

SECRET / *DENA*

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILATERAL WITH BAKER

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A SHORT BILATERAL WITH BAKER AT THE NAC TODAY. THE GULF WAS THE ONLY SUBJECT.

U S OPINION

2. BAKER SAID THAT WHILE HE WAS NOT YET SURE OF CONGRESSIONAL OPINION, PUBLIC OPINION WAS NOW 63 PERCENT IN FAVOUR OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY, WITH 56 PERCENT FAVOURING THE USE OF FORCE IF SADDAM HUSSEIN DID NOT WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT BY 15 JANUARY. IF FORCE WAS USED, THERE WOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE RALLYING TO THE PRESIDENT BUT THAT WOULD DIMINISH WITH EVERY DAY THAT PASSED AND WITH CASUALTIES.

MEETING OF THE FIVE

3. BAKER SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE A MEETING OF THE PERMANENT FIVE IN EARLY JANUARY AND TO AVOID THE FRENCH RUNNING AWAY WITH IT, IE IT SHOULD BE HELD IN LONDON. BAKER SAID HE WOULD TRY TO STEER THE MEETING TOWARDS LONDON AND THOUGHT THAT SHEVARDNAZDE WOULD FOLLOW HIS LEAD. HE DID NOT THINK THERE WAS ANY ACTION TO BE TAKEN NOW. HE WAS NOT GOING TO CHASE AFTER THE IRAQIS, WHO HAD MORE TO GAIN FROM A MEETING THAN THE AMERICANS. 3 JANUARY WAS A DATE BEYOND WHICH THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT GO BECAUSE IT WOULD ALLOW THE IRAQIS TO MANIPULATE THE DEADLINE. IF THE IRAQIS AGREED TO A MEETING ON 3 JANUARY, IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO HAVE A MEETING OF THE PERMANENT FIVE JUST BEFORE THAT OR (LESS GOOD) ON THE WAY BACK. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THERE WAS A LOT TO BE SAID FOR BAKER GOING WITH A CLEAR MESSAGE AS LONG AS THE FRENCH AND THE CHINESE DID NOT TRY TO COMPLICATE IT. BAKER THOUGHT THE CHINESE PROBABLY WOULD ATTEND SUCH A MEETING AND THAT, EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD NOT SIGNED UP TO RESOLUTION 678, THE VERY ACT OF THEIR PARTICIPATION WOULD SEND A CLEAR SIGNAL TO IRAQ.

PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT QUITE POSSIBLE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD MAKE A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WHEN HE WAS UP AGAINST THE DEADLINE. BAKER SAID THAT IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES WE SHOULD FOLLOW RIGHT ON IN WITH OUR FORCES, RE-INSTALL THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT IN KUWAIT AND KEEP SANCTIONS ON IN FULL. IT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN SHOULD OCCUPY RUMEILA AND BUBYIAN, BUT WHETHER TO USE SANCTIONS OR FORCE TO PUSH HIM OUT WOULD BE A DECISION FOR THE TOP POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT OUR PRECISE STRATEGY COULD NOT BE DECIDED IN ADVANCE, THOUGH WE MUST BE CLEAR THAT PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. MR WESTON COMMENTED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS UNLIKELY TO ANNOUNCE THAT HE WOULD BE WITHDRAWING PARTIALLY. HE WOULD ANNOUNCE THAT HE WAS WITHDRAWING BUT MAYBE HE WOULD SIMPLY THIN OUT HIS TROOPS ACROSS THE BOARD. WE SHOULD PERHAPS MAKE CLEAR NOW THAT WE WOULD BE WATCHING AND WOULD NEED EARLY SIGNS OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. BAKER SAID THAT, IF SADDAM HUSSEIN THINNED OUT HIS FORCES, HE WOULD BE VERY VULNERABLE. THE UN RESOLUTION CALLED FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN TO BE OUT BY 15 JANUARY. THE AMERICANS WERE NOT GOING TO ALLOW HIM TO START SOME NEW PROCESS BY HAVING TALKS WITH HIM ON 12 JANUARY.

