

CONFIDENTIAL
GULF CRISIS - MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE
(including financial contributions to military costs and offset contributions)

21 Nov 90

COUNTRIES

Nation	Forces Committed	Cost of Military Operation/Financial Contribution	Manpower
US	Details attached	Full cost of \$1.5bn to end of 1990 (\$3bn per month)	
UK	Details attached	Full cost of £630m to end FY90/91 (£2m/day, £220m one-off)	
Canada	1 frigate, 1 destroyer, 1 support ship, 18 CF-18 aircraft, 170 troops	Extra cost of C\$348M to end FY 1990/91	1360
France	Details attached	£150m start up costs, £2m per day. £304m to end 90	
FRG	No forces committed to the Gulf	DM1bn for military eqpt, DM400M for transport, DM200M for NBC equipment. Support package for UK being negotiated. 60 NBC recce vehs to US	
Italy	3 destroyers/frigates, 1 support ship, 8 Tornados	£54.5M to end of 1990	1110
Japan	-	Contribution of \$2bn in 1990/91. Support package for UK being negotiated	

OECD

Nation	Forces Committed	Cost of Military Operation/Financial Contribution	Manpower
Australia	2 destroyers/frigates, 1 support ship	Extra costs of Aus\$102M for 12 months	555
Austria	-	-	
Belgium	2 MCMV, 1 support ship, 1 frigate, 4 C130 aircraft	£1.16m per month	380
Denmark	1 corvette	£2.6M to end of 1990	100
Finland	-	-	
Greece	1 frigate	-	175
Iceland	-	-	
Ireland	-	-	
Luxembourg	-	\$2M for Benelux countries and Portugal	
Netherlands	2 frigates	Gv14.6M to end of 1990	370
New Zealand	-	-	
Norway	1 coastguard vessel	Sealift assistance, fuel, charter tanker for US et al (cost £10M)	60
Portugal	1 naval transport vessel for use of UK	£1.4M	30
Spain	1 frigate, 2 corvettes	Between Pts4 and 5bn to end of 1990	520
Sweden	-	-	
Switzerland	-	-	
Turkey	-	-	

MIDDLE EAST AND ISLAMIC COUNTRIES

Nation	Forces Committed (under command of Saudi Joint Force Cdr)	Cost of Military Operation/Financial Contribution	Manpower
Bangladesh	2500 troops deployed to Saudi Arabia, another 3000 if hostilities break out		5500
Bahrain	200 troops in Saudi Arabia. 24 combat ac, 2 support ac in Bahrain	For UK: airfield services, medical treatment and accommodation	200
Egypt	17000 troops with 156 tanks to Saudi Arabia, SF troops to UAE. Further 14500 troops plus F-16 sqn to be sent		31500
Kuwait	2000 troops, 18 Chieftain and 40 M84 MBTs, 40 combat ac and 25 hel 1 support aircraft in Oman.	\$5bn offset contribution to US costs to end of 1990	2000
Morocco	1400 troops to Saudi, 550 to UAE. 5000 in UAE pre-conflict. Another 2000 to be sent		8950
Oman	1000 troops with artillery in Saudi. 44 combat ac, 4 support ac in Oman	Aircraft fuel and airfield services for UK	1000
Pakistan	2000 troops deployed, another 3000 may be sent		5000
Qatar	1900 troops with light tanks in Saudi. 21 combat ac in Qatar		1900
Saudi Arabia	About 40000 troops committed to Saudi/Kuwait border area, with armour. 289 combat aircraft, 61 support aircraft	\$150-250M per month offset contributions to US costs. Aircraft fuel, airfield services, POL, food and water for UK	40000
Syria	6300 troops (of which 3200 SF) with 140 MBT to Saudi, 600 to UAE. Another 6000 likely to be sent		12900
UAE	900 troops plus artillery and missiles in Saudi Arabia. 84 combat aircraft, 24 support aircraft in the UAE	\$1bn offset contribution to US costs	900

