

PRIME MINISTER

Visit of the President of the Ivory Coast

I attach:

- A The briefs
- B Draft speaking notes for the lunch
- C A note on the reception ceremony in the FCO Quadrangle

Talks

The President has asked for a 15 minute tete-a-tete followed by the plenary.

As he will attach importance to the formal arrangements and to protocol, I have asked the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor and the Minister of Agriculture to attend the plenary at 1215 to match his own Ministers.

The list of those attending the plenary is therefore as follows:

On Their Side

The President
Foreign Minister (M. Aké)
Minister of Economy and Finance (M. Kone)
Minister of Agriculture (M. Kanon)
HE M. Le Gouverneur Guy Nairay - Director of Cabinet of the
Presidency
HE M. Dieudonne Essienne - Ambassador of the Ivory Coast
HE M. l'Ambassadeur George Oueguin - Director of Protocol at
the Presidency

On Our Side

Yourself
Foreign Secretary
Chancellor
Minister of Agriculture
Sir John Leahy
Mr. M.F. Daly - Head of West African Department, FCO
Mr. J.M. Wilson - HM Ambassador to the Ivory Coast

A.S.C.

26 July 1983

Mr. Coler

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MR. THATCHER

IVORY COAST

I attach, as you requested, a set of the briefs for the President's visit tomorrow. You will not want to read them all but I think you will find in them what you are looking for.

As some of these briefs are confidential, could you let me have them back in due course?

AJC

26 July 1983

Mr. John Coler

Reimure with Thanks

B 28/p



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 July 1983

Every last

~~Please type in
special form~~

1 + 3.

AK 25/7

Joe S...

I enclose, as requested, some notes for the Prime Minister's use at the luncheon for President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast on Wednesday 27 July.

[Handwritten signature]

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SPEAKING NOTES FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S ADDRESS AFTER LUNCH ON
27 JULY 1983

Mr President, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen.

one of the world's most distinguished statesmen

It is a great honour to welcome back to this country after a long absence a statesman as distinguished as President Houphouet-Boigny. ¹⁹⁶² When you were last here, Mr President, the Ivory Coast had not long before embarked on its path of national independence. Now, 21 years later, the results of your wise leadership are clear for all the world to see. For two decades the Ivory Coast has enjoyed enviable political stability and unparalleled economic growth and prosperity. It is also a model of harmony between ethnic groups and immigrant minorities. I believe that the Ivory Coast's success may have some important lessons for development theory and practice elsewhere. First, the success has been achieved by the pursuit of liberal economic policies based on proper incentives for the producer. Secondly, you have always rightly insisted, Mr President, on agriculture as the main vehicle for development. And thirdly, with your emphasis on the small farmer, you have ensured that production and prosperity is broadly based. In pursuing these policies from the outset, you have shown a far-sightedness which other developing countries could wisely emulate. Indeed, these policies are now widely recognized by such authorities as the World Bank as the most sensible way forward for developing countries. You yourself, Mr President, have set ^{an} outstanding personal example in this and can justly claim with pride the title of 'First Farmer' ('premier planteur').

Nor ^{have not} have your achievements been confined to the Ivory Coast. You are admired in this country as a force for moderation and a source of wisdom, both in African affairs and in the wide international arena. The discussions which we have had this morning have provided a most useful opportunity to exchange views with a leader who has enormous experience of international affairs.

/Mr President



Mr President, while a long time has elapsed since your last visit, this does not imply that there has been ^{in fact} a lack of contact between our governments, still less that there has been ^{not at all any} any coolness or difficulties in our bilateral relations - quite the contrary. In recent years there have been a growing number of visitors in both directions. In this context may I say how grateful we are for the courtesy and hospitality which you and your Ministers have unfailingly extended to visiting British Ministers and dignitaries. We have also seen ^{welcome} a growth in British investment in the Ivory Coast and improved communications between our two countries.

Nevertheless, I believe that there is scope for broadening and deepening our bilateral relations. Your visit, Mr President, provides both a fresh impetus to this end and an opportunity to discuss ways and means of strengthening our bilateral relations.

We most sincerely welcome you, Mr President, and your suite to this country. I am sure that the other engagements in the programme, including the hospitality of Her Majesty The Queen and His Royal Highness The Duke of Kent, will be as warm and as friendly occasions as this luncheon has been.

This morning we agreed that Britain would make available £ 3.5 million in aid for spending over the next 3 to 4 years. We are also making available a line of credit of £ 10 million. We have also agreed that we should ~~try~~ improve our working for bilateral consultations and have directed our officials to draw up a Memorandum of Understanding covering such matters as investment ~~and commerce~~ to investment, cultural exchange, political exchange and other matters.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 July, 1983

Joe T...

Visit of the President of the Ivory Coast: 26-30 July 1983

We have already corresponded about the arrangements for the meeting and luncheon between the Prime Minister and President Houphouet-Boigny on 27 July. I enclose three sets of briefs for the Prime Minister for these engagements. *(in attached folder)*

I am sending separate copies to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food who will also be present.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

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Ivory Coast: visit of Paes 10/82

British and Foreign
Antiquarian and
Book Dealers Association
London W1A 1AA



VISIT BY PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY OF THE IVORY COAST,
26-30 JULY 1983

LIST OF BRIEFS

BRIEF NO.	SUBJECT
1	Steering Brief
2	Bilateral Relations
3(a)	Trade
(b)	Investment
4	UK Aid to Ivory Coast
5	Cultural Relations
6	Developing Country Issues
7	Commodities
	(a) Coffee and Cocoa
	(b) Sugar
8	Libyan Activities in West Africa
9	Southern Africa
10	Other African Issues
	(a) OAU
	(b) Chad

BACKGROUND BRIEFS

Ivory Coast
Personality Notes
Copy of Programme

VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE IVORY COAST: 26-30 JULY

STEERING BRIEF

INTRODUCTION

1. President Houphouet-Boigny, who last visited the UK in 1962, is arguably the doyen of African elder statesmen. He is sensible, moderate, pragmatic, the apostle of 'dialogue' and staunchly pro-Western. He has ruled the Ivory Coast since independence in 1960; and thanks mainly to his liberal economic policies, the country is by African standards a model of political stability and economic progress. Although offshore oil was discovered in 1977, and Ivory Coast will reach self-sufficiency this year, the world recession and sharply falling commodity prices over the last three years have hit the Ivory Coast hard and the Ivorians have sought extensive help from the World Bank and the IMF.

2. There are no contentious bilateral issues between us. Although the President is a fervent advocate of better returns for primary producers, he appreciates in private - if not in public - that economic difficulties facing the West make this difficult. He is thus unlikely to press for any firm commitment on commodity prices. The Prime Minister will find him an engaging and unfailingly courteous interlocutor who, with his fifty years' experience of political life, views world affairs in broad perspectives.

3. Despite his age he is mentally very alert; physically he is getting frail and sometimes suffers badly from sciatica.

OBJECTIVES FOR THE TALKS

4. Ours

- to pay tribute to an elder statesman and friend of the West;
- to deepen our relationship (announce our £3.5m aid programme to the Ivory Coast);
- to encourage more trade (and announce line of credit);
- to seek the President's views on how 'dialogue' might solve African problems, particularly Namibia and South Africa;
- to point out that economic constraints in the Western world inhibit dramatic increases in commodity prices;
- to respond constructively if the Ivorians make proposals for more institutionalized bilateral consultations.

/His

His (probably)

- to appeal for improved terms of trade for commodity producers (and possibly to seek support for a substantial EC sugar quota);
- to urge greater Western economic support for moderate African states to prevent their falling victims to Communism;
- to discuss the activities in West Africa of the Libyans, whom he sees as the surrogate of the Soviet Union.

CONDUCT OF THE TALKS

Tête-à-tête (15 minutes maximum)

5. The Prime Minister may like to stress our pleasure at having the President as an official guest again after so long a gap and congratulate him on his great achievements during more than 50 years in public life. She could add that she regretted that his illness prevented their meeting at the Cancún summit. She might then propose, since time will be short given the need for interpretation (the President speaks no English), that an exchange of views on bilateral and international issues be made in the plenary session.

Plenary Session

6. No agenda has been arranged. Three Ministers (Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, and Economy and Finance), the Ivory Coast Ambassador, the Director of the President's Cabinet and the Director of Protocol, will accompany the President. The Prime Minister might first briefly touch on our bilateral relations (Brief No 2) - there are no contentious issues - then raise our interests in developing trade and investment (of which the Ivorians are well aware; but they do not want the visit to have too commercial a flavour). She can announce ECGD's willingness to back a line of credit of £10m and thank the President for the unsolicited public and private assurances he has given that when the new Abidjan airport is built it will be done by British firms. (Briefs No 3(a) and (b)) It would then also be appropriate to announce our new £3.5m aid programme (Brief No 4). After mentioning the possibility of expanding British Council activities (Brief No 5), the Prime Minister could invite the President to give his views on African affairs and how the continent's problems might be solved by dialogue - particularly Namibia and Southern

/Africa

Africa. At the same time she could pay tribute to the President's courage in advocating a dialogue with the South Africans in the seventies - despite criticism at the OAU Summit in 1971 he persevered with high-level contacts until the South African invasion of Angola in 1975 (Brief No 9).

