

S E C R E T

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10 DOWNING STREET

NOTE FOR THE FILE

The attached documents were given to the Prime Minister by King Hussein when he was here with the Arab League Delegation last week. King Hussein stressed their confidentiality.

A-J-C. $\frac{22}{3}$.

22 March 1983

S E C R E T

FIRST, YOU HAVE ASKED IF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD RESULT IN THE RETURN OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO THE PALESTINIANS. WHILE I HAVE REFRAINED FROM MAKING ANY ABSOLUT GUARANTEES TO ANY PARTY REGARDING THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH GOD ALONE CAN KNOW, I BELIEVE THAT THE FUTURE OF THESE TERRITORIES SHOULD BE THAT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT BY THE INHABITANTS IN ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN. THE FIRST ITEM ON THE AGENDA IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. YOU MAY RECALL THAT IN MY SEPTEMBER INITIATIVE, I STATED VERY CLEARLY THAT, IN MY VIEW, THE PURPOSE OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS THE PEACEFUL AND ORDERLY TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY FROM ISRAEL TO THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, THE PALESTINIANS OF THE TERRITORIES WILL EXERCISE REAL AUTHORITY OVER THEMSELVES AND THEIR AFFAIRS, PARTICULARLY INCLUDING THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ULTIMATE STATUS OF THE TERRITORIES UNDER CONDITIONS OF FINAL PEACE. IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE I AM PREPARED TO SUPPORT ANY RESULT ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES INVOLVED, I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT SELF-GOVERNMENT BY THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IN ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN PROVIDES THE MOST LIKELY AVENUE TO PEACE.

SECOND, YOU HAVE ALSO ASKED IF THE U.S. OPPOSES THE FORMATION OF A CONFEDERATION OF JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF KING HUSSEIN. CONFEDERATION, OF COURSE, COULD BE ONE OF THE POSSIBLE FORMS OF "ASSOCIATION" WHICH I HAVE SAID IS MY PREFERENCE.

THIRD, YOU MUST HAVE NEXT ASKED IF THE ARAB DELEGATION WOULD BE ABLE TO ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE FEZ SUMMIT. IT IS IMPORTANT TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE AGREED PURPOSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS ADOPTED BY ANY OF THE PARTIES. CLEARLY, PARTIES TO A NEGOTIATION SHOULD BE IN AGREEMENT ON ITS PURPOSE WHICH, IN THIS CASE, IS PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS, AS CALLED FOR IN UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS ASSURED THAT ANY APPROACH TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE WITH WHICH IT IS ASSOCIATED RESTS FIRMLY ON THE PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THOSE RESOLUTIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS MY FIRM CONVICTION THAT, IN ANY NEGOTIATING PROCESS, EVERY PARTY SHOULD BE FREE TO PRESENT ITS VIEWS IN THE FORM IT CONSIDERS MOST APPROPRIATE. IT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE NEGOTIATORS THEMSELVES TO RECONCILE THE INEVITABLE DIFFERENCES IN THE POINTS OF VIEW OF THE VARIOUS PARTIES. THEREFORE, WE, OF COURSE, WILL NOT DECTATE TO ANY PARTY THE POSITIONS WHICH IT WISHES TO PRESENT DURING NEGOTIATIONS.

FOURTH, YOU HAVE ADDRESSED THE SUBJECT OF WITHDRAWAL AND HAVE ASKED THAT I REAFFIRM OUR SUPPORT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF "TERRITORY FOR PEACE," YOU WILL RECALL THAT IN MY STATEMENT ON SEPTEMBER 1, I REAFFIRMED THE POSITION OF THE U.S. THAT -- IN RETURN FOR PEACE -- THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION OF RESOLUTION 242 APPLIES TO ALL FRONTS, INCLUDING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. I DESCRIBED A LOGICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXTENT OF TERRITORY WHICH ISRAEL SHOULD BE ASKED TO GIVE UP AND THE EXTENT OF TRUE PEACE AND NORMALIZATION AND THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL BE OFFERED IN RETURN, PUT ANOTHER WAY, THE FINAL REGIONAL BOUNDARY TO THE EAST OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL WILL, AS WE ALL KNOW, BE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION. IN THAT NEGOTIATION, THE U.S., IN ITS ROLE AS A FULL PARTNER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WILL STRIVE TO ASSURE THAT EACH OF THE PRINCIPLES OF RESOLUTION 242 IS FULFILLED TO THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE EXTENT.

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Your Majesty:

I look forward to seeing you in London this weekend for a good talk about Lebanon and the peace process. Meanwhile, following Dick Viets' talks with you on this subject, I want to bring you up-to-date on our discussion with our Saudi friends. You of course have Prince Saud with you and I understand Prince Bandar may call on you in London on his way home to Saudi Arabia from Washington. I will be seeing Prince Bandar Thursday evening before his departure but, before you see him, I want you to know for your information that I believe the Saudis now have a better understanding of the difference between the basis of negotiations and any party's negotiating position. Prince Saud told our Ambassador that it might be possible to find a formula indicating that 242 is the basis of negotiations, though he stressed that Fez should be the negotiating position.

On another aspect of the issue, however, I believe the Saudis still support an unrealistic position. That is, they seem to support Arafat's desire for confederation and his interpretation that this means two independent states which then choose to join together. While we have been clear, even blunt, in telling our Saudi friends that this will not work, they have not yet dropped it.

Your Majesty, these are just two of the many issues we will want to discuss when we meet. I have taken the liberty of addressing this message to you at this time, in the belief that the quickening pace of events now requires the closest and most frequent consultation between us.

Respectfully,

Philip C. Habib

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FOR AMBASSADOR VIETS FROM UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER:

The report King Hussein gave to Ambassador Barnes about the U.S. agreeing to quadripartite talks involving the PLO, Jordan, Israel, and the U.S. is of course untrue. It results, we assume, from some mixed signals through which King Hassan got the impression that Kissinger would be willing to go to Morocco for talks with Hassan and a "third party" on U.S.-PLO relations. While Kissinger has in the past met with Hassan to discuss global and regional issues of mutual interest, and has a pending invitation to do so again, King Hassan now understands that there should be no "third parties" present for such discussions.

You should convey the above explanation to King Hussein, emphasizing that of course our position on the PLO has not changed, and asking that he try to avoid discussing this matter further with the Moroccans as it was a bit awkward for both us and King Hassan.

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