OTHERS

Nation	Forces Committed	Cost of Military Operation/Financial Contribution	Manpower
Argentina	1 destroyer, 1 corvette, 1 transport plane		450
Bulgaria	Medical unit offered		
Czechoslovakia	1 chemical defence unit		180
Hungary	Offer of medical unit		40
Niger	1 x infantry battalion in Saudi Arabia		480
Poland	Field hospital to be sent to Saudi Arabia, hospital ship to the Gulf		220
Romania	Offer of chemical decontamination unit		160
Senegal	1 x infantry Battalion in Saudi Arabia		500
South Korea	-	\$50M in cash, \$70M for transport, NBC kit etc in 90/91	

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAQ/KUWAIT
POSITION PAPER

Purpose

1. The purpose of this paper is to provide a political framework against which directives to military commanders can be drafted.

Strategic Objectives

2. The primary strategic objective is to secure the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 660. The strategy currently selected to achieve this objective is to impose financial and economic sanctions in accordance with UNSCR 661 and subsequent relevant Resolutions and to apply additional pressure on Iraq by demonstrating that military action is an available option in the event of her failure to withdraw.

3. Additional objectives of great importance are

a. To remove the danger of the threat posed by Iraq's Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons potential/capability and her long range missile capability;

b. to promote long term regional security, including consideration of appropriate structures for this purpose.

[4. Other objectives are to play our part in the implementation of UNSCRs on

a. the payment of compensation by Iraq for losses

b

arising from the invasion of Kuwait;

b. the accountability of those responsible for committing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.]

[5. An important ancillary objective is

a. To avoid to the extent possible Israeli military involvement in a way that would put at risk the achievement of the primary objective.]

6. It is not a specific objective to bring about the downfall of the present Iraqi leadership (though that would be a desirable side effect); that is a choice for the Iraqi people. We should aim for Saddam Hussein to face the Iraqi people as a defeated leader.

Military Objectives

7. Current military objectives are

a. To enforce the maritime and air embargoes on trade with Iraq;

b. To deter and, as necessary, defend Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states against further Iraqi aggression.

8. If the current strategy fails to achieve the primary strategic objective (paragraph 2), the military option is available in accordance with UNSCR 678. If it were to be used, our additional military objectives are seen as

a. To secure the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait;

b. To destroy to the extent possible Iraq's Nuclear,

C

Biological and Chemical weapons capability/potential and her long range missile capability.

It would not be an objective to hold Iraqi territory except so far as may be necessary to achieve the military objectives and to bring about the termination of hostilities.

Guiding Principles for Development of Military Directives

9. The basis for the use of military force will be SCR 678. The means chosen to achieve the military objectives must be necessary to achieve the stated purposes of SCR 678, and must meet the general requirements of international law including those affecting the selection of targets and the methods and means of warfare. Account must be taken of the need to minimise casualties to our own forces and the duration of operations consistent with meeting the military objectives set, as well as their impact on domestic, Arab/Islamic and world opinion. National military commanders will therefore be guided by the following principles, which will be supplemented by Rules of Engagement (ROE):

- a. Tactical military planning and (subject to ROE) the selection of targets and methods of attack will be the responsibility of the military commanders.
- b. Any target which provides direct or indirect support to Iraqi military operations or to the occupation of Kuwait may be attacked. Examples include (but are not limited to) military research establishments and production facilities, oil refineries, power stations, transport systems and Government command centres as well as purely military targets.
- [c. Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons and associated facilities, civil electronic communications, water facilities, civil shipping and civil port and harbour installations should not be attacked without

d

specific political authorisation.]

d. Account must be taken of the need to minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage, to avoid damage to locations of religious or cultural significance and to avoid creating long term environmental damage.

e. Planning should include the need to protect and subsequently assist nationals and refugees to the extent realistically possible.

