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FROM TEL AVIV 281320Z FEB 83  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELNO 74 OF 28 FEBRUARY 1983  
INFO PRIORITY BONN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT, CAIRO,  
DAMASCUS AND MODUK.

MY TELEGRAM NO 69 (NOT TO ALL): ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. AT TODAY'S MEETING OF THE TEN, THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF A CONVERSATION ON 27 FEBRUARY WITH THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY, MAINLY ABOUT ISRAEL/LEBANON.
2. KIMCHE SAID THAT MORE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE LAST WEEK. FORMULAE HAD NOW BEEN AGREED AD REFERENDUM ON MANY POINTS AND AGREEMENT WAS SHAPING UP ON OTHERS. KIMCHE STRESSED THE HIGH DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY SHOWN BY ISRAEL, WHO WANTED TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SUGGESTIONS THAT ISRAELIS WERE ENGAGING IN FOOT DRAGGING IN ORDER TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WERE UNTRUE. KIMCHE WOULD NOT HOWEVER FORECAST WHEN AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE SIGNED: MANY PROBLEMS REMAINED AND HE COULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER CRISES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.
3. KIMCHE SAID THAT IN ALL LIKELIHOOD THERE WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON SIGNED BY FOREIGN MINISTERS. THE PREAMBLE HAD BEEN AGREED AND WORK ON THE WORDING OF THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR WAS MORE OR LESS FINISHED. THE MAIN REMAINING DIFFICULTIES CONCERNED MUTUAL RELATIONS, AND SECURITY QUESTIONS INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL. APART FROM THE FINAL CLAUSES, THERE WOULD ALSO BE MANY APPENDICES. THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE RATIFIED BY BOTH PARLIAMENTS, EVEN THOUGH THIS WAS NOT A LEGAL REQUIREMENT IN ISRAEL.
4. KIMCHE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LIAISON COMMITTEE WHICH WOULD BE SET UP BY THE AGREEMENT. THIS WOULD NOT MERELY SUPERVISE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT BUT WOULD ALSO DEAL WITH ALL PENDING BILATERAL ISSUES. THERE WOULD BE SUB-COMMITTEES ON ECONOMIC AND SECURITY QUESTIONS.
5. ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, KIMCHE SAID THAT THE KEY PROBLEM WAS THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND GOODS ACROSS THE ISRAEL/LEBANON BORDER. THIS WAS OF PRIME IMPORTANCE FOR ISRAEL. THE LEBANESE CLAIMED THAT IT WAS CORRESPONDINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THEM BECAUSE THE SYRIANS WERE THREATENING NOT TO WITHDRAW IF TOO MUCH WAS GIVEN TO ISRAEL. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION COULD BE A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF NOT MORE THAN SIX MONTHS DURING WHICH THE ECONOMIC SUB-COMMITTEE WOULD DEAL WITH APPLICATIONS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE. IF SO, ISRAEL WOULD NEED SUBSTANTIAL GUARANTEES THAT THE PROBLEM WOULD BE TACKLED FORMALLY NOT MORE THAN SIX MONTHS AFTER SIGNATURE OF THE MAIN AGREEMENT.

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6. KIMCHE SAID THAT THERE WERE ALSO PROBLEMS OVER THE ARAB BOYCOTT, WHERE THE LEBANESE WERE PREPARED TO GIVE ORAL UNDERTAKINGS WHICH THE ISRAELIS WANTED FORMALISED. AS REGARDS DIPLOMATIC OFFICES, THE ISRAELIS INTENDED TO ESTABLISH ONE IN OR AROUND BEIRUT: THE LEBANESE WERE NOT PREPARED TO DO LIKEWISE AT PRESENT.

7. KIMCHE TOLD HANSEN THAT THE LEBANESE HAD ALSO EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW THE RESERVATIONS REGARDING ISRAEL THEY HAD LODGED IN VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL BODIES. THIS HAD IMPORTANT PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS IN THE POSTAL AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS FIELDS. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE POLICE FORCES ON THE CURTAILMENT OF DL,5.89-98GLING.

8. KIMCHE SAID THAT MANY SECURITY ISSUES REMAINED UNRESOLVED. ISRAEL HAD NOT YET WITHDRAWN HER DEMAND FOR FIVE BASES. BUT SHE WAS FLEXIBLE AND KIMCHE HAD HINTED THAT IF ISRAELI AIMS COULD BE ACHIEVED BY OTHER MEANS THE DEMAND WOULD BE DROPPED. MEANWHILE, THERE WAS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON JOINT PATROLS SEMICOLON HANSEN PRESUMED THAT ISRAELI FORCES WOULD NOT STAY IN LEBANON OVERNIGHT.

