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OF 130500Z FEBRUARY 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, EAST BERLIN, UKDEL NATO
INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, UKDEL CSCE VIENNA, WARSAW, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST
INFO IMMEDIATE BMG BERLIN

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER

SUMMARY

1. ONE HOUR MEETING. SHEVARDNADZE IN MELANCHOLY AND FATALISTIC MOOD. ACCEPTS INEVITABILITY OF GERMAN UNIFICATION. HANKERS AFTER FOUR POWER MEETING BUT RECOGNISES THAT MEETING OF FOUR PLUS TWO IS NOW THE ONLY REALISTIC PROSPECT. QUESTIONS NEED FOR, OR FEASIBILITY OF, MEMBERSHIP OF NATO BY A UNITED GERMANY. WORRIED ABOUT GERMAN POLITICS AND ATTITUDES A FEW YEARS DOWN THE TRACK.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD AN HOUR MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE THIS AFTERNOON. GERMANY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY WERE THE ONLY ISSUES DISCUSSED.
3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONGRATULATED SHEVARDNADZE ON HIS SPEECH: HE HAD DEVELOPED A WITTY AND RELAXED STYLE WHICH WENT DOWN WELL. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT BEHIND THE JOKE HE HAD MADE ABOUT CHICKENS IN SPACE LAY A SERIOUS POINT AND AN IMPORTANT PROBLEM.
4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REFERRED TO THE MEDVADEV VISIT AND HIS OWN FORTHCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW. SO MUCH WAS HAPPENING SO FAST THAT HE WELCOMED THE CHANCE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS, PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING THE KOHL/GENSCHER AND BAKER VISITS TO MOSCOW. WE WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED TO KNOW HOW THE SOVIET VIEWS STOOD ON THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE GERMAN ISSUE.
5. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY WE SEEMED TO BE MOVING TOWARDS RATHER GOOD RESULTS IN THE FORM OF SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS. THE VIENNA CFE TALKS WERE GOING WELL AND EVERYBODY NOW SEEMED TO AGREE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A EUROPEAN SUMMIT. VIEWS ON THE AGENDA APPEARED TO COINCIDE. THE SOVIET UNION SHARED THE VIEW WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAD PUT TO HIM, THAT WE SHOULD ADOPT A DOCUMENT AT

THE SUMMIT. HE BELIEVED THE CFE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE SIGNED AT THE CSCE SUMMIT. HE ALSO THOUGHT ANOTHER MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD PROBABLY BE NECESSARY FIRST. WE SHOULD PERHAPS LOOK AT THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING IN BUDAPEST, WHERE THE NEXT STAGE OF OPEN SKIES WAS TO BE HELD. FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD WORK OUT A PLAN FOR THE SUMMIT IN TERMS OF DOCUMENTS TO BE ADOPTED ETC.

6. SHEVARDNADZE SAID IT WAS QUITE UNCLEAR HOW THIS RANGE OF ISSUES WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THE GERMAN QUESTION. EVENTS WERE MOVING EXTREMELY RAPIDLY AND THERE WAS NO SYNCHRONISATION BETWEEN THE CSCE PROCESS AND THE GERMAN QUESTION. CSCE WAS LAGGING BEHIND EVENTS AND HE DOUBTED IF THE TWO PROCESSES COULD NOW BE SYNCHRONISED. THERE WERE NO ANSWERS YET TO MANY QUESTIONS. PEOPLE TALKED ABOUT A UNITED GERMANY BEING A MEMBER OF NATO. WHAT DID THAT MEAN? HE WAS NOT SURE THAT WOULD BE GOOD FOR NATO, TO SAY NOTHING OF THE WARSAW PACT. KOHL AND GENSCHER HAD SAID THAT A UNITED GERMANY SHOULD BE A MEMBER OF NATO BUT THAT NO NATO TROOPS WOULD BE DEPLOYED ON THE FORMER TERRITORY OF THE GDR. HE COULD NOT IMAGINE HOW THAT WOULD WORK OUT.

THE BORDER QUESTION WAS STILL OPEN. KOHL HAD TRIED TO CALM HIM DOWN BY SAYING THAT, WHILE IT WAS NOT CONVENIENT FOR THE FRG TO TALK ABOUT THE ISSUE NOW, EVERYTHING WOULD BE FINE IN THE END. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BELIEVED KOHL AND GENSCHER AND RESPECTED THEM, JUST AS THEY RESPECTED MODROW. BUT WHO COULD SAY WHO WOULD BE ELECTED BY A UNITED GERMANY?

