

SECRET

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MIL GARDEN

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MIPT: THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALK WITH THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, BRUSSELS, 4 JULY: NATO SUMMIT DECLARATION

1. BAKER SAID THE DECLARATION SHOULD HAVE AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE FOR BUREAUCRATISE, HAVE A HIGH POLITICAL CONTENT AND BE REASONABLY SHORT. THE AMERICANS BELIEVED THAT THE INITIATIVES IN THEIR DRAFT WERE SENSIBLE AND WORTH ISSUING IN THE DECLARATION BOTH FOR THEIR INTRINSIC MERITS AND FOR THEIR PRESENTATIONAL VALUE. THE PRESENTATIONAL PITCH WAS NOT JUST TO THE SOVIET UNION BUT TO GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION. MORE WAS NEEDED THAN JUST GERMAN UNIFICATION WITH A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO: SUPPORT FOR NATO BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BE CRUCIAL OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS. THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT. THAT MORNING FOR EXAMPLE MECKEL, THE GDR FOREIGN MINISTER, HAD BEEN TALKING TO HIM ABOUT THE DENUCLEARISATION OF GERMANY AND GETTING ALL ALLIED TROOPS OUT OF BERLIN.

2. BAKER SAID HE KNEW WE HAD A PROBLEM WITH THE REFERENCE (PARAGRAPH 16 OF THE DRAFT) TO NUCLEAR FORCES AS WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT. IN THE AMERICANS' VIEW THIS WAS NO MORE THAN A RECOGNITION OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES. THE AMERICANS ALSO WISHED TO RETAIN THE SYMBOLIC INITIATIVES SUCH AS INVITING GORBACHEV TO NATO. THIS WAS A COST-FREE GESTURE.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THE UK DIFFICULTIES WITH PARAGRAPHS 16 AND 17. WE FELT VERY STRONGLY THAT A REFERENCE TO NUCLEAR FORCES AS WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT WOULD MAKE IT MOST DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF SUB-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAUSE WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT WERE UNDERSTOOD TO BE STRATEGIC FORCES. WE SAW THE DANGER OF ABANDONING AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE ALLIES' DETERRENT. IN ADDITION PARAGRAPHS 16 AND 17 SEEMED TO PREEMPT THE OUTCOME OF THE REVIEW OF ALLIED STRATEGY. BUT AT THE SUMMIT WE WOULD BE ANXIOUS NOT TO CROSS SWORDS WITH THE AMERICANS.

4. BAKER SAID THERE HAD BEEN UNANIMITY OF SUPPORT IN WASHINGTON FOR ALL THE INITIATIVES IN THE U.S. DRAFT DECLARATION. THE SUPPORTERS HAD INCLUDED THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE DEFENCE SECRETARY. THE AMERICANS WERE NOT TALKING OF ABANDONING FLEXIBLE RESPONSE BUT THAT STRATEGY HAD ACQUIRED THE MEANING OF AN INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHIN THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF A CONFLICT. IT NEEDED TO BE MODIFIED IF SOVIET FORCES LEFT EASTERN EUROPE. DESCRIBING NUCLEAR FORCES AS WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT WAS TO ADOPT A DELIBERATELY AMBIGUOUS PHRASE, THE DEFINITION OF WHICH WOULD BE FOR THE ALLIES THEMSELVES. BAKER UNDERSTOOD IT TO MEAN THAT NUCLEAR FORCES WERE WEAPONS TO BE USED AT THE POINT WHEN THEY WERE NEEDED. IT WAS A PHRASE VASTLY PREFERABLE TO 'NO EARLY FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS'. THE ACCEPTANCE OF 'NO EARLY FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS' IMPLIED ACCEPTANCE OF THE ANTI-NUCLEAR LOBBY'S TERMS OF DEBATE. ZOELICK WONDERED IF IT WOULD HELP IF THE DRAFT SAID '..... MAKING ITS NUCLEAR FORCES TRULY WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT IN EUROPE'. IF THIS AMENDMENT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE COULD THE UK OFFER ANYTHING ELSE, IF POSSIBLE AHEAD OF THE START OF THE SUMMIT ITSELF?

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED AGAIN THE UK FEAR THAT REFERRING TO NUCLEAR FORCES AS WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT MIGHT REMOVE UNCERTAINTY IN THE MINDS OF A POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR. HE UNDERTOOK TO GET BACK TO THE AMERICANS ON LANGUAGE.

6. AT THE END OF THE MEETING BAKER TOLD THE SECRETARY OF STATE VERY PRIVATELY THAT THE GERMANS WERE SEEKING DELETION OF THE REFERENCE TO KEEPING WEAPONS UP TO DATE. TO FEND THEM OFF THE AMERICANS NEEDED TO MINIMISE OTHER CHANGES TO THE DRAFT DECLARATION, AND VERY MUCH WANTED TO RETAIN THE PHRASE 'LAST RESORT'.

7. PLEASE ADVANCE PS, PS/NO 10, GOULDEN AND HEAD SEC POL D.

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