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TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELNO 812

OF 311600Z DECEMBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, BELGRADE

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSATION WITH GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER:
31 DECEMBER

SUMMARY

1. GENSCHER BELIEVES THAT ON 4 JANUARY EC FOREIGN MINISTERS MUST CONSIDER HOW TO DRIVE HOME THE MESSAGE THAT IRAQ WILL NOT BE ATTACKED IF SHE COMPLIES WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. AGREES ON NEED TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH AMERICANS. DOES NOT FAVOUR EC MISSION TO BAGHDAD.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPOKE TO GENSCHER THIS AFTERNOON ABOUT EC/IRAQ CONTACTS AND TO ASK GENSCHER WHAT HE THOUGHT SHOULD EMERGE FROM THE FAC ON 4 JANUARY. GENSCHER REPLIED THAT THE MEETING SHOULD RECONFIRM THE EC'S POSITION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE GULF CRISIS. MINISTERS SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER HOW TO DRIVE HOME TO SADDAM HUSSEIN THE MESSAGE THAT IF IRAQ IMPLEMENTED THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IT WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED. THIS WAS VERY IMPORTANT. GENSCHER HAD JUST SPOKEN TO THE YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR WHO HAD SAID THAT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD SHORTLY SEND A MESSAGE TO THE PERMANENT FIVE ABOUT HIS VISIT TO BAGHDAD. LONCAR HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS READY TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT BUT HE WANTED AFTERWARDS A CONFERENCE ON ISSUES CONNECTED WITH THE GULF REGION AND ALSO GUARANTEES THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED. LONCAR HAD TOLD SADDAM HUSSAIN THAT HE SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT THAT THE EUROPEANS WOULD LINE UP BEHIND THE AMERICANS. GENSCHER THOUGHT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE EC SHOULD REINFORCE THIS MESSAGE AND SHOW SADDAM HUSSAIN A WAY OUT. HE WOULD WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGAIN ONCE WE HAD BOTH RECEIVED A WRITTEN ACCOUNT OF LONCAR'S VISIT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT LONCAR WAS RIGHT AND THAT SADDAM HUSSAIN PROBABLY BELIEVED HE WOULD BE ATTACKED WHATEVER HE DID. IT WAS QUITE RIGHT TO DRIVE HOME THE MESSAGE THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED IF THEY COMPLIED WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS - BUT EQUALLY, WE SHOULD

NOT BLUR THE SECOND HALF OF THE MESSAGE THAT IF HE REMAINED, HE WOULD BE ATTACKED.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO BAKER ON 30 DECEMBER AND HE KNEW THAT GENSCHER HAD ALSO SPOKEN TO HIM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS ANXIOUS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO CONFUSION AND WAS WORRIED BY THE IDEA THAT POOS MIGHT VISIT BAGHDAD ALTHOUGH THE EC MIGHT FIND OTHER METHODS OF CONTACT. GENSCHER WAS SURPRISED TO HEAR THAT POOS HAD SAID ON THE BBC THAT HE EXPECTED TO BE MANDATED BY THE FAC TO GO TO BAGHDAD. ALTHOUGH DE MICHELIS HAD PRESSED AT THE LAST FAC FOR AN EARLY MEETING WITH THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER, THE UK AND GERMANY HAD SEEN THIS IDEA OFF ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE US MUST FIRST BE GIVEN A CHANCE. EVEN AFTER 3 JANUARY THERE HAD BEEN TALK OF INVITING TARIQ AZIZ TO EUROPE BUT NOT AN EC MISSION TO BAGHDAD. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO POOS WHO NOW SAID THAT HE WAS DOUBTFUL ABOUT GOING TO BAGHDAD AND HAD AGREED THAT MINISTERS WOULD NEED TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITIES ON FRIDAY. THERE WAS SOME POSSIBILITY OF MOVEMENT ON THE US/IRAQ FRONT AND IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ANY EC DECISIONS SHOULD NOT COMPLICATE THIS. GENSCHER AGREED AND SAID THAT WE WOULD NEED TO HAVE A LAST CONTACT WITH THE US ON 3 JANUARY BEFORE THE FAC. HE WOULD SPEAK TO BAKER.

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