

NONFO 015/14



MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 16

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PS/MR LUCE  
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SIR J LEAHY  
MR EBERTON  
SIR J BULLARD  
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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 132329Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 2582 OF 13 SEP

INFO IMMEDIATE TROOPS DHEKELIA (FOR PS/MR LUCE) BUDAPEST (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY) BEIRUT

PRIORITY DAMASCUS ROME PARIS TEL AVIV JEDDA BRITFORLEB UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT AND YOUR TELNO 1497 (NOT TO ALL): LEBANON/MNF

1. RAPHEL AND MACK (STATE DEPARTMENT TOLD MNF CONTRIBUTORS THIS EVENING THAT POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS WERE STILL HELD UP BY THE SYRIAN REFUSAL TO ALLOW THE LAF ANY ROLE IN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE CHOUF.

BANDAR HAD RETURNED TO DAMASCUS TO MAKE A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE THE SYRIANS TO ACCEPT SOME COMPROMISE FORMULA ON THIS ISSUE. MCFARLANE HAD MEANWHILE GONE BACK TO BEIRUT. BUT, AT LEAST, ALL THE PARTIES, INCLUDING JUMBLATT, WERE STILL INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING A SOLUTION.

2. THE LAF HAD FOUGHT OFF FURTHER DRUZE ATTACKS ON THEIR POSITIONS IN ARRAYA, SUQ ELGHARB AND QABR CHMOUN. THIS LINE WAS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE: IF THE DRUZE CONTROLLED THE RIDGE THEY WOULD BE WITHIN EASY RANGE OF THE AIRPORT AND WELLPLACED TO LINK UP WITH AMAL IN SOUTH BEIRUT. THE SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE IDF WITHDRAWAL IN THAT THE DRUZE NOW SEEMED PREPARED TO PRESS FORWARD RATHER THAN REMAIN IN STATIC POSITIONS AND THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT ON THEIR SIDE. HENCE THE U S DECISION TO ENGAGE IN MORE AGGRESSIVE SELF DEFENCE. BUT THIS DID NOT CHANGE THEIR CONTINGENT BASIC MANDATE. MCFARLANE HAD BRIEFED



~~DECISION TO ENGAGE IN MORE AGGRESSIVE SELF DEFENCE.~~ BUT THIS DID NOT CHANGE THEIR CONTINGENT'S BASIC MANDATE. MCFARLANE HAD BRIEFED GEMAYEL ON THE NEW RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT BE INFORMED.

3. RAPHEL SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE GRATEFUL FOR THE ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENTS BY MNF CONTRIBUTORS TO THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN WHICH INCREASED THE EFFECTIVENESS AND CREDIBILITY OF THE MNF. THE AMERICANS HAD NO PLANS TO WITHDRAW ANY OF THEIR FORCES AT PRESENT IN THE REGION. THEY WERE PREPARED IF ASKED TO RESPOND TO ATTACKS ON ANY OF THE MNF CONTINGENTS. THIS WOULD HELP TO INCREASE LOCAL PERCEPTION OF THE MNF AS A UNITED INTERNATIONAL FORCE. THEY HOPED THAT OTHER CONTRIBUTORS WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR GREATER COORDINATION AND MUTUAL SUPPORT. THE FRENCH EMBASSY SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD US THAT CHEYSSON HAS TURND DOWN THE OFFER OF US ASSISTANCE: IF THE FRENCH CONTINGENT WERE ATTACKED THE FRENCH WOULD DEFEND IT WITH ALL NECESSARY FORCE.

4. WE DESCRIBED YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVISED US RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (PARA 6 OF TUR). IN REPLY RAPHEL CLAIMED THAT THEY DID NOT REPRESENT ANY MAJOR NEW DEVELOPMENT BUT A MINOR AND NATURAL EXTENSION OF THE BASIC ROLE OF THE MNF. HE STRESSED THAT THE REVISED ROES APPLIED ONLY TO SUQ EL GHARB AND ONLY IN THE EVENT THAT THE MNF WERE DIRECTLY THREATENED BY THE IMMINENT COLLAPSE OF THE LAF THERE. THE AMERICANS WERE REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT THE LAF COULD DEFEND ITS PRESENT POSITIONS ON THE RIDGE UNLESS THERE WERE EXTENSIVE NON-LEBANESE INTERVENTION AGAINST THEM. THE INVOLVEMENT OF NON LEBANESE FORCES HAD PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT PART IN THE ORIGINAL DECISION TO EXTEND THE ROES.

5. RAPHEL SAID THAT THE REVISED ROES WERE INTENDED ONLY TO TRY TO BUY SOME MORE TIME FOR EFFORTS AT INTERNAL POLITICAL RECONCILIATION TO SUCCEED. THERE WAS NO LONG TERM POLITICAL OBJECTIVE. GEMAYEL NOW ACCEPTED THE INEVITABILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF BROADENING HIS POLITICAL BASE AND OF DEALING WITH HIS FAMILIES TRADITIONAL OPPONENTS. HE WAS MORE LIKELY TO NEGOTIATE CONSTRUCTIVELY IF HE FELT CONFIDENT THAT HIS CAPITAL WAS NOT ABOUT TO BE OVERRUN. AS FOR MODERATE ARAB REACTIONS, RAPHEL CLAIMED THAT THE SAUDIS HAS INDICATED TO THE US THAT THEY WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION IF THE MNF WERE A LITTLE MORE AGGRESSIVE IN ITS OWN DEFENSE AND IN SUPPORT OF THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES. (THIS WAS GREETED WITH POLITE SCEPTICISM ALL ROUND).

