

PRIME MINISTER

## MEETING WITH GORBACHEV

You were reflecting on the order in which you want to take the various issues in your meeting with Gorbachev.

He normally likes to start by discussing his domestic preoccupations. The problem is that it can take quite a long time. On the other hand it helps you to judge his mood, the pressures which he is under and how he is meeting them. My inclination would be to let him start on these - the economy, Yeltsin, the Baltics, the forthcoming party conference, the role of the military - if that seems to be what he wants; but to keep an eye on the time. You will want to select three or four key questions - what is his bottom line with Lithuania? What is his most pressing need for help with the economy? How is he going to establish a new balance between the centre and the republics? - and concentrate on them, keeping his anecdotal account for lunch. You will want to be moving on to more operational issues after an hour.

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You will want to devote the greater part of the meeting to Germany and future European Security. The judgment from Washington appears to be that Gorbachev has not really thought through his ideas on this. Whether it is really worth going back over the past few months and how you felt let down by him at the turn of the year, I rather doubt. I would not harp on it. We have to deal with the situation as it is.

You will want to take him through the various points of reassurance for the Soviet Union: no NATO forces in East Germany: Soviet forces to remain for a transitional period: changes in NATO strategy: a greater political role for NATO: the assurance of a CFE agreement: the prospect of negotiations on SNF: Germans to confirm renunciation of nuclear and chemical weapons: a further CFE which could include limits on the size of German forces: prospects of German (and other Western) financial help: ideas on building up the CSCE. There is a great deal here, and the question is how best to package it, to enable him to sell it in the Soviet Union. He will go on about dissolving alliances, creating a new pan-European security structure based

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on the CSCE, and the need for a transitional period. You will need to underline that this is illusory now. In addition, a rather vague Soviet idea for an agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact seems to be emerging, although it is far from clear what it would be about: you will want to explore. It is possible that the Germans and Americans are cooking up something further. You will want to quiz Jim Baker on this tomorrow.

The purpose will be to talk the issue of Germany and NATO through with him in depth and try to implant an idea of how the German issue can be resolved in ways which get him some political credit in the Soviet Union. If you can make some progress, that would be a very worthwhile outcome from the meeting, but it would be unrealistic to expect anything more concrete. The trap to be avoided is allowing him to claim you as an ally against Germany and in favour of slowing everything down on unification. We are past that point.

The other area which needs substantive discussion is nuclear arms control, in particular non-circumvention, but also the case for retaining nuclear weapons in Europe (you will also want to pursue this with the military). You will want to get to this before lunch, say by 1230. The Americans have suggested that you should not take the initiative in raising non-circumvention: the real test how serious the Russians are will be whether Gorbachev himself brings it up. If he does not we can probably conclude that it is just the bureaucrats stirring things up. But I think you must make clear that we and the Americans are committed to continuing our present cooperation, and absolutely reject any third party constraints. That cooperation has been in place since the middle of World War II.

There are two difficult issues which I suggest you deal with at the very end of the morning session, while we are still in very restricted format. They are biological weapons and Mrs. Gordievsky (apparently President Bush did not raise her case specifically). He will not welcome your mentioning either point. If you want to end on a sweeter note, you might try to get agreement before lunch on respective Embassies keeping their

Residences in Moscow and London: and mention the sort of bilateral and economic help which we are prepared to give.

That would leave regional issues to be done mainly over lunch, together with further discussion of internal developments and anything more he wants to tell you about his visit to the United States. You will also want to work in - perhaps under the Middle East - something about Jewish emigration and the rise of anti-Semitism, presenting the latter as a European-wide phenomenon. You might mention Princess Anne's visit and end by issuing an invitation to President Gorbachev to pay another official visit to the United Kingdom, next year.

C.D.P

(C. D. POWELL)

6 June 1990

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