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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1505 OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV,

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS, AMMAN,

INFO CAIRO, BEIRUT.

Read in full.

ADL 30/9

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

UNGA: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER

1. SHAMIR CALLED ON THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN HIS HOTEL AT 1730 ON 29 SEPTEMBER. THE MEETING LASTED 45 MINUTES.

ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. SHAMIR SAID THAT DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON FOLLOWING RECENT ISRAELI MILITARY OPERATIONS WERE RATHER POSITIVE AND NOT ONLY FOR ISRAEL. BEIRUT NO LONGER BELONGED TO THE PLO, BUT WAS ONCE MORE THE CAPITAL OF LEBANON, AND THERE WAS A GOOD PROSPECT FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM THE COUNTRY. ONCE SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE TO PREVENT THE RETURN OF THE PLO, THERE COULD BE PEACE IN AND WITH LEBANON, WHICH WOULD ONCE AGAIN BE PART OF THE FREE WORLD AND NOT SUBJECT TO SOVIET INFLUENCE. ISRAEL HAD HAD TO PAY A PRICE FOR THESE ACHIEVEMENTS, AS ONE ALWAYS DID IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SOMETHING POSITIVE. NO OTHER COUNTRY FACING SUCH A TERRORIST THREAT WOULD BE ACTED DIFFERENTLY. HE HOPED THAT ONCE THE SOLDIERS HAD LEFT LEBANON THERE MIGHT BE PROGRESS ON THE WIDER ISSUES.

3. MR PYM SAID THAT MR SHAMIR MUST KNOW THAT MOST OF THE WORLD TOOK A DIFFERENT VIEW OF ISRAELI ACTIONS. BRITAIN BELIEVED THAT THE ISRAELI MILITARY INVASION OF LEBANON WAS UNJUSTIFIED, AND RECENT EVENTS IN BEIRUT, WHATEVER THEIR ORIGIN, HAD HORRIFIED THE WHOLE WORLD AND CONSTITUTED A SET BACK FOR PEACE. HE WELCOMED WHAT SHAMIR HAD SAID ABOUT WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, WHICH HE ASSUMED TO MEAN ALL OF LEBANON. SHAMIR SAID THAT IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT THEIR TROOPS WOULD LEAVE LEBANON AS PART OF A GENERAL EVACUATION OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM THE WHOLE OF LEBANON. THERE WERE NO OTHER PRECONDITIONS. THE AMERICAN POSITION WAS THAT FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD ALL GO SIMULTANEOUSLY: ISRAEL AGREE. MR PYM ASKED WHY THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO EVACUATE BEIRUT AIRPORT. SHAMIR SAID THAT THEY HAD FELT THAT THERE WAS ADVANTAGE IN RETAINING USE OF A CORNER OF THE AIRPORT WHILE ISRAELI FORCES REMAINED IN THE AREA. BUT THEY HAD NOT INSISTED.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE EVENTS OF RECENT MONTHS HAD LEFT GREAT BITTERNESS, NOT LEAST IN THE ARAB WORLD. HE TRUSTED

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THAT THE ISRAELI REACTION TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSALS WOULD NOT INFLUENCE THEIR ATTITUDE TO WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. SHAMIR SAID THAT THEY HAD NO HESITATION ON THIS SCORE, AND NO WISH TO PROLONG THEIR STAY IN LEBANON. THE ISRAELIS HAD HELPED THE MARONITES SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY WERE THE ONLY ENEMIES OF SYRIA AND OF THE PLO IN LEBANON, AND THEY COULD BE PROUD THAT A MARONITE PRESIDENT NOW HAD SUPPORT FROM ALL ELEMENTS OF LEBANESE SOCIETY INCLUDING MUSLIMS. ISRAEL HAD BEEN DOUBLY SHOCKED BY THE TRAGEDY IN THE CAMPS, FIRST BY THE LOSS OF LIFE ITSELF AND SECOND BY THE ATTEMPTS THAT HAD BEEN MADE TO PUT RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT ON ISRAEL. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS MOUNTING EVIDENCE IT WAS STILL NOT FINALLY CLEAR WHERE RESPONSIBILITY LAY. SHAMIR SAID THAT IT WAS PERFECTLY CLEAR. THERE WOULD BE AN ISRAELI ENQUIRY, BUT THE ONLY QUESTION IT HAD TO ANSWER WAS WHETHER INDIVIDUAL ISRAELIS SERVING IN LEBANON COULD HAVE ACTED EARLIER TO STOP WHAT WAS HAPPENING. THE LEBANESE THEMSELVES WANTED TO PUT THE INCIDENT BEHIND THEM AND GET ON WITH BUILDING A NEW LEBANON. MR PYM SAID THAT MANKIND DID FORGET MASS MURDER. SHAMIR SAID THAT MURDER HAD BEEN ONLY TOO FAMILIAR A FEATURE OF RECENT LEBANESE HISTORY. IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT MUSLIM ELEMENTS IN LEBANON, SUCH AS KARAEH, STILL SUPPORTED PRESIDENT GEMAYEL THOUGH HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FALANGE.

