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FM F C O 271700Z SEP 82

TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG

TELEGRAM NUMBER 784 OF 27 SEPTEMBER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF
PRIVATE OFFICE WAS RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV TELNO 393 OF 26/9/82.

FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY.

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FM TEL AVIV 261220Z SEP 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 393 OF 26 SEP 82

AND TO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK, TUNIS, RABAT, JERUSALEM.

SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELNO 266: BEIRUT MASSACRES

1. I SAW DEPUTY DIRECTOR-GENERAL THIS MORNING WITH HEAD OF CHANCERY.
I READ TO BAR-ON THE TEXT OF PARA 7 2 OF TUR VIRTUALLY VERBATIM.
AT ONE POINT I CHANGED THE WORDING TO REFER MERELY TO RECENT REPORTS
OF HARRASSEMENT OF PALESTINIANS BY HADDAD'S MEN IN SOUTHERN LEBANON
(YOUR TELNO 267).

2. BAR-ON NOTED THAT WE ACCEPTED THAT THE IDF HAD NOT BEEN DIRECTLY
INVOLVED IN THE SLAUGHTER OF PALESTINIANS, WHICH HAD DEEPLY
CONVULSED THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF ISRAEL AND LEFT A SENSE
OF MORAL OUTRAGE. THE ATTENTION OF ALL ISRAELIS WAS SHARPLY
FOCUSSED ON THE NEED FOR A INVESTIGATION. HE HOPED THAT,
IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FELT THE NEED TO ADD ITS VOICE, WE
WOULD NOT DRAW CONCLUSIONS IN ADVANCE AS WAS IMPLIED IN SOME OF
MY QUESTIONS, AS IF THE FACTS OF THE INCIDENT WERE FULLY KNOWN
TO US, WHICH WAS NOT THE CASE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE IMPLICATION OF
POINT(C) WAS THAT THE PERPETRATORS HAD COME FROM SOUTH LEBANON.
WHIS WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS SO FAR AS THEY WERE KNOWN
TO THE ISRAELIS. HADDAD HAD HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE MASSACRE,
THOUGH BAR-ON COULD NOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT INDI-
VIDEAL MEMBERS OF HIS MILITIA WERE PRESENT.

3. BAR-ON SAID THAT, WHILE THERE WOULD BE AN INVESTIGATION, HE COULD NOT SAY WHAT FORM IT WOULD TAKE. AS WE KNEW, THERE WAS A COMPLICATION AS REGARDS THE PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME COURT AND IT WAS ALWAYS POSSIBLE THAT THE CABINET WOULD DECIDE ON SOME OTHER FORM OF ENQUIRY.

THE FACTS OF THE MATTER AS REGARDS ISRAEL WOULD BE FULLY BROUGHT OUT AND PUBLISHED: IN THAT RESPECT ISRAELI COMMISSIONS OF ENQUIRY GENERALLY FOLLOWED BRITISH PRACTICE. BUT IT WAS FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE THE INVOLVEMENT OF THEIR NATIONALS, AND BAR-ON NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD ALREADY INSTICATED AN INVESTIGATION. (BAR-ON ASKED WHETHER IN THIS CONNECTION WE WERE MAKING A CORRESPONDING APPROACH IN BEIRUT: I TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD SPOKEN TO THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR IN LONDON.)

4. BAR-ON ACCEPTED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD PERHAPS BEEN NAIVE. BUT HE DOUBTED WHETHER ANYBODY HAD IMAGINED SUCH AN ACT WOULD BE PERPETRATED BY A FORMED MILITARY UNIT. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF ISRAEL, NOR THE IDF, BORE A MAJOR MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OUTRAGE.