7. The President is likely to discourse at length on the need for the West to help moderate African states out of their economic difficulties by ensuring better returns for their commodities: his thesis is that Communism's only breeding grounds are poverty and despair and thus it is in the direct interest of Western nations to help Africa and so protect its huge potential from falling into Soviet hands (Brief No 6). He may raise specific commodity issues like coffee and cocoa (Brief No 7(a)) but is unlikely to press for any firm commitments. However, he may seek support for a substantial EC sugar quota (Brief No 7(b)).

8. One aspect of the President's devotion to 'dialogue' worked to our disadvantage: the Ivory Coast voted at the UNGA for negotiations between the UK and Argentina following the Falklands war. It is unlikely that he will abandon this stance, particularly since he has virtually no interest in South American affairs which he knows he cannot influence.

9. If time remains, and if the President has not himself brought them up, the Prime Minister could ask for his views on Libyan activities in West Africa (Brief No 8) and in Chad (Brief No 10(b)). She might also ask for his current opinion on the OAU (Brief No 10(a)).

THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAMME

10. The official programme is, at the Ivorians' specific request, light. It includes luncheons with Her Majesty The Queen at Buckingham Palace and with the Duke of Kent (as Vice-President of the BOTB), a visit to the Tower of London and a river trip. The Anglo-Ivory Coast Society and the Anglo-Afrique Group of the Westminster Chamber of Commerce are giving a joint reception. The President is privately receiving African Ambassadors and some British businessmen.

11. The accompanying Ministers are calling on their opposite numbers: the Minister of Economy and Finance has also meetings with the Governor of the Bank of England and other bankers, and the Minister of Agriculture with businessmen.

West African Department, FCO
22 July 1985

VISIT BY PRESIDENT OF IVORY COAST, 26-29 JULY 1983

BRIEF NO. 2: BILATERAL RELATIONS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Our relations excellent. No significant bilateral problems because we share similar political and economic values.
2. Thanks for warm reception given to visiting British dignitaries and Ministers.

REGULAR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS [If raised]

3. We think it could be useful to establish more formalised arrangements for representatives of our two countries to consult regularly on matters of mutual interest. Suggest our officials pursue the modalities.

BRIEF NO. 2: BILATERAL RELATIONS

ESSENTIAL FACTS

ROYAL AND MINISTERIAL VISITS

1. There have been many of these since the Prince of Wales in 1977, including the Duke of Gloucester (British Consultants Bureau), the Duke of Kent (BOTB), the Foreign Secretary (Lord Carrington). All had a strong commercial flavour. The most recent visit was by Dr. Vaughan, then Minister for Consumer Affairs, last April. All visitors have been warmly received and though no spectacular commercial successes have been recorded recently, without these visits our trade would probably have declined.

REGULAR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS

2. During Dr. Vaughan's visit in April the Ivorians raised the question of setting up a mixed commission to thicken our commercial relations. Dr. Vaughan agreed to pursue this.

3. Although the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department of Trade and Industry have reservations about the usefulness of joint commissions generally, in the case of the Ivory Coast it is evident that the Ivorians see some greater formalisation of our bilateral relations as much the best way to deepen our relationship in the political, commercial and cultural fields. They already conduct their relations in this way with France, Germany, Belgium, Canada and Spain, and have a similar arrangement with the United States in the agricultural sector. Further UK resistance to the Ivorian proposal could be counter-productive in terms of our trade. The President is likely to attach importance to a positive response.

4. The DTI have therefore agreed that some concession in the direction of bilateral consultative machinery would be prudent. They propose that we show willingness to hold discussions on a range of subjects to be mutually agreed, and to charge officials of both governments with drawing up a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) covering such matters as incentives and disincentives to investment, cultural exchanges, political consultations, as well as careful references to aid and commodity agreements. In addition both Governments should attempt to identify industrial and commercial sectors for particular attention for inclusion in the MOU. When the MOU is prepared and agreed, the intention would be to use it as an agenda to enable some more formal discussions to take place

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between the two Governments, preferably at official level
(although the MOU may have to be signed by Ministers).

WEST AFRICAN DEPARTMENT
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
22 July 1983

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VISIT BY PRESIDENT OF IVORY COAST, 26-30 JULY 1983

BRIEF NO. 3(a): TRADE

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Despite the level of bilateral trade being more modest than we would like, Ivory Coast is the UK's largest trading partner in francophone West Africa. We are confident that trade will grow to our mutual advantage. We should like to make available a £10m line of credit backed by ECGD which could be used separately for projects in those same sectors identified for aid.
2. Thanks for assurances that when economic conditions improve, the new Abidjan airport will be built by British firms. But might the eventual transfer of the Ivorian capital from Abidjan to Yamoussoukro affect the project? In any case we also hope to make a substantial contribution to any work needed at Yamoussoukro to enlarge the facilities there.
3. We have heard that a decision has now been taken on the go-ahead for the Man hospital project. Can the President confirm this? (NB. A UK consortium led by Wimpey is pursuing this contract).



VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE IVORY COAST, 26-29 JULY 1983

TRADE/ECONOMIC RELATIONS BRIEF

ESSENTIAL FACTS

- 1 The Ivory Coast is the most developed of the French - speaking countries in West Africa, and enjoys considerable prosperity by African, and other developing world, standards. This has been achieved largely through free enterprise in the guise of state capitalism and a liberal foreign - investment regime; the underlying factor, which has made this possible, being a sound and diversified agricultural base. (The country is the world's largest exporter of cocoa, and the third largest for coffee).
- 2 Offshore oil was discovered in 1977. Total production for 1983 is estimated at some 1.3m tons, thus reaching self-sufficiency for the first time with the Ivory Coast expected to become a small net exporter by 1985.
- 3 The country has not escaped the world recession; and in 1978/79 it became apparent that foreign indebtedness was straining the economy. The problem was augmented by the decline in export receipts for coffee and cocoa, because of low world prices. As a result the debt service ratio is projected to rise to an average of 43 per cent in the period 1983-85 before declining to 31% by 1990.
- 4 Tighter monetary controls have been introduced, in conjunction with the IMF/World Bank, and there has been an attempt to cut back on imports generally.
- 5 Despite its current lean spell, the economy is still expected to grow by 2% per annum during 1983-85 before moving to a higher growth rate in the second half of this decade. There is no reason why the UK should not significantly increase its share of the market, which is currently around 2.6%.
- 6 Although Ivorian official policy is to diversify its trade links, France remains the dominant partner. The Ivory Coast is nevertheless traditionally the UK's largest export market and bilateral trading partner in francophone West Africa: the balance of trade is in favour of the Ivorians. (Detailed figures at Annex A).

7 ECGD cover is available for short and medium/long-term business and they are also willing to back a £10m line of credit. It is now up to banks to come forward with proposals for specific projects. Credits should be used for separate and identifiable components of projects in those same sectors identified for aid.

8. A summary of projects of interest to the UK is at Annex B .

9. Defence Sales prospects are slight. Possible openings are described at Annex C.

Department of Trade & Industry
Overseas Trade Division 5

21 July 1983

VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE IVORY COAST, 26-29 JULY 1983

TRADE BRIEF

UK/Ivory Coast Trade

	<u>£ Millions</u>						Jan-May	Jan-May
	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
UK Exports to Ivory Coast	25.2	24.6	24.0	27.9	30.1*	28.2	13.1	10.5
UK Imports from Ivory Coast	79.5	58.0	73.6	53.6	63.1	56.1	29.5	34.0

* NB In 1981 export figures for March-August (inclusive) had to be estimated, and are therefore not guaranteed as accurate.

