

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

16

*Prime Minister*

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
MR EGERTON  
SIR J BILLARD  
ED/NEHAD  
ED/MED  
ED/DND

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE D10

ED/... *NAD* ...

ED/.../DEPT

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FSD (2)  
RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 270800Z

FM WASHINGTON 270127Z NOV 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3836 OF 26 NOVEMBER

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

INFO IMMEDIATE MIDDLE EAST POSTS UKNIS NEW YORK PARIS

YOUR TELNO 2088: VISIT BY ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION:  
PLO REPRESENTATION

1. AS SMULTZ WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH PIK BOTNA'S VISIT,  
I MADE THESE POINTS TO VELIOTES THIS AFTERNOON, LEAVING  
COPIES OF YOUR MESSAGE TO ARAB LEADERS, THE DRAFT STATEMENT,  
AND MY TALKING POINTS.

2. VELIOTES COMMENTED THAT THE DRAFT STATEMENT WENT PRETTY  
FAR AND WOULD BE A POSITIVE STEP FORWARD. BUT THE AMERICANS  
WOULD HAVE TROUBLE IN AGREEING THAT IT MOVED THEM CLOSER TO  
A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO BECAUSE THERE WERE NO EXPLICIT REF-  
ERENCES TO SCR 242 AND 338 AND ARAB WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNISE ISRAEL

WAS STILL CONDITIONAL ON RECIPROCAL ACTION BY THE ISRAELIS. THE PRESIDENT WAS FIRM THAT ANY PLO STATEMENT HAD TO BE MORE CONDITIONAL. VELIOTES NOTED THAT THE ARABS WERE NOW ARGUING THAT THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AS THIS WOULD QUOTE LEGITIMISE THE BALFOUR DECLARATION UNQUOTE; THE MOST THEY COULD DO WOULD BE TO ACCEPT ISRAEL AS A FACT OF LIFE WITH WHICH THEY COULD LIVE.

3. VELIOTES THEN GAVE ME AN ACCOUNT OF A TELEGRAM JUST RECEIVED FROM RABAT REPORTING A CONVERSATION BETWEEN KING HASSAN AND, HE THOUGHT, GENERAL WALTERS. HE STRESSED THAT WE SHOULD NOT QUOTE THIS IN ANY SUBSEQUENT ACTION WE TOOK WITH THE ARABS. HASSAN HAD SAID THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE VISIT TO LONDON HAD BEEN CANCELLED. HE CLAIMED THAT THE BRITISH HAD BEEN VERY DIFFICULT OVER ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VISIT OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD. IT WAS PARTICULARLY OBJECTIONABLE THAT NO MEETINGS HAD BEEN ARRANGED BETWEEN HIS LUNCH WITH THE QUEEN ON 1 DECEMBER AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S DINNER FOR THE DELEGATION ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. THE PROPOSED STATEMENT WAS OFFENSIVE BOTH IN ITS SUBSTANCE AND ITS MODE OF DELIVERY (I.E. TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION RATHER THAN TO HIM AS ITS LEADER). HASSAN SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH FAND WHO WAS irate and in full agreement that the visit should be cancelled. HE CONCLUDED THAT THE WASHINGTON VISIT HAD SET A HIGH STANDARD WHICH LONDON WOULD DO WELL TO EMULATE. VELIOTES ADDED THAT THE WASHINGTON VISIT HAD LACKED SUBSTANCE; HASSAN HAD TAKEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESS REAGAN TO MODIFY HIS POLICY, AND NO DOUBT HOPED TO USE THE LONDON VISIT TO PERSUADE US TO DO THE SAME.

4. VELIOTES WAS CONFIDENT THAT KING HASSAN HAD BEEN ACCURATELY REPORTED, BUT HE WAS A GRAY THESPIAN AND LIABLE TO MAKE A MOUNTAIN OF PROTOCOL MOLEHILLS; IN THE AMERICANS EXPERIENCE, HE COULD NOT BE RELIED ON TO GIVE A TRUTHFUL ACCOUNT OF HIS DEALINGS WITH FAND. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE COULD BE ANY SUBSTANCE TO HASSAN'S COMMENTS; THE REAL PROBLEM WAS THE DRAFT STATEMENT WHICH HASSAN PROBABLY SUSPECTED WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE PLO. RATHER THAN PRESS THE PLO ON THE SUBJECT HE HAD DECIDED TO BE OFFENDED.

5. VELIOTES CONCLUDED THAT THE AMERICANS DIDN'T REALLY CARE WHETHER OR NOT THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION WENT TO LONDON. THEY WERE CERTAINLY NOT GOING TO FAULT US FOR HANGING TOUGH ON THE ISSUE OF PLO REPRESENTATION. BUT IF IT TRANSPIRED THAT KING HASSAN HAD NOT CANCELLED THE VISIT, WE WOULD CERTAINLY

THAT KING HASSAN HAD NOT CANCELLED THE VISIT, HE WOULD CERTAINLY ENSURE THAT YOUR MESSAGE WAS URGENTLY CONSIDERED AT A HIGHER LEVEL.

WRIGHT

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