

PM

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IMMEDIATE

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MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

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PS/MR HURD  
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SIR J LEAHY  
MR EGERTON  
SIR J BULLARD  
D/NENAD  
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 271 OF 13 DECEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE RABAT  
INFO PRIORITY ALGIERS AMMAN BAGHDAD DAMASCUS JEDDA UKMIS NEW YORK  
WASHINGTON  
INFO ROUTINE OTHER ME POSTS PARIS MOSCOW

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S VISIT TO LONDON

SUMMARY

1. LORD CARRINGTON CALLED SEPARATELY ON THE TUNISIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 11 DECEMBER. HE SAID THAT HMG WAS DISTURBED BY THE DIFFICULTIES THAT HAD ARISEN OVER THE DELEGATION AND HAD SENT LORD CHALFONT TO KING HASSAN IN THE HOPE OF FINDING A SOLUTION. HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE REPORT OF THE INTERVIEW. HE OFFERED A PERSONAL EXPLANATION OF WHAT HAD PREVIOUSLY GONE WRONG. BOTH CAID ESSEBSI AND KLIBI EXPRESSED BEMULDERED OUTRAGE AT THE MESSAGE WHICH HAD BEEN SENT

EXPRESSED BEWILDERED OUTRAGE AT THE MESSAGE WHICH HAD BEEN SENT ABOUT THE DELEGATION'S VISIT, BUT SAID THAT THEY WOULD WILLINGLY HELP TO FIND A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS. LORD CARRINGTON CONVEYED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO KLIBI. BOTH MEETINGS WERE EXTREMELY CORDIAL.

#### DETAIL

2. LORD CARRINGTON TOLD CAID ESSEBSI THAT LORD CHALFONT'S VISIT TO RABAT APPEARED TO HAVE GONE WELL. BOTH HMG AND KING HASSAN WANTED TO SETTLE THE MISUNDERSTANDING AND HE WAS SURE THAT A WAY COULD BE FOUND. ESSEBSI SAID THE MESSAGE WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED ABOUT THE DELEGATION'S VISIT HAD SICKENED HIM ( 'M'A FAIT MAL AU COEUR' ). HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW TUNISIA COULD HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED IN THESE TERMS AND HE WAS BEWILDERED THAT HMG COULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT THE TUNISIANS WOULD STAND FOR IT.

3. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT, AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, HMG THOUGHT THAT A STRAIGHT REFUSAL WOULD HAVE BEEN A SLAP IN THE FACE AND HAD TRIED TO FIND A COMPROMISE. THE APPROACH HAD BEEN WELL MEANT, IF MISTAKEN. LORD CARRINGTON EXPLAINED THE PRIME MINISTER'S REVULSION AGAINST TERRORISM AND SUGGESTED, AS A PERSONAL THOUGHT, THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN FELT THAT READINESS TO RECEIVE THE PLO COULD ENTAIL PRESSURE TO RECEIVE THE IRA. IT WAS REALISED THAT THE PLO WAS NOT A TERRORIST ORGANISATION, BUT HE POINTED OUT THAT SOME MEMBERS OF IT WERE UNDENIABLY TERRORISTS.

4. ESSEBSI REMARKED THAT SOME WELL-KNOWN ISRAELIS WERE TERRORISTS BUT HMG DEALT WITH ISRAEL. HOWEVER, HE REALISED THAT THE QUESTION WAS DELICATE AND HE WAS VERY READY TO DO HIS BEST TO HELP, BUT HMG MUST NOT PUT THE ARABS IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION.

5. LORD CARRINGTON SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED ON KLIBI. HE SAID THAT THOUGH HE WAS NO LONGER A MEMBER OF THE GOVERNMENT, HE BROUGHT AN OFFICIAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER. HE SAID THAT LORD CHALFONT HAD BEEN SENT TO RABAT IN THE HOPE OF FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE DIFFICULTIES OVER THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION'S VISIT. HE COMMENTED THAT HE HAD SEEN A TELEGRAM (RABAT TEL NO 495) REPORTING THE VISIT AND THAT THE PROSPECTS WERE ENCOURAGING. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ASKED HIM TO SAY THAT IF KLIBI WISHED TO VISIT LONDON FOR DISCUSSIONS, HE WOULD BE MOST WELCOME AND THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE VERY PLEASED TO MEET HIM.

6. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO ADD A PERSONAL AND

6. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO ADD A PERSONAL AND ENTIRELY UNOFFICIAL COMMENT. HE SPOKE AS IN PARA 3 ABOVE.

7. KLIBI SAID THAT HE HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF AS CALM AND WISE LEADERS. HE THEREFORE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW A LETTER SO WOUNDING TO ARAB SENSITIVITIES COULD HAVE BEEN SENT; HE WAS BEWILDERED BY THE BRITISH ATTITUDE. THE ARAB LEAGUE ALWAYS SOUGHT CONSTRUCTIVE COMPROMISES AND THERE WAS ALWAYS ROOM FOR DISCUSSION. AS OMRAN HAD TOLD ME AT THE TIME, THE LETTER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENT WITHOUT PRELIMINARY SOUNDINGS. BUT BY THEN IT HAD ALREADY GONE TO OTHER COMMISSION MEMBERS AND THERE WAS NOW A DIFFICULT SITUATION. KLIBI SAID THAT WHILE HE UNDERSTOOD AND RESPECTED THE ATTITUDE TO TERRORISM, HE TRUSTED THAT IT APPLIED EQUALLY TO PEOPLE SUCH AS BEGIN AND SHAMIR. HE SAID THAT A SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT PROBLEM WITH THE UK MUST BE FOUND WHICH TOOK FULL ACCOUNT OF ARAB FEELINGS. HE INVITED LORD CARRINGTON'S SUGGESTIONS.

8. LORD CARRINGTON OUTLINED KING HASSAN'S PROPOSAL AND MR EGERTON'S ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTION ON PLO REPRESENTATION IN THE DELEGATION. HE COMMENTED THAT, SPEAKING WITH GREAT DIFFIDENCE SINCE HE MUST NOT INTERFERE, HE DID NOT THINK THAT OBJECTION COULD BE TAKEN TO AN ELECTED MAYOR; THE SAUDIS HAD ALREADY MADE THIS SUGGESTION TO HIM. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED BY KING HASSAN AND LORD CHALFONT THAT CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN KING HASSAN AND HMG WOULD CONTINUE AND THAT CONTACT COULD BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN HMG AND THE ARAB LEAGUE. OMRAN ASSUMED THAT THIS WOULD NOT EXCLUDE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN KLIBI AND THE PRIME MINISTER ON GENERAL ME DEVELOPMENTS. I REPLIED THAT MY UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT TALKS ON THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE VISIT WOULD BE CONDUCTED EXCLUSIVELY WITH KING HASSAN, BUT THAT WE WISHED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THAT GENERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH KLIBI WOULD BE MOST WELCOME. (KLIBI HIMSELF DID NOT REACT TO THE SUGGESTION THAT HE MIGHT VISIT LONDON).

9. KLIBI SAID THAT ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING THE VISIT MUST CERTAINLY BE LEFT TO KING HASSAN, BUT HE WOULD GLADLY GIVE WHAT PERSONAL HELP HE COULD. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE THOUGHT THAT THE PROPOSALS MENTIONED BY LORD CARRINGTON WERE PRACTICABLE, THOUGH IT WOULD BE FOR THE PLO TO ACCEPT THEM.

STIRLING