(SOURCE: Overseas Trade Statistics of the United Kingdom)

UK exports to Ivory Coast in 1982 - Machinery specialised for particular industries (£3.0m); tobacco (£2.7m); beverages (£1.9m); power generating machinery and equipment (£1.9m); general industrial machinery and equipment (£1.3m) paper and paperboard (£1.0m)

UK imports from Ivory Coast in 1982 - Coffee and cocoa (£27.3m); cork and wood (£9.4m); fish (£4.1m); vegetable oils and fats (£2.6m); vegetables and fruit (£1.5m); oil seeds and oleaginous fruit (£1.1m); sugar (£1.0m)

Department of Trade and Industry

Overseas Trade Division 5

21 July 1983

IVORY COAST

Projects and Contracts of Interest to the UK

- 1 The contract signed in 1977 with Plessey, and valued at £26.3m for work on the extension of Abidjan International Airport was the first major contract awarded to the UK. However the Ivorians have subsequently deferred, largely because of a lack of finance but also because of further consideration of the form such an airport would take. A further complication affecting the project could be the transfer of the Ivorian capital from Abidjan to Yamoussoukro.
- 2 In 1981 Wimpey were awarded a contract to build a road from Dimbokro to Kotobi, worth approximately US \$33 millions. This has recently been completed. Wimpey have now been awarded a \$2 millions contract for re-surfacing and drainage work in Dimbroko and Bongouanou.
- 3 Wimpey are leading the UK consortium pursuing the contract for a 500/600 bed hospital at Man. Unfortunately the Ivorian economic climate has meant a considerable delay on the project, although agreement on its go-ahead is now rumoured.
- 4 Adidjan's Lagoon area, plus some 20 km of coastline, is heavily polluted through oil and other industrial waste. Wimpey, Oil Mop International Ltd and Salvesen are hopeful of securing business in this sector but face strong competition from the French, Americans and Danes.
- 5 Wimpey have prequalified for the civil works of the Soubre hydro-electric power scheme, viewed as the Ivory Coast's most important development project.
- 6 Rolls Royce hope Air Afrique will purchase a Boeing B757 for which the RB 211-535 is the launch engine.

Department of Trade and Industry

Overseas Trade Division 5

21 July 1983

VISIT OF PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY, PRESIDENT OF THE IVORY COAST
26-30 JULY 1983

DEFENCE SALES BRIEF

DEFENCE SALES PROSPECTS

1. The exploitation of the offshore oil has stimulated interest in maritime surveillance and protection. British Aerospace have submitted proposals which include credit and an offer of RAF training for both HS125 and HS748 in the maritime surveillance role. Vosper Thornycroft, who visited in mid-1982, were asked to submit budgetary proposals for Mk 3 Corvettes and fast patrol craft. However, both firms have been told by the Ivorians that, due to the present economic difficulties, money is not likely to be found before 1984.

DEFENCE SALES ACTIVITIES

2. The 1983 Defence Sales Operating Plan envisages the allocation of more time and resources to the promotion of defence sales business in Francophone West Africa. The British Embassy in Abidjan are not optimistic that the Ivorian Armed Forces will break with the French, with whom they are closely linked by Defence Treaties, or that the Ivorian defence budget will allow major new procurement decisions to be taken in the near future. A visit is, however, being made in July by a member of the Defence Sales Organisation as part of a short West African tour.

Defence Sales Organization
Ministry of Defence
July 1983

VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE IVORY COAST: 26-30 JULY

BRIEF NO 3(b): INVESTMENT
POINTS TO MAKE

INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND PROTECTION AGREEMENT (IPPA)

1. We remain anxious to conclude IPPA with Ivory Coast. Our Embassy handed over our response to Ivorian draft in August 1982. Hope that reply will be received soon, so that negotiations can begin.

DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION (IF RAISED)

2. The conclusion of a satisfactory Double Taxation Convention should encourage and increase United Kingdom-Ivory Coast trade and investment.

3. The United Kingdom has an unrivalled network of tax treaties which makes London particularly suitable for international trading.

4. HMG hopes that the technical problems can be overcome quickly, so that the economic benefits of the Convention can be obtained. The United Kingdom will shortly be suggesting that negotiations should be resumed this year or early next year.

BRIEF NO 3(b): ESSENTIAL FACTS

INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND PROTECTION AGREEMENT (IPPA)

1. IPPAs are intended to stimulate the flow of new investment between the two signatory states; to protect existing and future investments under the law of the host country; and, in the event of expropriation by a host government, to ensure that prompt, adequate and effective compensation is paid. They also provide for the independent settlement of investment disputes. IPPAs can act as an incentive to potential investors and as a reassurance for existing ones.

2. In response to our model IPPA which we presented to the Ivorians a few years ago, they have given us their own version of a draft agreement. It is an encouraging start but there are a number of points which are unacceptable to us. A full list of our comments was passed to the Ivorians in August 1982, but we have yet to receive a reply.

DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION

3. There have been two rounds of negotiations (in 1979) and subsequent exchanges of correspondence on the possibility of a Convention. Substantial agreement has been reached on the terms of a Convention which would be broadly in line with our usual OECD-based treaties.

4. The Ivorians have been very reasonable except on one main issue. This has become the main stumbling block in the way of an agreed Convention.

5. They have insisted on retaining the right to impose income tax on what they see as the profit attributable to goods purchased in the Ivory Coast by the purchasing offices (situated in that country) of a UK business, even though the goods are not resold or processed in the Ivory Coast.

6. This is completely contrary to OECD and UN tax principles. The UK has never conceded this right in any of its treaties. But the Ivory Coast has insisted on it in all its treaties.

7. Present position. The Inland Revenue has just completed its consultations with the CBI about the implications of conceding this right under a Double Taxation Treaty. The CBI's members are divided: those with substantial interests in the Ivory Coast are in favour of a Treaty even if it concedes this point, but a majority of all those who expressed a view are opposed.

8. The Inland Revenue are now considering how to proceed and will shortly be suggesting further discussions with the Ivorians.

TRED, FCO/POLICY DIVISION 5 INLAND REVENUE

18 July 1983



VISIT BY PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET - BOIGNY
IVORY COAST 26 - 29 JULY 1983

Brief No. 4: UK AID TO IVORY COAST

Points to Make

1. Glad we can make capital aid offer of £3.5m for spending over next 3 to 4 years.
2. Project identification mission to Ivory Coast planned for later this year.
3. ECGD medium-term cover available for Ivory Coast. May be possible to associate this with aid-financed projects.
4. Technical cooperation programme will be modestly increased to support new capital aid.

Defensive (If President asks about continuation of aid after present tranche)

5. Too early to say. We shall have to take account of circumstances then prevailing.



Essential Facts

Bilateral Aid

1. Ivory Coast is relatively prosperous by African standards with a Gross National Product per capita of US \$1,150. It has therefore been a country of minor aid interest to the UK. The present small bilateral technical cooperation programme is concentrated exclusively on English Language Teaching and related scholarships. There are three English Language lecturers in the Ivory Coast: one at the University, one at the Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS) and one at the Institut National Superieur de L'Enseignement Technique (INSET). Total estimated expenditure in the current financial year will be about £205,000.

Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC)

2. CDC began operations in the Ivory Coast in 1974 and its total investment (so far) of £14.5m is in rubber, oil palm, coconut and forestry projects. With ODA's approval CDC are now negotiating a further investment of £21m with the Ivorian authorities.

Multilateral Aid

3. The United Kingdom contributes indirectly to the development of the Ivory Coast through institutions such as the World Bank (IBRD) and its International Development Association (IDA) and the European Development Fund. Our subscription to the IBRD represents 6.58 per cent of the total shareholding and our contribution to the IDA VI Replenishment is 10.1 per cent of the total. Ivory Coast has received IBRD loans worth US \$1,056.1m and IDA credits worth US \$7.5m. The United Kingdom contributes approximately 18% of the EDF budget. The EDF V programme for Ivory Coast (1981/85) will be £27m to £37m. The notional United Kingdom share is about £4.8m to £6.6m.

New Aid

4. A £3.5m allocation of capital aid for Ivory Coast (for projects) has been agreed by Ministers, but not yet formally offered to the Ivory Coast Government. (A possible offer of £2m was mentioned informally to the Government of the Ivory Coast by Dr Gerard Vaughan during an official visit in April but was not well received) This aid will be provided on soft loan terms.

NOT
TO BE
QUOTED



5. Because of the constraints on the aid programme we cannot plan to spend the money quickly. The proposed phasing is:-

NOT
TO BE
QUOTED

<u>1983/84</u>	<u>1984/85</u>	<u>1985/86</u>	<u>1986/87</u>
£0.5m	£1.0m	£1.0m	£1.0m

However, because of likely further adjustments in the Aid Framework, this phasing has not yet been finalised.

6. The aid offer can be made known to the President during his visit. A Government to Government loan agreement covering all the details (including terms) will have to be negotiated. Instructions on this will be sent to our Embassy in Abidjan. The President's attention can also be drawn to the availability of ECGD medium-term export credit cover for Ivory Coast and to the possibility of employing some of this on projects for which an element of British aid is agreed.

7. The ODA and DTI propose to send a project identification mission to Ivory Coast later this year to identify suitable projects for implementation under the agreement.

8. The small existing technical cooperation programme will be expanded modestly to support the new capital aid programme. This has been allowed for in the draft Aid Framework.

Eastern and Western Africa Department
Overseas Development Administration
19 July 1983

VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT OF IVORY COAST: 26-29 JULY 1983

BRIEF NO 5

CULTURAL RELATIONS

Points to Make

1. Pleased to see the contribution we are making to development of English Language Teaching in Ivory Coast.

2. We are looking at ways in which this might be expanded, perhaps through a direct teaching operation in Abidjan organised by the British Council in consultation with the Ivorian Ministry of Education.

CULTURAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

14 JULY 1983

VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT OF IVORY COAST: 26-29 JULY 1983

CULTURAL RELATIONS

Essential Facts

General

1. Our cultural relations with Ivory Coast are at present limited to modest support for English Language Training under the Technical Co-operation Training Programme (TCT). There is no British Council representation in Abidjan and the educational aid is administered by the Embassy with the support and guidance of the Council Headquarters in London.

Current Programme

2. The £200,000 allocated in 1983/84 for the TCT programme provides for three British lecturers in English at higher educational institutions, including the University of Abidjan; eighteen awards to Ivorian students for various English language courses in Britain; and books to the value of £2,000 for presentation to Ivorian institutions.

Future Prospects

3. An ODA Education Adviser visited Ivory Coast earlier this year recommending a possible increase in our local support for English Language Teaching through:

(a) provision of an adviser to the Ministry of National Education;

/(b) the

(b) the establishment of a Direct Teaching of English operation supervised by the British Council (whose representative in neighbouring Ghana has already visited Abidjan with a view to overseeing the educational aid programme).

4. The cost of setting up a direct teaching operation and its prospects of becoming self-financing would need to be carefully considered. If a teaching operation could pay its way and eventually produce a working surplus, the British Council might be persuaded to open a resident representation. At the present time the Council lacks the financial resources for this.

Is there
anything you
need to raise?

VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE IVORY COAST, 26-30 JULY

BRIEF NO 6: DEVELOPING COUNTRY ISSUES
POINTS TO MAKE (IF RAISED)

1. I understand the great hardships which primary producers have been suffering. Best hope for everyone lies in economic recovery of developed countries, to which our policies are directed. Williamsburg Summit most recently recognized this. Recovery now under way.
 2. UK has firmly resisted protectionist pressures at time of recession. Continued free access for the developing world's products one of the most practical ways we can help.
 3. Some modest progress at UNCTAD VI. Hope that future UNCTAD conferences can achieve more.
 4. [If it is suggested that developing countries' products should be subject to a CAP-type regime.] Fear that cost would be prohibitive. Likely to lead to unsaleable surpluses.
- AID
5. Western countries devote very considerable resources to bilateral and multilateral aid programmes. Of course it never seems enough. British aid programme is in excess of £1 billion annually.

West African Department, FCO
22 July 1983

BRIEF NO 6: ESSENTIAL FACTS (UNCTAD VI ONLY)

UNCTAD VI (BELGRADE 6-30 JUNE)

1. A difficult conference. G77 (the developing countries' group) failed to obtain progress towards the ambitious programme which they put forward at their Ministerial Meeting in Buenos Aires (28 March-9 April). Despite rumours of a walk-out by G77 the Conference did finally adopt more than 20 resolutions by consensus, after the President (Yugoslavia) had struck out all the contentious passages from the texts, and presented them to the G77 on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
2. Although some developing countries are likely to be disappointed with the outcome of UNCTAD VI, it was less confrontational than UNCTAD V, and may well prove to be a more realistic basis for further work on developing country issues than previous UNCTAD Conferences. UNCTAD procedures have proved to be quite unworkable: they must bear part of the blame for any disappointment over the outcome of the Conference. The UK delegation took the lead at Belgrade in suggesting more flexible working methods on the lines set out in a report by a Commonwealth Expert Group.
3. The Ivory Coast played no significant role.

Economic Relations Department, FCO

22 July 1983

RESTRICTED

VISIT BY PRESIDENT OF IVORY COAST: 26-29 JULY 1983

BRIEF NO 7(a)

COMMODITIES: (A) COCOA AND COFFEE

Points to Make

1. Recognise importance of commodities to the Ivory Coast. Sympathise with many producers facing problems as a result of low commodity prices.

2. UK supports UNCTAD Integrated Programme for Commodities (IPC) and participates in a number of International Commodity Agreements (ICAs). Important that members should make these operate as effectively as possible in the interests of both producers and consumers. Hope Ivory Coast will join the present International Cocoa Agreement and any successor Agreement.

3. (If raised) Important also to bring Common Fund into operation as soon as possible. UK has already signed and ratified Common Fund Agreement. Does Ivory Coast intend to do so?

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TRMAAM

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The Ivory Coast is the world's largest exporter of cocoa and third largest of coffee, with world market shares of 23.9% and 6.9% respectively in 1978-80. Also a major exporter of tropical timber. These three commodities represented 63.4% of total exports in 1978-80 (cocoa 25.1%, coffee 25.1% and tropical timber 13.2%).
2. Despite a small recent upturn, commodity prices are still generally very low. Until recent weeks the cocoa price has been well below the current range set in the Third International Cocoa Agreement (106-146 US cents/lb). The average price of coffee has held up somewhat better: currently around 124 US cents/lb, ie within the range set by the International Coffee Agreement (120-140 US cents/lb).
3. Cocoa, coffee and tropical timber are among the 18 products covered by the Integrated Programme for Commodities (IPC) agreed by UNCTAD IV in 1976. The IPC provides for the establishment of International Commodity Agreements, and a Common Fund which is designed to provide finance for these Agreements. The Agreements may either include price stabilizing measures (such as buffer stocks) and/or simply provide for 'other measures' (such as research and development). But progress on the IPC has been slow. Apart from agreements on cocoa, coffee, sugar and tin, which were in place before 1976, new Agreements have been concluded in only two commodities: rubber and jute (though an Agreement on Tropical Timber appears to be close). The Common Fund not yet ratified by sufficient countries to bring it into operation.
4. United Kingdom supports the IPC and is a member of 5 of the 6 existing commodity agreements (excluding sugar, but including the two commodities of primary interest to the Ivory Coast: cocoa and coffee). UK policy is to work to make these agreements operate as effectively as possible in the interests of producers and consumers, and to look at proposals for new ICAs very carefully on their merits. The UK has also signed and ratified the Common Fund Agreement, and UK policy is to urge others to do so in order to bring the Fund into operation as soon as possible.

5. The Ivory Coast is a member of the Coffee Agreement, but refuses to join the Cocoa Agreement. This factor, together with the absence of the USA (the major consumer), has not helped this Agreement to work. The Ivory Coast's objections were the price range (too low) and the principle of automatic reduction in times of surplus. UK view remains that the price is too high to defend in current market conditions. Discussions about a possible new agreement are scheduled to start later this year. Ivory Coast (and US) participation will be necessary if any new agreement is to have any chance of working.

6. Ivory Coast has neither signed nor ratified the Common Fund Agreement. The period for ratification now extended to 30 September 1983, but the chances of the Fund coming into effect seems remote: only 53 of the 90 countries required to ratify it have done so, and the US seems unlikely to do so.

Economic Relations Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

21 July 1983

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VISIT BY PRESIDENT OF IVORY COAST: 26-29 JULY 1983

BRIEF NO 7(b): SUGAR

POINTS TO MAKE (If raised)

1. We understand the Ivory Coast's concern for an allocation under the Sugar Protocol.
2. The Commission have proposed that the Ivory Coast should accede with a quota of 2,000 tonnes. We and a number of other Member States support this proposal.
3. (If necessary) Realise that this may be a disappointingly low quota. But only very limited amount of sugar is currently available for reallocation and there are other claimants, all of whom (unlike the Ivory Coast) are traditional suppliers.
4. (If asked about the possibility of increasing the 1.3 million tonne figure for preferential sugar) Other Member States have made it quite clear that there can be no question of an increase.

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The Sugar Protocol to the Lomé Convention guarantees access to the European Community market for 1.3 million tonnes of sugar, which is divided up into quotas for each of the members of the Protocol.
2. The Ivory Coast applied to join the Sugar Protocol over a year ago; they are, we understand seeking a quota of around 25,000 tonnes. (The Ivorians began sugar production only in 1975 and were thus not exporters at the time the Protocol was drawn up). As there is no prospect of any increase in the overall figure of 1.3 million tonnes they are essentially competing for a share of the 12,000 tonnes of sugar which is at present available for reallocation as a result of certain ACP countries' failure to deliver. The other main bidder in the running is India (which was given access for sugar on similar terms to members of the Sugar Protocol under a separate trade agreement, but lost its entitlement because of a failure to deliver in 1980/81).
3. After much deliberation (and heavy lobbying from both the Indians and Ivorians) the Commission have recently proposed that the 12,000 tonnes be split 10,000: 2,000 for India: Ivory Coast. Although we have been resisting the claims of the Ivory Coast because it is a new producer and supplier we would be prepared to go along with this proposal, as it is the best result we are likely to obtain. The French however (who have substantial commercial interests in the Ivory Coast - including in the sugar industry) have argued in Brussels that the Ivorians should get the full 12,000 tonnes and that the Indian case should be looked at in

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slower time.

4. The matter is due to be discussed again in Brussels in the course of July, although it is not yet clear whether before or after the President's visit. We shall support the Commission's proposal as a package and resist French attempts to squeeze out the Indians. We shall however wish to avoid a position in which we are identified by the Ivorians as the Member State which opposes a fair allocation for their country.