THE ENQUIRY MIGHT SHOW THAT THERE HAD BEEN ERRORS OF JUDGEMENT, PERHAPS BUT NOT NECESSARITLY SOLELY AT THE PROFESSIONAL LEVEL. HE PERSONALLY WAS SCEPTICAL WHETHER THE EXACT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WOULD EVER BE FULLY KNOWN. EVEN WITH OUR FALKLANDS ENQUIRY THERE WOULD NO DOUBT BE AREAS WHERE IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO RECONSTRUCT AN INDIVIDUAL INCIDENT AFTERWARDS.

5. BAR-ON SAID THAT TO SINGLE OUT HADDAD (PARAGRAPH 2 (D)

OF TUR) WAS TO PUT THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE. THE LEBANESE SITUATION WAS THE RESULT OF INSTABILITY GOING BACK MANY YEARS. APART FROM THE EXISTENCE OF AUTONOMOUS MILITIAS, THE INABILITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO EXERCISE SOVEREIGNTY STEMMED FROM THE EXISTENCE OF A STATE WITHIN A STATE (IE THE PLO) AND SIX YEARS OF SYRIAN OCCUPATION. THERE WAS STILL AREAS SUCH AS TRIPOLI AND EASTERN LEBANON WHERE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD NO AUTHORITY. THIS WAS LESS SO IN THE SOUTH WHERE THE ISRAELIS WERE AT LEAST TRYING TO ADMIT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. ONLY TIME WOULD TELL WHETHER HADDAD, THE DRUSE, KATAEB, FRANJIEH AND AMAL COULD ALL BE REINTERGRATED INTO THE LEBANESE BODY POLITIC. MUCH DEPENDED ON WHETHER THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES COULD BE RECONSTITUTED (OR RATHER, AS BAR-ON PUT IT, "CONSTITUTED"). THIS INVOLVED AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS IN WHICH ISRAEL WOULD HELP IF ASKED.

WHAT CONSTITUTED INTERFERECNCE COULD NOT BE JUDGED BY EUROPEAN OR AMERICAN STANDARDS. THE LEBANESE TRAGEDY WAS UNIQUE. NEVERTHELESS ISRAEL'S BASIC OBJECTIVE WAS STILL THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. BAR-ON TOOK UP MY REFERENCE TO THE NINE MONTHS OF RELATIVE PEACE BETWEEN JULY 1981 AND APRIL 1982 (PARAGRAPH 2 (E) OF TUR). THIS MIGHT BE FACTUALLY CORRECT, BUT IT IGNORED THE EXISTENCE IN SOUTH LEBANON OF A MINI-STATE DIRECTED SOLELY AGAINST ISRAEL, WHOSE RAISON D'ETRE WAS THE ARMED STRUGGLE AND WHICH THEREFORE POSED A CONSTANCE MENACE. IT WAS NOT SO MUCH WHAT HAD HAPPENED AFTER JULY 1981, THOUGH THERE HAD BEEN INCIDENTS, INFILTRATION VIA JORDAN, AND TERRORIST ATTACKS OR PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACKS AROUND THE WORLD, BUT RATHER THE PROSPECT OF PERMANENT HARRASSMENT SO LONG AS THE PLO ENTERTAINED NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE ARMED STRUGGLE. EVEN NOW, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF PLO READINESS TO SEEK A SETTLEMENT TO THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION BY NEGOTIATIONS. SADAT HAD MADE A QUANTUM LEAP WHICH NO ONE ELSE HAD FOLLOWED. BAR-ON EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT WITH KING HUSSEIN, WHO HAD SEIZED ON THE MASSACRE AS A NEW EXCUSE TO AVOID DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

