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Prime Minister  
not unlike your  
concerns  
with him.  
COP.

SHAMIR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON: 11-13 DECEMBER

## SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION CONSIDER SHAMIR VISIT A SUCCESS. GOOD ATMOSPHERE AND BROAD AGREEMENT OVER THE GULF. ADMINISTRATION PUT DOWN MARKERS ON PEACE PROCESS AND ISRAELI PRACTICES IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

## DETAIL

2. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO STATE DEPARTMENT (KURTZER, DAS/NEA) AND WELCH (NSC) ABOUT PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON.
3. SHAMIR'S MAIN MEETINGS WERE WITH THE PRESIDENT AND CHENEY ON 11 DECEMBER AND BAKER ON 13 DECEMBER. BOTH KURTZER AND WELCH THOUGHT THAT THE VISIT HAD GONE WELL. ALTHOUGH ALL SUBJECTS HAD BEEN COVERED, THE AREAS OF AGREEMENT ON THE MAIN ISSUE OF THE DAY, THE GULF CRISIS, HAD BEEN SUFFICIENT TO OVERSHADOW DIFFERENCES ON THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
4. ON THE GULF CRISIS, THE PRESIDENT TOLD SHAMIR THAT HE WAS DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE AN OUTCOME IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. NONE OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S RECENT MOVES - HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE, CLOSING OF THE KUWAIT EMBASSY ETC - WERE TO BE SEEN AS ANY DIMINUTION OF THIS. THE US DID NOT INTEND TO GET DRAWN INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAQ, AND REMAINED FIRMLY AGAINST ANY LINKAGE WITH THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT ISRAEL'S LOW PROFILE WAS CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE GOALS AND WAS ALSO

IN ISRAEL'S OWN INTEREST. SHAMIR APPARENTLY ACCEPTED THIS AND SAID HE WOULD SUPPORT THE ADMINISTRATION IN WHATEVER IT CHOSE TO DO TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS.

5. THERE WAS A GENERAL EXCHANGE ON THE POST-CRISIS ENVIRONMENT. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE WOULD MEET THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, IT WOULD NOT RESOLVE THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE CRISIS. SHAMIR AGREED ON THE NEED TO TACKLE REGIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL. HE EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTROLLING IRAQ'S NON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND MAINTAINING SANCTIONS BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL ON HOW THIS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED.

6. THE PRESIDENT TOLD SHAMIR THAT IT WAS IN THE COLLECTIVE INTEREST THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PROVIDE ARMS TO MODERATE ARAB STATES FOR THEIR SELF DEFENCE. SHAMIR DID NOT DISPUTE THE PRINCIPLE BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SIZE OF RECENT AND UPCOMING ARMS SALES (PARTICULARLY TO SAUDI ARABIA) AND THE RISK OF DIVERSION. THE PRESIDENT (AND IN MORE DETAIL CHENEY) REPEATED US COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL SECURITY AND ITS MILITARY QUALITATIVE EDGE IN THE REGION.

7. THE PRESIDENT TOLD SHAMIR THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD WANT TO SEE EARLY MOVEMENT ON THE PEACE PROCESS ONCE THE GULF CRISIS WAS RESOLVED. BAKER WENT OVER THIS GROUND IN MORE DETAIL AND, ACCORDING TO KURTZER, IN FAIRLY BLUNT TERMS. BAKER NOTED THAT, FOR A PERIOD OF A YEAR, THE ADMINISTRATION HAD THOUGHT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE TOWARDS AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE BUT THAT WHEN THE TIME CAME THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO TAKE A DECISION. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD BE GIVING THOUGHT TO HOW THE PROCESS MIGHT BE RESUMED AND, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, MAKING DECISIONS IN ADVANCE RATHER THAN STAVING THEM OFF. WHEN BAKER SUGGESTED THAT NEW IDEAS WERE REQUIRED, SHAMIR RESPONDED DEFENSIVELY THAT THE ISRAELIS STILL HAD A PERFECTLY GOOD PEACE PROPOSAL ON THE TABLE - THEIR FOUR POINTS OF MAY 1989. BAKER SAID THAT AN ADMINISTRATION TEAM LED BY ROSS WOULD VISIT ISRAEL IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS TO TALK THROUGH POSSIBLE WAYS FORWARD.