5. It will also be important not to leave Houphouet-Boigny with the impression that it is the UK which is the prime barrier to Ivorian accession to the Protocol. Although we have, for good reason, been a reluctant supporter of the Ivorian case we are now prepared to agree to their accession, in line with the Commission proposal.

European Community Department (External)

15 July 1983

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VISIT BY PRESIDENT OF IVORY COAST, 26-29 JULY 1983

BRIEF NO. 8: LIBYAN ACTIVITIES IN WEST AFRICA [If raised]
POINTS TO MAKE

1. Main focus of Libyan activity is Ghana, Upper Volta and Niger. (Chad is covered in Brief No. 10(b)). Welcome President's views on Libyan activities in Upper Volta and Niger, where our own interests are slight.
2. We can speak more fully on Ghana. Concerned at increased Libyan activity there. Her influence should not be exaggerated. Apart from radicals in the PNDC leadership, few Ghanaians feel any political or ideological affinity with Libya. Ghanaians have sought aid from whoever may be prepared to give it.
3. The UK has continued its development aid, technical co-operation and military assistance to the present Ghanaian government. We believe that moderate elements in Ghana welcome this. UK military assistance also helps deny the field to other less benign influences (eg Libya).
4. Welcome more regular dialogue with Ivorians on this subject.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Since the present Ghanaian government under Flight Lieutenant Rawlings assumed power, there has been a rapprochement with Libya. Diplomatic relations have been restored. Libya has supplied oil on concessionary credit terms, and may shortly conclude a further oil/credit agreement for supplies to Ghana in 1983. Libya has also provided military assistance in the form of arms and equipment as well as training of Ghanaian personnel in Libya. But there is some evidence of Libyan frustration with Ghana's performance so far. Significantly, Ghana was not included in Colonel Qadhafi's tour of West Africa in April/May 1983. The Libyans, like the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe generally, may have concluded that the future of the present Ghanaian leadership is too uncertain to justify a more substantial investment.
2. UK military assistance to Ghana (which costs some £400,000 per annum) now consists of two loan service personnel at the Ghana Armed Forces Staff College, one of whom is the Deputy Commandant of the College. We have also recently sent out a 4-man infantry training team on a 6 month attachment. The decision to provide this team reflects a shift in emphasis in favour of training at unit level where the need for restoring discipline and morale is greatest. Last year we also provided a quantity of non-lethal equipment (uniforms, boots, groundsheets etc) to enable the armed forces to get out of the towns (where they were a potential source of trouble) and into the field for (British designed) training exercises.
3. In recent weeks, Libya has been making major efforts to destabilize the moderate government in Upper Volta. In May President Ouédraogo of Upper Volta announced the arrest of his radical Prime Minister Captain Sankara who had developed close links with Libya. This led to a temporary rebellion among pro-Sankara army units in the south of the country to which the Libyans supplied arms via northern Ghana. Tripoli radio broadcast appeals to support Sankara and denounced President Ouédraogo. The rebellion petered out in June after the release of Sankara who was dismissed from the government. President Ouédraogo has since strongly criticised Libyan interference

in Upper Volta's internal affairs.

4. Niger shares a common border with Libya. Relations with Libya are uneasy and President Kountché has frequently expressed concern at Libyan intentions.

WEST AFRICAN DEPARTMENT
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
22 July 1983

VISIT BY PRESIDENT OF IVORY COAST: 26-29 JULY 1983

BRIEF NO 9
SOUTHERN AFRICA

(i) South Africa

POINTS TO MAKE

Constitutional Developments/Internal Change

1. You have had contact with the South Africans. How do you see prospects for change in SA and for avoiding bloodbath which President Kaunda has been predicting? Do you consider that dialogue with Pretoria can be helpful? Would you like to see the West and/or Africa doing more to engage the South Africans and to try to convince them of the need for new policies?
2. For people of South Africa and South African Government to decide on current proposals. But these are flawed by absence of any provision for role for blacks. We are ready to welcome and encourage progress towards a form of government acceptable to all the peoples of South Africa.
3. As you know, P W Botha had great difficulty in gaining white approval for even present inadequate proposals. Politically he has to move gradually. Some hope that change will generate its own momentum. But social and economic advancement of the blacks in South Africa may well provide the real motor for change. We will use our links and such influence as we have to encourage reform. Sanctions and external pressures will not be effective.

Destabilisation

4. We view growing insecurity in the region with considerable concern. We strongly believe each country must be allowed to decide its own future and that relations between States should adhere strictly to the principles of non-use of violence and non-intervention in internal affairs.

5. We have condemned South Africa raids into neighbouring states (most recently raid on Maputo in May). We have also condemned terrorist violence.

6. South Africa's internal policies are central to the problem. But the South Africans have legitimate security concerns. These must be recognised. We must also try to understand their perceptions of the threat they face.

7. It is essential that other African states talk to South Africa. Dialogue need not involve the sacrifice of principle. The problems of Southern Africa must, in the last resort be solved by the countries of the region. As a first step to reducing tension, cross-border attacks, in either direction, must be ended.

VISIT BY PRESIDENT OF IVORY COAST, 26-29 JULY 1983

SOUTHERN AFRICA

(i) South Africa

ESSENTIAL FACTS [May be used freely, except where otherwise indicated].

M. Houphouet-Boigny's Attitude Towards South Africa

1. President Houphouet-Boigny is interested in and knowledgeable about South Africa. He also has experience of dialogue and contact with the South Africans. In 1970 Mr Vorster (then South African PM) invited other African states to enter into non-aggression pacts with South Africa. President Houphouet-Boigny (with subsequent support from several other African states) called publicly for a dialogue with South Africa; but his initiative was rejected by the OAU's summit meeting in 1971.

2. The Portuguese coup in 1974 and subsequent changes in Angola and Mozambique prompted South Africa to a fundamental appraisal of its own attitude towards black Africa which resulted in a new South African initiative and a policy of détente. In 1974 Vorster visited Ivory Coast for talks with Houphouet-Boigny. In 1975 the Ivory Coast Minister of Information made an official visit to South Africa. However the period of détente came to an abrupt end with the South African invasion of Angola in October 1975.

Constitutional Developments/Internal Change

3. South African Government are pressing ahead with their constitutional reform proposals to bring Coloured and Asian communities into the central government process in a tricameral parliamentary system. Proposals will not be put into affect until late 1984.

4. Proposals are so designed that whites will still retain control over all important decisions. They are flawed by absence of any role
/for

for 21 million blacks who are still expected to satisfy their political aspirations within the homelands system. Coloured and Asian communities are also deeply divided in their attitudes. But in white South African terms, proposals represent a radical step. They have already caused splits in ruling National Party. Black leaders in South Africa regard Government's whole programme of reform as irrelevant to their advancement.

5. Limited nature of Government's proposals and international suspicion of them make it inappropriate for us to offer any public welcome. We have therefore emphasised our wish to see progress towards a form of government acceptable to all the people of South African and pointing out that proposed changes are flawed by absence of any provision for role for blacks in central government process.

Destabilisation

6. South Africa's policies towards its neighbours increasingly aggressive. They are aimed at: the elimination of, and the ending of facilities for, the ANC; the reduction of communist influence; and, apparently, the maintainence of neighbouring states in a condition of weakness and dependence. South African forces are regularly engaged in cross-border operations against the ANC (they attacked targets in Lesotho in December 1982 and in Maputo, Mozambique in May)

[NOT FOR USE]: There is considerable evidence of direct covert acts of destabilisation and of support for dissident movements in Mozambique, Lesotho and Angola. South African forces occupy part of Southern Angola.

7. South African policies have increased tension. Some short term results, eg both Angola and Mozambique negotiating with the South Africans on a range of issues including the ANC, but long term effects certainly damaging to Western and South African interests. Recent attacks have led to increased Communist assistance and influence in the region as well as the introduction of more sophisticated weaponry.

8. It is in Western interests to encourage direct contacts/negotiations between South Africa and her neighbours as the best way of resolving regional problems peacefully. But we do not seek or see advantage

/in

in a rôle as intermediaries in the process.

Southern African Department

14 July 1983

VISIT BY PRESIDENT OF THE IVORY COAST: 26-29 JULY 1983

SOUTHERN AFRICA

(ii) Namibia

Points to Make

Security Council

1. Grateful for constructive role played by African Group at recent Security Council Meeting. Adoption of SCR 532 a positive step. Hope that FLS and other moderate Africans agree that Contact Group initiative offers only realistic prospect for peaceful settlement in Namibia.

The Five

2. Five still very much in business. Have offered Secretary-General full support for his Mission. Stand ready to help in any way we can.

US/Angola

3. US and South Africa must have understanding on Cuban troop withdrawal for implementation of SCR 435 to proceed. Do you think Angolans will deliver? How else could South Africans be persuaded to accept UN Plan? A settlement cannot be imposed.

