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INFO SAVING EUROPEAN POSTSSOVIET UNION: CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM: DISCUSSION ON LITHUANIA  
SUMMARY

1. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TOOK A FAIRLY TOUGH LINE TOWARDS THE LITHUANIANS. THE FINAL RESOLUTION WAS TOUGHER THAN THAT ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY GORBACHEV. BUT IT IS LIKELY TO MAKE LITTLE DIFFERENCE IN PRACTICE.

## DETAIL

2. THOUGHTS THAT GORBACHEV MIGHT BE ABLE TO SLIP QUICKLY THROUGH THE AGENDA ITEM ON LITHUANIA AT THE END OF THE PLENUM PROVED UNFOUNDED. ALTHOUGH DISCUSSION ONLY BEGAN MID-WAY THROUGH THE ADDITIONAL THIRD DAY, IT CONTINUED WELL INTO THE EVENING AND, AS THE RECORD PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA OF 9 FEBRUARY SHOWS, THERE WAS A FAIRLY HEATED DISCUSSION WITH AN HOURS BREAK NEEDED BEFORE THE FINAL VERSION OF THE RESOLUTION COULD BE AGREED.

3. GORBACHEV OPENED THE PROCEEDINGS WITH A FAIRLY CONCILIATORY SPEECH. HE WAS CRITICAL OF SAJUDIS AND BRAZAUSKAS BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS ALSO WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR PERESTORIKA IN LITHUANIA AND THAT MANY OF THE PROBLEMS STEMMED FROM PAST POLICY IN MOSCOW. HE WARNED THAT A SEPARATIST POLICY WOULD BE FRAUGHT WITH UNFORSEEABLE CONSEQUENCES, BUT ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING CONFRONTATION. FOR THAT REASON HE WAS AGAINST ANY ATTEMPT BY THE CPSU TO DECLARE THE LITHUANIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE INVALID. HE ALSO WELCOMED THE LITHUANIAN SUGGESTION THAT THE FORTHCOMING CPSU CONGRESS SHOULD TAKE THE LITHUANIAN PLATFORM AS A DISCUSSION DOCUMENT- NOT BECAUSE HE REGARDED IT AS A MODEL FOR THE CPSU BUT BECAUSE IT SHOWED THE LITHUANIANS WERE NOT INTENDING TO ISOLATE THEMSELVES FROM THE CONGRESS. THE CONGRESS HE SAID WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS ALL DOCUMENTS.

4. GORBACHEV THEN PROPOSED A DRAFT RESOLUTION TO THE PLENUM WHICH DID NOT CONDEMN THE LITHUANIAN ACTION BUT ASKED THEM TO SET ASIDE THEIR OWN RESOLUTIONS UNTIL THE 28TH CASU CONGRESS AND PARTICIPATE IN THIS CONGRESS.

5. BRAZAUSKAS THEN SPOKE AND, AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, WAS ENTIRELY UNREPENTANT. HE RECOGNISED THAT THE DRAFT PLATFORM AGREED AT THE

PLENUM MARKED AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD. BUT HE SAID THAT THE LITHUANIAN PARTY COULD NOT AGREE TO SET ASIDE ITS DECISION AND PROPOSED THAT THE CPSU TAKE NO ACTION OVER THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE UNTIL THE 28TH CONGRESS.

6. IN A SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE WITH AN APPARENTLY IRRITATED GORBACHEV, BRAZAUSKAS SAID THAT HE COULD NOT SAY AT THIS STAGE WHETHER WHETHER THE LITHUANIANS WOULD TAKE PART IN THE 28TH CONGRESS. GORBACHEV WARNED THAT IF THEY DID NOT DO SO, THEN THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THEY HAD, IN PRACTICE, LEFT THE CPSU. KRYUCHKOV (KGB HEAD) AND PROKOFEV (MOSCOW PARTY LEADER) THEN INTERVENED IN THE DISCUSSION AND MADE CLEAR THEIR CONCERN THAT THE POLICY OF THE LITHUANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY WOULD RESULT IN THE ABANDONMENT OF COMMUNISM IN LITHUANIA. BRAZAUSKAS RETORTED THAT IF THE LITHUANIAN PARTY HAD NOT TAKEN ITS INDEPENDENT STANCE, THIS WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN THE RESULT. BUT NOW THEY WERE IN A STRONG POSITION IN THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS. HE DENIED THAT HE WAS PLANNING TO CHANGE THE NAME OF HIS PARTY.