TOP SECRET

23B1a
R. Hunter
12/12
Copy No 1 of 3 copies

B.0692

MR POWELL

c Sir Robin Butler

Gulf Crisis: UK/US Talks

I attach a note recording the main points of the UK/US talks on 14 December, which I gather may be mentioned at the OPD(G) Gulf presentation later this morning. Some of the points will be reflected in the briefing for the Prime Minister's visit to Camp David which will be discussed at OPD(G) on Wednesday 19 December.

2. Much of the time was taken up with discussing the text of the paper on strategic and military objectives. There was considerable overall agreement on the objectives, both strategic and military. Apart from some uncontroversial drafting amendments, the main American problem lay with the concept of a document itself. They were plainly worried in case the document leaked in Washington at a later date and was used in the furtherance of inter-agency disputes or to brand the military for failing to meet all the objectives.

3. The main point of difficulty arose over paragraph 9c of the paper which dealt with those installations which should not be attacked without specific political authorisation. The Americans were reluctant to sign up to this without further bilateral discussion and joint work in-theatre to analyse the implications of attacking NBC targets. The Joint Commander, Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, will contact General Schwarzkof to follow up. Air Chief Marshal Hine will then put recommendations to the Defence Secretary

TOP SECRET

6

TOP SECRET

which can be discussed by OPD(G). The Americans made clear that at present they were not planning to attack water facilities, civil shipping and civil port and harbour installations unless there was a specific military target in those areas. We had a useful discussion about civil electronic communications (including Iraqi radio and TV transmissions) which is recorded in paragraph 8 of the note.

4. We agreed with the Americans on the need for urgent joint work on the problems created by partial and complete Iraqi withdrawal. The Americans accepted the need for the Allies to concert in advance rapid statements insisting on full implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions if the Iraqis announced a partial withdrawal.

5. The Americans agreed with us on the importance of co-ordinated media handling, and further discussions will take place in Washington early in the New year.

6. We obtained helpful clarification on the Israeli position and confirmed that the Americans are giving this problem the same priority as ourselves.

7. Both sides agreed that there should be a further meeting early in the New Year, probably in the period 4-10 January, to finalise the strategic and military paper and take forward the other points raised in discussion.

L V Appleyard
L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
17 December 1990

C

TOP SECRET

NOTE BY OFFICIALS ON INTER AGENCY TALKS IN WASHINGTON ON
14 DECEMBER 1990

1. Talks took place in the Pentagon on 14 December between Mr Wolfowitz (Under Secretary Defence Policy) Mr Kimmit (Assistant Secretary State Department), Lt Gen Graves (Assistant to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) and ACM Sir Patrick Hine (UK Joint Commander), Mr Bevan (MOD), Mr Appleyard (Cabinet Office) and Mr Broomfield (FCO).

Strategic and Military Objectives

2. There was a detailed discussion of the UK position paper which had previously been handed over by the Defence Secretary to Mr Cheney.

3. The Americans began by expressing general concern about the purpose of the paper. Was it intended to be an inter-governmental agreement signed by both sides? They were also worried whether it would restrict the ability of the Force Commanders to take the necessary military action in theatre. We explained that the paper was intended to provide the political framework against which subsequent directives to the Military Commanders could be drafted. It was designed to enable Ministers on both sides to give the necessary political clearance in advance so that operations, should they become necessary, could proceed on an agreed and effective basis.

4. In further discussion a number of detailed drafting amendments were suggested by the American side. They are reflected in the attached revised text which, it was agreed, would be referred to Ministers on both sides.