ARAB/ISRAEL

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT BRITAIN HAD WELCOMED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE, WITH ITS RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE BOTH OF SECURITY FOR ISRAEL AND OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. SHAMIR SAID THAT THIS DID NOT REPRESENT A NEW DEPARTURE OF US THINKING. THE OFFICIAL US POSITION SINCE 1967 HAD BEEN THAT A SOLUTION MUST BE FOUND FOR THE TERRITORIES CONCERNED WHICH DID NOT ENTAIL LEAVING THEM UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL. REAGAN WAS A GOOD FRIEND OF ISRAEL BUT THE ISRAELI POSITION WAS DIFFERENT. NIXON AND CARTER HAD HAD SIMILAR IDEAS AT EARLIER PERIODS, BUT TO NO PURPOSE. A PALESTINIAN STATE IN 5,000 SQUARE KILOMETRES WOULD NOT SOLVE THE SO-CALLED PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, AND WAS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH ISRAELI SECURITY, WHICH MR PYM CLAIMED TO WANT TO SEE ASSURED. ISRAEL LIVED IN SPECIAL CONDITIONS AND HAD TO DEFEND ITSELF, AND IT DID SO. IT COULD NOT ACCEPT A RETURN TO THE PRE-1967 BOUNDARIES, WHICH WOULD PLACE ALL THE HIGH GROUND OUT OF HER CONTROL.

6. MR PYM ASKED WHETHER SHAMIR WAS TRYING TO SAY THAT THERE WAS NO PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. SHAMIR SAID THAT THERE WERE 4 MILLION PALESTINIANS IN THE WORLD, AND JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA WOULD TAKE 1 AND A HALF MILLION AT MOST, INCLUDING THE 1.2 MILLION ALREADY THERE. THIS WOULD NOT SATISFY THE PLO: A PALESTINIAN STATE OF THIS SIZE WOULD MERELY BE A BASE FOR FURTHER AGGRESSION AGAINST ISRAEL AND PERHAPS JORDAN. MR PYM ASKED WHETHER THE PROBLEM WAS NOT WORTH AT LEAST DISCUSSING. SHAMIR SAID THAT THERE WAS NO HARM IN DISCUSSING, BUT SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR ISRAEL. THE RIGHT SOLUTION WAS AUTONOMY, AS LAID

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DOWN AT CAMP DAVID. MR PYM SAID THAT LIFE HAD MOVED ON SINCE THEM. IT WORRIED HIM THAT SHAMIR APPEARED NOT TO RECOGNISE THE EXISTENCE OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, AND THAT HE ASSUMED FROM THE OUTSET THAT A PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD BE A HOSTILE NEIGHBOUR. SHAMIR SAID THAT ISRAEL KNEW THE MENTALITY, INTENTIONS AND IDEOLOGY OF HER ARAB NEIGHBOURS.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT ONCE FOREIGN FORCES HAD LEFT LEBANON, THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE READY TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF THE REAGAN PLAN. IT DISTURBED HIM THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD DISMISS IT OUT OF HAND. SHAMIR SAID THAT THIS WAS A MATTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND SURVIVAL. ISRAEL COULD NOT ALLOW AN UNACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO BE IMPOSED ON HER. MR PYM SAID THAT THE RIGHT TO SECURITY WAS NOT CONFINED TO ISRAEL. SHAMIR SAID THAT THE CAMP DAVID NEGOTIATIONS HAD SHOWN THAT ISRAEL WAS READY TO TAKE GREAT RISKS AND MAKE GREAT SACRIFICES FOR PEACE. SINAI WAS THE ONLY STRATEGIC DEPTH THAT ISRAEL HAD EVER HAD. BUT SHE COULD NOT BE ASKED TO GO BEYOND THE ACCEPTABLE, TO TAKE STILL GREATER RISKS AND MAKE STILL MORE SACRIFICES.

