded others to agree, that the question whether there should be any kind of declaration from the Summit on East/West relations and arms control should be left open. Unless the European Allies had reached a measure of agreement, there would be a high risk that any attempt to agree such a declaration at the Summit would be difficult and patently divisive. Given that there was to be a meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Reykjavik the day after the Summit, it might well be better to say no more at the Venice Summit than that Heads of State or Government had discussed the issues, and not to try to think in terms of a declaration.

5. I am still apprehensive about this risk, the more so since any divisions at the Summit will become apparent only two days before the General Election here (and five days before the General Election in Italy). For these reasons, it may well be better to be modest from the outset, and suggest that there should be no Summit declaration on these issues.

why?
No
6. But it became clear at the last meeting of Personal Representatives that the Italian Presidency feared that it might be impossible not to produce a declaration from the Summit: the absence of a declaration might be thought to be hardly less embarrassing, as evidence of divisions in Europe, than a difficult and divisive attempt to agree one. The United States Political Director also believes that in practice a statement will prove inevitable, if only to satisfy the curiosity of the press.

7. At the last meeting of Personal Representatives the Japanese Personal Representative produced a draft declaration on East/West relations (copy attached as Annex A), which was full of high-flown generalities but was in fact a respectable draft as a starting point, if there had to be a declaration.

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8. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office have therefore proposed that our acting Political Director and I should have language available to us at the forthcoming meetings, so that, if it is felt that there will have to be a public statement of some kind, or that preparations should be made in case one is needed, we can ensure that it will at least be on the right lines and, in particular that, in order not to cut across the meeting of the North Atlantic Council just after the Summit, it should keep clear of specifics on arms control.

--- 9. I attach, as Annex B, a Foreign and Commonwealth Office draft intended for such a purpose. I understand that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has seen it, and is in general content with it.

10. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will wish to discuss this with the Prime Minister when he comes to see her tomorrow.

11. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Private Secretary to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

12 May 1987

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Draft Declaration on East-West Relations

April 23, 1987

1. We, the Heads of State or Government of seven major industrial nations and the representatives of the European Community, have discussed East-West relations, which are vital to world peace and stability, and are agreed that we share the following common understanding.

2. Recognizing with pride that our shared values of freedom, democracy and respect for human rights are the source of the dynamism and prosperity of our societies, we reaffirm our determination to build a more stable and constructive East-West relationship through the close cooperation that exists among Japan, North America and Europe with a view to preserving and strengthening peace. To that end, while striving to maintain a credible deterrent and always bearing in mind that the security of our countries is indivisible and must be approached on a global basis, we stand ready to promote East-West dialogue.

3. We are following, with cautious but keen interest, current Soviet policies, domestic as well as external. Recognizing that East-West relations should not be seen as a set of separate relationships affecting specific areas and allowing of selective treatment, but are a relationship comprising various elements inextricably

linked with one another and, therefore, must be considered as a totality, we will pay close attention to how the Soviet Union responds with concrete action to existing issues of common concern to us, in particular, with regard to the following:

First, there must be extensive action giving substantial progress in such areas as human rights and the free movement of people and information;

Second, balanced, substantial and verifiable reductions in the level of arms must be pursued so as to strengthen strategic stability;

Third, there must be an immediate and total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Action must be taken to expedite solutions to the other regional conflicts and issues in which there is a Soviet involvement.

We firmly believe that positive action by the Soviet Union on these issues will not only contribute to establishing an East-West relationship based on mutual trust, but will also lead to a more peaceful and stable world.

4. We hope that fruitful dialogue between the leaders of East and West will be continued. We look forward to meaningful progress on the major issues in East-West relations, in particular, through dialogue at the highest level between the United States and the Soviet Union.

VENICE ECONOMIC SUMMIT : EAST-WEST RELATIONS :
ELEMENTS FOR A DRAFT STATEMENT

1. We, the Heads of State or Government of seven major industrial nations and the representatives of the European Community, have discussed East-West relations and reaffirmed our shared principles and objectives, and our common dedication to preserving and strengthening peace.
2. We recognise with pride that our shared values of freedom, democracy and respect for human rights are the source of the dynamism and prosperity of our societies. We renew our commitment to the search for a freer, more democratic and more humane world.
3. In the conviction that the security of our countries is indivisible, and must be seen in its global context, we shall continue to consult closely on all matters affecting our common interests. Within existing alliances each of us is resolved to maintain a strong and credible defence that can protect freedom and deter aggression while not threatening the security of others.

4. We are following with close interest recent developments in the internal and external policies of the Soviet Union. It is our hope that the policies of greater openness, restructuring and democratisation point the way to the greater trust and confidence needed for progress on arms reductions and the peaceful resolution of problems between East and West.

5. We are convinced of the value of continued high level dialogue between the countries of East and West and are determined to work for a more stable and constructive relationship between them.

6. In this connection we will be paying close attention to Soviet actions on issues of common concern to us, and in particular:

First, in the negotiation of balanced, substantial and verifiable arms control measures. Effective verification is essential. Real progress can only be made if a stable overall balance, taking account of nuclear, chemical and conventional forces, is assured at all times.

Second, in the respect for human rights and the freer movement of people and ideas.

Third, in the early and peaceful resolution of regional conflicts. We look for the immediate and total withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, so that the peoples of Afghanistan and

Cambodia may be free to determine their own future.

7. We firmly believe that positive action by the Soviet Union on these issues will create greater confidence and trust between East and West, and lead to a more peaceful and stable world.