TOP SECRET

d

5. The major points which arose in discussion were:

a. References to the release of hostages were deleted throughout the paper. Mr Kimmit, however, flagged the need for further discussion and agreement about the implications for military action against Iraq of retaining our Embassies in Baghdad after 15 January.

b. Paragraph 4 - Some drafting amendments were agreed ad referendum. The Americans did not deny that these objectives stemmed from the Security Council Resolutions. But they had doubts about the wisdom of stating them so explicitly in a document which they feared would become public at their end. They believed the objectives were probably unattainable anyway and the document might be used against the Administration by people wishing to prosecute their individual claims. They asked that this paragraph and paragraph 5 should be placed in square brackets pending further consideration on their side.

c. Paragraph 5 - The Americans agreed on the importance of avoiding Israeli involvement (see paragraph 14 below) and had no problems with the text itself. They thought, however, that this aim could be jeopardised if it emerged in public that the two governments had formally committed themselves to it.

d. Paragraph 9 - At the Americans' request the sub-heading was changed to reflect their general concern that the position paper should not be seen as a direct instruction to Military Commanders. They also queried the need to set out the general legal principles when they were clearly accepted by both sides. We resisted the deletion of the paragraph on the grounds that it was a useful restatement of a common position. The Americans also pressed to change "must" to "should" throughout, which we resisted. Both sides agreed to reflect further.

e. Paragraph 9C - The Americans had serious reservations about this sub-paragraph. It appeared inconsistent with the objective stated previously in the paper to remove the NBC threat. Their approach was to leave targetting decisions to the discretion of the Force Commander, taking into account the general advice to minimise civilian casualties and avoid long term environmental damage set out in paragraph 9(d). In further discussions we handed over a paper giving our assessment of the potential risks of collateral damage from attacking NBC targets. They undertook to study it and accepted that there were hazards in relation to attacking chemical and BW storage tanks. They were studying these questions and would soon be reviewing them in Riyadh (Cheney, Schwarzkopf and Powell).

We emphasised that we were at one with the US on the importance attached to dealing with Iraq's NBC capabilities. Our Ministers needed, however, to have as clear a picture as possible of the attendant risks, before final decisions were taken. It was agreed that further work on analysis and target selection would be undertaken in theatre between the Joint Commander's staff and General Schwarzkopf's as a matter of urgency.

On the other targets mentioned in this sub-paragraph the US confirmed that, except insofar as they had military connections it was not their intention to attack them in their own right. Provided that both sides were satisfied about the collateral risks and Ministers had had an opportunity to take a political decision, it was considered that this sub-paragraph might eventually be dropped.

There was a separate discussion of civil electronic communications (see paragraph 8 below).

f

The Americans insisted on placing sub paragraph 9 (c) in square brackets.

6. Both sides agreed to reflect further on the discussion and to contact each other after reference to Ministers. It was noted that in substance there was almost complete agreement on the basic issues covered in the paper. Questions remained principally on matters of form and procedure.

Targeting of Nuclear Facilities

7. The Americans did not dissent from our view that there was no immediate prospect of Iraq acquiring nuclear weapons. It was nevertheless desirable to attack these targets. The rationale was the restoration of peace and security in the area referred to in UNSCR 678.

Iraqi TV and radio transmission capability

8. We asked what the US intentions were with regard to these targets and how they intended to tackle them. The Americans explained that they attached importance to disrupting Saddam Hussein's ability to project propoganda to his people. Civil communications were, on occasion, used for military transmissions. They intended to use precision guided coventional weapons. They were well aware of the need to avoid collateral damage to civilians in built up areas. They did not think that cutting off power supplies would be efective as the Iraqis had standby generators for their transmitters. The Americans made no mention of any plan to prevent western TV broadcasts being sent as a result of an attack on these installations. Nor did they show any awareness of the "sophisticated but untried kit" referred to recently by Mr Baker.

TEMPORARILY RETAINED

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

TOP SECRET

Implications of Partial and Full Withdrawal

9. We handed over the conclusions to the Foreign Secretary's OPD (G) paper on partial withdrawal and the defence secretary's paper on the military implications. We emphasised the importance of deterring Saddam Hussein from opting for partial withdrawal. Mr Baker should warn the Iraqis direct that partial withdrawal would not be enough. We should do our best to ensure the other Permanent Members of the Security Council and our allies took the same line, especially in the first few hours after any announcement.

