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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Meeting with President Reagan

The attached is a  
very preliminary letter. I  
will do you a fuller  
note next week.

It is precursor to a  
report from the Foreign  
Secretary to attend the  
meeting. You normally prefer  
to see the President without  
any Ministers. Do you  
want me to head him  
off? Yes our CD 26/2



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 February 1988

*mb*

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Bilateral with President Reagan at  
NATO Summit

Thank you for your letter of 23 February about the 3 March meeting. The timing (1410-1440) is firmly established in the President's schedule. The White House propose that the meeting should take place in the Chateau Steuvenberg, where the President will be staying. They would be grateful to know who will be accompanying the Prime Minister: and suggest that other details are best settled in Brussels.

As the meeting will take place after the end of the Summit, arms control/security issues will already have been extensively discussed, and there may not be much more to say. The Prime Minister will, however, no doubt wish to take account of the way the discussion has gone. Against this background we recommend that the Prime Minister should aim to get the following key points across to President Reagan:

- the need to promote a persuasive alternative to Gorbachev's appealing vision of a non-nuclear world. Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented, and will be essential for our security for the foreseeable future;
- On SNF (subject to discussion at the Summit) that it would be a tactical mistake to push the FRG too far too soon on Lance modernisation; but that we must not let them prevent necessary adjustment/up-dating of SNF, especially SLCMs and DCAs;
- our interest in US decisions on the Trident bus;
- The strength of our feelings on US arms sales to Argentina, and the importance we attach to the existing agreed consultation process prior to major arms deals;



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- Arab/Israel: reinforce President Reagan's personal commitment to the peace process; stress that King Hussein should not be expected to make further concessions unless there is corresponding movement from the Israelis; urge Americans to exert pressure on Shamir (his visit to Washington in mid-March offers the best opportunity).

Robert Culshaw will be writing separately before the Summit with further background on the arms sales to Argentina.

Yours ever,

*L Parker*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

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NADO : Summits Pt 2