7. BRAZAUSKAS GOT LITTLE SUPPORT IN THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION. V KUPTSOV (FIRST SECRETARY VOLOGDA OBKOM) WHO HAD BEEN PART OF THE GORBACHEV TEAM TO VISIT LITHUANIA, CONCEDED THAT THE LITHUANIAN'S PARTY DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE HAD IMPROVED THEIR POPULARITY RATING (HE QUOTED LITHUANIAN ESTIMATES THAT IT HAD GONE UP FROM 16%-75%). HE SAID THAT THE PARTY HAD NO RIGHT TO SEEK POPULARITY IN THIS WAY. HE DEMANDED THAT THE PLENUM RESOLUTION SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED TO CONDEMN THE ACTIONS OF THE LITHUANIANS. LIGACHEV STRONGLY SUPPORTED THIS. HE SAID THAT THE CPSU TOO WERE AIMING TO IMPROVE THEIR POPULAR STANDING, BUT WOULD NOT DO SO AT THE EXPENSE OF DESTROYING PARTY AND STATE UNITY. HE SAID THAT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT WITHOUT A STRONG AND UNIFIED PARTY, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GET THE COUNTRY OUT OF ITS PRESENT SITUATION. HE WAS FOR COMPROMISE, BUT NOT ON ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE. HE PROPOSED THAT THE RESOLUTION SHOULD NOT ONLY CONDEMN THE LITHUANIANS BUT ALSO OFFER MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO THE RUMP PARTY LOYAL TO MOSCOW.

8. THE DEBATE WOUND UP WITH A FURTHER DISCUSSION ABOUT THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, AND AFTER AN HOUR'S BREAK FOR REDRAFTING, THE FINAL VERSION WAS AGREED). IT DIFFERS FROM THE ORIGINAL GORBACHEV PROPOSAL BY INCLUDING A "CONDEMNATION" OF THE LITHUANIAN ACTION AS UNDERMINING PERESTROIKA, BY STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF OFFERING HELP, AND SPECIFICALLY FINANCIAL HELP TO THE RUMP LOYAL TO THE MOSCOW PARTY. IT ALSO APPARENTLY MAKES THE INVITATION TO THE LITHUANIANS PARTICIPATE IN THE 28TH CONGRESS DEPENDENT ON THE PRIOR AGREEMENT OF THE LITHUANIANS TO SUSPEND THEIR INDEPENDENT PROGRAMME AND CHARTER.

COMMENT

9. AGAIN, NO-ONE IN THIS DISCUSSION THREATENED OR HINTED AT THE USE

OF FORCE AGAINST LITHUANIANS. GORBACHEV WAS OBVIOUSLY CONTENT TO LET THE TWO SEPARATE LITHUANIAN PARTIES EXIST AT LEAST UNTIL THE CPSU CONGRESS WITH LITTLE MORE THAN A MILD RAP OVER THE KNUCKLES (OR THE INDEPENDENT KPL. THE MOOD OF THIS MEETING HOWEVER, WAS OBVIOUSLY AGAINST THIS)

10. THE FINAL RESOLUTION IS SIGNIFICANTLY TIGHTER THAN THE ORIGINAL PROPOSED BY GORBAHCEV BUT IT STILL SEEMS TO LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. HOWEVER, THE LITHUANIANS ARE OBVIOUSLY NOT GOING TO SET ASIDE THEIR DECISIONS ON INDEPENDENCE, EVEN TEMPORARILY.

THE QUESTION NOW REMAINING IS WHETHER THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO SEND DELEGATES TO THE CPSU CONGRESS, AND WHETHER MOSCOW WILL BE PREPARED TO HAVE THEM. GORBACHEV WOULD OBVIOUSLY WELCOME THEIR PRESENCE AS IT WOULD HELP HIM IN HIS TASK OF SECURING A LOOSER PARTY STRUCTURE. IT ALSO REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE RUMP PARTY, NOW IT HAS A FORMAL COMMITMENT OF SUPPORT FROM MOSCOW, AND THE INDEPENDENT KPL CAN MANAGE THEIR AFFAIRS WITHOUT OPEN CONFLICT WHICH WOULD FURTHER COMPLICATE RELATIONS BETWEEN LITHUANIA AND MOSDCOW.

11. IN PRACTISE, AS MOST OF THE SPEAKERS AT THE PLENUM PROBABLY REALISED, NOTHING THEY DECIDED WAS GOING TO MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE. THE ONE LITHUANIANS WITH WHOM WE HAVE SPOKEN WAS ENTIRELY RELAXED ABOUT THE OUTCOME. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD MEELY CONFIRM TO LITHUANIANS IN THEIR BELIEF THAT THEY COULD CONTINUE ON THEIR OWN WAY.

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