8. MR PYM SAID THAT HE FOUND THIS A DEPRESSING, UNCONSTRUCTIVE AND ONE-SIDED APPROACH, ALMOST IMPLYING A LACK OF DESIRE FOR A SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. TO INSIST ON GETTING ALL ONE WANTED WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE OTHER SIDE HAD A POSITION WAS NOT AN ATTITUDE WITH WHICH WE COULD SYMPATHISE. SHAMIR REPEATED THAT CAMP DAVID WAS THE ONLY BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THE PALESTINIANS HAD ALWAYS BEEN AND STILL WERE DOMINATED BY AN EXTREMIST MINORITY. THEY HAD ALWAYS REJECTED ALL ISRAEL'S REASONABLE OFFERS OF COMPROMISE. AS FOR HUSSEIN, ISRAEL HAD HAD SIX SECRET MEETINGS WITH HIM IN 1974-76, BUT HE HAD PROVED EXTREMELY NEGATIVE. MR PYM SAID THAT THE WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS WERE PROVOCATIVE. SHAMIR SAID THAT ISRAEL WANTED FULL AGREEMENT ON AUTONOMY, LEADING TO FREE ELECTIONS. THE SETTLEMENTS HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH IT: A FEW THOUSAND ISRAELIS WOULD NOT BE HARMFUL TO PEACE OR TO THE ARAB INHABITANTS. ISRAEL WAS LINKED TO JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA BY HISTORICAL TIES AND FOR SECURITY REASONS, BUT SHE ACCEPTED THAT A PROBLEM EXISTED, WHICH WAS WHY SHE HAD PUT FORWARD HER PROPOSALS FOR AUTONOMY.

9. MR PYM ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN NEXT. SHAMIR REPLIED THAT ISRAEL WOULD CONTINUE TO DISCUSS WITH THE US AND THE EUROPEANS. HE IMPLIED THAT ISRAEL WAS READY TO SIT IT OUT UNTIL THE ARABS WERE READY TO TALK ON ISRAELI TERMS. MEANWHILE LIFE WOULD GO ON.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

10. SHAMIR SAID THAT LORD CARRINGTON'S VISIT TO ISRAEL IN THE SPRING HAD BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL. IT HAD NOT SETTLED ALL THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, BUT IT HAD IMPROVED

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UNDERSTANDING, AND HAD PROVIDED THE START OF A DIALOGUE. WE SHOULD GO ON TALKING AND TRY TO NARROW OUR DIFFERENCES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE DIFFERENCES HAD CERTAINLY BROADENED IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS. IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE ISRAELI IDEA OF A DIALOGUE HAD NOT EXTENDED TO TELLING LORD CARRINGTON WHAT THEY INTENDED TO DO IN LEBANON. SHAMIR SAID THAT THEY HAD OBVIOUSLY NOT PROVIDED OTHER COUNTRIES WITH DETAILS OF THEIR PRECISE MILITARY INTENTIONS, BUT THEY HAD MADE NO SECRET, TO THE AMERICANS OR TO OTHERS, OF THE FACT THAT ISRAEL WOULD TAKE DRASTIC STEPS IF THE PLO CONTINUED TO ATTACK HER. HE LOOKED FORWARD TO CONTINUING THE USEFUL DIALOGUE WHICH THE ISRAELI CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN LONDON HAD ESTABLISHED AT OFFICIAL LEVEL IN THE FCO, AND WOULD SHORTLY BE NOMINATING A NEW AMBASSADOR. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MADE NO COMMENT. THE MEETING ENDED WITH AN EXCHANGE OF NEWS AND SYMPATHY ON THE HEALTH OF AMBASSADOR ARGOV.

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