7. IN REPLY I MADE POINTS:

A) AS REGARDS THE ARMED STRUGGLE, WE HAD NEVER CEASED TO URGE THE PLO TO ABANDON VIOLENCE, COME TO TERMS WITH THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL, AND PURSUE THEIR AIMS THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS. THE BIGGEST SINGLE CRITICISM OF ISRAELI ACTIONS IN LEBANON HAD BEEN THAT IT COULD HAVE DAMAGED THE PROSPECTS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. I HOPED THAT THIS MIGHT NOT PROVE TO BE THE CASE AND THAT THE PLO HAD BEEN CONVINCED THAT THEY SHOULD NOW ABANDON TERRORISM AND OPT FOR NEGOTIATIONS. I HAD BEEN CORRESPONDINGLY DISAPPOINTED THAT THE OPENING OFFERED BY THE REAGAN PLAN AND THE FEZ SUMMIT HAD FOUND NO ECHO HERE. I HAD NOT EXPECTED THE ISRAELIS TO SWALLOW SUCH IDEAS WHOLE. BUT THEY WERE A STARTING POINT:

B) IT WAS NOT THE CASE THAT WE PREJUDGED THE OUTCOME OF AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE MASSACRE. WE WERE PUTTING TO THE ISRAELIS POINTS WHICH TROUBLED US IN THE SPIRIT OF CONTINUING DIALOGUE. INITIAL STATEMENTS HERE HAD NOT ALWAYS BEEN CONSISTENT OR WHOLLY CLEAR. MY GOVERNMENT WERE GENUINELY PUZZLED AND WANTED AN AUTHORITATIVE PICTURE:

C) TO THE EXTENT THAT MANY QUESTIONS REMAINED ABOUT THE MASSACRE, THE SOONER THE INVESTIGATION WAS COMPLETED AND THE RESULTS PUBLISHED THE BETTER.

D) AS REGARDS WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES IN LEBANON, I SUGGESTED THAT AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE COULD HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN SUPPORTING THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND ASSURING STABILITY. THE IDEA HAD NOT APPEALED TO THE ISRAELIS HITHERTO. COULD WE EXPECT A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE IN THE WAKE OF RECENT EVENTS?

8. BAR-ON SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD FOUND THE FEZ DECLARATION ENTIRELY NEGATIVE: IT WAS WATERED DOWN FAHD. HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND EUROPEAN ENTHUSIASM FOR IT. THE REAGAN PROPOSALS CONTAINED POSITIVE FEATURES, BUT THE ISRAELIS DID NOT LIKE THE WAY IN WHICH THE OUTCOME OF THE AUTONOMY PROCESS WAS PREJUDGED. ISRAEL ENDORSED THE IDEA OF THE RESUMPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

9. AS REGARDS AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE, ISRAEL WANTED SECURITY ARRANGEMENT IN SOUTH LEBANON AGREED BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE GOVERNMENTS. THEY WOULD LIKE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ITSELF TO ASSUME FORMAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY ON LEBANESE TERRITORY. TO INJECT AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE INTO A SITUATION WHICH WAS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THE SINAI OR GOLAN WOULD BE A HINDRANCE RATHER THAN A HELP. HE DOUBTED WHETHER A UN OR INTERNATIONAL FORCE WOULD PROVIDE EFFECTIVE SECURITY OR HELP RESTORE THE AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT: RATHER THE CONTRARY. THE LEBANESE SHOULD NOT BE ENCOURAGED IN THEIR TENENCY TO ABDICATE RESPONSIBILITIES.

UNIFIL HAD BEEN IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION. THE ONLY REAL SOLUTION WAS FOR LEBANON TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH BOTH ITS NEIGHBOURS, WHICH MEANT THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT ALLOW INTO THE COUNTRY ELEMENTS WHICH THREATENED ONE OR OTHER OF THEM.

10. I SUGGESTED THAT THIS POSED A DILEMMA FOR ISRAEL. AN INDEPENDENT LEBANON MUST BE ALLOWED TO MAKE UP ITS OWN MIND. WHAT IF THE THE LEBANESE THEM SELVES ASKED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE? BAR-ON SAID THAT HE WAS NOT RULING ANYTHING OUT. A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WAS PROBABLY THE QUICKEST AND EASIEST, BUT NOT A LASTING, SOLUTION. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE SHOULD TALK AND AGREE WHAT WAS NEEDED.

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