10. On the political side, with one exception, the Americans were in full agreement with the course proposed on partial withdrawal. They thought it unwise to set a new deadline for Saddam to withdraw. Their inclination was to leave the threat of military action suspended over him and to add that if he was serious about his intention to withdraw they would expect that to be accomplished in a relatively short period. The Americans thought it would be helpful to study these questions further with us. The essential point was that withdrawal had to be complete and that there should be no linkage with other questions. The timing of any attack, should it become clear that Saddam was spinning out the withdrawal process, would in part be dependant on the military assessment of the latest date by which hostilities had to commence taking into account Ramadan (which the US were inclined to discount as an obstacle to hostilities), and the onset of the hot weather.

11. As far as statements to the Iraqis were concerned the Americans confirmed that their commitment not to attack Saddam was confined to his fulfilment of the three (now two) main conditions - full withdrawal, restoration of the legitimate government in Kuwait and release of the hostages.

12. The Americans thought that post withdrawal, the overriding priorities were to control Iraq's NBC capabilities, and to impose an arms embargo which would curtail Iraq's conventional offensive capability. They thought they had implicit UN cover for maintaining sanctions including an oil blockade, through the reference to the restoration of "international peace and security in the area" in operative paragraph 2 of UNSCR 678. They aired the possibility of going for a further Security Council Resolution between 15 January and the end of that month to commit other UN members to support an arms/NBC embargo. In the longer term the Americans envisaged the US contribution to regional security as consisting more of visits, training and exercises, than permanent basing. It was agreed that we would be in touch with Mr Kimmit (State Department) to arrange further discussion of partial and full withdrawal.

Media Handling

13. We welcomed the cooperation between MOD and Pentagon on media handling. We were particularly concerned to ensure that journalists were not in a position to reveal planned or on-going operations. We would also like to exchange views on what could be done to avoid a situation in which media reporting undermined the morale of public opinion at home or caused grief to families by showing casualties. We asked whether the Americans had done any thinking about transmissions from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. The Americans said that these issues were also causing concern to them. They would welcome more detailed discussions. It was agreed that the MOD's Chief of Public Relations would be invited to visit Washington for discussions with his Pentagon and other counterparts in the first or second week of January.

Israel

Israel

14. We asked for the US assessment of Israeli thinking and intentions in the light of President Bush's discussions with Mr Shamir. The Americans said that the Israelis had made clear that if they were attacked by the Iraqis, they would retaliate. If they were not attacked, they would not launch a preemptive strike "in this crisis". This delphic phrase was not apparently further defined. The Americans, however, interpreted this as Israeli acceptance of US advice that it would be counterproductive for the Israelis to launch an attack while there were major US forces in the Gulf. If Saddam Hussein withdrew peacefully and the Western allies established a credible and effective regime to restrict Iraq's access to advanced technology and NBC equipment, then, in the US view, the Israelis would not attack. If, on the other hand, Saddam Hussein had withdrawn and the Western allies had not set up an effective control mechanism in these respects, the Israelis would not feel themselves bound by any assurances. If the situation in Jordan became explosive, the Israelis might well be drawn into any ensuing chaos. Finally, the Americans commented that the Israelis were more aware now of the limitations of what they could do militarily vis-a-vis Iraq.

Strategic Deception

15. The Americans showed little awareness of this possibility. Discussions might be proceeding on other channels. As far as Turkey was concerned they thought that there was a good chance that its airfields would become available for US use after hostilities had started. They also thought that demonstrative activity on the Turkish/Iraqi border would have little effect unless Turkish forces had already been deployed in Saudi Arabia, and they now saw little likelihood of that.

Future Contact

16. It was agreed that a further meeting before 15 January would be useful. The Americans suggested a meeting in the period 4-10 January, probably in Washington. We agreed to be in contact about dates.