
CONFIDENTIAL FM CAPE TOWN TO IMMEDIATE FCO **TELNO 121** OF 221530Z FEBRUARY 90 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, HARARE, LUSAKA, LAGOS



MY TELNO 116: MEETING WITH MANDELA

1. I HAD A ONE AND A HALF HOUR TALK WITH MANDELA IN SOWETO THIS MORNING. AS ON THE PREVIOUS OCCASION, IT WAS A VERY FRIENDLY MEETING. MANDELA AGREED THAT WE SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THE CONTENT WITH THE PRESS.

INFO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI, BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS

- 2. I EXPLAINED THE EFFORTS THE PRIME MINISTER PERSONALLY HAD MADE WITH DE KLERK, BAREND DU PLESSIS AND PIK BOTHA TO BRING THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE MANY OF THE DECISIONS THEY HAD NOW TAKEN. IN DOING SO AND IN OUR EXCHANGES WITH THEM SINCE, INCLUDING WITH DE KLERK JUST BEFORE HIS SPEECH ON 2 FEBRUARY, WE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT IF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT DID THESE THINGS THERE WOULD BE A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM BRITIAN. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAD NOW TAKEN REALLY MAJOR STEPS AND WE WERE MAKING A POSITIVE THOUGH LIMITED RESPONSE. WE WOULD NOT BE COUNTINUING THE VOLUNTARY EMBARGOES ON TOURISM AND NEW INVESTMENT. THE FORMAL EC EMBARGOES ON THE IMPORT OF IRON AND STEEL AND KRUGERRANDS WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL THERE WAS AGREEMENT IN THE EC TO RESCIND THEM. THE GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT ALSO WOULD CONTINUE. SO WOULD THE MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO AND EMBARGOES ON ALL OTHER FORMS OF MILITARY COOPERATION. WE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IT MADE SENSE TO DISCOURAGE ACADEMIC, CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC CONTACTS. I POINTED OUT TO MANDELA THAT MOST OF THESE CONTACTS, IN OUR CASE, WERE WITH THE LIBERAL ENGLISH-SPEAKING AND STRONGLY ANTI-APARTHEID UNIVERSITIES OF CAPE TOWN, THE WITWATERSRAND, RHODES AND NATAL, WHERE WE WERE SUPPORTING LARGE NUMBERS OF BLACK SOUTH AFRICAN STUDENTS.
- 3. MANDELA SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD AND VERY MUCH APPRECIATED THE ROLE THE PRIME MINISTER HAD PLAYED AND THE EFFORTS I HAD MADE TO HELP SECURE HIS RELEASE AND THAT OF WALTER SISULU AND OTHERS, THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC ETC. HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS. BUT THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL CHANGE HAD ONLY JUST BEGUN HERE AND IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. I SAID THAT WE AGREED THAT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. IN OUR CASE, HOWEVER, THE PRESSURE WAS EXERTED MORE DIRECTLY WITH SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTERS THAN BY MOST OTHER COUNTRIES. WE DID NOT TRY TO DO SO IN PURELY DECLARATORY WAYS. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO GET RESULTS SIMPLY BY

PAGE 1 CONFIDENTIAL THREATENING THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OR BY TELLING THEM THAT, WHATEVER THEY DID, THERE STILL WOULD BE NO RESPONSE. MANDELA HIMSELF HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF DE KLERK BEING ABLE TO TAKE THE NATIONAL PARTY WITH HIM. HE WAS FACING A STRONG RIGHT WING REACTION. THERE ALSO WERE OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SECURITY FORCES. NONE OF THIS WAS CRITICAL AT PRESENT BUT THE PROCESS COULD BE BROUGHT TO A STANDSTILL IF IT APPEARED TO THE GOVERNMENT TO BE RESULTING ONLY IN POLITICAL PENALTIES AND NO PRIZES.