South Africa/Angola

4. We understand both parties mean to continue their exchanges. Dialogue the only way to solve problems of the region.

VISIT BY PRESIDENT OF THE IVORY COAST: 26-29 JULY 1983
SOUTHERN AFRICA

ii) Namibia

Essential Facts
Security Council

1. SCR 532 adopted on 31 May mandated Secretary General to consult parties with a view to speedy implementation of the UN Plan for Namibia. He must report back to the Council by 31 August. Difficult to see what positive development he will be able to report. Five have pledged support for his Mission. SG disposed to be helpful and willing to meet South African Government (SAG).

US/Angola

2. In practice, progress stalled until US receive from Angolans proposal for withdrawal of Cuban troops. Americans still optimistic, but no sign of time table as yet. Angolan government divided on Cuban withdrawal and Dos Santos probably too unsure of his position vis-a-vis MPLA hardliners to take risk at present.

Linkage

3. Introduction of linkage caused friction within the Five and open hostility from the non-aligned, particularly from Front Line States (FLS), who attack it as ploy by SAG, with US connivance, to delay implementation of SCR 435. In private, moderate Africans and UN Secretary General recognise it represents only way of securing US influence and South African co-operation in achieving a settlement. All parties accept that US/Angola dialogue must be given time to reach a conclusion.

UK Position

4. UK have taken line that while deal on Cubans is not pre-condition for Namibia settlement, it is a political necessity, and would also contribute to stability of the region as a whole. We are concerned to keep Five together (- so are others. Even the French, who are most opposed to linkage, wish the Five to continue).

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South African Attitude

5. Until US have a deal on Cubans, SAG can avoid final decision on UN Plan. Even then would be likely to temporize:reluctant to permit Namibia settlement until they have successfully launched new constitutional proposals within South Africa (in late 1984). Meanwhile, SAG still trying within Namibia to create viable opposition groups to contest elections against SWAPO. Little success so far.

African Attitude

6. Moderate Africans routinely denounce linkage, but accept there is no alternative at present. The FLS were helpful during Security Council debate when their constructive and 'non confrontational' approach made possible adoption of moderate resolution. But they will find it hard to resist tougher line if there has been no visible progress by 31 August. Ivory Coast have not played prominent part in discussion on Namibia.

Southern African Department

14 July 1983

VISIT BY PRESIDENT OF IVORY COAST, 26-29 JULY 1983

BRIEF NO. 10(a): OAU

POINTS TO MAKE [If raised]

1. Pleased that the OAU was successful in holding 19th Summit at Addis Ababa in June: demonstration of ability of African states to discuss their problems in a spirit of unity.
2. But problems remain. Will the referendum in the Western Sahara be carried out before the summit in Conakry next year? What are the chances of a permanent Secretary-General being elected?
3. How will the OAU develop? Does the Addis Summit reflect real cohesion, or will the moderates versus radical divide reopen?

BRIEF NO. 10(a): OAU

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. After more than a year when the OAU was in disarray following the contested admission of the SADR (Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, ie the Polisario Movement in the Western Sahara) as 51st member of the Organisation, it succeeded in June in holding its 19th Annual Summit. Two previous attempts to hold the Summit in Tripoli in July and November 1982 had failed to achieve a quorum as a result of disputes over the SADR and the representation of Chad. These disputes reflected a more fundamental division between the radicals led by Libya and the more moderate pro-Western states such as the Ivory Coast who do not recognise the SADR and/or opposed Libyan backing for ex-President Goukouni of Chad.
2. The Summit at Addis was a success for the Organisation and for the moderates within it. The latter refused to accept the presence of the SADR in the conference chamber. The pro-SADR states conceded defeat and persuaded the Polisario representatives to withdraw 'voluntarily and temporarily'. Only Libya refused to accept this, and Col Qadhafi left Addis prematurely, isolated even from his former supporters. He thus lost the chance to become Chairman and Ethiopia's Chairman Mengistu was elected to the post.
3. The resolution adopted on the Western Sahara called inter alia for an immediate ceasefire, and for a referendum to be held before December 1983 under the joint supervision of the UN and the OAU. It seems unlikely, however, that this will be achieved so quickly (there is little agreement even on who should be entitled to vote). The SADR issue may still disrupt the next Summit planned for May/June 1984 in Conakry.
4. The Addis meeting failed to reach agreement on the appointment of a new Secretary-General. Deadlock of the moderate Gabonese candidate and the radical Malian. The Acting Chairman (until next year) is the former Deputy Chairman, Peter Onu (Nigerian).

UK ATTITUDE TO OAU [NOT FOR USE]

5. We support the OAU as a forum for discussion and resolution of exclusively African problems. We do not want to become directly involved in the OAU's internal affairs, nor to see institutional links with the EC as some of our Community colleagues would like.

CENTRAL AFRICAN DEPARTMENT/WEST AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

22 July 1983

VISIT BY PRESIDENT OF IVORY COAST, 26-29 JULY 1983

BRIEF NO 10(b): CHAD

POINTS TO MAKE [If raised]

1. UK interest in Chad minimal. But concerned by recent renewal of hostilities. Would like to see lasting peace, without any malign external interference, to allow for essential reconstruction and development.

2. UK has contributed substantial humanitarian relief, both directly and through international agencies.

3. Is OAU likely to play an important role in bringing internal stability to Chad?

4. [If asked]

No question of UK offering military support. We would consider joining any appeals for restraint, if we thought it useful.

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Renewal of fighting in Chad in the last month. Forces of former President Goukouni Weddeye, using Libya as a base and with Libyan logistic support, captured towns of Faya Largeau in the North, and Abeche in the East. But rapidly-supplied French equipment allowed President Hisseine Habré's forces to mount a counter offensive, recapturing Abeche and moving towards Faya. The fighting is the most serious threat to Habré's government since he expelled Goukouni from Chad in June 1982.

2. There is no firm evidence of direct Libyan involvement in the fighting, but Habré produced a captured Libyan corporal at a press conference.

3. France has been airlifting military equipment to the capital Ndjamena since the end of June. President Houphouet-Boigny flew to Paris in early July with the Presidents of Togo and Niger to ask France to intervene directly on Habré's behalf. But France declined to send troops to fight in Chad on the grounds that the 1976 bilateral agreement between the countries is a cooperation rather than defence agreement. (French troops were in the country from Independence in 1960 until 1980, however, with interruptions). Zaire has sent over 1,000 troops, 3 Mirage fighters and 2 Hercules transporters to help defend Ndjamena.

4. An emergency meeting of the bureau of the 19th OAU summit has called for a cessation of hostilities and an end to foreign interference. But Habré has refused to consider any appeals until all Libyan support had ceased. The USA announced on 19 July plans to send non-military aid worth \$10m to Ndjamena to 'help stop destabilizing Libyan influence spreading.' Ethiopia (in the OAU Chair) has denounced this involvement as exacerbating 'the already existing tense situation in the region'.

UK INTERESTS

5. UK interests in Chad are minimal. There is no consular angle. We would be concerned however at the effect any Libyan supported regime in Chad would have on the stability of the whole area (neighbouring Sudan, Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger). If Libyan troops or aircraft become directly involved in the fighting we would

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consider associating ourselves in any joint appeal for restraint, eg by the Ten.

6. Chad survives largely on aid from governments and NGO's. UK contributed nearly £400,000 in 1981 and 1982 on humanitarian relief, and about £50,000 this year for medical supplies, plus blankets and spare parts. Also contributes to EDF and other agencies.

WEST AFRICAN DEPARTMENT
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
22 July 1983

IN CONFIDENCE

VISIT OF PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY OF THE IVORY COAST,

26-30 JULY 1983

IVORY COAST

BACKGROUND BRIEF

Internal

1. The Ivory Coast has gained a unique reputation since independence in 1960 for political stability, and remarkable and sustained economic progress. Under the patriarchal rule of President Houphouet-Boigny ('le vieux') the country has been run as a one-party state without manifest tribal divisions. Executive power is vested in the President to whom a Council of Ministers is responsible.

The President, now at least 78, intends, health permitting, to see through his present 5-year term to 1985, preparing a team from which his successor would be chosen. He is now the unrivalled, elder statesman of West Africa. In the Ivory Coast his present political position appears unassailable.

2. The country's considerable prosperity by African and other developing world standards has been achieved through free enterprise under the guise of state capitalism, and a liberal foreign investment regime. French commercial interests still predominate but Ivorian policy is to diversify.

3. The President's efforts since 1980 to overhaul the Party (PDCI) and to bring greater democracy have paradoxically concentrated even more power in his own hands. He was returned to office that year for a fifth 5-year term (having been the sole candidate). A constitutional amendment in November 1980 removed the article providing for the automatic assumption to the Presidency of the Republic by the President of the National Assembly, and created

IN CONFIDENCE

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the post of Vice-President of the Republic, which will be an elective office from 1985. Houphouet-Boigny resolutely refuses to be drawn as to the identity of his successor. Whoever finally succeeds to the Presidency seems likely to pursue much the same general policies as Houphouet-Boigny.