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT OUR VIEWS ON THE CSCE SUMMIT WERE VERY SIMILAR. IT HAD EMERGED CLEARLY AT THE NATO CAUCUS THE PREVIOUS EVENING THAT CSCE AND CFE NEEDED TO BE VERY CLOSELY LINKED AND THE CSCE SUMMIT WOULD HAVE TO GO ALONGSIDE THE AGREEMENT AND SIGNATURE OF CFE. REALISTICALLY, THE CSCE SUMMIT IN 1990 WOULD SET WORK IN HAND ON SOME OF THE MAIN ISSUES OF EUROPEAN STRUCTURE AND SECURITY RATHER THAN CROWN WORK ALREADY DONE. HE AGREED THAT THE CSCE AND GERMAN UNITY WERE OUT OF SYNC. IN ANY CASE, A MEETING OF 35 GOVERNMENTS WAS NOT THE RIGHT FORUM FOR TAKING DECISIONS ABOUT THE GERMAN QUESTION, DECISIONS WHICH FELL TO THE FOUR POWERS AND THE GERMANS. WE TRIED TO MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, WHICH WAS FOR THE TWO GERMANIES, AND THOSE RELATED MATTERS WHICH WERE FOR JOINT DETERMINATION: SOME BY THE FOUR POWERS, SOME BY NATO, SOME BY THE EC, DEPENDING ON WHAT SUBJECT OF POLICY WAS BEING DISCUSSED. WE BELIEVED THERE WAS GREAT ADVANTAGE IN HAVING A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO BECAUSE IT WOULD PRESERVE THE INTEGRATED COMMAND AND THE PRESENCE OF US, CANADIAN AND BRITISH

TROOPS IN GERMANY. THAT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE SECURITY OF EUROPE.

8. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT A UNITED GERMANY WOULD NOT BE EASY TO MANAGE. HE WONDERED WHETHER A UNITED GERMANY WOULD WANT TO HAVE FOREIGN TROOPS ON ITS SOIL. WHAT WOULD THE PLACE OF A UNITED GERMANY BE IN THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPE ? IN THE FIRST TWO OF THREE YEARS THINGS WOULD GO MORE OR LESS PAINLESSLY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD MADE AN IMPORTANT POINT IN HIS SPEECH THAT MORNING ABOUT NATIONALISM. HE WAS SURE HE WAS NOT REFERING TO LITHUANIAN NATIONALISM, WHICH WAS NOT SUCH A TERRIBLE BEAST, BUT HAD BEEN SPEAKING ABOUT MAJOR ISSUES. IF WE COULD BE SURE OF A DEMOCRATIC, UNITED GERMANY, THEN UNIFICATION WOULD BE NO TRAGEDY. BUT RUSSIA'S FRIENDS IN EAST GERMANY - AND SHE STILL HAD SOME - SAW THE NEO-NAZIS BECOMING STRONGER DESPITE BEING OUTLAWED. THIS WAS A PROBLEM IN THE FRG AS WELL. SO FAR, THE RUNNING HAD BEEN MADE BY THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, BUT AFTER UNIFICATION THINGS MIGHT BE DIFFERENT. A UNITED GERMANY WOULD NOT WANT TO LIMIT ITSELF TO BEING JUST A PARTNER.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THESE CONCERNS WERE REAL AND WIDELY SHARED. THAT WAS ONE REASON WHY WE THOUGHT IT A GOOD IDEA TO HAVE GERMANY IN NATO AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. SHEVARDNADZE HAD REFERRED TO THE IDEA, WHICH WAS OF SOME INTEREST, THAT A UNITED GERMANY MIGHT HAVE NO STATIONED NATO TROOPS IN THE FORMER GDR, ONLY GERMAN TROOPS. IF THAT COULD BE COMBINED WITH ARRANGEMENTS ABOUT SOVIET TROOPS WHICH WERE SATISFACTORY TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, THAT MIGHT BE AN IDEA WORTH PURSUING.

10. SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE WAS GIVING ALL THIS A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT BUT HE COULD NOT IMAGINE IN PRACTICE HOW IT WOULD WORK. HUMAN NATURE LOVED TO IMAGINE PERFECT VARIANTS. WHAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD PROPOSED WAS PRECISELY SUCH A VARIANT, WITH A GERMANY LED BY GOOD, DEMOCRATICALLY MINDED PEOPLE WHO WERE NOT AGGRESSIVE AND HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE PRESENCE OF US AND SOVIER TROOPS. BUT HOW DID THE GERMAN REPUBLICANS FIT INTO THAT ? THEY WERE NEO-NAZIS. THEY WERE ALREADY IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND WOULD BE IN THE BUNDESTAG. IF THEY CONSOLIDATED THEIR POWER, THEY WOULD WANT THE AMERICANS OUT. A UNITED GERMANY WOULD NOT TOLERATE THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED THAT THE REPUBLICANS WERE NOT DOING VERY WELL AT THE MOMENT. WE SHOULD NOT TAKE A NEGATIVE LINE, WHICH WOULD MERELY INCREASE THEIR SUPPORT. WE UNDERSTOOD SOVIET WORRIES. ON PROPOSURE, WE HAD BEEN THINKING OF A MEETING OF THE FOUR PLUS THE TWO GERMANIES TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS AND TO TRY TO FIND THE ANSWER. THAT WAS A BETTER FORUM THAN THE 35 AND MORE REALISTIC THAN JUST THE FOUR.

11. SHEVARDNADZE SAID GENSCHER HAD A DIFFERENT CONCEPT, IE TWO PLUS FOUR, MEANING THAT THE TWO GERMANIES WOULD MEET AND REACH AGREEMENT AND THEN INVITE THE FOUR TO JOIN THEM. THEREAFTER THE WHOLE ISSUE WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE CSCE. THE MAIN FEATURE WOULD BE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, NOT THE ROLE OF THE FOUR. WE HAD TO FACE NEW FACTS EVERY DAY. ONLY YESTERDAY THE IDEA OF A TREATY COMMUNITY HAD SEEMED THE MOST ATTRACTIVE IDEA AND CONFEDERATION HAD SEEMED REVOLUTIONARY. NOW NO-ONE WANTED TO HEAR ABOUT EITHER OR FEDERATION. MERGER WOULD SIMPLY HAPPEN AND THE FOUR WOULD BE A REGISTER TO RECORD THE FACT. BUT HE SAW NO OTHER MECHANISM BUT THE FOUR PLUS TWO AND WE WOULD HAVE TO USE IT. IN LONDON HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE FOUR MIGHT MEET BUT THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT WOULD AFFEND HELMUT. THAT WAS A REASONABLE POINT. HOWEVER, THE FOUR HAD A RIGHT TO MEET, THOUGH NOT IT WAS TOO LATE. TWO OR THREE MONTHS AGO IT WOULD HAVE BEEN REASONABLE FOR THE FOUR TO MEET AT FOREIGN MINISTER OR EVEN SUMMIT LEVEL. A MEETING OF THE SIX COULD MANAGE THE PROCESS SOMEHOW. THEY COULD NOT REGULATE THE PROCESS, BUT COULD TRY TO MAKE SURE THAT A FULL MERGER WAS NOT FORCED. THAT SEEMED TO BE THE ONLY WAY OUT. CERTAINLY THE CSCE STRUCTURES WERE NOT YET WORKING IN A WAY THAT COULD HELP.

12. SHEVARDNADZE CONTINUED THAT, AS FAR AS THE IDEA OF A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO WAS CONCERNED, IT SHOULD BE THOUGHT ABOUT AND CHECKED AND CHECKED A THOUSAND TIMES. WHY WAS THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WORRIED ABOUT A UNITED GERMANY? THAT IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE GERMANS HE COULD UNDERSTAND, BUT WHY TO US? THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT A UNITED GERMANY WOULD HAVE TWO CONSEQUENCES. THE FIRST WAS THAT US AND CANADIAN TROOPS WOULD HAVE TO GO HOME. THOSE TROOPS WOULD NOT COME TO BRITAIN OR FRANCE AND WE WOULD THUS REPEAT THE MISTAKE OF 1919 WHEN THE US HAD DETACHED ITSELF FROM THE FUTURE OF EUROPE WITH VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES (SHEVARDNADZE APPEARED TO NOD IN AGREEMENT). THE INTEGRATED COMMAND OF NATO WOULD COLLAPSE, SO YOU WOULD HAVE IN THE CENTRE OF EUROPE THE MOST POWERFUL COUNTRY TO THE WEST OF THE SOVIET UNION, IN THEORY NEUTRAL BUT IN PRACTICE WHO COULD TELL? SOVIER FEARS WOULD HAVE MORE BASIS IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES. THERE WERE NOW GENERATIONS OF RESPONSIBLE AND DEMOCRATIC GERMANS AND IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE INSTITUTIONS WHICH HAD HELPED CEMENT DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY SHOULD REMAIN. OF COURSE, NATO ITSELF WOULD DEVELOP. IT WOULD BECOME MORE POLITICAL, THERE WOULD BE LOWER TROOP LEVELS AND NATO WOULD NOT CONFRONT THE SOVIET UNION BUT RATHER PRESERVE SECURITY IN OUR PART OF EUROPE.