\* 6. RAPHEL TOOK THE POINT ABOUT THE PROBLEMS WHICH MIGHT BE RAISED \* BY THE REQUEST FOR 'MUTUAL SUPPORT'. THE AMERICANS WERE NOT SUGGESTING THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE AUTHORITY OVER OTHER CONTINGENTS NOR THAT THERE SHOULD BE A COMMITMENT TO AUTOMATIC SUPPORT FOR THEIR ACTIVITIES FROM OTHER CONTINGENTS. AUTHORITY WOULD REMAIN WITH THE NATIONAL CONTINGENT COMMANDERS WHO MIGHT CALL IN OHELP FROM THEIR COLLEAGUES IF NECESSARY.

7. NONE OF THE OTHERS HAD A REPORT OF TODAY'S COORDINATION MEETING IN BEIRUT (BEIRUT TELNO 507) OR VIEWS ON GEMAYEL'S SUGGESTIONS FOR REDEFINING THE ROLE OF THE MNF. RAPHEL COMMENTED THAT THE US HAD NO PLANS AT PRESENT TO INCREASE THE SIZE OR ROLE OF THEIR CONTINGENT.

8. WE ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY CONTRIBUTION WE COULD MAKE ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT (PARA 7 OF TUR) RAPHEL SUGGESTED THAT WE AND



~~8. WE ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY CONTRIBUTION WE COULD MAKE ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT (PARA 7 OF TUR) RAPHEL SUGGESTED THAT WE AND THE FRENCH COULD HELP TO MOBILISE SUPPORT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR TUEINI'S DRAFT RESOLUTION (UKMIS TELNO 812) MCFARLANE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL: IT CONTAINED A NUMBER OF GOOD POINTS AND THE PROVISION OF UNTSO OBSERVERS WOULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO JUMBLATT. RAPHEL SAW NO NEED FOR FURTHER ACTION WITH THE SAUDIS WHO WERE STILL "VERY MUCH ENGAGED", NOR MUCH POSSIBILITY OF OUR BEING ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE SYRIANS. AS FOR THE ISRAELIS THEY SEEMED ANXIOUS TO REMAIN ON THE SIDELINES. THE AMERICANS HAD ASKED THEM TO URGE BOTH THE PHALANGISTS AND DRUZE TO SHOW RESTRAINT AND THE ISRAELIS MAINTAINED THAT THEY WERE DOING SO. THERE WAS NO SIGN OF ANY ISRAELI INTEREST IN FURTHER WITHDRAWALS AT THIS STAGE.~~

9. ADMIRAL HOWE LOOKED IN DURING THE MEETING TO SAY THAT SHULTZ HAD BEEN MUCH ENCOURAGED BY REACTIONS ON THE HILL TO HIS BRIEFING TODAY. THERE HAD BEEN FULL SUPPORT, EVEN FROM LIBERAL DEMOCRATS IN THE SENATE, FOR MAINTAINING THE US CONTINGENT IN LEBANON. THE ONLY QUARREL HAD BEEN ON THE TECHNICAL LEGAL ISSUE OF THE WAR POWERS ACT. BUT HOWE WAS SATISFIED THAT PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY SENATORS TODAY WOULD SEND A CLEAR SIGNAL OF SUPPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY AND FOR THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT.

10. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE FINDING IT DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN THE FICTION THAT THE MARINES ARE NOT IN A COMBAT SITUATION AND THAT THEY ARE THEREFORE NOT REQUIRED TO INVOKE THE PROVISIONS OF THE WAR POWERS ACT (WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF THEIR DEPLOYMENT IN LEBANON FOR MORE THAN 60 DAYS). SENATOR MATHIAS HAS, HOWEVER, INTRODUCED A RESOLUTION APPROVING THE MARINE PRESENCE IN LEBANON FOR A PERIOD OF 6 MONTHS. A HOUSE STAFFER HAS TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE THAT CONGRESSMAN ZABLOCKI (CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE) IS DRAFTING A RESOLUTION TO APPROVE THE MARINES CONTINUED PRESENCE IN LEBANON FOR 18MONTHS, SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS INCLUDING THE SUBMISSION OF REGULAR REPORTS TO CONGRESS. THIS WOULD HAVE THE ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE OF TAKING THE ISSUE OUT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

WRIGHT

CCN READ GROUPS AS 1100 ✓

AND IN PARA 6. FIRST LINE READ LAST WORD AS RAISED RPT ✓  
WHICH MIGHT B EEEE BE RAISED ETC TKS

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