Economy

4. Agriculture has been the motive force behind the Ivory Coast's impressive economic growth up till 1980. With a production in excess of 400,000 tons per year, the country is now the world's largest producer of cocoa. But in the last three years, earnings from Ivorian primary products have fallen by 50% (the low level of prices is the principal reason why the Ivory Coast has refused to join the International Cocoa Agreement). Diversification into sugar and rice has proved disappointing, but there have been a number of success stories, notably rubber, pineapples, bananas, cotton and copra. The discovery of substantial offshore oil and gas supplies has brought self-sufficiency and an exportable surplus is likely to be available after 1983. It has been predicted that the Ivory Coast will become Black Africa's second largest oil producer by the end of this decade. The wealth generated by oil will be used chiefly for investment in agriculture and infrastructural products. Meanwhile, good progress is being made in implementing an IMF structural reform programme.

External

5. President Houphouet-Boigny's foreign policy has been one of independent initiative, although the French connection remains the central pillar. He is robustly anti-Soviet; he threw the Soviet Ambassador out in 1969 for subversion and has not re-established relations. But he criticises the West for not paying enough for the

IN CONFIDENCE

raw materials of stable developing countries, risking their slide into conditions where Communism thrives.

6. Houphouet-Boigny was a founder signatory to the OAU Charter but has been sceptical about the organization and has stayed away from its Summits. Nevertheless, the Ivorians play a major role in African regional groupings, especially the francophone Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and also the smaller Conseil de l'Entente set up in 1959 as a political and economic association of French West African states. The Ivorians were horrified at the coup in 1980 in neighbouring Liberia; and relations with Rawlings' Government in Ghana have lacked warmth. The President has long favoured dialogue with South Africa, meeting Vorster in 1974 and 1977 and Pik Botha also in 1977. Following a visit to Peking by the Ivorian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China and the Ivory Coast concluded an agreement on 1 March to establish diplomatic relations. The Ivorians intend to open a resident mission in Peking as soon as practicable.

The Special Relationship with France

7. The traditional economic, cultural and military ties with France remain, though the special relationship has not been without strains, especially in the last years of President Giscard's administration. For some years Houphouet-Boigny has sought both to Ivorianize administration and commerce and to diversify external and economic links from dependence upon France. Houphouet-Boigny was the first African head of state to call on President Mitterrand at the Elysée in 1981. He has been a personal friend of President Mitterrand for over 30 years, and shares with him a political viewpoint described

IN CONFIDENCE

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by 'Le Monde' as 'liberal in the British sense of the term.' However, the close personal relationship with Mitterrand has not so far led Houphouet-Boigny to show any greater flexibility on such issues as membership of the International Cocoa Agreement (which the Ivory Coast refuses to join). President Mitterrand paid a state visit to the Ivory Coast in May 1982.

Bilateral Relations

8. The increasing prosperity of the Ivory Coast and the President's express wish to do more business with us (as part of his policy of loosening his country from the French commercial straitjacket) led the UK in 1977 to take a more active interest in the country. The Prince of Wales paid a very successful visit to the Ivory Coast that year. Lord Carrington's brief (12 hour) visit to the Ivory Coast in February 1981 was the first ever by a British Foreign Secretary. It was followed that year by visit by Lord Trefgarne and by the Duke of Kent. Mrs Fenner, Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, also led a team of businessmen to the Ivory Coast in June 1982. The most recent outward visit was that of Dr. Vaughan, Minister for Consumer Affairs, in April 1983.

9. Inward visits from the Ivory Coast have been less frequent, but M. Brou Tanoh, the Minister of the Environment, paid a successful visit to the UK in November 1982 to study marine pollution control equipment and techniques. The programme for President Houphouet-Boigny's visit will include talks at No 10 and lunches given by the Prime Minister, The Queen and the Duke of Kent. The President last visited the UK in 1962. Last month he paid state visits to the United States and to Canada.

IN CONFIDENCE

Trade

10. British business is taking an increasing interest in trade and investment in the Ivory Coast. British direct exports totalled £28.2 millions in 1982. An unquantifiable volume of British exports also reaches the Ivory Coast via France. The Ivory Coast is Britain's largest market and bilateral trading partner in francophone West Africa, but our market share (2.6%) remains small. Ivorian exports to the UK in 1982 were worth £56.1 millions, of which cocoa and coffee amounted to two-thirds by value.

West African Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
18 July 1983

IVORY COAST

Area	127,000 sq miles (cf UK 94,000)
Population	8.3 million (1981 estimate)
Population growth 1975-79	4.2% per annum
Life Expectancy	46 years
Expatriate French population	45,000
Religion	65% animist; 23% Muslim; 12% Christian
Currency	CFA franc (583 CFA francs = £1 sterling)
GNP per capita	Approximately US\$ 1100
GNP growth 1975-79	8.0% (real) per annum
Inflation rate	12.1% (12 months to July 1982)
Debt service ratio	Approximately 40%
Principal products	Cocoa (the world's largest producer - approx. 400,000 tons per annum), coffee, timber, palm products, sugar, cotton.
Oil production	18,000 barrels per day (320,000 BPD forecast towards the end of this decade).
Principal trading partner	France (supplies around 40% of imports)
UK exports (1982)	£28 million (2.6% of total Ivorian imports).
Ivorian exports to UK (1982)	£56 million (mainly cocoa and coffee)
Political Party	Parti démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI)

FÉLIX HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY, GCMG

First President of the Republic from 1960, re-elected in 1965, 1970, 1975 and for a further five-year term in October 1980.

Born 1905 at Yamoussoukro.

Member of the Baoulé Tribe, a branch of the Ashanti who immigrated from what is now Ghana in the 18th Century.

Educated at secondary school at Dakar, Senegal (where many French African leaders were educated), and at Ecole de Médecine, Dakar. He spent fifteen years as a senior dispenser.

In 1940 Houphouet-Boigny was appointed Chef de Canton at Yamoussoukro where he inherited landed estates. In 1945 he created the Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) and made himself President. In the same year he was elected to the French Constituent Assembly and became Deputy in the French National Assembly in 1946. He went on to hold a series of French ministerial posts between 1956 and 1960 and as Minister of State under de Gaulle he played a leading part in forming the Constitution of the French Community, which he conceived as an association of states linked federally with France. He returned to West Africa in 1959, installing himself as Prime Minister of the Ivory Coast Republic. He finally led the Ivory Coast out of the Community in 1960, together with the other states of the Conseil de l'Entente he had formed with Niger, Upper Volta and Dahomey. (Togo joined later.) The independent Constitution of the Ivory Coast gave complete executive power to the Head of State, limiting the functions of the unicameral single-party National Assembly. Houphouet-Boigny was elected President on 27 November 1960.

Houphouet-Boigny has travelled extensively. He came to London in 1962 and was invested with the GCMG. In 1963 opposition to his regime flared up but was effectively crushed. Since then he has

/concentrated

concentrated on domestic political management and on the country's economic development. Houphouet-Boigny speaks of leaving a well-prepared team behind him, but he refuses to be drawn on the identity of a successor.

Houphouet-Boigny is persuasive, pragmatic and excels in political management. He is authoritarian and paternalistic, but accessible and is regarded with great respect by Ivorians, not least because of his financial acumen, which he has applied to the benefit of himself and his country. His attitude to political opposition has been to conciliate and absorb rather than to repress. However, he has frequently shown concern for the problem of student unrest. He has stressed the incompatibility of Communism with African religion, realism and his attachment to the soil.

The President is believed to have married three times. His present wife, Thérèse, is sophisticated and self-willed, and the marriage is now one of convenience. The President is believed to have had three daughters and a son by his first wife, who is still alive.

He is sentimental about his home and family. In the last twenty years he turned his birthplace Yamoussoukro into a remarkable model village and country retreat. In 1983 Yamoussoukro, by now a town, was decreed the political and administrative capital of the country, though the actual transfer is unlikely to take place for some time.

AKÉ, SIMÉON

Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1977. Comité Directeur (1975-80). Bureau politique (1980).

Born at Bingerville 1932.

Graduated from Grenoble University in law. Having gained a diploma in public administration, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served as Counsellor to the UN (1961-3) and Director of Protocol (1963-4), before being appointed, in 1963, Ambassador to the UK and concurrently Ambassador to Denmark (1964). From 1966 to 1977 he was Ambassador to the UN.

Plump and friendly, he is a competent Minister with good access to the President. He speaks very good English.

Married, with six children. His wife, a practising midwife, is friendly and charming.

MME MARIE ZINSOU

Daughter of President Houphouet-Boigny (by his first marriage).

Born 1943.

Studied law in France.

Married to the Director-General of SIVOMAR, one of the Ivorian shipping lines. She has two children, a daughter aged 15 and a son aged 13.

KONÉ, Abdoulaye

Minister for the Economy and Finance 1981. Comité Directeur (1980).