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PART TWO OF TWO

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13. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE KEY LINK IN THE WARSAW TREATY WAS THE GDR. THE GDR MIGHT CEASE TO EXIST. SOVIET TROOPS WOULD LEAVE CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY AND POLAND AS THE SOVIET UNION HAD STATED. A UNITED GERMANY WOULD NOT WANT SOVIET TROOPS TO REMAIN. SO WHY WOULD THEY NEED THE WARSAW TREATY? IF THERE WAS NO WARSAW TREATY ORGANISATION, WHY WAS NATO NECESSARY: EVERYTHING WOULD COLLAPSE? WE MIGHT ARGUE THAT NATO WAS NEEDED BECAUSE THE ONLY SOURCE OF DANGER WAS THE SOVIET UNION. BUT HE DOUBTED IF MANY IN EUROPE WOULD BE PERSUADED OF THAT BECAUSE THE SOVIET UNION HAD TAKEN A FIRM DECISION TO BUILD ITS FORCES ON THE BASIS OF A DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE. IN THIS THEY WERE REALLY SERIOUS. WE FACED A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT SITUATION IN WHICH THERE COULD BE DOZENS OF VARIANTS.

14. LOOKING AT EUROPE, HE HAD PUT FORWARD ONE IDEA WHICH WAS PROBABLY NAIVE AND WOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED, NAMELY A REFERENDUM THROUGHOUT EUROPE, NOT TO DECIDE THE ISSUE OF UNIFICATION BUT JUST TO FIND OUT WHAT ORDINARY PEOPLE THOUGHT. HE DOUBTED WHETHER 100 PER CENT OF THE BRITISH ELECTORATE WOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF UNIFICATION. HE WAS PRETTY SURE THAT 90 PER CENT OF THE FRENCH ELECTORATE WOULD VOTE AGAINST, TO SAY NOTHING OF THE SOVIET UNION. HE DOUBTED IF ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE NETHERLANDS WOULD VOTE FOR UNIFICATION. WE SHOULD NOT HAVE A SITUATION WHERE THE POLITICIANS THOUGHT ONE THING AND THE PEOPLE ANOTHER. THE POLES WERE WORRIED. THE CZECHS WERE VERY CONCERNED. EVERYONE WAS WORRIED. HE REALISED THAT THE PROCESS COULD NOT BE STOPPED AND TO HAVE ANY HOPE OF REGULATING IT WE WOULD NOW HAVE TO USE NOT THE FOUR BUT THE SIX. WE SHOULD NOT POSTPONE THAT MEETING TOO LONG. WE COULD MISS THE TRAIN.

15. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ~~WAS~~ BUT ADVISED SHEVARDNADZE NOT TO BE TOO GLOOMY ABOUT THE SIX. THE MEETING WOULD NEED TO BE WELL PREPARED AND WOULD NEED TO BE IN A POSITION TO DECIDE ON THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS

HE AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD DISCUSSED, SUCH AS THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE GDR. HE THOUGHT THAT SOVIET TROOPS MIGHT STAY FOR A LONG TIME. WE HAD CONSISTENTLY MADE THE POINT THAT, WHILE SELF-DETERMINATION WAS A MATTER FOR THE TWO GERMANIES, RELATED MATTERS WENT WIDER. WE HAD MADE THAT POINT DEPITE THE BAD PRESS IT GOT US IN THE FRG. THE SOVIER UNION MUST HAVE A REAL VOICE AND GENSCHER AND KOHL RECOGNISED THAT. SHEVARDNADZE AGREED, THOUGH AGAIN, HE SAID, HE COULD NOT HELP RAISING DOUBTS. KOHL WAS PROPOSING AN INTEGRATED MONETARY SYSTEM WITH THE GDR. THAT MEANT IN PRACTICE THE ABSORPTION OF THE GDR. OF COURSE, THE SIX COULD STILL DISCUSS THE STATUS OF SOVIET AND OTHER TROOPS IN GERMANY, BUT THOSE WERE RATHER SECONDARY QUESTIONS. BUT HE AGREED WE SHOULD TRY TO BE CLEAR ABOUT DATES FOR SUCH A MEETING. HE COULD NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT, IF SUCH A MEETING DID NOT HAPPEN, THE KEY ISSUES WOULD BE DECIDED IN THE STREETS RATHER THAN IN THE CONFERENCE ROOM. AND IN THIS DAY AND AGE YOU COULD NOT SHOOT PEOPLE ON THE STREETS IF THEY TOOK AN OPPOSSING VIEW. SO IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS WHEN SUCH A MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE. CLEARLY THE GERMANS HAD TO BE CONSULTED AND WE SHOULD SEE WHAT THE KOHL/MODROW PROCUDED. SHEVARDNADZE ADDED THAT, BUT FOR THE FRG ELECTION CAMPAIGN, EVENTS WOULD HAVE TAKEN A DIFFERENT TURN. BUT THE GDR WAS THE CAMPAIGN SUBJECT AND HAD ACCELERATED THE WHOLE PROCESS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED. NO GDR POLITICIAN WAS AS WELL KNOWN IN THE GDR AS KOHL, BRANDT OR GENSCHER. THEY WOULD ALL BE CAMPAIGNING. MOST PEOPLE IN THE GDR WATCHED WEST GERMAN TELEVISION. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT THAT HARKED BACK TO HONECKER'S TIME. WHEN HE HAD URGED HONECKER TO START A PROCESS OF PERESTROIKA, HONECKER HAD ARGUED THAT THE SITUATION IN THE GDR WAS DIFFERENT. HE HAD THAN SWITCHED ON THE TELEVISION AND SHOWED 4 FRG TELEVISION PROGRAMMES BEAMED IN FROM THE WEST. THE WHOLE POLICY OF HONECKER'S GOVERNMENT - EXEMPLIFIED BY THE BERLIN WALL - WAS USELESS. IT WAS A POLICY OF SELF-PRESERVATION. SHEVARDNADZE WELL UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO OPPOSE THIS URGE OF AN ENTIRE NATION TO UNITE. WHAT WAS BAD WAS THAT IT WAS HAPPENING TOO FAST.

16. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID WE SYMPATHISED. THE OPENING OF THE BORDER HAD PRECIPITATED EVENTS AND IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER IF THEY HAD TAKEN PLACE MORE RATIONALLY OVER A LONGER PERIOD. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES WE OUGHT TO LOOK AT WHAT FOOTHOLDS WE COULD FIND. SHEVARDNADZE AGREED. WE HAD MISSED A NUMBER OF POSSIBILITIES. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH BETTER IF HONECKER HAD BEGUN TO REFORM TWO OR THREE YEARS AGO. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD URGED HIM TO DO SO BUT COULD NOT IMPOSE THEIR ADVICE. HONECKER HAD ARGUED THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE CHANGED: THE PEOPLE OF THE GDR WERE WELL BROUGHT UP. BUT THEN THERE HAD BEEN AN EXPLOSION. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO KNOW THE

MOOD OF THE PEOPLE, HENCE IN PART HIS OWN, UNREALISTIC, SUGGESTION FOR A REFERENDUM. WE SHOULD CONSULT AND KEEP IN TOUCH MORE SYSTEMATICALLY. WE SHOULD WORK FASTER TO ENGAGE THE MECHANISM OF THE SIX. WE SHOULD DO OUR BEST TO ACCELERATE PROGRESS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN PROCESS. IT WAS GOOD THAT WE HAD DECIDED UPON A SUMMIT. THAT WOULD EXERCISE A STABILISING INFLUENCE. DISARMAMENT TOO WAS A VERY IMPORTANT FACTOR FOR STABILITY.

17. THE SECRETARY OF STATE PROPOSED THAT, IN ADVANCE OF HIS OWN VISIT TO MOSCOW, HE SHOULD SEND A TEAM OF OFFICIALS TO PREPARE THE GROUND IN A RATHER CONCRETE WAY. SHEVARDNADZE THOUGHT THIS A VERY SENSIBLE IDEA. IT WAS A PRACTICE WHICH THEY HAD FOLLOWED FOR YEARS WITH THE AMERICANS. IT MADE IT POSSIBLE TO COVER A LOT OF GROUND.

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