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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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CM

John Charles

INF at Venice

You know the state of play on INF and the range of options now being considered.

We have not yet been able to finalise the brief for use with the Germans in Venice. Nevertheless I enclose the latest draft, together with a possible formula for the concluding section of the NATO Communique/Declaration on INF. These texts have not been seen by FCO Ministers, but will be submitted in parallel to the Foreign Secretary tonight. Nor have they yet been formally agreed with the MOD.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to John Howe.

John Howe

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Private Secretary

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VENICE ECONOMIC SUMMIT: INF

SPEAKING NOTE FOR USE WITH FRG CHANCELLOR AND FOREIGN
MINISTER

- Alliance unity crucial to success in arms control. On LRINF were able to hold Soviet feet to fire because we held together.

- Glad we now share common ground over SRINF, and conditions to apply to agreement on double-zero: [globality, third country systems excluded, integrally linked to LRINF agreement, effective verification].

- But vital that no distance between us when we come to consider next steps after INF agreement. Believe our joint priorities clear, on basis of your (Bundestag) statements. Also clear on objectives of these priorities:

- greater security at lower level of forces
- denuclearisation of Europe is unacceptable ([Kohl in Bundestag]). Cannot afford to arouse public expectations that we support such unrealistic/dangerous visions.
- we should seize initiative from Gorbachev and ensure his salami tactics cannot pay dividends.

- we should provide ourselves with breathing-space to make the necessary modifications and improvements to our deterrent capability. We also need to assess our experience of implementation and verification of INF agreement.

- Against that background believe important to re-state priorities publicly: halving of strategic weapons, and elimination of chemical weapons/conventional imbalances.

- But recognise special concerns in FRG over residual short/shorter range nuclear missiles.

- Understand FRG wish "never to say never" to further reductions in SNF and SCUD. [Important that we continue to concentrate on missiles, not "systems" - nuclear-capable aircraft will be crucial element in continued nuclear capability in Europe].

- Need therefore to agree wording between ourselves that
 - allows for eventuality of follow-on negotiations, but
 - precludes danger evident in such negotiations being launched in parallel with current strategic/chemical/conventional negotiations.

- Therefore propose we build on draft Declaration to be issued at Reykjavik, of which US "place-holder" text already circulated in NATO [paras 1 to 6 of UKDel NATO telno 230]. For us first five paragraphs acceptable. Suggest new [attached] text for remainder.

EXTRACT FROM DRAFT NATO DECLARATION ON INF AND SECURITY

[6.] "Concluding our discussions, we welcomed the progress already made in the INF talks in Geneva as a result of Alliance cohesion and solidarity. We reaffirmed our belief that early agreement should be possible on the basis of the Alliance position. Future progress will continue to depend upon setting the arms control process in its proper context, within the overall framework of security policy. At our last meeting we agreed that "real progress on arms control can only be made if a stable overall balance is assured at all times". This will continue to be true, as we move step by step to eliminate the remaining threats to our collective security.

[7.] Apart from INF, the following steps now seem to us both necessary and feasible. They represent the priorities of the Alliance; the 50% reduction in the strategic offensive weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union, which is currently under negotiation in Geneva; and the successful conclusion, with arrangements for effective verification, of the present negotiations also in Geneva for the world-wide elimination of chemical weapons. Logically we must also work to redress the existing imbalances in conventional forces, through the negotiating frameworks which ^{now} exist in Vienna.

[8.] This is consistent with our agreement at our last meeting that "reductions in nuclear weapons will increase the importance of removing conventional disparities and eliminating chemical weapons". This will remain crucial as we contemplate further reductions in nuclear missiles in Europe. We believe that the negotiation of the objectives set out above will make a major contribution to the strengthening of European security. In such a context, further reductions in US and Soviet nuclear missiles of shorter range will become feasible."

GE2AAJ