9. KIMCHE SAID THAT AGREEMENT ON A TWO PART SECURITY ZONE WAS SHAPING UP. UP TO THE LITANI, SECURITY WOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE HADDAD MILITIA WHO WOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY (KIMCHE SAID THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS DID NOT NECESSARILY INCLUDE HADDAD PERSONALLY). ONLY ONE BRIGADE WOULD BE ALLOWED SOUTH OF THE LITANI. A LARGE NUMBER OF COMPLEX TECHNICAL QUESTIONS REMAINED TO BE SETTLED.

10. KIMCHE STATED THAT ISRAEL WAS AGAINST AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE (WHETHER MNF, UNIFIL OR MARINES) IN SOUTH LEBANON. HE SUBSEQUENTLY SAID THAT THEY WERE "FOR THE TIME BEING" OPPOSED TO UNIFIL GUARDING THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE SOUTH: THIS SHOULD BE DONE BY THE LEBANESE ARMY, WHO COULD DEPLOY MUSLIM UNITS IF NECESSARY WOULD HELP.

11. KIMCHE SAID THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO FIX A TIMETABLE FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE ISRAELIS COULD FIT IN WITH WHAT OTHERS, IE, THE SYRIANS AND PLO, COULD MANAGE (BUT SEE PARAGRAPH 130(C) & (D) 92). PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL TO THE 45 KMS LINE EVEN BEFORE AN AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED WAS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE BUT IN PRACTICE UNLIKELY. MEANWHILE, THE LEBANESE WERE HAPPY TO OVERLAP WITH IDF FORCES EG IN THE CHOUF MOUNTAINS.

12. KIMCHE TOLD HANSEN THAT HE WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE SYRIANS (HANSEN COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS A CHANGE FROM KIMCHE'S USUAL ATTITUDE). THE SYRIANS HAD AN ECONOMIC AS WELL AS POLITICO/MILITARY INTEREST IN STAYING IN LEBANON, SINCE THEY CONTROLLED THE TRADE IN HASHISH. THE RUSSIANS WERE ENCOURAGING THEM TO BE INTRANSIGENT. THERE WAS ALARMING EVIDENCE OF SOVIET VISITS AND FURTHER ARMS SUPPLIES TO SYRIA IN THE PAST WEEK, THOUGH TALK OF A PRE-EMPTIVE ISRAEL STRIKE AGAINST SAM-5 SITES WAS NONSENSE.

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THE ISRAELIS WERE URGING HABIB TO VISIT DAMASCUS, BUT HE WAS NOT KEEN TO GO UNTIL MORE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN THE ISRAEL/LEBANON TALKS. KIMCHE SUGGESTED THAT THE SAUDIS AND EUROPEANS HAD A ROLE TO PLAY IN CONVINCING THE SYRIANS TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING.

13. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR (STRESSING THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO BE QUOTED BACK TO HIS COLLEAGUE IN BEIRUT OR TO THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY) READ RAPIDLY FROM A TELEGRAM REPORTING ON A CONVERSATION BETWEEN HABIB AND THE FRENCHMAN IN BEIRUT ON 26 FEBRUARY. THIS WAS BROADLY CONSISTENT WITH KIMCHE'S ACCOUNT OF THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. BUT THE FOLLOWING GLOSSES MAY BE WORTH ADDING:

- A) IT WAS CLEAR THAT HABIB AND THE LEBANESE ENVISAGE A COMPLETELY SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON NORMALISATION, TO BE CONCLUDED AT A LATER STAGE (IE 6 MONTHS AFTER SIGNATURE OF THE MAIN AGREEMENT) SEMICOLON
- B) HE AND THE LEBANESE SEEM TO BE PLANNING THAT THE LEBANESE SHOULD PRESENT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL A REQUEST FOR A CHANGE IN THE UNIFIL MANDATE, TO ALLOW IT TO PERFORM ITS NEW ROLE SEMICOLON
- C) THE LEBANESE WANT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO TAKE PLACE OVER AN EIGHT WEEK PERIOD, WITH THE ISRAELIS ASKING FOR EI 233(' SEMICOLON
- D) HABIB WAS HOPEFUL THAT AN AGREEMENT COULD BE SIGNED BY LATE MARCH, IN WHICH CASE IDF WITHDRAWAL COULD START AT THE BEGINNING OF APRIL AND BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF MAY.

14. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO NENAD.

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