8. BAKER SUGGESTED TO SHAMIR THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD KEEP AN OPEN MIND ON THREE POINTS: SOVIET INVOLVEMENT, A ROLE FOR THE UN AND SYRIAN INTENTIONS. BAKER NOTED THAT THE HELPFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE PERFORMANCE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE GULF CRISIS MEANT THAT ISRAEL COULD NO LONGER DISMISS OUT OF HAND THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE. SHAMIR ACKNOWLEDGED THE ROLE OF THE UN IN THE GULF CRISIS, BUT SAID THAT IT HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY

HOSTILE TOWARDS ISRAEL OVER THE YEARS AND HE REMAINED SCEPTICAL AS TO WHETHER IT COULD CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY ON ARAB/ISRAEL. ON SYRIAN INTENTIONS, BAKER SAID HE HAD NO UNDUE EXPECTATIONS, BUT COULD NOT RULE OUT THAT, FOLLOWING THE GULF CRISIS, SYRIA MIGHT SEE ADVANTAGE IN INVOLVING ITSELF IN THE PEACE PROCESS. SHAMIR WAS VERY DEFENSIVE. HE SAID HE SAW LITTLE DIFFERENCE IN ATTITUDE AND OUTLOOK BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAQ. SYRIA'S INTEREST IN BRINGING DOWN SADDAM HUSSEIN SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH ITS BROADER REGIONAL INTERESTS. SYRIAN AMBITIONS IN LEBANON, PARTICULARLY ITS APPARENT INTEREST IN PROVOKING CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL IN THE SOUTH, WERE CAUSING ISRAEL INCREASING CONCERN.

9. ON SETTLEMENTS, THE PRESIDENT AND BAKER REITERATED US OPPOSITION TO ISRAELI POLICY. BAKER SAID THAT US OPPOSITION WAS IF ANYTHING GROWING STRONGER SINCE THE WORSENING SITUATION IN THE OTS COULD BE ATTRIBUTED IN PART TO ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICY. SHAMIR COMMITTED HIMSELF PERSONALLY TO LEVY'S LETTER OF 2 OCTOBER TO BAKER ON

SETTLEMENT OF SOVIET JEWS. HE ALSO REITERATED THAT SETTLEMENT OF SOVIET JEWS IN ISRAEL WAS BEYOND THE FINANCIAL MEANS OF ISRAEL, BUT HE MADE NO SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR FURTHER US HELP.

10. BAKER ALSO MADE STRONG REPRESENTATIONS ON ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION OF THE OTS. SPECIFICALLY, HE SAID THE ADMINISTRATION OPPOSED THE RUMOURED REINTRODUCTION OF DEPORTATION, WERE CONCERNED ABOUT USE OF IDF SHARP SHOOTERS TO COMBAT STONE THROWING, URGED THE ISRAELIS TO REDUCE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL AND URGED THEM TO DO WHAT THEY COULD TO BRING SOME SEMBLANCE OF NORMAL LIFE TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (IN PARTICULAR BY REOPENING UNIVERSITIES). COMMENT

11. ONE OBJECTIVE OF THIS VISIT WAS CLEARLY TO IMPROVE THE PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SHAMIR AND THE ADMINISTRATION (PARTICULARLY THE PRESIDENT). ON THE GULF, THE ADMINISTRATION WANTED TO REASSURE SHAMIR THAT ISRAEL'S INTERESTS WERE NOT BEING FORGOTTEN AND ENCOURAGE HIM TO MAINTAIN A LOW PROFILE. SHAMIR'S COMMENTS AFTER HIS MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT (...VERY GOOD AND FRIENDLY CONVERSATION... FULL SUPPORT FOR THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES... PRESIDENT EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR OUR BEHAVIOUR, FOR OUR POLICY AND FOR OUR PROBLEMS) SUGGEST THESE OBJECTIVES WERE ACHIEVED. BUT DESPITE THIS IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES REMAIN ESPECIALLY OVER THE PEACE PROCESS.

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