

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
 FM WASHINGTON
 TO DESKBY 030800Z FCO
 TELNO 11
 OF 022340Z JANUARY 91
 INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING, EC POSTS, BAGHDAD, UKDEL NATO
 INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, ACTOR

MY TELNO. 1 AND MY TELECONS OF 2 JANUARY WITH NIXON:

IRAQ/KUWAIT
 SUMMARY

STATEMENT

1. KIMMITT ASKED TROIKA ON 2 JANUARY TO ENSURE THAT ANY SETTLEMENT ISSUED FOLLOWING THE EPC MINISTERIAL ON 4 JANUARY SHOULD AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE US AND THE EC, AND ESCHEW LINKAGE. AMBIGUITIES WOULD REMAIN IN THE US POSITION UNTIL THE WEEKEND.

DETAIL

2. KIMMITT ASKED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TROIKA TO CALL AT MID-DAY ON 2 JANUARY TO TALK ABOUT THE NEXT STEPS ON IRAQ/KUWAIT. HE RECALLED US SATISFACTION AT AMERICAN COORDINATION WITH THE EC AND TOOK THE OCCASION TO WELCOME THE AMF (AIR) DEPLOYMENT TO TURKEY. THE MAIN BODY OF HIS MESSAGE RELATED TO THE 4 JANUARY MEETING TO BE HELD IN LUXEMBOURG.

3. KIMMITT SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN TRYING TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE GULF CRISIS EVER SINCE THE INVASION OF 2 AUGUST. AN INTERNATIONAL COALITION WAS PURSUING COMMON OBJECTIVES. THINGS WERE NOW REACHING A CRITICAL POINT. THE AMERICANS UNDERSTOOD THE NECESSITY FOR THE EPC MINISTERIAL AT SUCH A JUNCTURE. BAKER WOULD PROBABLY BE SENDING A MESSAGE TO HIS EC COLLEAGUES (THE TEXT OF WHICH HAS NOT YET, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, BEEN APPROVED). IN THE MEANTIME HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE A NUMBER OF POINTS.

4. KIMMITT TOLD THE TROIKA THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT ANY DIPLOMATIC STEPS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO COMPLETE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL AND A PEACEFUL OUTCOME. THE ADMINISTRATION FIRMLY REJECTED ANY PARTIAL SOLUTION AND ANY LINKAGES. IF WE ACTED OTHERWISE WE WOULD ESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLE THAT AGGRESSION PAID. SADDAM HUSSEIN SHOULD GAIN NO BENEFIT FROM HIS AGGRESSION. THE AMERICANS WOULD BE GRATEFUL IN THAT CONTEXT FOR ANYTHING THE EC COULD DO TO SUPPORT OUR COMMON GOAL. BUT WHAT SADDAM HUSSEIN AND KING HUSSEIN WERE LOOKING FOR IN CALLING FOR A QUOTE INDEPENDENT UNQUOTE EUROPEAN POSITION WAS A STANCE THAT WOULD BE DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE UNITED STATES. SADDAM

HUSSEIN SHOULD BE GIVEN NO REASON TO BELIEVE THERE WERE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US. IT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL IF AN EC REPRESENTATIVE WERE TO BE SENT TO BAGHDAD AT THIS STAGE. THE US OFFER FOR AZIZ TO COME TO WASHINGTON AND BAKER TO GO TO BAGHDAD WAS STILL ON THE TABLE. THE BALL WAS IN THE IRAQI COURT. THAT BEING SO, IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT NOT TO UNDERCUT THE EFFECTS THE AMERICANS ALREADY PERCEIVED OF THEIR POLICIES ON SADDAM HUSSEIN, WHO COULD ALL TOO EASILY INTERPRET ANY EUROPEAN INITIATIVE AS IMPLYING DIVERGENCE FROM THE COMMON POSITION. IF ANYONE WERE SENT TO BAGHDAD THAT WOULD BE SEEN AS DISTANCING THE COMMUNITY FROM THE UNITED STATES. EVEN A MEETING IN EUROPE WOULD UNDERCUT THE CURRENT US EFFORT. THERE WAS STILL A CHANCE OF US/IRAQI CONTACTS TAKING PLACE.

