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DESKBY 091000Z

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FM MADRID 090820Z SEPT 83

TELEGRAM NUMBER 529 OF 9 SEPTEMBER

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON AND MODUK

YOUR TELNO 261 (NOT REPEATED) : LEBANON/MNF

1. AT ANDREOTTI'S SUGGESTION THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE 4 MNF CONTRIBUTOR COUNTRIES TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF THEIR PRESENCE HERE FOR THE CLOSING SESSION OF THE CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE TO MEET FOR AN HOUR ON 8 SEPTEMBER TO COMPARE NOTES ABOUT LEBANON. BULLARD REPRESENTED YOU.

2. CHEYSSON AND SHULTZ WERE FULL OF PRAISE FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LEBANESE ARMY IN BEIRUT. BUT THIS WAS SEEN AS THE ONLY RAY OF LIGHT IN A SOMBRE PICTURE. CHEYSSON DESCRIBED HOW THE FRENCH HQ HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY SHELLED BY 2 155 MM GUNS FROM POSITIONS IN SYRIAN CONTROLLED TERRITORY, AND HOW THE SHELLING HAD CEASED WITHIN MINUTES OF HIS TELEPHONING KHADDAM, ALTHOUGH THE LATTER HAD SAID HE COULD NOT IMAGINE HOW THE GUNS CAME TO BE THERE.

3. ANDREOTTI MENTIONED THE LEBANESE REQUEST TO THE MNF TO HELP EVACUATE STRANDED CHRISTIANS IN DEIR AL QAMR (BEIRUT TELNO 484). BULLARD SUGGESTED THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD NO DOUBT LIKE TO SEE THE MNF AND PERHAPS UNIFIL TOO MOVE INTO THE SHOUF, BUT THAT THE MNF HAD BETTER STICK TO ITS MANDATE, ITS AREA AND ITS ROLE. OTHERS AGREED.

4. SHULTZ THEN SAID THAT IF NOT GOING BEYOND THE MANDATE WAS ONE SIDE OF THE COIN, THE OTHER WAS CARRYING THAT MANDATE OUT. THE MNF SHOULD NOT ONLY HELP THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES BUT ALSO DEFEND ITSELF. THE US WAS MORE AND MORE INCLINED TO FIRE BACK WHEN FIRED ON. WE SHOULD SHOW "THE PEOPLE SURROUNDING BEIRUT" THAT OUR MEN WOULD PROTECT THEMSELVES AND NOT MERELY ALLOW ARTILLERY TO TAKE FREE SHOTS AT THEM. SHULTZ MENTIONED RECENT US PRECAUTIONARY MOVES (USS EISENHOWER, 2000 MARINES) AND EXPRESSED INTEREST IN WHAT OTHER CONTRIBUTORS MIGHT BE DOING ON THESE LINES.

5. BULLARD SAID THAT THE BRITISH CONTINGENT WAS PERHAPS IN A SPECIAL POSITION, BEING SMALLER AND EQUIPPED FOR MAINLY RECONNAISSANCE, A ROLE WHICH IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES COULD BECOME VERY DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT. (ANDREOTTI INTERJECTED THAT HE WISHED THE BRITISH CONTINGENT COULD BE INCREASED.) WE WERE THERE ON TWO POLITICAL ASSUMPTIONS: THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS PLAYING A NATIONAL AND NOT A SECTARIAN ROLE, AND THAT ITS PEACE EFFORTS WERE CONTINUING. HE HOPED THAT THESE WERE STILL VALID.

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6. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE US HAD BEEN URGING JEMAYEL TO BROADEN THE BASE OF HIS GOVERNMENT. (ANDREOTTI SAID THAT JEMAYEL HAD OFFERED TO DO SO: JUMBLATT'S JOURNEY TO ROME WAS IN THIS CONNEXION.) BUT THERE WERE 2 PROBLEMS: THE DIFFERENCES IN THE SHOUF, AND SYRIA'S EFFORTS TO REPLACE OR CHANGE THE JEMAYEL GOVERNMENT. JEMAYEL WAS SINCERE IN WHAT HE SAID ABOUT NATIONAL UNITY, AND HE HAD THE ARMED FORCES TO HELP HIM. BUT IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY WITH ITS CONFSSIONAL COMPOSITION WAS RELUCTANT TO TAKE ON THE SHOUF.

7. SHULTZ FEARED THAT THE PASSAGE OF TIME WAS NOT HELPING. THE ISRAELIS DID NOT WANT A PARTITIONED LEBANON. GIVEN ANY KIND OF REASONABLE CONDITIONS, THEY WOULD WITHDRAW. BUT IF THEY SAW SIGNS OF A "SYRIA-PLO LEBANON" TAKING SHAPE THEY WOULD "TAKE STEPS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES", WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A GREATER ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH THAN WAS DESIRABLE. THERE WAS A DANGEROUS IMPRESSION IN THE ARAB WORLD THAT ISRAEL WAS ON THE RETREAT IN LEBANON. ISRAEL COULD EASILY BECOME AGGRESSIVE AGAIN, AND THE ARABS WERE WRONG TO DISCOUNT HER POWER. THE US WAS DOING WHAT IT COULD TO KEEP ISRAEL COOL, AND THIS WAS PART OF MACFARLANE'S FUNCTION. CHEYSSON THOUGHT THAT THIS DESCRIPTION OF THE ARAB MOOD WAS PERHAPS MORE TRUE OF SYRIA THAN OF THE OTHER ARAB STATES, WHO SIMPLY FELT HELPLESS.

8. AS IF SUMMING UP, SHULTZ SAID THAT THERE WERE THINGS THE MNF COULD AND MUST CONTINUE TO DO, BUT THE URGENT TASK OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS "TO CONSTRUCT SOME RECONCILIATIONS OF THE INTERNAL TENSIONS". MEANWHILE THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS SHOULD NOT FLINCH.

9. ANDREOTTI' SAID THAT THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT WOULD CERTAINLY REMAIN, ALTHOUGH THE COST OF 300 MILLION DOLLARS A YEAR WAS A STRAIN ON A DEFENCE BUDGET ALREADY STRETCHED. HE HAD SOUGHT TO PERSUADE THE YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER TO PROVIDE SOME TROOPS, BUT THE LATTER HAD EXCLUDED ANY POSSIBILITY OF JOINING A NON-UN FORCE.

10. SHULTZ SPECULATED ABOUT A JAPANESE CONTINGENT, BUT THOUGHT THAT THIS COULD ONLY BE SOUGHT IN A PERIOD OF RELATIVE STABILITY SUCH AS THE PRESENT WAS NOT.

11. BULLARD SAID THAT BRITAIN VALUED THE BRIEFINGS FOR MNF CONTRIBUTOR EMBASSIES IN WASHINGTON. WITH EVENTS MOVING FAST IT WAS A GROUP THAT COULD NOT MEET TOO OFTEN.

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12. IT WAS AGREED TO TELL THE PRESS SIMPLY THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD TAKEN THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MEET AND COMPARE NOTES.

FCO PLEASE REPEAT ELSEWHERE AS NECESSARY.

PARSONS

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

## MIDDLE EAST

### STANDARD

NENAD MAED  
MED ESSD  
NAD ERD  
SAD ESID  
UND CONS D  
EESD CONS EM UNIT  
ECD MR EGERTON  
WED MR THOMAS  
RID  
SEC D CABINET OFFICE  
CSCEUNIT

### ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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