

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification

Caveat


Precedence

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY

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ZCZC 1 ZCZC  
 FC 2 CONFIDENTIAL  
 CAVEAT 3  
 FM 4 FROM FCO  
 TO 5 TO DESKBY 091100Z UKMIS GENEVA  
 TELNO 6 TELNO  
 OF 7 OF  
 AND TO 8 INFO DESKBY 1100Z CAIRO (FOR SIR CHARLES POWELL)  
 9 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, LUXMEBOURG, ROME  
 10 INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, THE HAGUE, BAGHDAD, RIYADH  
 11  
 12  
 13 FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY  
 14 GULF: SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY BAKER  
 15 1. The Secretary of State and Baker spoke on the telephone at  
 16 0915Z this morning. *(Thank you for helping to set this up.)*  
 17 2. The Secretary of State said he was concerned because the  
 18 French were preparing to take their own initiative. He wondered  
 19 about trying to head them off.  
 20 3. Baker said that he thought that ~~the~~<sup>a</sup> French initiative would  
 21 be counter-productive. He had said as much to Genscher and to  
 22 de Michelis on 8 January. But he could not say so publicly. In  
 23 public had to say that he welcomed any efforts to resolve the  
 24 crisis, provided of course that the message to the Iraqis was  
 25 consistent. Baker added that, in his discussions in Paris on 8  
 26 January, he and the French agreed that they were playing on  
 27 different wickets on the question of a Middle East Conference.  
 28 4. The Secretary of State said that the Luxembourg Presidency  
 29 had it in mind to try to relaunch the Troika invitation to Tariq



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 MAIN  
 ADDITIONAL  
 NNNN

		Catchword:	
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Aziz, if Baker's meeting with Tariq Aziz in Geneva today was unsuccessful. The Presidency would offer the Iraqis a Troika meeting at some venue other than Luxembourg (but not/not Baghdad). On substance the message from the Troika would of course be the same as that from Baker. Personally the Secretary of State did not think relaunching the Troika invitation would succeed in heading off a French initiative but he asked Baker for his views on a Troika meeting with Tariq Aziz somewhere other than Luxembourg, perhaps Algiers.

5. Baker said that the Troika invitation was already on the table. As for shifting the venue he had no difficulty with that. He thought the Iraqis might seize on it and use it as an excuse to delay further any concession which they might be contemplating, but then who knew if they had any concession in mind in any case.

6. The Secretary of State raised the question of an initiative by the UN Secretary General. We were getting somewhat ambiguous signals from them. Baker said that he would not seek to prevent the Secretary General from taking an initiative. Baker and the Secretary of State agreed that the Secretary General was the person who was most bound by the Security Council Resolutions and that they should not seek to discourage him from action if he so wished.

7. Baker promised that Kimmitt or Seitz would telephone someone in London as soon as possible after the meeting with Tariq Aziz.

HURD

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LIMITED

IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET

NAD