5. KIMMITT SAID THAT IF THE COMMUNITY THOUGHT DIPLOMATIC MOVES ADVISABLE FOLLOWING THE 4 JANUARY EPC, THE BEST STEP MIGHT BE TO CALL IN IRAQI AMBASSADORS IN THE VARIOUS CAPITALS IN ORDER TO GET OVER TO SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT WE WERE PURSUING A COMMON GOAL. COALITION SOLIDARITY WAS THE BEST MEANS TO BRING SADDAM HUSSEIN TO ACCEPT A PEACEFUL OUTCOME. SHOULD SUCH SOLIDARITY BE COMPROMISED, WAR WOULD BE BROUGHT THAT MUCH CLOSER. HE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD SUGGEST A NEW DATE FOR MEETINGS. IF THE COMMUNITY ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT AND REINFORCED THAT TO IRAQI AMBASSADORS, A FIRM MESSAGE WOULD BE SENT TO BAGHDAD. IF THE IRAQIS DID NOT MOVE ON DATES THAT WOULD SHOW THEY WERE NOT SERIOUS.

6. THE LUXEMBOURG AMBASSADOR ASKED, FOR THE PRESIDENCY, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF EACH OF THE DISPUTANTS BELIEVED IT WAS UP TO THE OTHER SIDE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE. KIMMITT SAID THE QUESTION WAS CRUCIAL. THE US PRESIDENT WOULD BE MEETING WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP ON 3 JANUARY. HE EXPECTED THE SITUATION TO REMAIN FLUID UNTIL THE WEEKEND WITH AMBIGUITIES REMAINING IN THE US POSITION UNTIL THEN. A STATEMENT BY THE TWELVE ON 4 JANUARY WOULD HELP IF IT STUCK AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE TO UNSCR LANGUAGE. ANY HINT OF A SUGGESTION OF LINKAGE WITH THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE WOULD BE HARMFUL. HE NOTED THAT A SEPARATE STATEMENT ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAD BEEN ISSUED IN ROME. THIS HAD WORKED WELL AT THE TIME. THE SITUATION WAS NOW MORE CRITICAL. IT MIGHT BE HARDER TO AVOID ANY SUGGESTION OF LINKAGE AT LUXEMBOURG WHERE THERE WOULD PRESUMABLY BE FEWER STATEMENTS THAN WERE ISSUED AT ROME. SADDAM HUSSEIN DID NOT AFTER ALL INVADE KUWAIT BECAUSE OF PALESTINE.

7. THE TROIKA, HAVING NO INSTRUCTIONS, PUT NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 3 JANUARY WAS NOT MENTIONED AS A DEADLINE FOR TALKS. IF THE IRAQIS MADE A SUDDEN MOVE TOWARDS TALKING, KIMMITT MADE

IT CLEAR THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT REJECT IT OUT OF HAND.
HE ALSO SAID THAT NO TRIP BY BAKER HAD BEEN ARRANGED ALTHOUGH
HE CONFIRMED THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS VISITING EUROPE AND
THE REGION WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

COMMENT

8. JOURNALISTS ARE ALREADY AWARE THAT A MEETING TOOK PLACE.
WE AGREED AT OUR MEETING IT WOULD BE BEST TO SAY AS LITTLE AS
POSSIBLE ABOUT THE 2 JANUARY DISCUSSION WITH KIMMITT, PERHAPS
PUTTING IT IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ONGOING EC/US DIALOGUE.

9. YOU WILL KNOW FROM MY CONVERSATION WITH NIXON OF 2 JANUARY
THAT MEETINGS THIS MORNING AT THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE PRODUCED NO
FIRM DECISIONS ON WHAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD DO NEXT. I HAVE
FAIR PROMISES THAT WE WILL BE TOLD ONCE CHOICES HAVE BEEN MADE
AMONG THE APPARENTLY NUMEROUS POSSIBILITIES ON THE TABLE, EITHER
THROUGH ME OR DIRECT TO YOU OR NO. 10. BOTH STATE AND THE NSC
ARE ALSO AWARE THAT YOU WILL PROBABLY WISH TO SPEAK TO BAKER.

WOOD

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MR YOUNG, E.U. (PASSED)

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