



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
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12 December 1990

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P. Minister
COP 12/11

Dear Charles

I attach a note about operational planning for Operation Granby. You will understand that this is highly sensitive.

The presentation to members of OPD(G) by Air Chief Marshal Hine and General Wilkes on 17th December will illustrate the plans and give more detail.

in reply
Sue Webb

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OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR OP GRANBY - BRIEF FOR PRIME MINISTER

1. General Schwarzkopf (CINCENTCOM) is confident that he already has more than enough forces in theatre to defeat any Iraqi attempt to invade the NE part of Saudi Arabia, and that he would have sufficient warning to re-position his ground forces to thwart any such attack. Moreover, there is a rolling daily air plan to conduct both defensive and offensive air operations should the Iraqis launch a pre-emptive attack. The likelihood of a major Iraqi ground operation into Saudi Arabia is now very remote, but the possibility of a 'bolt from the blue' air attack with surface-to-air missiles and manned aircraft remains. A high proportion of allied surface-to-air missiles are kept on immediate or near-immediate alert to counter such a surprise attack, and fighter patrols with airborne early warning and control are also maintained on a round-the-clock basis. An Iraqi attack of this kind on any scale would almost certainly lead Schwarzkopf to seek political authority to implement the air campaign plan described below.

2. The overall operational plan for an offensive operation to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait has yet to be finalized, as the ground operations plan is being revised to reflect the very significant reinforcements that President Bush recently agreed should be sent to the area. These reinforcements should be in theatre and operational by end January or early February - a timing that coincides with our own projection for 1(UK) Armd Div becoming operational. How the UK Division is to be employed has yet to be decided, but the Joint Commander (ACM Hine) has strongly recommended that the Division be re-subordinated from MARCENT (the US Marines) to ARECENT (with the US Army's VII Corps). This minute assumes CINCENTCOM's agreement.

Air Campaign

3. The air campaign plan is well developed and comprehensive. It is to be conducted in 4 phases. Phase 1, which is scheduled to last 4-6 days, is directed against key targets in Iraq itself. It is designed to achieve air superiority (and here our Tornado GR1s with their JP 233 airfield denial weapons have a vital role to play) to disrupt the Iraqi High Command's C3 system, and to interdict the main lines of communication between Central Iraq and the Kuwaiti Theatre of Operations (KTO). Planning to attack CW, BW and nuclear facilities, oil refineries, power stations and 'civil electronics' installations (to prevent Saddam Hussein, if possible, from communicating with his people) and to begin attrition of the Republican Guards Divisions which constitute the most serious ground threat to the International Force has also been undertaken.

4. Phase 2 is aimed at suppressing Iraqi surface-to-air defences (both SAM and AAA) in and close to Kuwait so that allied aircraft can subsequently attack Iraqi ground forces with minimum risk (Phase 3). These two phases are likely to overlap somewhat, and Phase 3 will be focused on (continuing) attacks against the

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Republican Guards, other Iraqi armoured forces, artillery and forward prepared defensive positions where it is intended that the allies should 'break in.' Phases 2 + 3 may last a week or more, and it is planned that the allied ground operation should begin only when the key Iraqi divisions have been reduced to 50% strength. Phase 4 will be air operations in support of the ground plan, and will be aimed at maintaining air superiority, interdiction of Iraqi supply lines and main storage depots, and support of ground operations. Phase 4 will continue for as long as necessary.

Ground Plan

5. The ground plan envisages attacks into Kuwait by the US Marines (MARCENT) and Arab (Egyptian, Saudi, Kuwaiti and perhaps Syrian) forces. MARCENT will be on the right (coastal) side with the Arabs on their left and attacking into the SW of Kuwait. The depth of these attacks will depend on the strength of Iraqi opposition and the effectiveness of their well-prepared defences. To the extent that our forces can exploit penetrations, so much the better, but the main allied attack will be into SE Iraq, with a powerful armoured thrust, spearheaded by the US VII Corps and including 1(UK) Armd Div, on a wide left hook, aimed at engaging and defeating the Republican Guards before cutting off the Iraqi forces in Kuwait from the north. This should prove the decisive battle, but Iraqi opposition inside Kuwait could continue and would be suppressed by sustained allied joint land/air operations. If the Iraqis had not sought a cease fire by this stage, opportunities could arise for the insertion of one or two US marine brigades from offshore amphibious ships, one aim being to prevent an Iraqi withdrawal into Kuwait city and thereby minimising the risk of street fighting.

Targeting Constraints

6. The air campaign plan seeks to inflict minimum collateral damage, avoid the risk of damage to sites of religious significance and to minimise civilian casualties. The US also plans to attack strategic targets such as oil refineries and power stations in a way that will not keep them out of action for a lengthy period following cessation of hostilities. Finally, the Americans are studying as a matter of urgency the likely or possible effects of attacks against CW and BW storage facilities. They too are concerned about the release of such agents into the atmosphere where they could be carried downwind over quite considerable distances and cause substantial ill-effects amongst the civilian population.

Liaison

7. We have a couple of Army and RAF staff officers who work alongside their US counterparts in theatre on the preparation of ground and air plans for offensive operations.

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Republican Guards, other Iraqi armed forces, artillery and forward prepared defensive positions. It is intended that the allies should 'break in' Phase 3 + 4 say last week or more, and it is planned that the allied ground operations should begin only when the key Iraqi divisions have been reduced to 50% strength. Phase 4 will be air operations in support of the ground plan, and will be aimed at maintaining air superiority, interdiction of Iraqi supply lines and main storage depots, and support of ground operations. Phase 5 will continue for as long as necessary.

Ground Plan

2. The ground plan envisages attacks into Kuwait by the US Marine (MARINE) and Arab (ARAB) (ARAB) and perhaps Syrian) forces. MARINE will be on the right (coastal) side with the Arabs on their left and attacking into the SW of Kuwait. The bulk of these attacks will depend on the strength of Iraqi opposition and the effectiveness of their well-prepared defenses. To the extent that our forces can exploit penetrations, so much the better, but the main allied attack will be into the SW and a powerful armored thrust, spearheaded by the US VII Corps and including (US) 1st Armored Div, on a wide front, aimed at engaging and defeating the Republican Guards before cutting off the Iraqi forces in Kuwait from the north. This should prove the decisive battle, but Iraqi opposition inside Kuwait could continue and would be suppressed by sustained allied joint land/air operations. If the Iraqis had not sought a cease fire by this stage, opportunities would exist for the insertion of one or two US marine brigades from the Gulf to Kuwait City and thereby maintaining the threat.



3. The attack plan is to follow similar collateral damage, avoid the use of weapons of religious significance and to minimize civilian casualties. The US also plans to attack the Iraqis such as oil refineries and power stations in a way that will not keep them out of action for a lengthy period following cessation of hostilities. Finally, the Iraqis are studying as a matter of urgency the likely possible effects of attacks against CW and BW storage facilities. They are concerned about the release of such agents into the atmosphere where they could be carried downwind over quite considerable distances and cause substantial ill-effects amongst the civilian population.

Mission

4. We have a couple of key and key staff officers who work alongside their US counterparts in theatre on the preparation of ground and air plans for offensive operations.