Born 1933 at Ségénéla; a Senoufo.

Attended Ivory Coast (1943-54) and French (1954-8) schools, and took a French licence in law. Passed out of the French Ecole Nationale du Trésor and did a year in the Inspection Général des Services Financiers. Returned to the Ivory Coast in 1963 and became Assistant Director of Financial Control (1963-67), Regional Director and Municipal receiver at Bouaké (1967-71), Director of the Budget Spécial d'Investissement et Equipment (1971), State Secretary (1971-76), Minister for the Budget (1976-77) and Minister for the Economy, Finance and Planning (1977-81). (Note: in 1981 a new Planning Ministry was created). President of Committee for Financial Coordination and Control of Public Investments; of the Caisse autonome d'amortissement de C.I.; and President of the Board of Governors of the African Development Bank (since 1979, re-elected 1980).

An immensely hard-working technocrat, he listens carefully to the many French advisers in his Ministry but most of his decisions are ruled by the Presidency. Considered personally incorruptable.

His sight is very poor and there have been rumours from time to time that his health is not good.

Friendly, but difficult to contact because of overwork. Understands a little English but does not speak it.

A Muslim.

BRA KANON, Louis Denis

Minister of Agriculture since 1977. Bureau politique (1975)

Comité directeur (1980)

Born at Daloa 1936; a Bété.

Graduated in Agricultural Engineering from ENSA, Toulouse (1957-61) and Montpellier (1962). On his return from France, he was posted to BONDOUKOU as Chef de Secteur Agricole before, in 1963, being appointed a Departmental Head of the company SATMACI (Société d'Assistance Technique pour la Modernisation Agricole de la Côte d'Ivoire), the aim of which is to develop coffee and cocoa production. From 1966 until his present appointment as Minister he was Director-General of SATMACI. Also President of a number of other companies in the agricultural sphere. (eg Mutuelle Agricole, SOCATCI, APROMA, MOTORAGRI, etc).

Personable and friendly yet capable of robustly defending the Ivory Coast's national interests, he is considered an able and enterprising technician in his crucial and demanding Ministerial responsibilities.

A frequent visitor to the world's major commodity capitals, including London.

Married, with four children.

NAIRAY, GUY

Directeur de Cabinet to the President.

Born Guadeloupe 1914; of mixed race.

After studying at the French School of Oriental Languages and graduating in law, he joined the French Overseas Service, holding appointments at Dakar and in Mauritania in 1945-7. He was then attached to the Ministry of France Outre-Mer for about two years, after which he spent five years as Commandant du Cercle at Gagnoa, Ivory Coast.

In 1955 he was appointed Chef de Cabinet to Mr Jean Medecin, Under-Secretary in the French Prime Minister's Office. From 1956-1958 he was Chef de Cabinet to M. Houphouet-Boigny when the latter was Ministre-Délégué in the French Prime Minister's Office and later Minister of Public Health in France. Promoted to be Directeur de Cabinet and appointed in that capacity when M. Houphouet-Boigny became Prime Minister of the Ivory Coast Republic in 1959. Retained the post when M. Houphouet-Boigny became President of the Ivory Coast in 1960.

He has become President Houphouet-Boigny's right-hand man in the Presidency. He writes all the President's speeches. The furnishing of his office is a deliberate expression of the epicurean austerity which he regards as his own character. He can be depended upon to be helpful as he was during the President's visit to the UK in June 1962, when he was awarded the CBE (honorary). He pays for his devotion and efficiency by being constantly overworked.

A bachelor.

ESSIENNE DIEUDONNÉ

Ambassador to the Court of St James's since October 1978.

Born at Grand-Lahou 1938.

He has a degree in law and diplomas in political studies, public law and diplomatic studies.

He began his administrative career in 1963 as chef de cabinet to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and was directeur du cabinet to the Minister from 1964 to 1970, when he acquired the personal rank of ambassador. He was ambassador to Canada from 1973-78.

Although he has complained of overwork, he does not seem to have exerted himself to any great extent as ambassador here, and he may be leaving soon. He seems poorly informed on many subjects and his interventions are seldom helpful. His English is limited, but he can be gracious on social occasions.

He is married, with seven children. His wife is lively, well-dressed and generally makes a much more positive impression than him.

OUÉGNIN, Georges

Chef du Protocole at Presidency.

Born at Alexandretta 1934.

Son of M. François Ouégnin, former Deputy and Comité Directeur member, and his Lebanese wife of that time. Has been Chef du Protocole at the Presidency since early 1961, after coming to Abidjan from Senegal to work as a Renault salesman. Made an Honorary CBE during President Houphouet-Boigny's visit to London in 1962.

Saturnine and balding, he is feared by many Ivorian Ministers (and ambassadors) who seem unable to distinguish whether he is speaking personally or with full Presidential authority. Nevertheless, he is invariably helpful to the Diplomatic Corps, and a notably vigorous Chef du Protocole; usually having to attend to every detail himself, he is not to be blamed if occasionally his vigour fails to discriminate between Ambassadors and waiters. Whilst his intellectual talents may not run deep, he is urbane and an easy linguist (very fluent in English). His ambitions appear to be in his chosen career of diplomacy rather than in politics; but he has made himself so indispensable to President Houphouet-Boigny that his long-rumoured appointment as Ambassador to Beirut has never come off. Embassies profit from his capacity as a fixer, and it would be unnatural if his Lebanese friends and relations did not profit too; but not scandalously. Accorded the rank of Ambassador in 1968. His fortunes seem likely to fade when Houphouet dies.

He made an advantageous marriage - many said socially above himself - to the daughter of Joseph Bilé, a wealthy Ivorian (Agni) importer.

Claims he was offered post of Chief Protocol Officer at the UN by Dr Waldheim in 1973, but declined.

GUARD OF HONOUR - Procedure


1. A Guard of Honour found by 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards under the command of Major N E Emson MC with the Regimental Colour, the Band of the Scots Guards and the Corps of Drums of the Battalion will be formed in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Quadrangle on Wednesday 27 July at 1145 hours to greet His Excellency Monsieur Felix Houphouet-Boigny, President of the Republic of the Ivory Coast. Embassy staff and other spectators are requested to arrive not later than 1100 hours.
2. At 1135 hours the Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, will arrive in the Quadrangle; he will be met to the left of the dais by Major-General James Eyre, Major-General Commanding the Household Division. He will be accompanied by the Brigade Major, Lt Col R J S Wardle, Brigade Major of the Household Division. At 1138 hours the members of the official suite will arrive at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Quadrangle by car via King Charles Street. They will alight from their cars just beyond the dais (ie to the east of the latter) where they will be received by The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe. They will remain near the Colour points on the east side of the Main Archway (see diagram attached). The cars will proceed to the east of the King Charles Street Archway and await the arrival of the President and his party. As soon as these cars have entered the Quadrangle the cars of the official suite should proceed to park in the south west corner of the Quadrangle.
3. At 1142 hours the Prime Minister will arrive at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Quadrangle through the Main Archway; she will be met at the Archway by Major General James Eyre. The Major General will then escort the Prime Minister to the right (west) of the dais where she will receive the President.
4. At 1145 hours the President will arrive at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office via King Charles Street.
5. The Prime Minister will welcome him and present Major General Eyre who will escort the President to his place on the dais. The Prime Minister will then take up a position on his right and behind the dais, and the Major General will take up his position on the left and behind the dais. After the Guard Commander has presented his Guard of Honour to the President the Major General will accompany the President and the Guard Commander on the inspection. The Prime Minister should remain in the vicinity of the dais with the Brigade Major until the inspection is completed and the Major-General has accompanied the President back to the dais. The President will introduce his Ministers to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister will then escort the President to No 10 Downing Street. Those participating in the plenary talks will follow.
6. Meanwhile the Major-General and the Brigade Major will have taken their leave of the President and will authorise the dispersal of the Guard of Honour once the President has departed for No 10 Downing Street.

Wet Weather Programme

In the event of wet weather the Parade will not be cancelled. The prog-

/ramme will

ramme will continue as scheduled up to the point where the inspection of the Guard of Honour should begin. If there is heavy rain at that point in the programme and the President does not wish to inspect the Guard of Honour, the Prime Minister should lead the President to No 10 Downing Street.



DOWNING ST. WEST BUILDING

DOWNING ST.

DOWNING ST. EAST BUILDING

Main Archway

PRESS

+ / + S of S

OFFICIAL SUITE

EMBASSY STAFF & SPECTATORS

PRESIDENT'S car will park here

PM MG
GofH

GUARD OF HONOUR

BAND

OLD HOME OFFICE BUILDING

WHITEHALL

APPROACH ROUTE FOR CARS

KING CHARLES ST. BUILDING

KING CHARLES ST.

**GUARD OF HONOUR CEREMONY
FCO QUADRANGLE**

- + Colour Points
- GofH. Guest of Honour
- PM Prime Minister
- MG Major General