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BURDEN

BURDEN-SHARING

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED HOW WE WOULD HANDLE THE GAP BETWEEN THE 15TH AND THE DAY THE MILITARY OPTION STARTED. BAKER SAID THAT CONGRESS WOULD RETURN ON 3 JANUARY. THEY HAD THEN INTENDED TO ADJOURN UNTIL THE 22ND. THEY WOULD NOT NOW DO SO, THOUGH THEY WOULD NOT EXPECT TO CONDUCT NORMAL BUSINESS. THE ADMINISTRATION WERE, HOWEVER, CONSIDERING POSSIBLE SCENARIOS, INCLUDING THE VARIOUS RESOLUTIONS THAT MIGHT COME FORWARD URGING A STAY OF EXECUTION ETC. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE TO ACT TO KEEP THE CONGRESS STEADY. IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY, NOT LEAST TO HELP WITH CONGRESS, FOR THE AMERICANS TO GO ROUND AGAIN ON RESPONSIBILITY SHARING, ESPECIALLY TO THE GULF STATES AND TO THOSE COUNTRIES WHO, UNLIKE BRITAIN, WERE NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE MILITARY EFFORT. BAKER HIMSELF MIGHT GO ROUND IN PERSON BEFORE 15 JANUARY. BECAUSE OF THE INCREASE IN AMERICAN FORCES ON THE GROUND, THE EXISTING EFFORT ON RESPONSIBILITY SHARING HAD ONLY GIVEN THE AMERICANS COVER TO ABOUT 50 PER CENT. THERE WAS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FLAK IN CONGRESS ABOUT THE PROFITS THE GULF STATES WERE MAKING FROM THE OIL WINDFALL.

ISRAEL

6. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE, BAKER SAID THAT SHAMIR HAD GIVEN SOME OF THE BROADEST COMMITMENTS EVER ABOUT NOT TAKING PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION. BAKER THOUGHT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD GOT ABOUT AS FIRM AN ASSURANCE AS THEY COULD HAVE. IF THERE WAS MILITARY ACTION AND SADDAM HUSSEIN ATTACKED ISRAEL, ISRAEL WOULD HIT BACK. BUT ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE ARAB COALITION, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF SYRIA, HAD SAID THAT THAT WOULD NOT AFFECT THEIR ATTITUDE. THIS OF COURSE WAS ON THE CONDITION THAT THE PROVOCATION CAME FROM IRAQ.

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY

7. BAKER SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD SOFT-PEDALLED THIS ISSUE. THERE MIGHT NOT BE MUCH CHANCE OF RESOLVING THE CRISIS PEACEFULLY BUT THAT CHANCE WOULD EVAPORATE IF SADDAM HUSSEIN THOUGHT HE WAS EITHER GOING TO BE BLOWN TO PIECES OR PROSECUTED IF HE WITHDREW PEACEFULLY. BAKER AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONCLUSION THAT WE SHOULD SAY THAT THIS WAS A MATTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THAT WE WERE NOT PROPOSING ANY PARTICULAR JURISDICTION BUT SIMPLY POINTING OUT TO INDIVIDUALS THAT THEY WERE LIABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.

PHASE 2 WARNING

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WERE ISSUING A PHASE 2 WARNING TO DEPENDANTS TODAY. IT WAS LIMITED IN SCOPE BUT WE WERE NOT ABLE TO LAUNCH A MILITARY EVACUATION OF OUR PEOPLE AND WE THOUGHT IT BETTER TO MOVE NOW THAN IN TWO WEEKS' TIME. BAKER DID NOT COMMENT.

MEETING BETWEEN THE EC AND TARIQ AZIZ

9. BAKER ENDORSE THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VIEW THAT IT WOULD ^{NOT} BE BETTER FOR THE PRESIDENCY TO SEE TARIQ AZIZ BEFORE HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON. IF THE EC DECLINED TO SEE HIM, THAT WOULD DRIVE HIM TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES. BAKER WONDERED HOW LONG IT WOULD BE BEFORE MITTERRAND WENT TO BAGHDAD. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DOUBTED WHETHER HE WOULD DO SO. ZOELLICK SAID THAT, IF THERE WERE SLIGHT GRADATIONS IN THE MESSAGES SADDAM HUSSEIN GOT THEN HE WOULD NOT PULL BACK AND THAT WOULD COST LIVES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED.

ALEXANDER

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