- 4. ON THE REMAINING OBSTACLES TO NEGOTIATION, I ASSURED MANDELA THAT WE WOULD BE PRESSING THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO LIFT THE STATE OF EMERGENCY PROVIDED CONDITIONS OF CALM WERE MAINTAINED, THOUGH THERE WAS AN URGENT NEED TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE VIOLENCE IN NATAL. ON THE ISSUE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ANC AND DE KLERK HAD INDICATED THAT HE WAS READY FOR THESE TO TAKE PLACE SOON. THE ISSUE WOULD BE A DIFFICULT ONE AS SOME OF THE PERSONS THE ANC CONSIDERED POLITICAL PRISONERS HAD COMMITTED HORRENDOUS CRIMES THOUGH THE SAME WAS EQUALLY TRUE OF SOME MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE PROGRESS TOWARDS AGREEMENT ON SOME KIND OF AMNESTY. I HAD TALKED TO DR VILJOEN, MINISTER OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, ABOUT THIS. MANDELA EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS.
- 5. I SAID THAT WE COULD NOT AGREE WITH OTHER PARTS OF THE HARARE DECLARATION. IDEAS THAT AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED OR ELECTIONS TO A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY HELD BEFORE ANY AGREEMENT ON THE FUTURE CONSTITUTION HAD BEEN REACHED WERE NON-STARTERS: THEY AMOUNTED TO A DEMAND THAT MAJORITY RULE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE. THAT HAD NOT BEEN THE PATTEN IN ZIMBABWE OR NAMIBIA AND WAS NOT GOING TO SUCCEED IN SOUTH AFRICA EITHER. THE ANC ALSO SEEMED TO BE TRYING TO INSIST ON THE REPEAL OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT. THE STATE OF EMERGENCY COULD BE TERMINATED BY EXECUTIVE ACTION. THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT WAS FLAWED, BUT IT WOULD REQUIRE LEGISLATION TO REPLACE IT AND IF THAT WERE MADE A PRE-CONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS, THEY WOULD BE PUT OFF FOR A LONG TIME. A BETTER COURSE WOULD BE TO GET ASSURANCES FROM THE GOVERNMENT THAT THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT WOULD NOT BE USED AGAINST THE ANC OR ANY OTHER POLITICAL GROUPING, PROVIDED THEY ACTED PEACEFULLY. WE CERTAINLY WOULD SUPPORT THAT AND COULD HELP TO MONITOR IT.
- 6. IN RESPONSE MANDELA INDICATED THAT, FOR HIS PART, HE BELIEVED THAT THERE SHOULD BE ONLY TWO CONDITIONS TO BE MET LIFTING OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND AN AMNESTY FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE. I ASKED IF, ON THAT BASIS, THE ANC WOULD

PAGE 2 CONFIDENTIAL COMMIT THEMSELVES FORMALLY TO A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE AND MANDELA SAID THAT THEY SHOULD.

- 7. I SAID THAT WE WERE GLAD THAT SISULU AND KATHRADA HAD GONE TO NATAL FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH DHLOMO IN AN ATTEMPT TO GET THE VIOLENCE THERE UNDER CONTROL. I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD BE ACHIEVED UNTIL MANDELA SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH BUTHELEZI AND HE HOPED THAT THIS COULD BE USED TO HELP BRING AN END TO THE KILLINGS.
- 8. MANDELA SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GOING TO LUSAKA AND, POSSIBLE, HARARE NEXT WEEK TO MEET THE ANC AND FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS AND THEN PLANS TO GO TO STOCKHOLM TO SEE TAMBO. HE WAS THEN LIKELY TO RETURN TO SOUTH AFRICA FOR THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT. HE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE STOPPING IN LONDON ON THIS OCCASION. BUT HE WOULD BE GOING TO LONDON FOR THE WEMBLY RALLY ON 16 APRIL.
- 9. I AM TELEGRAPHING SEPERATELY ABOUT OTHER POINTS MANDELA MADE.

RENWICK

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